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ABSTRACT
This thesis is organised in three movements. The first (chapters 1
and 2) comprises a critical discussion of Marx's writings on social
classes, and the relations between classes and political forces, along
with an examination of some modern Marxist positions. The main
proposition argued in this movement is that class analysis, if it is
to achieve political relevance, must avoid the 'reductionism' which
makes political forces merely the 'expression' of pre-given class
interests. The second movement (chapters 3 and 4) develops a
conceptualisation of the economic class relations (possession
of/separation from the means of production) of contemporary British
capitalism. It is argued that the possession of the means of
production as capital is increasingly impersonal, and the agents of
this impersonal possession (multi-divisional joint-stock companies,
financial institutions) are examined in some detail. From the
analysis of this movement, conclusions are drawn concerning the
pr9blems and opportunities facing the 'socialist project' for the
transformation of economic class relations. The third movement
(chapters 5 and 6) analyses the political conditions under which a
transformation of economic class relations might be achieved. This
analysis comprises: (a) a discussion of the concept of 'social
collectivities', as an intermediate concept between economic classes
and political forces; (b) an examination of the process of formation
of social collectivities as support-blocs for political forces, first
in general terms and then concretely in relation to post war British
politics; and (c) an analysis of the particular relations between
economic classes, social collectivities and political forces in the
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'Social classes in Marxist theory and in post war Britain*. This
thesis has a double object : first I wish to examine critically the
conceptions of social class employed by Marx and by modern Marxist
writers, to probe their problematic areas and to propose certain
modifications to those conceptions; second I wish to 'test' the
conclusions derived from this theoretical reflection against the task
of analysing some aspects of the development of class relations in a
particular social formation in a particular historical period :
Britain over the post war years and up to the present. In practice
these two aims are not so discrete and distinct as this formulation
might suggest. The emphasis in the first part of the thesis is placed
upon the writings of Marx and Marxists but this does not exclude
consideration of empirically-based arguments, and while the second
part contains a greater empirical content relation to post war Britain
the dialogue with Marxist (and of course other) writers continues
throughout. It is not a matter of deriving fully fledged concepts
then merely 'applying' these to the particular case of post war
Britain.
It is appropriate, before giving an anticipatory summary of the
particular arguments offered here, to outline the 'position' from
which this thesis is written. If I say it is a Marxist work that does
not in itself tell one very much, since it has become increasingly
clear over the last two decades, if not over a longer historical
period, that there is no unique Marxist orthodoxy to which one can
refer with any confidence. Marx's work is open to a number of
different interpretations and emphases and what we now see is not a
unitary 'Marxism' but a variety of theoretical currents : the
'subjective' Marxism of the Frankfurt school; the 'structural' Marxism
of Althusser and his collaborators; the 'form-determination' approach
of German Marxist state theory; the 'historical' Marxism of Edward
Thompson and others, and so on. And this theoretical diversity is of
course paralleled by a political diversity : Lenninism, Trotskyism,
Maoism, Eurocommunism, and more amorphous political tendencies
critical of all of these. Some of these theoretical and political
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tendencies may claim to be the guardian of the true orthodoxy, but
since the demise of Comintern hegemony over the international
communist movement none has had the political means of enforcing its
claim. There is, however, a theme which is common to all the
Marxisms, and that is worth emphasizing here : the work of theoretical
analysis is fundamentally linked to the political project of the
transformation of social relations in the direction of socialism
(however 'socialism' is defined by the different tendencies). Marx's
eleventh 'Thesis on Feuerbach' may be almost a cliche by now, but it
still bears repetition : "the philosophers have only interpreted the
world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it" (Marx and
Engels, 1968, p.30). The questions posed in any theoretical discourse
do not select themselves; they are always selected on the basis of
some definite criterion of relevance, which one might call
the a priori of the discourse. Marxism is quite explicit in arrowing
its own a priori : fundamentally, questions are selected with a view
to understanding the (social) world in order to change it, in order,
in other words, to orient a political practice which aims at the
abplition of the conditions of class antagonism. It need hardly be
said, I hope, that this position does not have to collapse into a kind
of theoretical opportunism, in which theories are selected or devised
in order to justify a pre-given political line, although such
deformations have occurred within Marxism.
So the 'interpretations of the world' offered in the following pages,
and the questions which I have selected as most relevant, have been
guided by a definite political interest, although the work has been
'open' in the sense that it has not been designed to 'discover'
certain political conclusions which were already present at the
outset. Let me outline the main strands of argument pursued, showing
the ways in which these have been shaped by this interest.
Chapter 1 considers Marx's conception of the two 'basic' classes of
capitalism, bourgeoisie and proletariat, and then goes on to pose the
problem of the connection, within Marx's writings, between these
classes and the social and political forces active in particular
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capitalist social formations. This problem I regard as fundamental if
class analysis is really to be of value in orienting politics. A word
on the works by Marx which I have chosen to consider in this context :
when one attempts to give an account of Marx's views on classes, and
on the class/politics relationship, one immediately encounters a
paradox. In one sense, almost everything which Marx wrote is
concerned in one way or another with classes and class struggle, yet
equally Marx nowhere gives a systematic definition of the concept of
'social class' or a systematic account of the relationships between
class and political forces. There is only one place in his writings,
so far as I am aware, where such a systematic presentation seems to be
promised, and that is in the unfinished fragment 'on classes' found in
Volume 3 of 'Capital' (Marx, 1972, pp. 885-6). But there Marx only
gets as far as discounting the idea that classes are to be defined on
the basis of the sources of their revenue before the manuscript breaks
off. One has to work, therefore, from a variety of sources which show
up different aspects of Marx's views. My account of Marx's definition
of bourgeoisie and proletariat, on the basis of economic property
relations, draws mainly upon that inescapable reference point for
Marx's developed conception of capitalism, 'Capital'. On the
class/politics relationship I have chosen to concentrate on two works
of differing status : the 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' and the
'Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' (Marx and Engels, 1968, pp.
36-63 and 96-179). These have been selected because they provide an
interesting contrast, the former being concerned to sketch out the
broad sweep of history, the necessary long term relationship, as Marx
sees it, between class structure and politics, while the latter gives
a rich and detailed analysis of the class struggles of a particular,
limited, period within a particular nation state. The principal
thesis which I argue on the basis of my reading of these works is that
the conception put forward in the Manifesto, and repeated passim in
'Capital' - a conception in which, in the 'last analysis', political
forces coincide with the two basic economic classes in a necessary
polarisation - is not sustainable, and is belied by the concrete
analysis of the 'Eighteenth Brumaire'. In the latter work Marx deals
with the relationship between classes and political forces under the
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sign of 'representation' (i.e. the latter are said to 'represent' the
former) but I argue that the various contents given to the notion of
representation overflow the boundaries of any unitary conception. In
other words 'representation' is not a rigorous concept but a word,
which marks the site of a problem. The word is applied to a range of
disparate relationships between classes and political forces, and I
argue that it is necessary to recognise the diversity of these
relationships, and to abandon the idea of the reducibility of politics
to a field in which pre-given 'interests' of economically-defined
classes are merely 'represented' or 'expressed'.
Chapter 2 extends this line of argument through a consideration of
various modern Marxist writings on social classes. I argue that the
same problem emerges in these writings as in Marx, although it assumes
a different form. Writers such as Poulantzas and Carchedi, unlike
Marx, refuse to give an 'economic' definition of classes, and argue
for a synthetic definition which encompasses economic, political and
ideological criteria. This gives rise to two kinds of problems : on
the one hand the introduction of political and ideological criteria
into the definition of classes tends to undermine the avowedly
'primary' role of property relations in the determination of class
relations, a role which these writers explicitly avow; but on the
other hand, even when political and ideological criteria are brought
in there is still a theoretical gulf between 'structurally' defined
classes and the actual social and political forces active in any given
historical situation. Poulantzas and others complicate the problem of
the relationship between classes and politics, but do not resolve it.
I argue in favour of a 'disaggregation' of the concept of class, a
conception in which (a) the analysis of the economic class structure,
in terms of the pattern of property relations, serves to identify what
is 'at stake' in political struggles in the long run (i.e. the
maintenance or transformation of the given pattern of possession
of/separation from the means of production) but (b) it is not possible
to 'read off', from one's analysis of the economic class structure,
the definite political and social forces which will accomplish that
maintenance or transformation; the political realm demands a specific
analysis.
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The following chapters then set out to justify this claim, and prove
the value of the alternative conception of classes and the
class/politics relationship which I propose. Chapter 3 and 4 develop
the analysis of the economic class structure of modern capitalism,
with special reference to Britain. It is not possible to deal with
all aspects of this structure within the scope of this work, and my
account concentrates on the forms of possession of the principal
industrial means of production, and the conditions of financing of
production.^ I outline the development of the 'impersonal capital' as
the dominant form of capitalist property, and explore some of the
ramifications of the advanced separation of individuals from the means
of production. The second part of Chapter 4 presents certain
implications for socialist politics, as I see them, of the forms of
property characteristic of modern British capitalism, in terms of the
constraints and opportunities connected with those forms of property.
These implications are considered under the two headings of 'planning'
and 'enterprise democracy'. My general contention is that the project
of abolishing the separation of the producers from the means of
production must be approached by means of a 'pincer action' : gaining
social control over investment funds, a project in which government
must play a major role; and democratising the operations of
enterprises 'from below', a project in which a left government can be
helpful but the major part must be played by workers' own initiatives.
These basic aims are elaborated with reference to the particular forms
of property which are 'at stake' in modern Britain : I draw attention
to the possible role of trade union pension funds in a struggle for
social control over investment, and to the conditions for developing
democratic control within large, and often diversified,
multi-divisional enterprises.
In particular, I cannot deal specifically with the question of
ownership of land, although this is clearly not unimportant. An
interesting recent Marxist discussion of landed property in Britain is
given by Massey and Catalano ( 1978) .
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In line with the general critical positions adopted in chapters 1 and
2, I do not consider that the analysis of property relations in
chapters 3 and 4 provides a basis for 'reading off' the political
forces which might accomplish the strategic transformations of
property relations identified in the latter part of chapter 4. In
particular, in my discussion of property relations I employ a
conception of the 'working class' which encompasses all workers
separated from the means of production and obliged to sell their
labour power for a wage or salary (i.e. including salaried managers
and professionals), yet it is clear that this economic class is far
from homogeneous politically and cannot act as a unified social force.
Chapter 5 takes up this point and considers some of the relevant lines
of division among the population of employees separated from the means
of production. I discuss the role of the division of labour in this
regard, and the pertinence of the 'working class'/'middle class'
distinction within popular ideology, and then examine the patterns of
party-political allegiance. The latter examination leads to an
outline account of the development of politics in Britain over the
post war years - the ways in which the major political forces have
defined their projects of social transformation/conservation, and have
built, or failed to build, support blocs for those projects among the
classes of society. Chapter 6 then focusses on the rise of
'Thatcherism', and the developing alignment of political forces and
their support blocs in the period of Thatcherism 1979-81. In this
context my aim is to draw together some of the conclusions derived in
earlier chapters, by arguing that the 'core' economic programme of
Thatcherism is rendered impossible by the dominant forms of capitalist
property, and by examining the political capacity of the Labour Party,
as it is currently developing, to achieve the kind of strategic
socialist advances identified as important in chapter 4. Finally the
conclusion attempts to tie together and assess the main theoretical
and political points which emerge from this exercise as a whole, and
to identify certain avenues of further investigation which I consider
worth pursuing.
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This is the outline of the main material of the thesis. It is
fundamentally shaped by the interest avowed at the outset, in that I
attempt to identify (a) what is at stake in the transformation of
economic class relations in a socialist direction, and (b) some of the
opportunities and problems in building a support bloc for such changes
under current conditions. But before proceeding to the substance of
the arguments sketched above, it is necessary to give some preliminary
indication of the meaning which I attached to certain general concepts
of Marxism, concepts which are open to a variety of interpretations
yet which must play an important role in any 'Marxist' analysis. I
propose to devote the remainder of this introduction to a discussion
of, first, certain 'concepts of structure' employed by Marx and
Marxists (mode of production, relations of production, productive
forces, base and superstructure) and second, the concept of socialism.
It will not be possible to discuss these concepts in great detail
here, and my remarks will necessarily be dogmatic in places, since the
concepts of 'mode of production' or 'socialism' could well form the
object of whole works in their own right, but nonetheless I feel it
will be useful to give the reader some idea of which tradition, within
the broad field of 'Marxism', my own arguments emanate from.
Some 'concepts of structure' in Marxism
According to Marx, the possibility of social class division arose as a
consequence of the developing productivity of social labour. Once the
productivity of labour had developed to a certain stage, it became
possible to produce a social surplus product over and above that
necessary to maintain the direct producers and their offspring. The
appropriation of this social surplus product by a category of agents
distinct from the 'direct producers' is seen as the origin and
continuing foundation of the class division of society. The historic
originality of Marx's theory, however, does not simply consist in the
recognition of the existence of social classes and class antagonisms.
One of the central propositions of his theory is that the form which
class division and class struggle take on in particular epochs is
fundamentally determined by the mode of exploitation or mode of
7
extraction of the surplus product which characterises the successive
modes of production which arise in the course of historical
development. Now the concepts of 'mode of exploitation' and 'mode of
production' are very much bound up with certain other 'original'
concepts of Marxism : relations of production, forces of production
and the distinction between 'base' and 'superstructure'. In fact Marx
wrote very little on their explicit definition, and on their place in
the analysis of social classes and class struggle in particular social
formations. I shall begin this survey by considering the few
well-known quotations in which these questions are explicitly
addressed, and then go on to examine some of the strands of recent
debate over these questions.
First consider the position which Marx outlines as the 'guiding
principle' of his studies, in his 'Preface to a Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy' of 1859 :
"In the social production of their life, men enter into
t definite relations that are indispensable and independent of
their will, relations of production which correspond to a
definite stage of development of their material productive
forces. The sum total of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real
foundation, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of
social consciousness. The mode of production of material
life conditions the social, political and intellectual
process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social
being that determines their consciousness. At a certain
stage of their development, the material productive forces
of society come in conflict with the existing relations of
production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same
thing - with the property relations within which they have
been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the
productive forces these relations turn into their fetters.
Then begins an epoch of social revolution." (Marx and
Engels, 1968, pp.181-2)
In this passage Marx invokes certain objects : an 'economic
foundation' of society (composed of the totality of the relations of
production), 'material productive forces', a political/legal
'superstructure', and 'forms of social consciousness'. He also
specifies certain relations between these objects : the superstructure
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'rises upon' its foundation; forms of consciousness 'correspond to'
the foundation. Also the relations of production can either be a
'form of development' of the productive forces or a 'fetter' upon
them. In this text, however, neither the objects nor the relations
between them are given a precise definition. This gives rise to a
number of problems of interpretation, which one can place in two
groups. First there are the problems relating to the concept of the
economic foundation : what exactly is the content of the concepts of
'relations of production' and 'productive forces'? What is the
relationship between them? Is it true to say that the productive
forces are conceived as the 'active element', and if so how does one
account for their development? Then there are the problems of the
base/superstructure relationship : in what sense is the economic
foundation 'basic'? How does it 'condition' the other levels of the
social formation?
As regards the first group of questions, concerning the nature of the
'economic foundation', one can find some answers in 'Capital'.
Whereas the propositions put forward in the 'Preface' of 1859 are
sketchy in the extreme, Marx developed his concepts in a more precise
way when he was faced with the problem of analysing the particular
economic foundation of capitalist society in detail. Without quoting
particular passages, one can draw from 'Capital' as a whole a certain
conception of relations of production, productive forces, and of the
relations which hold between them. I offer the following as a first
approximation :
1. Relations of Production : These are the relations of economic
property which hold between the producers, the owners of the
means of production, and the means of production. They permit
the extraction of surplus labour from the producers, and their
particular form determines the particular mode of exploitation.
For instance, under capitalism the exclusive ownership of the
means of production is in the hands of the capitalists, and the
workers, who are separated from the means of production but who
(unlike slaves) possess their own labour power as 'free' workers,
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are forced to sell their labour power to a capitalist. This
results in the extraction of surplus labour in the particular
form of surplus value.
2. Productive Forces : The productive forces include all the
elements of the production process : workers, means of production
in a broad sense, and the objects which the workers transform
through their labour. At any given stage of development these
elements are combined in a definite system of productive forces -
a particular technical organisation of the elements of production
which makes possible an effective production process.
3. Relations between relations of production and
productive forces : This point demands a rather more lengthy
treatment. In the 1859 'Preface' these relations are presented
in a rather one-sided way : the relations of production are
conceived as a kind of 'shell' or envelope within which the
productive forces develop. When the productive forces have
' exhausted the developmental possibilities afforded by given
relations of production they break through this 'shell' and
instigate an epoch of social revolution. The productive forces
seem to have their own autonomous dynamic, and the relations of
production are forced to 'keep in step' with this dynamic through
the mechanism of social revolution. This conception is elsewhere
aphoristically summed up in the remark that 'the water mill
produces the feudal lord and the steam mill produces the
capitalist' (Marx, 1963). That is, the character of economic
property relations is determined by the level of productive
technique. This view was taken up in the orthodoxy of the 3rd
International (Comintern) after Lenin. In Stalin's 'Dialectical
and Historical Materialism' one finds a philosophy of history in
which the inexorable development of the productive forces secures
the succession of modes of production from slavery through
feudalism and capitalism to communism. There is a serious
problem in this conception : what accounts for the timeless
forward march of the 'productive forces'? It seems it can only
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be based on the philosophy of 'homo faber' - the idea that
humanity necessarily strives to develop the techniques of
production, and that this tendency is prior to any particular
historical form of social relations. But this surely contradicts
Marx's strongly-expressed view that there are no such
trans-historical human absolutes, and that 'human nature' itself
is constructed and reconstructed in the process of historical
development.^
There are some echoes of the conception described above, which
one can label the theory of the 'primacy of the productive
forces', in 'Capital', but in the detailed analysis of the
transition from manufacture to modern industry (Marx, 1976, Chs.
14,15) a more complex conception is outlined. In this section of
'Capital' Marx argues that it is the dispossession of the direct
producers, their forcible separation from their means of
production, and the rise of the forms of wage labour and capital
which 'determine' the specific form of development of the
* productive forces under capitalism. It is the compulsion for
capital to extract increased surplus value through increasing the
productivity of labour and driving down the time of 'necessary
labour' which impels the development of the productive forces
from the level of artisanal production to modern machine
industry. The 'industrial revolution' took place not merely
because certain key machines and sources of power were invented,
but because the social preconditions for the large scale use of
machinery and steam power had been developed by the gathering
together of many dispossessed detail labourers in a system of
cooperation under the roof of the employing capitalist, and
It may not be out of place to mention in addition one of the
political consequences of the 'orthodoxy' expressed by Stalin.
The thesis that if only the productive forces were developed then
'corresponding' socialist relations of production would spring
into being was the license for the introduction of 'one-man
management' and dictatorial methods in Soviet industry.
11
because the necessity of increased productivity was posed by the
exigencies of capitalist competition. In this argument a
particular development of the productive forces is conceived as
an effect of certain relations of production.
To express my own view, however, it is not adequate simply to invert
the theory of the primacy of the productive forces and proclaim the
'primacy of the relations of production' . Rather there is a complex
interdependence between the two concepts. The dispossession of
artisans and peasants was a necessary precondition for the development
of capitalist manufacture (and this was not secured by the
'development of the productive forces' as such, but as a result of
long and bitter social struggles) . And the compulsion to extract
increased profit and maintain a place in the developing competitive
market system was the motive force in the development of machine
industry. But in turn this development of the productive forces, and
increase in the scale of production, was the precondition for
subsequent changes in capitalist property relations such as the
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formation of joint stock companies.
To conclude on the relationship between the relations of production
and the productive forces, one can say the concept of 'mode of
production' in Marxism refers to the combination of these two systems.
Marx sometimes used the term 'mode of production' in a descriptive
manner, to refer to the form of the direct labour process, but insofar
as he uses it to denote a theoretical concept, this is the concept of
the combination of a certain system of relations of production and a
3 The complexity of the problem of the relationship between
relations of production and productive forces is also revealed in
the debates over the 'transition to socialism' (see, for
instance, Bettelheim (1976)). Here the problem lies in
determining the transformations in the relations of production
which will mesh most closely with the productive forces inherited
from capitalism, and push the development of the productive
forces in a socialist direction. In this sense the importance of
the productive forces as a constraint on the possible forms of
relations of production must be recognised : the former cannot be
transformed by fiat.
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and a certain system of productive forces. Looking at the matter in
terms of process, this can be rephrased as the combination of a
particular mode of extraction of surplus labour and a particular mode
of appropriation of nature. This notion of 'combination' should not,
however, be taken to suggest an external linkage between two distinct
entities : rather the social production process is simultaneously a
process of appropriation of nature and a process of appropriation of
surplus labour .
We now have a more developed conception of the 'economic base', and
are in a position to consider the second set of problems raised by the
passage from the 1859 'Preface' - those concerning the
base/superstructure relations. The 'Preface' deals with this relation
in rather loose metaphorical terms : the superstructure 'rises upon'
the base. The classical Marxist development of this conception runs
like this : the economic level is 'determinant in the last instance',
but the various levels of the superstructure have a certain autonomy
in that they can 'react back' and modify the base. But what is the
medhanism of 'determination in the last instance'? And just how
'autonomous' is the superstructure?
Again, Marx himself had remarkably little to say explicitly on these
questions, but I shall begin the enquiry by considering some of the
passages where he does offer some hints at least. One is a footnote
in Volume One of 'Capital' where Marx is replying to a critic who
maintains that while the mode of production may condition the rest of
social life under capitalism, this is not true of all societies. Marx
writes :
"One thing is clear : the middle ages could not live on
Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On
the contrary, it is the manner in which they gained their
livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the
other case Catholicism, played the chief part". (Marx, 1976,
p. 176n)
The first point here - that people must eat before they can
participate in politics or religion - is clearly true, but does not in
itself help to explain why the mode of production should determine the
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character of the superstructure. The second sentence presents a
twofold conception. On the one hand the 'manner of gaining their
livelihood', or 'economic foundation' in the words of the 1859
'Preface', is appealed to as the ultimate explanatory principle, but
it is conceded that other 'levels' of the social formation such as
politics or religious ideology may 'play the chief part'. The idea is
that the character of the economic foundation determines which aspect
of the social formation shall 'play the chief part'. But in this
answer to his critic Marx only provides the merest hint as to how his
own argument might be developed. In effect, by drawing a distinction
between the ultimate explanatory principle (always the economic base)
and the most prominent aspect of the social formation (variable) he
only shows that his theory is possible, that it is not immediately
contradicted by certain 'obvious facts' of history. He does not show
the necessity of his theory - does not explain why the economic base
is the ultimate explanatory principle, not how it may come to promote
other levels to the 'chief' role. A rather more substantial hint in
this regard can be found in the following interesting passage from
Volume Three of 'Capital'. :
"The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour
is pumped out of the direct producers, determines the
relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out
of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a
determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the
entire formation of the economic community which grows up
out of the production relations themselves, thereby its
specific political form. It is always the direct
relationship of the owners of the conditions of production
to the direct producers - a relation always naturally
corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the
methods of labour and thereby its social productivity -
which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the
entire social structure, and with it the political form of
the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the
corresponding specific form of the state". (Marx, 1972,
p.791, emphasis added)
The context is a discussion of labour rent, and this passage is
preceded by a more specific argument which relates the 'relationship
of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers'
under feudalism to its 'corresponding form of sovereignty and
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dependence' . Marx argues that under feudalism the direct producers
were capable of producing on their own account, and that because of
this the extraction of surplus labour demanded that the producers be
bound to the ruling class in a relation of direct servitude :
"...it is evident that in all forms in which the direct
labourer remains the "possessor" of the means of production
and labour conditions necessary for the production of his
own means of subsistence, the property relationship must
simultaneously appear as a direct relationship of lordship
and servitude, so that the direct producer is not free".
(Ibid, p.790)
Poulantzas ( 197 3) has developed and expanded this argument, and has
used it to draw a contrast between feudalism and capitalism which is
designed to elucidate the manner in which the economic base determines
the character of the superstructure. Let us follow this development
through. The first step is an elaboration of the concept of economic
property relations. Poulantzas distinguishes between the codified
juridical expression of property right, which belongs to the
'superstructure', and the 'real' property relations which exist in the
economic base. Juridical property relations will generally serve to
reinforce the real economic property relations but there is always the
possibility of dislocation between the two. For instance in Russia
after 1917, in the economic system which Lenin referred to as 'state
capitalism', juridical ownership of the means of production was
transferred to the state but in many cases real control was still in
the hands of the capitalists. Then within the realm of economic
property relations Poulantzas makes a distinction between 'economic
ownership' and 'possession' . 'Economic ownership' means the power to
assign the means of production to given uses and to dispose of the
product obtained, whereas 'possession' means the power to put the
means of production into operation. Poulantzas then analyses the
difference between feudalism and capitalism in terms of these
relations : in feudal society the feudal lords enjoyed 'economic
ownership' of the means of production and appropriated the surplus
labour of the peasant cultivators, but the producers themselves still
had 'possession' of their instruments of labour. The individual
peasant or peasant household could perform its own labour without the
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intervention of the feudal lord. This meant that the producers had to
be bound to the lord by ties or personal dependence, supported by
direct force and/or religious ideology, to ensure the extraction of
surplus labour. The peasants worked on their own account, for their
own subsistence, and the lord intervened to compel the producers
either to surrender part of their product or to work the lord's fields
for a certain proportion of the time.
In the capitalist mode of production, on the other hand, economic
ownership and possession are united in the hands of the capitalists.
The worker can no longer produce on his own account. Once capital has
attained its developed form - fixed capital as a system of machinery
in the capitalist factory - and the division of labour has been pushed
to an extreme, the individual worker can no longer operate the means
of production independently : the worker sells his 'bare labour-power'
to a capitalist and then is incorporated into the 'collective
labourer' on terms laid down by the capitalist. There is no longer,
therefore, a 'visible' separation between necessary and surplus
labour - rather, the latter is extracted through the wages system,
whereby the workers exchange their labour-power against a wage and
then work the capitalists' means of production to produce commodities,
the difference between (a) the value they add to the commodities
through their labour and (b) the value they receive in the form of
means of subsistence in exchange for the wage (necessary labour)
constituting (c) the surplus labour. Exploitation is 'concealed' by
the appearance of equal exchange in the wage contract.
If this argument is accepted, it then becomes possible to trace the
connection between the mode of exploitation and the form of the
superstructure. Take for instance the form of the state under
capitalism : first, the fact that economic ownership and possession of
the means of production are united in the hands of capital, and that
the workers have no option but to sell their labour-power, means that
there is no need for the direct use of physical or ideological
coercion in the extraction of surplus labour. Second, if the formally
'free and equal' exchange-relation between the owners of commodities
(means of production and labour-power) is to be maintained, then the
relations of force necessary in the last instance for the reproduction
of any antagonistic relations of production must be abstracted from
the sphere of production. There must be a locus of relations of force
beyond the sphere of individual competing capitals, and apparently
'above classes' : the bourgeois form of state.
I shall not consider all the questions which this kind of argument
raises at this point, but note that it had led Poulantzas and other
followers of Althusser to give the concept of 'mode of production' an
extended definition. If the character and role of the superstructure
is determined by the mode of exploitation - analysed as the
configuration of economic property relations - then it becomes
legitimate to conceive of the 'mode of production' in a broader sense
as a structured totality, a totality in which the economic level plays
the role of 'determinant in the last instance' in the sense that it
fixes the overall 'matrix' of the mode of production and thereby can
assign other levels of the mode to the position of 'dominance' (e.g.
religious ideology in the feudal mode). Further, in the Althusserian
conception the extended concept of 'mode of production' is conceived
as the 'basic concept' of Marxist Historical Materialism, in the sense
that real history is taken to be the effect of the structure of modes
4
of production and their combinations. Althusser uses the term
'structural causality' to denote this conception : the particular
practices which appear in .history are to be conceived as effects of
the structure of the 'social formation', which is made up of one or
more modes of production.
The concept of 'structural causality' has certain merits, or at least
had certain merits in its polemical context. In the first
4 The locus classicus of this conception is 'Reading Capital'
(Althusser and Balibar, 1970). It is also taken up by Poulantzas
( 1973).
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place, it was designed to distance Marxism from the subjectivist
conception of history as the product of the will and
consciousness of historical actors ('subjects'), whether these be
'individuals' or 'classes'. Althusser first developed his
conception of structural causality in his attack on which he
called 'theoretical humanism', i.e. the interpretation of all of
Marx's work on the model of the concept of 'alienated human
subjectivity' contained in Marx's early works (in particular the
Paris Manuscripts of 1844) . Against what he argued was an
over-emphasis on the role of human subjectivity, Althusser
stressed the simultaneously theoretical and political 'break'
between the humanism of the young Marx and the mature Marx's
'scientific' investigations into the objective laws governing the
development of capitalism. The context of this polemic was the
ideological crisis of Marxism which followed the first attempts
at 'de-stalinization' in the Soviet Union : Althusser argued that
while it was correct to attack the 'mechanical' version of
Marxism which had become dominant in the Stalin period (in
particular the 'primacy of the productive forces' thesis referred
to earlier) it was a grave mistake to reject along with this the
idea of Historical Materialism as a scientific theory of
historical development, and the corresponding conception of
history as an 'objective process'. The flowering of 'humanistic'
interpretations of Marxism threatened to subvert its
revolutionary materialist core and reinstate the old philosophies
with which Marx had painstakingly 'settled accounts in the German
Ideology'
5 The most developed form of this argument that Marx had to reject
all forms of 'theoretical humanism' before he could develop his
own revolutionary theory is found in Althusser (1973). The first
formulation was given in Althusser ( 1969). It seems clear that
in proposing the case against 'theoretical humanism' Althusser
was being faithful to the conceptions of the 'mature' Marx,
particularly his claim that, for the purposes of materialist
analysis, individuals should be conceived as "personifications of
economic categories, the bearers (Trager) of particular
class-relations and interests". (Marx, 1976, p.92)
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'Structural causality' also contests the straightforward empiricist
approach to history, in which particular practices, institutions and
ideas are explained simply in terms of previous practices,
institutions and ideas in a linear temporal sequence. In stressing
this point Althusser could make reference to Marx's critique of
Proudhon :
"How indeed could the simple logical formula of movement, of
sequence, of time explain the body of society, in which all
relations co-exist simultaneously and support one another".
(Marx, 1963, pp.110-111)
It was this 'simultaneous co-existence of relations' in the form of a
complex structured totality which Althusser referred to as the
structure of the social formation.
So, to summarise, the Althusserian doctrine of structural causality
clarifies the conception of 'determination in the last instance by the
economy'. The 'last instance' is not a temporal limit : the matrix
of the mode of production is always determined by the economic level,
but within this matrix other levels may be promoted to 'dominance'.
Also, in the Poulantzian version, the doctrine includes a more
developed explanation than can be found in Marx of how the economic
level comes to play the 'determinant' role.
Nonetheless, this general conception has been much criticised, on the
grounds that it turns Marxist theory into a variant of 'structuralism'
or more specifically that it sets up the 'mode of production' as an
eternally self-reproducing entity. Certainly the theory of structural
causality runs into severe problems. If the development of a social
formation is governed at all levels by the structure of a mode of
production, or combination of modes, how does one explain the
transition from the dominance of one mode of production to that of
another? Althusser is concerned to avoid the Hegelian type of
teleology in which each 'moment' of historical development contains
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the 'germ' of the succeeding higher moment, and therefore progress
from each historical moment to the next is guaranteed by the inner
logic of history. So he refuses to write into the concept of a mode
of production the necessity of its eventual abolition, i.e. he refuses
to conceive a mode of production as a self-dissolving contradiction.
How then to resolve the problem? In .'Reading Capital' it is left to
Balibar to fill in this gap in the theory of structural causality, and
he attempts to do so by invoking the concept of the 'transitional mode
of production' (Balibar, 1970). The reproduction of a given mode of
production proceeds up to a certain point, then in the period of
transition between the dominance of that former mode and the
establishment of a new mode, development is governed by a
'transitional mode of production'. For Balibar, in an established
mode of production the relations of production and the productive
forces 'correspond' to one another, whereas the 'transitional' mode is
defined by a non-correspondence between relations of production and
productive forces. He gives the example of 'manufacture' as a
transitional mode between feudalism and capitalism : in 'manufacture'
there is a non-correspondence between the newly-established capitalist
relations of production and productive forces inherited from artisanal
production.
This conception complicates the problem, but does not solve it, for
how does one then explain the break between the dominance of the
former mode of production and the emergence of the transitional mode?
Either one gets involved in an infinite regression of 'transitional
modes' , or else the revolutionary break is inaccessible to the theory
of structural causality. It seems therefore that while Althusserian
Marxism has broken with the Hegelian teleology according to which the
development of history towards its final goal is a predetermined
necessity, it is in danger of substituting a static teleology in which
the reproduction of a mode of production is an effect of the structure
of that mode and in consequence there is no convincing way of
theorising the revolutionary process in which the structure of an
existing mode of production is broken and displaced.
It has been suggested (both by Balibar in later writings and by
Hindess and Hirst, in rather different ways) that this theoretical
impasse is the result of an exaggerated 'rationalistic' claim for the
concept of mode of production. In 'Reading Capital' the mode of
production was presented as the basic concept of Historical
Materialism and this was understood to mean that for Marxism history
must be grasped as the effects of a succession of modes of production.
Balibar ( 1977) changes the emphasis by saying that 'mode of
production' is not a 'basic concept' in this sense, rather it is
'basic' in that it serves to 'orient the problematic' of Marxism, i.e.
it defines the nature of the major questions for Marxist analysis of
particular social formations (e.g. what is the dominant mode of
exploitation? What are the connections between this and the legal,
political and ideological aspects of the social formation?). Hindess
and Hirst (1977) also maintain that social formations cannot be
grasped as the effects of modes of production or combinations of
modes. Rather the concept of a social formation is the concept of a
specific set of relations of production, along with the conditions of
existence of those relations of production. Any set of relations of
production has certain conditions of existence : political conditions,
ideological conditions, technological conditions, and whether or not
these conditions are met depends on the particular course of
historical development, not on the 'structure of the mode of
production' - a mode of production or set of relations of production
cannot by itself secure its own conditions of existence. This
conception displaces the idea of the mode of production as a totality
'determined in the last instance' by the economic level. By analysing
the concept of a given set of relations of production one can arrive
at an account of the general characteristics of the necessary
conditions of existence of those relations of production (e.g.
capitalist relations of production, dependent upon the existence of
wage-labour, require some form of legal system adequate to define the
wage contract) but one cannot deduce the specific form in which those
conditions of existence are met. The political and ideological
conditions required for the development or maintenance of a given set
of relations of production are not simply tiers in the structure of
the 'mode of production'.
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This is the theoretical postion which I find most acceptable. The
relations of production - the forms of property relations and the
conditions under which a social surplus product is produced and
controlled - certainly form a central object of interest for Marxism,
but the claim that they 'determine' the character of the
'superstructure' is not sustainable. If we now return to the argument
which Poulantzas developed concerning the different modes of
exploitation under feudalism and capitalism and the 'corresponding'
forms of 'superstructure', we can assess it in these terms. If one
accepts the Poulantzian account of the modes of exploitation in
feudalism and capitalism (closely based on Marx's views), it does not
prove that the capitalist mode of exploitation generates a
corresponding form of 'superstructure'.^ Strictly, what it proves is
that the mode of exploitation sets certain limits on the forms of
political and ideological relations compatible with its development
and continued reproduction. In certain social formations the forms of
political and ideological relations may block the development of the
capitalist mode; in certain instances the forms of politics and
ideology may change over time and make the continued reproduction of
of capitalism difficult or impossible. And, of course, where the
political and ideological forms are compatible with capitalist
relations of production this leaves open a wide margin of variation in
the particular characteristics of the former : this is surely the
burden of Marx's comment in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme'
that the notion of the 'present-day state' is specious. Rather there
are a number of states, showing certain common features yet differing
in important respects in different nations.
6 Hindess and Hirst ( 1975) have argued that there are problems even
in the account of feudal exploitation given by Marx and taken up
by Poulantzas, particularly the idea that the peasant households
were perfectly capable of producing on their own account, and
therefore that exploitation by the feudal lords was, in a sense,
'external' to the actual production process and so had to be
enforced by direct coercion or religious blackmail. They
maintain that feudal lords and land-owning religious orders
played a more active and necessary part than Marx and Poulantzas
allow in organising the general conditions of production, such
as, for instance, irrigation and drainage schemes. Nonetheless,
the contrast with the capitalist economy in which workers cannot
even begin to produce their" own means of subsistence outside of
the wage-contract with a capitalist enterprise is reasonable
enough.
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In rejecting the concept of 'structural causality' in this way, one is
not forced into accepting the positions which the Althusserians were
originally concerned to attack : the 'theoretical humanism' which
appeals to the essential creativity of humanity as its ultimate
principle or the empiricism which is content to gather 'facts' and
place them in chronological order. Instead one can reject all
social-historical theories which appeal to an essential explanatory
principle (be it human subjectivity, 'the facts', the structure of the
mode of production, the spirit of the Age, the inexorable development
of the productive forces or whatever). But at the same time one can
take from Marx a focus, or an 'orientation', which prevents this
resistance from collapsing into a more structureless eclecticism. One
can insist that historical analysis^ must take account of a whole
range of agents (social movements, political parties, blocs of voters,
bodies of armed men, prominent individuals, economic enterprises and
so on) and that the activities of these agents are constrained and
influenced in various ways by a wide range of factors (forms of
political constitution, forms of property, the state of technology and
so-'on), yet produce an order in one's analysis by focussing on the
question of the maintenance/transformation of class relations (I shall
argue that in effect this is precisely what Marx does in his
'Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte'). And this 'focus' is not
merely the result of an arbitrary choice, since it can be argued that
the transformation of class relations (economic property relations and
mode of appropriation of surplus labour) is a strategic necessity if
many progressive social and economic changes are to be achieved.
Since the term 'social formation' will be employed quite often in the
following analyses, it is appropriate to draw out further the meaning
which is given to that term within the theoretical framework sketched
above. We have seen that for the Althusserians a social formation is
a combination of modes of production : this is conceived as a
'structure in dominance' in which one mode dominates the others and
7 I use the term 'historical analysis' in what I take to be Marx's
sense, i.e. to refer to the analysis of the development of social
formations. In this sense 'historical analysis' need not refer
to the study of the past.
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subordinates them to its expanded reproduction. For instance,
Poulantzas (1973) says that the social formation of Bismark's Germany
presented a combination of the capitalist, feudal and patriarchial
modes of production, with the capitalist mode emerging as dominant and
tending to dissolve the others. But the critical comments concerning
Althusserian 'structural causality' which have been noted above
undermine this particular conception of 'social formation'. If the
political, legal, technological and other conditions of existence of
any given set of relations of production are not in any sense
'generated' by the relations of production themselves, and if these
conditions can be met in a variety of different forms, then the
concept of any definite social formation (Bismark's Germany, post war
Britain) is not reducible to the concept of a combination of modes of
production. One may well say that Bismark's Germany sustained
capitalist relations of production on an expanding scale and feudal
relations on a diminishing scale, but just to say that is not to give
the full concept of the German social formation of the time. Rather,
the term 'social formation' refers to a specific set of relations of
production, the conditions of existence of which are satisfied in
certain specific forms. To give this schematic definition more
substance I shall expand on what I mean by the 'social formation of
post war Britain' (or 'British social formation' for convenience).
This concept presupposes the more general concept of capitalist
relations of production, but it involves, or at least points towards,
the specification of a particular form of those relations of
production, and particular forms of politics, law, industrial
structure and so on. For instance:
(i) Economic class relations are more closely specified in the
concept of the British social formation than in the general
concept of capitalist relations of production. The latter
concept entails the two categories of 'capitalists' and
'workers'; the former entails an account of the particular form
of organisation of 'capitalists' in Britain (as I shall argue,
the 'capitalists' are largely impersonal enterprises) and also
the particular forms of organisation of 'labour' (the patterns of
division of labour, union organisation, cultural and geographical
divisions and so on) .
(ii) The general concept of capitalist relations of production
presupposes certain 'productive forces' onto which the former are
articulated; the concept of the British social formation points
towards a specification of the form of these productive forces,
in terms of industrial structure, patterns of technology and so
on.
(iii) From the concept of capitalist relations of production in
general one can deduce, as a necessary condition of existence of
those relations, a general form of state which presents a locus
of relations of force outside of the immediate production
process, and a form of law capable of defining labour contracts
etc.; the concept of the British social formation points towards
a specification of the particular forms of state and law in
Britain : parliamentary democracy with universal suffrage; a
particular electoral system; separation of judiciary and
executive, and so on.
It' should be stressed that these relationships of specification exist
within theory. In other words the 'British social formation' is a
concept, albeit of a different order from the 'capitalist mode of
production', and not some kind of 'raw reality' outside of theory,
against which theory can be measured. By the same token, specifying
fully the concept of the British social formation cannot be a matter
of simply 'looking and seeing' the particular forms of relations of
production, state, industrial structure and so on, in Britain. Each
of these specifications necessarily involves the deployment of
concepts. It is also important to stress the distance between the
concept of the British social formation and the commonsense notion of
'British society' : the latter carries the suggestion of being a set
of interpersonal relations, while the former cannot be grasped in that
way - relations of production are not just interpersonal relations.
Also the idea of 'British society' suggests a certain kind of
ideological 'organic whole' (the sense in which one can talk of, say,
unemployed blacks as not properly part of 'British society').
Further, 'British society', in general parlance, is something distinct
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from the 'British economy', whereas the concept of the British social
formation involves both economic class relations and political and
cultural forms.
Doubtless many questions are left unresolved, and many currents of
Marxism left unconsidered, in this brief discussion of Marxist
'concepts of structure'. These deficiencies will be made up to some
extent in the main body of the argument in the following chapters.
But as I indicated earlier it is not possible to question in depth all
the concepts of Marxism at once. My aim in this section has been more
modest : merely to 'place' my own analytical framework in relation to
certain of the currents of Marxism. I hope that the account given of
the concepts of 'relations of production', 'productive forces' and
'mode of production' has met this aim. If it is not already apparent,
I should say that my views on these concepts owe much to the work of
Hindess and Hirst. The views of these writers have in turn been
developed largely through a critical evaluation of 'Althusserian'
Marxism : Althusser, despite all the critical comment which has been
brought to bear on his work, had the great merit of posing the
theoretical problems of Marxism in a clear and rigorous form, of, in a
sense, bringing these problems to a head.
In the following, and final section of this introduction, I shall




In the light of what I have already said concerning the political
interest active in Marxist analysis, it is necessary to give some
indication of how the term 'socialism' will be used in the following
chapters. In the conventional usage of modern politics 'socialism'
most often refers to a system of social economy characterised by state
ownership of the means of production and economic planning, or to the
political ideology concerned with the promotion of such a system.
From the standpoint of Marxism (virtually any Marxism) such a
definition is seriously inadequate. In this section I propose to give
a brief account of the classical Marxist definition of socialism, and
to indicate my own assessment of this definition (more detailed
comments on what I take to be 'socialist objectives' under current
circumstances will be given in later chapters).
To take Lenin's formulation first, the term 'socialism' refers to the
transition period between capitalism and communism. Lenin maintained
that -
"Theoretically, there can be no doubt that between
capitalism and communism there lies a definite transition
period which must combine the features and properties of
both these forms of social economy. This transition period
has to be a period of struggle between dying capitalism and
nascent communism".
(quoted in Balibar, 1977,p.139)
It is this period to which the name 'socialism' is given. Socialism,
in other words, is not a coherent socio-economic system but a period
of struggle 'on the road to' communism. Only the latter is a
fully-achieved and distinctive social system. As Balibar (1977,
p. 140) has put it, amplifying the Leninist view, "there is no
socialist mode of production in the sense that there is a capitalist
mode of production or a communist mode of production". The basic
proposition here is that the socialist period is opened by a political
revolution which establishes the 'state power of the working class',
in distinction to the preceding political dominance of the bougeoisie,
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but that this change in the class character of the state power cannot
at once revolutionise all aspects of economy and society. The bases
of class division and antagonism remain - in the division of labour,
in the form of commodity production - and the elimination of these
demands a long period of struggle and social reconstruction. During
this period political relations must take the form of the
'dictatorship of the proletariat', whereby the working class
strengthens its dominance over opposed class forces working for the
g
restoration of capitalism. Only once the bases of class division are
eliminated entirely will the socialist period come to an end and the
period of communism begin. Communism will be a classless society,
with no systematic social antagonisms (and therefore no need for a
'state' in the sense of a special body concerned with maintaining the
conditions of class domination), with a fully planned and cooperative
economy, and with distribution carried out entirely on the basis of
'need'.
The terminology here - 'socialism' as the period of transition and
'communism' as the end-point of transition - is Lenin's, but the
substantive conception can be found in Marx, particularly in his
9
'Critique of the Gotha Programme'. In that work Marx stressed that
the society which emerges following a socialist revolution is
"a communist society, not as it has developed on its
own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it
emerges from capitalist society, which is thus in every
respect, economically, morally and intellectually,
still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society
from whose womb it emerges". (Marx and Engels, 1968,
p.319)
8 Lenin emphasised that the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' could
be realised in a wide variety of particular political
arrangements (electoral systems, forms of administration,
military systems and so on), just as the political dominance of
the bourgeoisie is not restricted to any one particular form of
state.
9 Marx and Engels (1968, pp.311-331).
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This form of society, which Marx refers to as the 'lower phase of
communism', is the transitional form to which Lenin gives the name
'socialism'. Marx clearly distinguishes this from the 'higher phase
of communist society', the system established
"after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the
division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis
between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after
labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime
want; after the productive forces have also increased with
the all-round development of the individual, and all the
springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly",
(ibid., pp.320-321)
Marx also used the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to refer to
the form of politics during the transition from capitalism to the
('higher stage' of) communism.
Later writers in the Leninist tradition have made the point forcefully
that the socialist transition period should not be seen merely as a
'stage' of a steady and linear upward progress. If it is a period of
acute struggles, there can be no guarantee that these struggles will
progress in any automatic fashion towards the goal of communism.
Hence, for instance, Mao Tse-Tung's insistence on the need for a
series of 'cultural revolutions' to promote the communist tendencies
in society, and his emphasis on the possibility of backsliding if the
supposedly 'proletarian' state and party became distanced from the
masses, authoritarian and unresponsive to popular criticism. As
Althusser has stressed, socialism is a historical period in which the
class struggle "may - depending on the relation of forces and the
'line' which is followed - either regress towards capitalism or
mark time in frozen forms or again progress towards communism"
(Althusser, 1977, p.204). Sweezy and Bettelheim (1971) have argued
the same point. This position is connected with the critique of the
'Stalinist' orthodoxy according to which the succession of modes of
production is assured by the development of the productive forces, to
which I have referred in the previous section of this Introduction.
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In my view, the conception of socialism as a period of struggle and
transition, the outcome of which is not pre-determined, as opposed to
communism as the fully-developed classless society, has certain
important merits, but I have certain reservations concerning the
concept of 'communism' in Marxist theory. I shall develop these
points in turn.
The fundamental value of the insistence that socialism is a
contradictory period of transition is that it dispels the Utopian
illusion that any form of political revolution can 'at a stroke'
transform economy and society. Whatever happens, we may be sure that
fundamental changes in the relations of production will take a long
period to accomplish, and will be fought over by opposed social forces
regardless of the formal character of the state power. Neither
commodity production nor the hierarchial division of labour can be
simply 'abolished' by decree, and the development of planned,
cooperative forms of social production will demand sustained
constructive effort and will encounter definite forms of resistance.
The socialism/communism distinction distances the Marxist view from
any minimal conception of 'socialism' as, say, nationalisation of
industry plus expansion of public service expenditure - from any
programme which might be rapidly implemented following the election of
an appropriate government, or even the storming of the barricades. It
emphasizes the point that communism as a political force sets its
sights on a society so radically different from capitalism that it
cannot possibly be acheived without a protracted historical period of
struggle and transformation.
So far so good, but what of the Marxist concept of communism, the
endpoint of socialist transition which governs the objectives of
politics in the socialist period? What is immediately striking here
is that the definition of communism (or the 'higher stage of
communism' in Marx's terminology) is primarily negative in character :
absence of classes; abolition of the subordination of the individual
to the division of labour; absence of the state; absence of commodity
relations. The 'positive' features of communism are merely gestured
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at : 'abundance', planning, and the 'all-round development of the
individual'. The problem is that the definite social developments
which could permit the various 'absences' that characterise communism
(classes, state, commodities), as well as its positive features, are
not really discussed.^ Both Marx and Lenin were very much averse to
the Utopian practice of 'idle scheming' regarding the detailed
character of the future society. In their view this would be
determined in the course of the class struggle and could not be
legislated in advance. But while the reluctance to engage in
speculative scheming is quite defensible, the question arises : is
there then any real basis for believing that 'communism', as defined
schematically and mainly in the negative, is an attainable social
order? If we cannot outline in advance the means of achieving
communism, how can we know that it is indeed a real possibility? My
view is that the Marx/Lenin conception of communism contains certain
elements which are of great importance as objectives of socialist
struggle, but there can be no guarantee that these objectives can ever
be completely realised, that the 'transition', in other words, has a
definite end-point. Indeed there are good grounds for believing that
certain of the features of 'communism' are neither praticable nor
desirable, if taken to the theoretical limit. I shall try to justify
this view by reference to certain major 'themes' of communism :
abolition of all subordination to the division of labour, of
commodities and of the state, and 'abundance'.
1. The Division of Labour : As regards the abolition of
subordination to the division of labour there are certain advances
which clearly could be made, given appropriate political conditions :
automation could be used to eliminate many of the tedious and
oppressive positions within the present division of labour; a full
programme of continuing education for all in both physical and
intellectual skills, combined with other measures, could make people
far more adaptable in moving between tasks during their working lives;
10 The Marxist discussion of the conditions for the 'withering away'
of the state constitutes a partial exception to this claim, and
is given consideration later.
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workers' control over enterprises could break down the
management/shopfloor division, and so on. But can these processes
ever reach the stage of complete fluidity in the division of labour, a
point at which (a) individuals are no longer constrained by the need
to work at a definite, limited task for protracted periods, and (b)
there are no longer any definite social groups with a focus of
identification in their position within the division of labour, rather
than with 'society' as a whole? This seems unlikely, and so long as
distinct collectivities within the division of labour continue to
exist, there will be a basis for conflicts of interest between them.
Even if the hierarchial aspects of this division can be substantially
broken down, there will still be room for conflict over the allocation
of resources to different areas, branches of production, or
enterprises.
2. The abolition of commodity production^ : The development of
social democracy, even, has shown that certain goods and services can
be produced successfully on a non-commodity basis, and there is every
reason to believe that the areas of non-commodity production could be
greatly expanded, again given appropriate political conditions. But
the same qualification arises: how can one prove that this process
can be taken to the point of eliminating commodity production
altogether, that all social production can be carried out according to
a 'predetermined plan'? It requires an act of faith to believe that
sufficiently flexible and decentralised models of planning can be
evolved to displace the a posteriori adjustment of production to
market demand in all sectors of the economy, while achieving maximum
responsiveness to changing popular tastes (tastes and preferences will
continue to change even if they are not orchestrated by high-pressure
advertising!).
3. The abolition of the state : As regards this question, there is
rather more to go on in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. This
is because they recognised, in the Paris Commune, a concrete model for
11 I shall return to this question in Chapter 1, so my remarks here
are purposely brief.
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the abolition of the state. A word of explanation is needed here.
The terra 'state' is given two distinct meanings in Marxism, meanings
which Lenin distinguished more clearly than his predecessors. On the
more general of the two definitions the term simply refers to the
political mechanism which functions to maintain the conditions of
dominance of a given social class. Since in the Marxist conception
the existence of class divisions necessarily implies class antagonism
and the dominance on one class over others, the state in this general
sense can disappear only once all class division has disappeared.
Indeed this is a cardinal point of difference between Marxism and
Anarchism. But then the term 'state' is also given a more restricted
definition : the state as a separate institution, standing
(supposedly) 'above society' and 'above classes', immune to
substantive popular control, incorporating a standing army isolated
from the rest of the working population and a corps of privileged
functionaries. What Marx saw in the Paris Commune was the abolition
of the state in this second sense. Lenin took up Marx's view and
expressed it by saying that the state of the Commune was no longer a
state 'in the proper sense of the word'. The Commune, in other words,
was a concrete model for the political mechanism maintaining the
conditions of working class dominance - a mechanism which was
necessarily fundamentally different from any state which functions to
maintain the postion of an exploiting class. The central features to
which Marx, and later Lenin, drew attention in this regard were (a)
abolition of the standing army and its replacement by the 'armed
people', (b) all official posts made subject to election and all
elected officials to be subject to recall by their constituents at any
time, (c) delegates to be paid only workmen's wages, and (d) abolition
of 'parliamentarism' and the fusion of legislative and executive
functions. The tendency implicit in these measures was the abolition
of the state as an institution standing 'above society' and its
replacement by 'the proletariat organised as the ruling class' (Marx).
So although the Commune was given very little chance to develop before
it was suppressed, its organisation in an important sense 'prefigured'
Communism. In an achieved communist society the military/repressive
side of the state power would no longer be required - would in Engels'
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words 'wither away' - leaving only a system of administration. But if
this administration were modelled on the lines of the Commune then
there would be no distinct administrative apparatus as such - only a
people organising itself.
This conception contains both vital insights and serious problems. The
central insight is that socialism, if it is to produce more than a
superficial transformation of society, must challenge the nature of
the state. The projects of transferring the means of production to
state ownership, or of expanding the range of services provided in
non-commodity form by the state, will fail to produce a real
emancipation of working people unless the state itself is subordinated
to popular control - unless, in other words, the apparatuses of
administration, policing, education, social welfare and so on are made
open to popular participation and accountability, and the mystique of
bureaucracy and the secrecy and material priveleges of officialdom are
broken down. But although certain features of the Paris Commune
clearly show the way in which these objectives might be pursued, it
seems to me (a) that some features of the Commune may be impractical
4
as permanent characteristics of the organisation of a complex society,
and (b) that Lenin's extrapolation of the tendencies of the Commune,
to the point where the state apparatuses are ultimately dissolved into
the self-regulation of society as a whole, is Utopian.
On point (a), I would draw attention to the conception of elected
representatives as mandated delegates, subject to recall at any time,
and to the abolition of the legislative/executive distinction.
Without offering a detailed argument here, I submit that although
these measures may have been workable in the context of a relatively
small and coherent political community exhibiting a high degree of
solidarity in the face of a common enemy, it is by no means
self-evident that they are practicable or desirable long term features
of socialist organisation. If, as I believe, not all conflicts of
interest in society are reducible to class conflict, then the
political system will always have the task of reconciling and
accommodating differing interests and points of view. And in this
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light, the principle of making all representatives into mandated
delegates of their constitutents threatens to paralyse the political
process : no representative would be able to compromise the
particular interests of his or her consituents for the greater good of
society as a whole, or accept as a result of detailed argument among
representatives a view different from that of the constitutents,
without running the risk of recall and replacement. Then take the
legislative/executive problem. The progressive aim of the attack on
'parliamentarism' is to abolish the conditions under which the elected
representatives of the people are involved merely in a 'talking shop',
with the 'real' business of government being conducted elsewhere,
behind closed doors. The representative institutions must be made
more than just a 'dignified' element of the condition, to use
Bagehot's term. But given the complexity of the business with which
any modern government must deal (and ipso facto any socialist
government on a national or international scale) it seems quite
unrealistic to suppose that this aim can be achieved by the outright
abolition of the division between legislative and executive functions.
A more promising route seems to lie in the strengthening of the
critical and supervisory role of parliament, involving increased
access of representatives to information and specialist advice and
enabling them to call senior executives to account.
Point (b) above concerned Lenin's extrapolation from the Commune to a
fully 'stateless' society. My criticism here is closely related to my
earlier remarks concerning the division of labour : I submit that
there is no basis for arguing that the activities of administration,
policing and so on can be eliminated as distinct branches of the
division of labour, to be performed by the 'people as a whole'. Lenin
suggests that the tasks of administration can be performed by 'any
literate person' and that policing to cope with 'individual excesses'
can be performed by the 'armed people' "as simply and readily as any
crowd of civilised people, even in modern society, interferes to put a
stop to a scuffle or to prevent a woman from being assaulted" (Lenin,
1969, p.83). On administration, it may be true that 'any literate
person' could perform the tasks, but if the more routine and tedious
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clerical tasks can be progressively reduced, in view of. the advances
in information technology, then the remaining tasks will surely be
more demanding. 'Any literate person' will require training and
experience, and will need to build up a good working relationship with
his or her colleagues, which is to say that total fluidity in the
division of labour, or the parcelling out of administrative tasks
among the whole working population on a rotating basis, is likely to
prove impossible. On policing, I am again doubtful of Lenin's
formatulations. If one admits as Lenin does, that there will be a
need for policing in any society, even if the aspect of class
domination is eliminated, then one has to recognise the need for a
disciplined and effective police force, and one that is better than
arbitrary in its operations. Certainly, such a force in a socialist
society would have to be very different from police forces as
presently constituted, in terms of popular accountability in
particular, and it would doubtless have a more restricted role, but
the notion of policing being carried out in complete informality by
the general citizenry raises an alarming prospect of both
ineffectiveness in detecting the less visible forms of anti-social
behaviour, and arbitrariness in discouraging and correcting such
behaviour.
4. 'Abundance' : This is the last aspect of communism on which I
wish to comment here. 'Bourgeois' economics, and neoclassical
economics in particular, lays great stress on the confrontation
between limited resources and limitless wants, and elevates this
confrontation to the status of the 'essential economic problem' :
resources will always be 'scarce' relative to their possible competing
uses and there is therefore a need for 'choice', for a mechanism to
allocate resources to the uses in which they will produce the greatest
possible 'welfare'. The claim has often been made that the market, or
at least an idealised market conforming to the canons of 'perfect
competion' is the best possible mechanism for optimising this
allocation of scarce resources. A common Marxist reposte to this
whole conception is that 'scarcity' is not a universal constraint.
The development of socialism towards communism will permit a vast
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increase in the productivity of labour on the one hand, and at the
same time eliminate the excesses of 'consumerism' under capitalism
(i.e. the stimulation of 'artificial' desires for the limitless
acquistion of consumer goods by means of advertising and other
pressures), and these changes will effectively eliminate the problem
, , .. , 12of scarcity .
Again this position has both valuable features and problems. Clearly
the productivity of labour could be greatly increased, given the
technology already developed in capitalist economies let alone future
development, if the question of productivity were to be approached in
terms of broad social criteria rather than just in terms of the
profitability and market position of individual enterprises. Here it
is important to stress a point which Marx makes in the 'Grundrisse'
concerning the possible 'virtuous circle' effect of the development of
technologies which permit a reduction in the labour-time. Marx argues
that in a planned economy the reduction of the time of necessary
labour would mean not unemployment but rather increased free time for
the 'artistic and scientific' development of the people, and in turn
this general raising of cultural standards would permit further great
improvements in the development of productive techniques :
"The saving of labour time is equal to an increase of free
time, i.e. time for the full development of the individual,
which in turn reacts back upon the productive power of
labour as itself the greatest productive power". (Marx,
1973a, p.711)
12 The position I have sketched here, involving the critique of
neoclassical economics and 'consumerism', is of course a
relatively modern Marxist development. Marx had relatively
little to say about 'abundance' and 'scarcity'.
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Equally, it can be argued quite plausibly that the ethic of
'consumerism' can and should be undermined, and that insatiable
avarice is not an intrinsic human characteristic. But here one must
draw a line between the Marxist view and a certain kind of moralism
which has become fashionable among elements of the middle classes in
the advanced capitalist countries. A desire for the 'simple life' is
no part of classical Marxism. Indeed Marx regarded the expansion of
'needs' under capitalism as a generally progressive development. In
the 'Grundrisse' Marx notes that the capitalist, in his search for
markets, "searched for means to spur (the workers) on to consumption,
to give his wares new charms, to inspire them with new needs by
constant chatter etc.". But far from leading up to a denunciation of
all this, Marx goes on to say "it is precisely this side of the
relation of capital and labour which is an essential civilizing
moment, and on which the historical justification, but also the
contemporary power of capital rests". (Marx, 1973a, p.287). In a
similar vein, Aneurin Bevan once said that "A society in which the
people's wants do not exceed their possessions is not a socialist
society. That sort of satisfaction is not socialism, it is senility"
9
(quoted in Foot, 1973).
So on the one side the productivity of labour may well be greatly
increased, while on the other, although certain kinds of frivolous and
wasteful consumption stimulated under capitalism could usefully be
discouraged, people's 'needs' and aspirations could be expected to
develop further, rather than shrink into a 'senile' satisfaction, in a
communist society. Can it honestly be maintained that the 'scarcity'
problem then disappears? A further point must be brought into the
reckoning : we have, since Marx's day, become much more conscious of
the finitude of many natural resources, and although this does not
justify the 'no-growth' ideology it does mean that the increased
output of material goods will encounter definite constraints. In some
cases alternative resources will be discovered or devised, but these
too will have a definite cost. If one sets the natural resource
constraints against the 'needs' of the majority of the world's
population at present living close to, or below, subsistence
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conditions then it seems very rash to suppose that the problem of
scarcity relative to the possible use of resources, and therefore also
the need to order priorities and privilege certain uses of resources
over others, will ever disappear. There is no need, of course, to
accept the neoclassical contention that the competitive market is the
best mechanism for carrying out this 'choice', or the idea that the
scarcity/choice problem is the essential problem of economics, but
there is a need to abandon the simplistic notion of 'abundance'
insofar as it is conceived as dissolving the problem of allocating
resources within definite constraints (although there may be
'abundance' relative to the present state of affairs). This also
throws some doubt on the idea of a free distribution of the means of
personal consumption : it will surely be possible to progress towards
distribution according to 'need', but not necessarily to allow people
freely to assess their own 'needs' in this respect and to take from
the social consumption fund all they might aspire to.
In the discussion above I have made critical comments concerning the
major defining features of 'communism'. If these comments are
accepted then they put in question the idea of a definite end-point of
socialist transition, with such-and-such clear cut features. My
conclusion is that it is misleading to talk of 'communism' as if it
had a platonic existence and merely awaits discovery. Balibar said
"there is no socialist mode of production in the sense that there is a
capitalist mode of production or a communist mode of production" : the
point he was making about socialism has been taken, but can one really
say that the communist mode of production 'exists'? It 'exists' only
as a concept within Marxist theory, and a rather problematic and
13
unelaborated concept at that . I would rather say that the classical
Marxist conception of communism contains certain important long term
13 Balibar's answer would doubtless be that communism exists in the
form of tendencies towards communism even in capitalist society.
But this begs the question of where precisely these 'tendencies'
are leading - the very question I have attempted to probe above.
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objectives of socialist advance, but that it is wrong to make the
presumption that these can be taken to the limit-point envisaged by
Marx, Engels and Lenin.
Let me summarise briefly the main long term socialist objectives which
can be taken from the concept of communism. In my view these are (a)
to break down the subordination of individuals to the division of
labour, and in particular to break down the hierarchial and
authoritarian aspect of this division, so far as this is practicable;
(b) to institute and develop planned and cooperative forms of
production whereever practicable, while recognising that certain
branches of production or sectors of the economy may be intrinsically
difficult to plan; (c) to break down the 'separation' of the state
from popular control, within the limits imposed by the need for a
workable degree of autonomy for the political process of accommodating
differing interests and viewpoints; (d) to pursue the objective of
distribution according to 'need' (along with the democratic
construction of what precisely 'needs' are), and the abolition of
special priveleges, while recognising that there may be a continuing
14
requirement for definite social constraints on personal consumption.
In the following chapters I shall refer to the pursuit of such
objectives as 'the socialist project', and when I refer to a
'socialist' economy or society I shall mean a social system in which
substantial progress has been made in the implementation of the
socialist project.
14 And although I have not developed the point earlier, there may be
a continuing need to offer higher material rewards to encourage
the supply of labour for particularly demanding or arduous tasks,
if 'moral incentives' are not sufficient and if a coercive
direction of labour is to be avoided as far as possible.
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CHAPTER 1
MARX ON CLASSES AND POLITICS
In this chapter I shall first discuss Marx's definition of the basic
classes of the capitalist mode of production - wage workers and
capitalists - and then give an assessment of the relationship, in
Marx's writings, between these 'basic classes' and the forces active
in politics in capitalist societies. In the latter assessment I shall
draw mainly on two works which show different faces of Marx : the
'Manifesto of the Communist Party' and the 'Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Bonaparte'. I shall argue that while the 'Manifesto' affirms a
clear and definite proposition concerning the necessary relationship
between the basic classes and political forces - one in which the
latter must eventually coincide with or correspond to the former -
Marx does not actually sustain this proposition. Many of the
'necessary' developments which would tend to produce the
'correspondence' affirmed in the 'Manifesto' turn out to be, in
effect, hypotheses of greater or lesser plausibility. The 'Eighteenth
Brumaire', by contrast, provides a useful account of the many complex
forms of concrete relationship which may obtain between classes and
political forces although Marx at times, misleadingly, attempts to
condense all of these under the single concept of 'representation' of
class interests. Through the critical reading of Marx on this
question, I aim to develop a conception of class/politics relations
which will be employed in my own analyses in later chapters.
First, Marx's definition of the basic classes of capitalism. This
definition is bound up with the form of property relations in the
capitalist mode of production. Some points have been made already
concerning capitalist property relations (see Introduction) but it is
necessary to specify these relations more fully. There are two main
features of these relations:
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1. Separation between the units of production
Under capitalism production is social, that is the products of
each unit of production or enterprise are generally not intended
for consumption within that unit of production (as opposed to the
case of subsistence production in a peasant household). For
instance few of the shoes produced in a shoe factory are going to
be worn by the shoe workers. Similarly, the means of production
employed within a given enterprise are generally produced
elsewhere. The units of production are interdependent - each is
a 'node' within a system of social production rather than a
self-sufficient entity. But while production is social in this
sense, appropriation is private. The units of production and
their products are objects of private property and the owners
will part with their products only on condition that they are
exchanged for an equivalent^ (so that 'property is conserved').
The product becomes a commodity and is exchanged for its
'equivalent' in money. Production becomes production for the
market, for exchange.
This concept of the commodity form as the correlate of 'social
production plus private appropriation' is one of the central
elements of Marx's theory of value. In the case of private
production by independent self-sufficient units of production
there is no need for the exchange of products and therefore no
commodity form. In the opposite case of a fully socialised
economy, social production would be complemented by social
appropriation of the product : there would be a need for
distribution of products between units (e.g. distribution of
producer goods from enterprise A to enterprises B and C where
they would be employed to produce consumer goods for distribution
to workers in A, B and C) but since the enterprises would not be
1 It is not necessary that this 'equivalence', defined in exchange,
is conceived as an equation of the labour-times embodied in the
products. The latter view may be criticised (although I shall
not pursue the point here) without undermining the present
argument. For a fuller discussion of this point see Cottrell
( 1981) .
42
objects of private property the need for exchange of equivalents
would not arise. The commodity as 'product to be exchanged for
its equivalent' would not exist. So it is only when products
have to be distributed across the boundaries of independently
controlled enterprises that products become commodities. This is
the substance of Marx's answer to the question which classical
political economy 'failed to pose' : the problem of the
specificity of the commodity, as opposed to the question of the
determinants of the exchange ratios or prices of commodities.
2. The separation of the direct producers from
the means of production
The basic historical presuppositions of capitalism are (i) the
expropriation of the direct producers and the creation of a class
of workers who cannot produce on their own account, and (ii) the
concentration of exclusive possession of the means of production
in the hands of a distinct class. Commodity production pre-dates
capitalism, and the specifically capitalist mode of production
develops only when the propertyless workers are constrained to
sell their labour power to capital in return for wages. That is,
the distinguishing feature of capitalist commodity production
is that labour-power becomes a commodity. Through the
wage-contract the capitalist enterprise gains the right of
disposition of the workers' labour power during the working day
and the right of possession of the products thereof. The hiring
of labour becomes a means of profit-making on the part of the
capitalist enterprises.
As Marx argues in Volume One of 'Capital', the separation of the
workers from the means of production is not only an historical
presupposition of capitalism; it is also a result continually
reproduced within capitalist relations of production. The worker
starts out propertyless, sells his labour power in return for a wage
which merely allows him to reproduce his labour power, produces
surplus value for capital, and then finds himself back where he
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started : still propertyless, and constrained to sell his labour-power
once again in order to live. Separation, in this sense, is not a
once-and-for-all act, rather it is a double process. On the one hand
'separation' refers to the continuing dissolution of pre-capitalist
forms of production, based on the artisanal unity of the producer and
his means of production, with the expanded reproduction of capitalist
relations. On the other hand it also refers to the condition whereby
the means of production confront the worker as the property of
another, which is constantly reproduced under capitalism.
It is worth emphasizing that the economic definition of capitalism
requires both these elements 1 and 2 above. I have pointed out that
commodity production pre-dated capitalism - further, it may be
impossible to abolish completely the commodity form in a socialist
economy. The elimination of the need for commodity exchange depends
not merely on the juridical re-definition of all means of production
as 'public' or 'state' property and the abolition of personal and
joint-stock forms of property, but rather on the elaboration of a
planning mechanism which permits a completely socialised
appropriation. To achieve a purely administrative 'transfer' of
products as opposed to exchange, all enterprises in the economy would
have to be under unified control in a manner analogous to the
operating units of a multi-divisional capitalist enterprise (within
which exchange relations are not necessary) . And this latter state of
affairs may be unattainable even given further development of the
productive forces. It would probably require a quite prodigious
centralisation, and it seems likely that in any socialist economy a
(regulated) sphere of commodity exchange between (democratically
accountable) enterprises will continue to exist. East European
2
discussions of the role of the market in a socialist economy cannot
reasonably be dismissed as revisionist apologetics. What we can say
is that where the workers remain separated from the means of
production, and bound to commodity-producing enterprises through the
2 See for example, Brus (1972 and 1975).
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wage contract in the absence of mechanisms of control over production
by 'the associated producers', we are dealing with capitalist property
relations.
This discussion of the basic property relations of capitalism enables
us to present the two fundamental categories of agents within
capitalist production:
1. Wage workers : separated from the means of production and
constrained to sell their labour power to capitalist enterprises.
2. Capitalists : owners of the means of production, and
appropriators of the surplus product in the form of profits.
We can take these categories as a starting point and pose the problem
of their adequacy for analysing the class forces present in capitalist
societies, and therefore for orienting socialist politics. What, in
other words, is the relationship between the 'economic' categories of
wage labour and capital, and the actual socio-political groupings
which are to be found fighting out the 'class struggle' at the point
of production and in national (or international) politics? Are wage
labour and capital not only economic categories but also historical
actors? Should the active political groupings and parties be
conceived as 'representing' (championing the interests of) the
economically defined classes? Or is the relationship more complex
than that?
In the following discussion I shall consider two strands of Marx's
views on the matter, presented in the 'Communist Manifesto' and the
'Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte'. I say 'strands' because
Marx's views on class do not form a unified essential whole ; his
positions changed over time in response to political and theoretical
developments. The 'Manifesto', however, presents in particularly
clear and striking form a broad interpretation which has been very
influential and which is echoed later in certain passages of 'Capital'
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(especially Volume One, Chapter 32), while the 'Eighteenth Brumaire'
presents a remarkably rich 'application' of Marx's theory to the class
struggles of a definite historical period.
The Communist Manifesto
We should remember that the 'Manifesto' was a mobilising pamphlet,
designed to crystallise and communicate the revolutionary ideology of
the Communist League at a time of great political optimism, before the
revolutions of 1848 had run into the sands. As such, it represents
the polarisation of social forces around the wage labour/capital
dichotomy as an inevitable tendency of capitalism. 'Wage labour' is a
category within Marx's theory but the 'Manifesto' presents a scenario
in which that category corresponds ever more closely to a real
historical agency i.e. the gap between 'class' as economically defined
entity and 'class' as social force is progressively eliminated, so
that it becomes legitimate to use the one term to encompass both.
Let us examine this tendency as set out in the text. Marx begins by
sketching the processes by which the bourgeoisie "pushed into the
3
background every class handed down from the middle ages" (p.37). He
argues that these processes have 'simplified' class antagonisms:
"society as a whole is splitting up into two great hostile
camps, into two great classes directly facing each other:
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat" (p.36).
As regards the political sphere the state power is increasingly the
naked materialisation of bourgeois power:
"...the bourgeoisie has at last., conquered for itself, in
the modern representative State, exclusive political sway.
The executive of the modern state is but a committee for
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie"
(p.37).
3 Unqualified page references in this section are to the one-volume
selected works of Marx and Engels, otherwise referred to below as
Marx and Engels ( 1968).
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Further, all organic ideologies, such as religion, which could cut
across class lines are drowned in the "icy water of egotistical
calculation" (p.38). 'Free trade' becomes the supreme ideology. The
'professions' are converted into mere branches of wage labour. The
family relation is reduced to a "mere money relation" (p.38). The
exploitation of the world market has given rise to "..intercourse in
every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations" which in turn
makes "national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness more and more
impossible" (p.39). Therefore all the various social ties (religion,
social status, family, nationality) which might obscure or override
the formulation of class based social collectiveness are progressively
demolished.
The rise of bourgeois society from feudalism is summed up in the
formula of the contradiction between productive forces and property
relations - the formula of the 'Preface' of 1859. After a point,
feudal property relations became a fetter on the already developed
productive forces and they were therefore duly 'burst asunder' . It is
made clear that bourgeois property is due for the same fate since the
prodigious productive forces unleashed by capitalism are
already..."too powerful for these conditions, by which they are
fettered..." (p.41). The bourgeoisie was an historically progressive
class so long as it represented the rising tendency of the productive
forces but now the progressive class is the proletariat - the class
which will revolutionise bourgeois property and liberate the
productive forces for a new stage of development. Each class is
'tied' to a particular system of property relations, and as the
development of the productive forces ensures the succession of forms
of property (feudal - bourgeois - communist) it also ensures the
successive dominance of the different social classes (feudal lords -
capitalists - proletariat). But what gives substance to this
schematism? What of the actual mechanisms which turn the proletariat
into the 'grave-diggers' of the bourgeoisie? Marx puts forward a
number of arguments, many of which are effectively hypotheses
concerning the social and political effects of economic development
under capitalism although in the rhetoric of the 'Manifesto' they
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assume the form of already realised or inevitable tendencies. The
following is a summary of Marx's arguments, to each strand of which I
have appended a 'comment' noting certain relevant problems and
debates. Many of these issues will be taken up in more detail in
later chapters - in order to avoid disrupting the exposition of the
logic of the 'Manifesto' they are only indicated briefly in this
context.
1. The effects of the application of machinery and the division of
labour: In the 'Manifesto' Marx clearly subscribed to the
conception which would now be labelled 'de-skilling' . The work
of the proletarians loses all its 'individual character' and
'charm'. So any grounds for identification with one's work are
destroyed. Further, since the wage is merely the cost of
production of labour power the simpler labour of machine-minding
goes along with a reduction in wages while the 'burden of toil'
increases.
De-skilling also makes differences of age and sex less relevant
» on the labour market, to the extent that 'differences in age and
sex no longer have any distinctive social validity for the
working class.'
Comment: The de-skilling notion has recently been argued and
extended by Braverman (1974). Braverman's arguments have,
however, been challenged by Cutler (1978) and Gershuny (1978) who
concludes that, at a social level, there is no clear tendency
towards simpler and more trivial work operating at present.
Further, it may be argued that insofar as de-skilling does take
place it can increase the competition among workers and undercut
certain forms of craft-based union organisation. Depending on
the context, resistance to de-skilling can appear as a divisive
attempt to maintain privileged status for certain groups.
On the tendency for wages to fall with the development of
capitalist production, Rowthorn (1980) has shown that Marx's
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views were to change in later years. And on the 'social
validity' of sex differences, it is clear that Marx was jumping
the gun. The women's movement over recent years had made us more
aware of the continuing effects of the sexual division of labour.
Effects of large-scale factory organisation; Labour becomes ever
more regimented in the large-scale factory. More and more
workers become concentrated under the despotic control of the
'overlookers' and the 'individual bourgeois manufacturer
himself'. This concentration counteracts the isolating pressure
of competition on the labour market and gives rise to
'revolutionary combination' . It goes hand-in-hand with an
'equalisation of the conditions of life' as distinct grades of
labour are abolished and wages progressively reduced to the same
low level.
Comment: The rise of large-scale factories certainly makes
effective point-of-production organisation more likely,
strengthening trade unionism. It does not follow, as Lenin
emphasized, that the workers will necessarily subscribe to
revolutionary politics. Even at the economic level, the
concentration of the work-force does not abolish differentiation
of grades and wages.
Concentration of industrial labour was an important point of
emphasis for Marx, since in his day the dominant shift in the
distribution of social labour was from agriculture and
small-scale production to machine industry. Under present
conditions socialists have to take into account the kind of
'deindustrialisation' investigated by Blackaby (1979) and face up
to its implications for the possibilities of workplace
organisation (Cutler et al 1978).
Effects of commercial crises: These occur on a larger and larger
scale as the world market develops. They give rise to
fluctuations in wages, and the threat of unemployment makes the
workers' livelihood 'ever more precarious1.
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Comment: Mass unemployment may make workers more bitter, but
there is no guarantee that it increases their potential for
combining as a political class. It may often weaken trade
unionism and ironically sap the strength of the workers' movement
just as it appears to strengthen the moral and economic case for
socialism (although even the latter effect depends upon
socialists putting forward a strong case showing that there is an
alternative to unemployment) .
4. Effects of 'social mobility' : In the course of capitalist
development the proletariat is the expanding class, and it draws
recruits from all sections of the populations. The lower strata
of the middle class in particular 'sink gradually into the
proletariat' either because, in the case of independent traders,
their capital is too small to compete with the big bourgeoisie
or, as in the case of artisans, their skills are rendered
worthless by the development of machine industry. This 'downward
mobility', to use the modern term, is presumed to furnish the
working class with 'fresh elements of enlightenment and
progress'. Enlightenment is also increased when progressive
ideologists who have 'raised themselves to the level of
comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole'
defect from the bougeoisie and take up a proletarian standpoint.
Comment: The only aspect of social mobility to be considered in
the 'Manifesto' is the downward progress of the erstwhile middle
classes into the proletariat. Two problems here. First, such
downward movement does not necessarily help to cement the unity
of the proletariat by supplying elements of 'enlightenment'.
Indeed some writers have seen this kind of mobility as a source
of 'infection' of the working classes by the individualistic
ideology of the middle classes. Second, there is the problem of
'upward' social mobility and its effects on the solidarity of
classes. This is an issue which Marx discussed in passing in
other writings, and one which can hardly be ignored nowadays
given the considerable expansion of the salaried strata. In the
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British case, we are fortunate to be able to draw on the recent
and detailed analyses, sympathetic to Marxist concerns, by
Goldthorpe et al ( 1980) .
5. The effects of ruling class struggles: In their struggle against
the aristocracy or sections of the bourgeoisie whose interests
are inimical to industrial development, the progressive
bourgeoisie enlist the aid of the proletariat, hence 'dragging
them into the political arena' and preparing them for the fight
against the bourgeoisie .
Comment; The working class may be 'drawn into politics' in this
way, but this does not provide an unambiguous preparation for
fighting the bourgeoisie. To the extent that the proletarians
are influenced by the ideologies under the sign of which such
'ruling class battles' are fought, they may indeed be seriously
deflected from open conflict with 'their' bourgeoisie. For
instance, the case of national wars and the ideologies of
t patriotism, nationality and racism.
The general point to notice here is that the processes which Marx
indicates seem far less determinate in their outcome, on closer
inspection and with the benefit of historical perspective, than is
claimed in the 'Manifesto'. The revolutionary political unity of the
working class may be rendered more likely by certain developments
within capitalism, but it is never guaranteed.
But let us return to the status of these tendencies within the
argument of the 'Manifesto'. The combined effects of these processes
( 1 to 5) can be traced in the phases of development of the
'proletarian movement'.
At first clashes between wage labour and capital are localised and
often backward-looking: seeking to restore the 'vanished status of
the workman of the middle ages'. At this stage competition still
fragments the class. This is the era of Utopian Socialist
system-building. The proleteriat offers the "spectacle of a class
without any historical initiative or any independent political
movement" (p.60), so the system-builders (Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen
et al) seek to replace 'historical action' with 'their personal
inventive action'. All the while, however, the proletariat is
learning politics in the service of the bourgeoisie against the feudal
classes.
Over time the processes indicated above (concentration, division of
labour, recruitment) have the effect of progressively giving the
'collisions' between workers and capitalists "the character of
collisions between two classes" (p.43). Trade union organisation
proceeds apace, aided by the modern communications systems, giving
rise to an 'ever expanding union of the workers'. Organised labour
begins to have an impact on the legislative process, witness the 10
hours bill. This class-in-the-making is increasingly unencumbered by
any ties of its own to 'secure and fortify', by any possible stake in
bourgeois society. The proletarian has no property, no country -
"modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in
America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national
character" - and no illusions. Law, morality and religion are all
seen through as "so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in
ambush just as many bourgeois interests" (p.44).
The workers can find no route of individual advancement, and their
situation within bourgeois society becomes increasingly intolerable:
"the modern labourer..instead of rising with the progress of
industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of
existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and
pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth.
And here it becomes evident that the bourgeoisie is unfit
any longer to be the ruling class.. ."(p.45) .
Moreover there is no 'third way' which could provide a pole of
political attraction distinct from the bourgeois/proletarian
antagonism. The proletariat is the 'only really revolutionary class'.
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The lower middle classes may have antagonistic relations with the
bourgeoisie proper but they can offer no viable historical project of
their own:
"the lower middle classes; the small manufacturer, the
shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight
against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their
existence as fractions of the middle class. They are
therefore not revolutionary but conservative. Nay more,
they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of
history. If by chance they are revolutionary they are so
only by virtue of their impending transfer into the
proletariate, they thus defend their own standpoint to place
themselves at that of the proletariat" (p.44).
These classes either join the side of the proletariat, or they are
condemned to historical marginality, fighting an ultimately useless
battle against relegation to the proletarian ranks.
The proletariat therefore possesses the organisation (born of
industrial concentration), the political education (from participation
in bourgeois struggles), the theoretical vision (aided by progressive
defectors from the bourgeoisie) and the motivation (alienated labour,
pauperisation, precarious livelihood) to mount a full-scale assault on
bourgeois power. Under these circumstances the proletarian movement
becomes the 'self-conscious independent movement of the immense
majority, in the interests of the immense majority'. Economic
category (exploited wage-labourers) and socio-political force
('proletarian movement') become practically identical. Only once does
Marx qualify this scenario, and even then the qualification is quickly
turned into a re-affirmation of belief:
"This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and
consequently into a political party, is continually being
upset again by the competition between the workers
themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer,
mightier" (p.43).
The same conception as we have found in the Manifesto is reiterated in
'Capital' Volume One, Chapter 32 'The Historical Tendency of
Capitalist Accumulation', in a famous passage:
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"Along with the constant decrease in the number of
capitalist magnates ... the mass of misery, oppression,
slavery and degradation grows; but with this there also
grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly
increasing in numbers, and trained, united and organized by
the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production.
The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of
production which has flourished alongside and under it. The
centralization of the means of production and the
socialization of labour reach a .point at which they become
incompatible with their capitalist integument. This
integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist
private property sounds. The expropriators are
expropriated" (Marx, 1976, p.929).
Appropriately, the chapter ends with a reference to the Manifesto.
Let us take stock of the implications of these arguments for the
concept of class. The procedure will be to identify some important
problems and themes from the 'Manifesto' and to develop these through
a critical reading of the '18th Brumaire'. I shall then draw on this
discussion to orient the investigation of more contemporary writings
and the modern class structure.
First, it is clear that the term 'class' is being used in two
different senses. On the one hand we have class as
economically-defined entity, as in 'the spectacle of a class without
any historical initiative or any independent political movement'.
Here the referent of the term must be the working class as the
category of propertyless wage-labourers, at this historical stage
having no broad organisation or political arm to define its common
interests in opposition to the bourgeoisie. On the other hand,
'class' is sometimes used in a sense which ties it closely to the
concept of an organised socio-political force:
"...This organisation of the proletarians into a class and
consequently into a political party..." (Marx and Engels,
1968, p.43, emphasis added).
Full 'classhood' here is achieved only when the occupants of a
particular place within the structure of property relations form
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themselves into an organised body pursuing a political project in
accordance with their 'historical mission' or 'class interest' as
defined within Marx's theory.
Second, in this text Marx envisages a necessary convergence between
these two referents of the term 'class': economic grouping and
political agency. The owners of capital attain their political unity
in the form of modern representative state, presented as the typical
or adequate form of state for capitalist society. The proletarians
attain their political unity in the proletarian movement or party, and
this 'self-conscious' organisation is only a matter of time, given the
development of large-scale industry. In the long run economic class
becomes historical actor. Or, in the language of the 'Poverty of
Philosophy' ( 1847), 'class-in-itself' becomes ' class-for-itself'. I
suggested, however, that despite the brilliance and passion of Marx's
polemic the mechanisms whereby this convergence is to be secured
remain sketchy and problematic.
Third, despite the pre-eminent position given to the opposition of
•>
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat, Marx recognises the existence of other
classes in mid-19th century European society. He writes of the 'lower
middle classes', small manufacturers and traders, artisans and
peasants. But at the same time he denies them any real political
importance. In contrast with the proletariat, that 'most
characteristic product' of large-scale industry, the other classes are
fated to 'decay and disappear' in the face of capitalist development.
They are seen as a 'survival' from the pre-history of capitalism
proper and are therefore only a transient complication in the
splitting of society into 'two great hostile camps'. This view is
very much in keeping with the 'productive forces' theory. Let us see
how these ideas had developed by 1851.
The 'Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte'
This work presents an analysis of classes far more rich in historical
detail than the 'Manifesto'. Obviously the text has a different
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status: it is an interpretation of specific historical events rather
than a piece of virtuoso propaganda. Marx's political commitment and
passion are equally evident, but by the winter of 1851/52 it was no
longer possible to present such a 'triumphalist' vision of proletarian
unity: the French working class had been defeated and one had the
grotesque spectacle of Louis Bonaparte at the apex of French politics.
In his 'Eighteenth Brumaire' Marx admits complexities and problems
which were brushed aside in the enthusiasm of the 'Manifesto', so by
drawing on the arguments of this text we can deepen and rectify some
of the 'Manifesto's' propositions.
Engels saw this work as a 'test' for Marx's 'great law of motion of
history':
"... the law according to which all historical struggles,
whether they proceed in the political, religious,
philosophical or some other ideological domain, are in fact
only the more or less clear expression of struggles of
social classes, and that the existence of and thereby the
collisions, too, between these classes are in turn
conditioned by the^degree of development of their economic
position.. ."(p.95) .
And he claims that the law has 'stood the test brilliantly'. But what
is of particular interest here is to see how the schematic 'law' of
the 'Manifesto' and the 'Preface' was necessarily modified, and at
points abandoned, in Marx's striving to understand the French politics
of the time.
We noted in the 'Manifesto' the conception of 'economic' classes
appearing as historical actors, constituting themselves into political
forces in their own right (classes 'for-themselves'). It is notable
that this theme is largely absent from the 'Eighteenth Brumaire'. The
nearest we get to a class appearing 'in person' on the political stage
is the Paris proletariat in the June days of 1848, but even then it is
precisely the Paris proletariat which arises, not the proletariat tout
court, and the particular militancy and unity of the Parisian workers
is a product of rather specific historical processes. Their position
4 Again, unqualified page references here are to Marx and Engels
( 1968).
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as wage-labourers was a necessary condition for bringing about that
militancy and unity, but by no means a sufficient condition. After
their defeat in June 1849 we find them submitting to political
'representation' by the Montagne, whose programme breaks the
'revolutionary point' off the 'social demands' of the proletariat,
entraining them behind the petty bourgeoisie. In the boom year of
1850 we find the workers 'forgetting the revolutionary interests of
their class for momentary ease and comfort'.
In general, the notion of classes appearing 'in person' in political
struggles appears to be inapplicable to the period and it is replaced
by the concept of representation: the political forces (parties,
movements, even individuals) active at the time are often analysed as
more or less adequate 'representatives' of definite class interests.
Surveying the various uses made of the concept of representation in
this context, it is evident that this concept in turn is problematic.
The notion of 'representation' covers a highly heterogeneous set of
relations between social classes and political or literary groupings.
We have seen that the concept was used in the Manifesto, in the case
of the bourgeoisie: there was a certain asymmetry in that the
proletariat would achieve its political unity as a mass movement or
Party while the bourgeoisie achieves its unity in the representative
state - the 'executive committee' for managing its common affairs. In
that context 'representation' was presented as a relatively
straightforward affair: the representative state simply serves to
pass off the interests of the bourgeoisie as the will of the 'people
as a whole'. In form the government 'represents' the will of the
electors, but in substance it represents the exclusive political sway
of the bourgeoisie. But in the particular struggle in France,
'representation' becomes more ambiguous.
First there is no one-to-one mapping between classes and their
political representatives: Contrary to Engels' version of the
'general law', it is admitted that representation of class interest
does not exhaust the field of political forces. For instance the
political grouping which formed the offical republican opposition
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under Louis Phillipe and which found itself elevated to power in the
latter half of 1848, draws this comment from Marx:
"it was not a faction of the bourgeoisie held together by
great common interests and marked off by specific conditions
of production. It was a clique of republican minded
bourgeois, writers, lawyers offices and officials that owed
its influence to the personal antipathies of the country
against Louise Philippe, to memories of the old republic, to
the republican faith of a number, of enthusiasts, above all,
however, to French Nationalism..(p.104).
Marx accepts that it is not possible to analyse the political
coherence of this grouping by reference to the conditions of
production. It was a 'faction of the bourgeoisie' but one whose
distinctiveness derived from common views on the desirable form of
state, and nationalist sentiment, rather than from common 'economic'
interests.
The cases of the army and the National Guard also illustrate this
point. As the different factions within the state apparatus fight it
out over the years, the affiliation of the armed forces is not given
in advance. Certainly the soldiers have a definite class origin and
the generals have at any one time definite political views, but their
affiliation to one side or the other is partly open to determination
by the skills of political calculation and timing of the contending
groups. The Montagne, for instance, attempted to impeach Bonaparte
and his ministers in June 1849 on the grounds that the bombardment of
Rome which Bonaparte had ordered was unconstitutional. The National
Assembly rejected the bill of impeachment and so the Montagne
attempted a revolt.
"Since a section of the army had voted for it, the Montagne
was now convinced that the army would revolt for it. And on
what occasion? On an occasion which, from the standpoint of
the troops had no other meaning than that the revolutionists
took the side of the Roman soldiers against the French
soldiers" (p. 122).
Thus Marx argues that a gross miscalculation by the Montagne ensured
that it lost the support of the military. This can be contrasted with
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Bonaparte's sedulous cultivation of the troops through free picnics -
the 'sausage of Satory' - which eventually paid off so well. So the
armed forces, the decisive element in any showdown between political
forces, were not linked to a particular class party by ties of
'representation'.
Second, even where Marx argues that a given political force does
'represent' a social class the relations between the two are by no
means straightforward. Let us examine three examples:
'representation' of the petty bourgeoise by the Montagne;
'representation' of the bourgeoisie by the Party of Order;
and
'representation' of the peasantry by Bonaparte himself.
The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Montagne
This is an interesting case in that Marx takes it as a basis for
generalising about the representation relation. According to Marx the
political demands of the Social-Democrats of the Montagne had as their
content "the transformation of society in a democratic way, but a
transformation within the bounds of the petty bourgeoisie" (p.119).
Their programme remained within these bounds because insofar as
democratic - republican institutions were demanded, this was "as a
means, not of doing away with two extremes, capital and wage labour,
but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony"
(ibid).
This is the characteristic politics of the petty bourgeoisie, by
virtue of its place as a 'transition class' in which the interests of
bourgeoisie and proletariat are 'simultaneously mutually blunted'.
But all the same one must not imagine that the democratic
representatives
"... are indeed all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of
shopkeepers. According to their education and their
individual position they may be as far apart as Heaven from
earth. What makes them representatives of the petty
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bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get
beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in
life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to
the same problems and solutions to which material interest
and social position drive the latter practically. This is,
in general, the relationship between the political and
literary representatives of a class and the class they
represent" (p. 120).
The concept of 'representation' is then a means for indicating a
correlation between the political ideology of a party or group and the
practical ideology of a social class. Not only may the
'representatives' remain blind to this correlation - believing their
political ideology to have a universal validity - but there is no
guarantee that the bulk of the class will follow its representatives
and faithfully support the latter's strategy. The miscalculation and
political naivete of the Montagne in the crisis of summer 1849 led to
a situation in which the petty bourgeoisie 'betrayed their
representatives' by refusing to subscribe to their rebellions
proclamation.
The point here is not to deny that we can usefully identify
relationships between political ideologies and forms of 'practical
thinking' bred in definite class positions. I shall be making use of
this conception in the analysis of the class forces in modern Britain.
Rather it is to question whether the concept of representation is an
adequate means for grasping such linkages. The term 'representation'
suggests the view in Engels' preface of political struggles as the
'more or less clear expression' of struggles between social classes,
which, if taken literally, would seem to foreclose on the importance
of the specific political uses to which 'class' ideologies are put,
the specific forms of political calculation employed by the forces
active in politics, and the complex and problematic relations between
'representatives' and 'represented' in the course of actual struggles.
The Bourgeoisie and the Party of Order
Marx takes the Party of Order to be the proper representative of the
French bourgeoisie in the political struggles of the period. This
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party, which gained political dominance with the overthrow of the
'pure republicans' in December 1848, was a coalition of the rival
royalist factions of Legitimists and Orleanists. The analysis of this
coalition and the tension between its two factions is a classic source
for the interpretation of Marx on classes. He claims that the
ostensible reason for the rivalry between the factions - allegiance to
competing Royal Houses - was a mere 'superstructure of sentiment'
overlying the division between landed property and capital ('high
finance, large-scale industry, large-scale trade').
"The Legitimate Monarchy was merely the political expression
of the hereditary rule of the lords of the soil, as the July
Monarchy was only the political expression of the usurped
rule of the bourgeois parvenus. What kept the two factions
apart, therefore, was not any so-called principles, it was
their material conditions of existence, two different kinds
of property... the rivalry between capital and landed
property. That at the same time old memories, personal
enmities, fears and hopes, prejudices and illusions,
sympathies and anticipations, convictions, articles of faith
and principles bound them to one or the other royal house,
who is there that denies this? Upon the different forms of
property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an
entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed
sentiments, illusions modes of thought and views of life.
The entire class creates them out of its material
foundations and out of the corresponding social relations"
(p.117).
So that although Legitimists and Orleanists came to believe that it
was the question of succession which divided them, "facts later proved
that it was rather their divided interests which forbade the uniting
of the two royal houses" (ibid.). Here we have a particularly clear
statement of the principle of representation/expression of class
interest. Specifically political and ideological factors are given an
entirely subsidiary position, and in an interesting twist to the
conception of 'class as historical actor' we find the 'entire class'
itself creating its own superstructure of 'sentiments, illusions' etc.
out of its 'material foundations' - a theme which is taken up by
Lukacs (1971) in his theory of classes as historical 'subjects'.
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But compare this account of the Legitimist and Orleanist factions with
the account noted above of the 'pure republicans' - a faction which
was not 'marked off by specific condition of production'. In a recent
discussion, Cutler et al argued that there is a contradiction between
the two.
"If political forces are not reducible to effects of the
structure of the economy then 'two different kinds of
property' cannot account for what kept the two Royalist
factions apart. Alternatively, if political forces are
reducible to the effects of different forms of property then
Marx has no business treating the republican faction as a
distinct and real political force" (Cutler et al, 1977,
p.184) .
There is no doubt that the 'republican faction' is treated as a real
political force in Marx's analysis. Its dominant position within
parliament did not last long but the constitution which it established
had important effects on the subsequent struggles between Louis
Bonaparte and the Party of Order. The point then is that if
particular political and cultural conditions, not reducible to effects
of property relations, were required to constitute the republican
faction as a political force then surely it will not do to regard
forms of property as a sufficient condition to explain the political
distinctiveness of the Royalist factions - all the rest being mere
superstructure. Again, although there are definite links between the
royal houses and different forms of property a literal application of
the principle of representation/expression threatens to establish a
thorough-going reductionism which is contradicted elsewhere in Marx's
analysis.
We can take this point further by considering the historical
development and final breakdown of the Party of Order as a political
force. Marx argues that as Royalists the two factions of the party
are at loggerheads, yet they are able to rule conjointly within the
form of the parliamentary republic.
"They do their real business as the party of order, that is,
under a social, not under a political title; as
representatives of the bourgeois world-order, not as knights
of errant princesses" (Marx, op.cit., p.118).
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So long as the parliamentary republic provides a reasonably stable
form of rule the old loyalties are reduced to 'mere obeisances' and
the restoration of the monarchy postponed 'ad infinitum'. And in the
struggle against the executive power (Bonaparte) the Orleanists and
Legitimists even appear willy nilly as defenders of republicanism.
But a dilemma arises because the parliamentary regime does not prove
stable. In order to preserve their dominant position in face of
popular opposition the Party of Order 'royalists' are forced to
restrict the suffrage and carry out violent repression. Their 'class
rule' becomes increasingly transparent as such, and increasingly
dangerous. They find themselves obliged to carry out measures which
have the effect of reducing the apparent legitimacy of parliament and
conversely giving credence to Bonaparte's claims to represent the
'popular will' as against parliament. Bonaparte, whose political
acumen was seriously underestimated by the royalists, is eventually
able to brand the Party of Order as - ultimate stigma - the threat to
order. The party is so afraid of losing its position as defender of
order in the eyes of the bourgeoisie outside parliament that it
finally succumbs to political paralysis. Unable to challenge
J
Bonaparte on substantive issues for fear of rocking the boat, it gets
involved in inconsequential wrangles over trivial, formal questions.
This leads to a crisis in which the bourgeoisie outside formal
politics loses all trust in, and comprehension of, its
'representatives'. The 'aristocracy of finance', with much of its
wealth tied up in state debts
"condemned the parliamentary struggle of the party of Order
with the executive power as a disturbance of order, and
celebrated every victory of the President over its
ostensible representatives as a victory of order" (ibid.,
p.157) .
The industrial bourgeoisie, likewise,
"proved that the struggle to maintain its public interests,
its own class interests, its political power, only troubled
and upset it, as it was a disturbance of private business"
(ibid .) .
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Again we find the possibility of radical dislocation between a class,
carrying out its day-to-day business and its 'representatives',
enmeshed in specifically political struggles and following a logic of
their own.
Let us return to the two royal houses. It is only when the
parliamentary republic has reached this paralytic crisis that the
question of succession is again seriously pursued. Now the statesmen
of the Party of Order desperately attempt to stave off imperial
usurpation by Bonaparte, by arranging a merger of the two contending
houses. But the pretenders will have nothing to do with this - the
'diplomats' on either side are regarded as mere renegades. The Party
of Order disintegrates and Bonaparte carries out his coup d'etat.
This in outline is the account which Marx gives of the fall of the
political representatives of the bourgeoisie and the rise of
Bonaparte. I am not concerned with the historical accuracy of the
account and am not equipped to judge it on those grounds; the point
is to examine how well it fits with the concept of political
representation of class interest given in the initial discussion of
the Legitimist and Orleanist factions. My claim is this: the
historical account given does not square with the earlier statement
that it was the divided interests of landed property and capital which
'forbade the uniting of the two royal houses'. The 'representatives'
of landed property and capital had ruled quite effectively together
for as long as the parliamentary regime was a feasible form of state.
Indeed they were well on the way to forgetting the rivalry of the
royal houses or at least confining it to 'after-hours' activity, by
Marx's admission. And Marx offers no argument to the effect that the
parliamentary regime broke down due to antagonism between landed
property and capital. It is clear that in his analysis the principal
factor was opposition on the part of the popular classes in France
(working class, petty bourgeoisie, peasantry) which made it impossible
for the Party of Order to gain a stable 'legitimate' majority and
which threatened to turn liberal democracy into a means of realising
revolutionary aspirations. And the last-ditch attempt at
reconciliation of the houses surely failed because of the flatly
incompatible claims and religious predilections of Bourbon and
Orleans.
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The interests of landed property and capital may clash on certain
issues, but there is the possibility of compromise and mutual
accommodation in the face of a common challenge. The rival claims of
the royal houses were, however, intrinsically mutually exclusive:
there could be only one Monarch and only one dominant religion.
The contrast with the English case reinforces the point. In England
the interests of landed property and capital clashed over the corn
laws. Land-owners had a vested interest in restricting trade in order
to preserve a high price for corn and therefore high agricultural
rents, while manufacturers had an interest in free trade and reduction
of the price of corn to reduce the cost of subsidence of industrial
workers and permit a reduction in wages. There were political forces
active on either side of the argument and the matter was not resolved
without struggle. But this did not seriously disrupt the long-term
process of interpenetration and accommodation between land-owners and
capitalists in Britain. In the English case the fortunes of the two
factions were not tied to competing pretenders and the parliamentary
regime proved much more stable. It is not, therefore, possible to
sustain the rigorous conception of representation/expression of class
interest by political forces - the conception in which political
forces are a mere reflex of class interests defined at the level of
property-holding. The Bourbon and Orleans Houses did not merely
'express' an opposition of class interest, they defined that
opposition in a particular way which made it highly inflexible.
Political forces have specific effects, and although Marx clearly sets
out the 'expression' principle at one point in the 'Eighteenth
Brumaire' it is evident that the rest of the text is not 'bound' by
that declaration. If it were, then much of its rich observation would
be impossible.
The Peasantry and Louis Bonaparte
The principle of representation undergoes further contortions in the
case of the relationship between the French peasantry and Bonaparte.
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Remember that in his analysis of the New Montagne, Marx argued that
the 'general relationship' between a class and its political
representatives was one in which the 'representatives' took up, for
whatever ostensible reasons, positions which were traceable as
appropriate to the practical situation of the class. On this
criterion, Bonaparte may be regarded as a representative of the
lumpenproletariat, with his politics of criminal subterfuge, obsession
with his debts and constant attempts to buy support. Marx indeed
often casts him in this role
"This Bonaparte, who consitutes himself chief of the
lumpenproletariat, who here alone discovers in mass form the
interests which he personally pursues, who recognises in
this scum, offal, refuse of all classes the only class upon
which he can base himself unconditionally..." (p. 137).
But the lumpenproletariat in itself cannot provide a stable basis of
social support for a regime. Accordingly, Bonaparte the successful
usurper is forced to create alongside the 'actual classes of society'
an 'artifical caste for which the maintenance of his regime becomes a
bread-and-butter question' i.e. an enormous state bureaucracy. Here
is a 'representative' who constructs his own constituency ex nihilo!
Marx recognises that this will not do as a complete account of
Bonaparte's basis of support. After noting the apparent 'complete
independence' of the Bonapartist state machine from the civil society
of France, he observes:
"And yet the state power is not suspended in mid-air.
Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class of
French society at that, the small-holding peasants" (p. 170).
The discussion which follows this observation returns us to the dual
conception of class which we noted in the Manifesto (economic
category/socio-political force). Marx first argues that the material
conditions of life of the peasantry preclude their active combination
as a social force in their own right:
"The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of
which live in similar conditions but without entering into
manifold relations with one another... Each individual
peasant family is almost self-sufficient... In this way, the
great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition
of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a
sack of potatoes. Insofar as millions of families live
under economic conditions of existence that separate their
mode of life, their interests and their culture from those
of other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the
latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a
local interconnection among these small-holding peasants,
and the indentity of their interests begets no community, no
national bond and no political organisation among them, they
do not form a class (pp.170-171).
If the peasantry are incapable of achieving full 'classhood', of
combining as a social force, then their political 'representation' can
only take the form of a governmental power which appears as an
authority over and above them.
"The political influence of the small-holding peasantry,
therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power
subordinating society to itself" (p.171).
Almost immediately, however, this 'expression' must be qualified. The
peasantry is not a politically homogeneous category. There are
peasant risings against Bonaparte; the army is obliged to raid and
repress sections of the peasantry. It turns out that Bonaparte
represents "not the revolutionary, but the conservative peasant... not
the enlightenment, but the superstition of the peasant..." (ibid.),
and in turn the balance between 'enlightenment' and 'superstition'
among the peasantry is in part the result of other cultural and
political struggles - between the schoolmasters and the priests;
between the maires and the prefects - struggles within which the Party
of Order and its predecessors intervened on the side of reaction to
quell any revolutionary yearnings in the countryside.
Again, the unitary concept of 'representation' seems inappropriate to
grasp the complex relations involved. If Marx is saying that the
existence of a large mass of conservative peasants with imperial
yearnings was a necessary condition for the accession of Bonaparte to
power then he is on strong grounds, but any suggestion that
Bonapartism is reducible to the 'expression' of the 'mode of
production' of the peasantry must be rejected.
67
It may be argued further that although Marx was not bound by his own
declarations of principle on the matter of representation, and was
able to produce analyses which go beyond reductionism, nonetheless he
was in the end misled in his estimation of Bonaparte's regime by his
theory of the necessary relations between classes and political
forces. In discussing the future prospects for the regime, Marx
reckoned that it was riven by impossible contradictions. Bonaparte
wished to preserve 'bourgeois order'.
"But the stength of this bourgeois order lies in the middle
class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the
representative of the middle class and issues decrees in
this sense. Nevertheless he is somebody solely due to the
fact that he has broken the political power of this middle
class and daily breaks it anew" (p. 176).
Marx seemed to find it incredible that Bonaparte, the representative
of the peasantry, who had displaced the natural representatives of the
bourgeoisie, could consolidate a regime under which capital
accumulation could proceed and the social power of the bourgeoisie
develop:
"Bonaparte throws the entire bourgeois economy into
confusion...and produces actual anarchy in the name of
order" (p.178).
As it happened, his domination was not the mere transitional anarchic
interlude which Marx envisaged. Bonaparte may not have seemed a
natural representative of the bourgeoisie, yet his political rule did
provide adequate conditions for the continuing economic dominance of
the bourgeoisie. Bonaparte's 'parasitic' state machine was thoroughly
dependent on capitalist production to provide the surplus off which it
lived, and therefore this state was not in a position to destroy the
basic juridical framework that protects the free exchange of
commodities. On the contrary, it can be argued that the Bonapartist
regime was able to take more far-reaching measures to further the
development of French capitalism than would have been possible under a
'bourgeois-democratic' regime"'.
5 This point is argued by Fernbach in his introduction to Marx
( 1973).
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The conclusion here is that political forces should be judged by their
effects and not by the presumed tie of representation which binds them
to one or other class.
Let us now organise and summarise the results we have reached through
the reading of the 'Manifesto' and the 'Eighteenth Brumaire'. We
began with the concept of the basic property relations of capitalism
and the two classes which can be defined at that level and then posed
the problem of the adequacy of these concepts in analysing the 'class
forces' and political movements active in capitalist societies. We
saw that the 'Manifesto' presents a ready general answer to this
problem: the line-up of class forces and political movements in
capitalist society at large will progressively approach the pure
reflection of the antagonism of bourgeoisie and proletariat. Society
will become organised into 'two great hostile camps' as (a) all
intermediate classes decay and disappear and (b) bourgeoisie and
proletariat attain their adequate forms of political organisation,
impelled by the dynamic of large-scale industrial development.
We^also noted that this proposition rested on a theory which was
present but not proven - the theory which would later be formalised in
the 1859 'Preface'. Marx indicated some mechanisms by which the
proletariat would attain the status of political class, but these
remained sketchy.
We then saw that the 'Eighteenth Brumaire' was written 'under the
sign' of the same theoretical proposition: that political forces are
the expression or representation of the interests of classes. Only
this time two kinds of complication were implicitly admitted.
First, the plurality of class interests: in place of the analloyed
collision between bourgeoisie and proletariat we found intrusions of
the interests of rival bourgeois factions, petty bourgeoisie,
peasantry, and even state machine. It was revealed that there are
fissures within the bourgeoisie which under certain conditions can be
politically paralysing and that the intermediate classes, despite
their precarious fate, can have important effects. These aspects of
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class were analysed in the context of the capital/wage labour
antagonism but they were not reducible to epiphenomena on the latter.
Second, although a unitary relationship between classes and political
forces was affirmed by the repeated use of the terms 'representation'
and 'expression', we found this unity effectively denied in the
specifics of Marx's analysis. Political forces and classes were
linked in various ways but there was no straightforward
'correspondence', and the former had their own effectivity. Marx
recognised the existence of a realm of political forces pursuing more
or less definite strategies which were by no means generated by the
forms of property alone, and operating within definite political
conditions (form of constitution; electoral system; allegiance of army
and national guard) which affected their popular support and
constrained their calculations in specific ways, and which were not
themselves reducible to reflections of property relations.
I have argued that the 'Eighteenth Brumaire' re-affirmed the
propositions of the 'Manifesto' in principle, but substantially
qualified or modified them in practice. Marx himself did not see a
radical discrepancy between the two texts. The 'Eighteenth Brumaire'
deals with a few years of history, the 'Manifesto' with a whole epoch,
and Marx held to the view that the tendency he had identified in the
'Manifesto' - 'the old Mole' - would in time grub its way through the
complicating historical circumstances. Bonaparte was only perfecting
the repressive state machine so that the proletariat, risen again,
could smash it. Nonetheless, it is the analysis of the 'Eighteenth
Brumaire' which provides the useful model for class analysis. Over a
century later the 'complicating circumstances' are as effective as
ever and what socialists need is a means of analysing that complexity
so as to make the most effective use of their resources, rather than a
promise of victory some day. Insofar as propositions of the kind
found in the Manifesto serve to short-circuit the analysis of
particular political forces and institutional forms they are
positively harmful.
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I have claimed that the 'Eighteenth Brumaire' provides the useful
model for analysis. I shall now try to sharpen the sense of that
proposition, as a prelude to considering contemporary Marxist analyses
of class.
First it means that we have to take seriously the range of 'class
interests' active in particular social formations, other than the
'pure' interests of bourgeoisie and proletariat. We have to consider
the ways in which the presence of other classes, can either sharpen
the political polarisation of society (e.g. the case of the Russian
revolution) or, under other circumstances, blunt the antagonism of
labour and capital (e.g. the case of the new Montagne) . This refers
us to the problem of the continued existence and effects of the
classes which Marx recognised perforce in the 'Eighteenth Brumaire',
yet saw as destined to disappear in the course of capitalist
development: the European peasantry is still an important force in
1980 (witness the struggles over the Common Agricultural Policy and
its implications for the E.E.C.); 'petty bourgeois' modes of thought
have a renewed significance in the economic policies of the Thatcher
government in Britain. It also refers us to the problem of the 'new
middle classes', however conceived, that is
"the constantly growing number of the middle classes, those
who stand between the workman on the one hand and the
capitalist and landlord on the other..." (Marx, 1969, part
two , p .57 3) ,
which Marx recognised in his later writings in an observation which
sits rather uneasily with the projections of the 'Manifesto', and
which we can hardly ignore today. Finally under this head of the
plurality of interests we have to consider the effects of
differentiation within the 'basic' classes, discarding the myth of a
necessary political homogeneity.
The second, related, lesson which can be derived from this reading of
Marx is that when one is analysing the politics of a given period from
a 'class' standpoint one always has to look for particular links
between political parties or movements and the classes of society.
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One cannot assume 'correspondence' as the a priori norm. Depending on
the context, it may be useful to ask the following kinds of questions
of political forces: To what extent is their membership or active
support drawn from certain classes? To what extent is their electoral
support concentrated in certain classes? Do their strategies indicate
an intention to better the position of certain classes? Do their
policies or actions have the effect of bettering/unifying/dividing
certain classes? Can their conceptions of society and social change
be related to the mode of 'practical thinking' appropriate to a
definite position in the class structure? The kinds of linkage which
may be revealed in answering these questions should not be bound by
any Procrustean conceptions of representation/expression.
The fulfilment of these tasks requires the rejection of one dominant
strand within classical Marxism: when it is said that the antagonism
between Labour and Capital is 'basic' this must not be taken to mean
that it is the unique causal motor and that other antagonisms are
marginal, or that it is the 'essence' and that specific struggles are
merely 'forms of appearance'. It means rather that for socialists
drawing upon Marx's analyses, the concept of the labour/capital
antagonism serves to organise and orient theory and politics. This
antagonism is taken as a 'basic' object of interest if one believes
that far-reaching popular democracy and social planning of production
can be achieved only with the abolition of bourgeois forms of property
and with the active participation of a substantial fraction of the
working class. This is not a license for unbridled empiricism - the
unstructured amassing of descriptive detail. The intention is to
preserve the fundamental interests active in Marx's writing, but
unsentimentally reject any concepts which constrict the pursuit of
those interests by blocking off important avenues of investigation.
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CHAPTER 2
MODERN MARXISTS ON SOCIAL CLASSES
In the previous chapter I have begun to outline a conception which I
trust will be useful in carrying out a class analysis of contemporary
capitalist societies - a conception which emphasizes the need for two
movements : the identification of 'economic' classes with respect to
the system of property relations, and the tracing of the complex
connections between these classes and the political forces which
operate on and define the dominant 'conflicts of interest' in society.
In attempting to analyse classes in contemporary capitalism one is
not, however, writing in a vacuum. The past two decades in particular
have seen a considerable volume of Marxist writing on social classes
and it is appropriate at this stage to offer a critical consideration
of this work. My general contention will be that a good deal of this
writing is marked by severe theoretical problems traceable to a
reluctance to accept the kind of analytical dichotomy indicated above
(economic classes/social and political forces). This chapter, then,
will be concerned with substantiating that general criticism and with
drawing out further the themes and problems which will be of
importance in my own analysis. I begin with Nicos Poulantzas, since
his arguments concerning the definition of a 'new petty bourgeoisie'
within the ranks of wage and salary-earning employees have had a
formative influence on the subsequent debates. In effect, Poulantzas
faced head-on the problem which Marx merely hinted at^ : has
capitalist development given rise to a 'third class', a new middle
grouping between the bourgeoisie and the working class? If so, how
should this class be conceptualised, and what are the implications for
socialist strategy?
1 See for instance the quotation from Marx in the conclusion to the
previous chapter, concerning the 'intermediates' between
bourgeois and proletarian. Other, similarly brief,
acknowledgements that there is some sort of problem here may be
found elsewhere in Marx's writings, but no systematic discussion
of the issue.
I then consider the critical development of Poulantzas' position by
Erik Olin Wright. The latter's stress on property relations in the
definition of classes leads me to a further discussion of property
relations, in which I argue (in agreement with Cutler et al (1977))
that they cannot really perform the particular analytical role which
Olin Wright assigns them, i.e. separating out certain 'contradictory
locations' between the bourgeoisie and the working class. I then
consider the alternative analytical strategy proposed by Carchedi,
which relies on the 'function of labour'/'function of capital'
dichotomy, and argue that it too is problematic. In the 'theoretical
reprise' which follows I argue that the search for the structural
criterion which will 'correctly' locate the 'lines of class division'
within the category of wage and salary-earning employees, is
ultimately a false search, resulting from a question inadequately
posed. In the final section of this chapter I amplify this conclusion
by discussing the problems which arise for the writers discussed
earlier (as well as for other 'traditional' Marxist positions) in
accounting for the relationship between 'structurally-defined' classes
and politics.
So, Poulantzas first. Poulantzas' concern was to apply and develop
the concepts of 'Althusserian' Marxism in relation to the problem of
social classes, and in particular the problem of the so-called 'new
middle class' of contemporary capitalism, with the ultimate aim of
providing a guide to socialist strategy and a means for criticising
the strategies of existing socialist political forces (in particular
the French Communist Party or PCF) . This concern led him from a
general theoretical treatment of 'Political Power and Social Classes'
( 1968), to the analysis of particular kinds of capitalist social
formation, notably in 'Fascism and Dictatorship', (1970) to a
2
synthesizing account of 'Classes in Contemporary Capitalism' (1974) .
1 shall devote most attention to the latter work, but refer to earlier
works where they can shed light on his later positions.
2 These dates refer to the original publications. English editions
were published in 1973, 1974 and 1975 respectively. References
henceforth will be to the English editions.
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Poulantzas employs two basic dichotomies in his development of the
theory of social classes in contemporary capitalism: the distinction
between productive and unproductive labour, and the distinction
between mental and manual labour. His position is that social classes
are determined by the global structure of social relations, and that
within this determination economic relations play a primary role but
political and ideological relations also have a relatively autonomous
effectivity. The distinction between productive and unproductive
labour is used to specify the economic position of agents, then the
distinction between mental and manual is introduced to grasp the
determinations at the level of ideology (and politics).
Poulantzas is not alone in taking the criterion of productive labour
as important in the determination of social class. Given the
importance which he assigns to this criterion it will be useful to
preface the discussion of Poulantzas' own views with a critical
discussion of Marx's concepts of productive and unproductive labour,
and their position within his theory of capitalist reproduction.
Productive and Unproductive Labour
The distinction between productive and unproductive labour was first
formulated in bourgeois political economy (notably by Adam Smith) in
the period during which the bourgeoisie in Britain was attempting to
cast off the fetters of feudal social relations. At this point it was
an explicitly critical distinction, used to attack the feudal ruling
classes and their retainers as 'unproductive' in relation to the
'productive' producers of commodities, as a drag on the process of
capital accumulation. Only labour which was materialised in a
'vendible commodity' was to count as productive. But with the
development of the class struggle of the working class, and the
closing of the ranks of the ruling classes in response to this new
challenge, the theory of productive and unproductive labour went
underground. The ex-feudal ruling classes were given a niche within
the superstructures of capitalism and 'vulgar economy' (Marx's
appelation for the apologetic school of economic theory which then
arose) developed the principle according to which all functionaries
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are productive and 'carry out a necessary social function'. Smith's
distinction was attacked as arbitrary. Meanwhile these concepts which
had been expurgated from bourgeois economic theory were taken up and
transformed by Marx in the context of his theory of capitalist
exploitation as a mode of extraction of surplus labour in the form of
surplus value. Marx constructed his own definition of the labour
which is 'productive' for capital - which contributes to the
3
accumulation of capital.
Insofar as Marx gives a definition of productive labour in general,
this is simply labour considered from the standpoint of the product -
that is, the process of combination of labourer, means of labour and
object of labour viewed as leading to a result: a determinate
product. But this definition was only a starting point. For Marx the
distinction between productive and unproductive labour does not serve
a moral purpose and it is not based on general ahistorical principles.
Rather it must be specified in relation to each mode of production.
Productive labour within the capitalist mode of production is
specified by a specification of the product: the specific product of
labour subordinated to capital is surplus value. So in the capitalist
mode productive labour is that labour which produces surplus value,
which serves as the means of the self-expansion of capital value.
"From the standpoint of capitalist production we may add the
qualification that labour is productive if it directly
valorizes capital, or creates surplus values".
(Marx, 1976, pp. 1038-9).
In order to fulfil this condition labour must clearly (a) produce
value (b) produce more value than that which serves as the equivalent
for the means of subsistence and reproduction of the worker. Now the
creation of value may be analysed as the expenditure of social labour
3 The principle sources for the following account are 'Capital'
Volume Two (Marx, 1970), the so-called 'unpublished chapter of
Capital' entitled 'Results of the Immediate Process of
Production' (Marx, 1976, pp.948-1084), and 'Theories of Surplus
Value' (Marx, 1969). I have also drawn on the account of Marx's
theory given by Berthoud ( 1974) .
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in the production of use values. Marx argues that the commodity, the
form of the product of social labour in capitalism, has two aspects:
exchange value and use value. In terms of exchange value a commodity
may be seen as the crystallisation of so much social labour time,
while in terms of use value the commodity is considered as an object
which satisfies some determinate need. In the same way productive
labour has two aspects: it is at once abstract labour and concrete
labour. That is, as regards the production of value labour counts
only as a quantitative proportion of total social labour: this is its
abstract aspect. But as regards the production of the particular use
values in which that value is embodied each labour is specific and
concrete.
The fact that productive labour, which creates surplus value, must be
embodied in some kind of use value does not, however, mean that it
must have any particular material content. We can bring about this
point by considering Marx's first distinction between productive and
unproductive labour. In this distinction Marx follows Adam Smith in
defining unproductive labour at the level of exchange: if productive
labour is labour subsumed by capital, i.e. is a function of labour
power exchanged against variable capital for the purpose of the
expansion of that capital through the extraction of surplus value,
then unproductive labour is labour which exchanges against 'revenue'
or 'simple money'. Unproductive labour is labour which is bought with
a view only to the enjoyment of the particular useful quality of that
labour. Now as Marx points out the same material labour may fall into
either of these categories. I can buy the services of a tailor in
order to make up a coat which I then wear. Here my money functions as
simple money and the tailor's labour counts as unproductive labour.
On the other hand I may own a tailoring establishment and buy the
labour power of the tailor in order to get him to make coats which I
then sell. In the sale of these coats I realise the value produced
during the whole day's labour of the tailor whereas I pay him only for
that portion of the working day during which he reproduces the value
of his labour power. In this case my money functions as capital and
the tailor's labour counts as productive. Thus the same material
labour may be either productive or unproductive. Here is Marx on the
subject:
"It follows from what has been said that the designation of
labour as productive labour has nothing to do with the
determinate content of the labour, its special utility, or
the particular use value in which it manifests itself. The
same kind of labour may be productive or unproductive. .. A
singer who sells her song for her own account is an
unproductive labourer. But the same singer commissioned by
an entrepreneur to sing in order to make money for him is a
productive worker; for she produces capital". (Marx, 1969,
part one, p .401).
He adds the examples of the hack writer and the teacher in a private,
profit-making school - both 'productive' - to reinforce the point.
The distinction rests upon the social relations within which the
labour is carried out, and not its particular material
characteristics. So far, the distinction is quite clear. Marx is
drawing a line between those employed by capitalist enterprises with a
view to making profit, and those employed in situations where the
hiring of labour is not tied in any direct way to the expansion of
capital values (e.g. the domestic servant or the civil servant).
Marx, however, regarded this first distinction as inadequate to grasp
the process of production and realisation of surplus value. It had to
be supplemented by a second distinction between labour of production
and labour of circulation. This is a distinction which goes beyond
the level of classical political economy, into the workings of the
different fractions or moments of capital in the overall reproduction
process of capital. By 'production' Marx means that activity in which
humans enter into relations with nature in order to produce some
determinate useful product of 'use value'. Where the social structure
is such that these use values assume the form of commodities, that is
the form of private property destined for exchange, there must also be
an activity of 'circulation'. In any society there must be a
distribution of the products of social labour to the sites at which
they are to be used and for Marx the labour involved in the spatial
distribution of products is productive. 'Circulation' on the other
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hand, is that purely social movement, the transfer of property titles,
which is necessitated only by the fact that products assume the form
of commodities.
Thus Marx's distinction does not correspond to an institutional
separation of production and circulation. Just as transport
represents productive labour carried over into the 'sphere of
circulation', so the productive industrial enterprise may employ some
of its own circulation workers (unproductive labour in the 'sphere of
production').
On the basis of this distinction between production and circulation
Marx further specifies the theory of productive and unproductive
labour in capitalism. The argument may be summarised as follows:
1. Labour in production creates surplus value, whereas labour in
circulation, which produces no 'use values', serves only to realise
the value materialised in the products, through sale and purchase.
9
2. For this reason the character of the consumption of labour power
by capital is different in the two spheres. In production labour
figures as the contradictory opposite of capital. Capital can expand
only by setting labour-power to produce use values, thereby calling
upon a force which contradicts its own authority. In circulation, on
4
the other hand, capital could hypothetically do without labour.
Commercial profit derives not from surplus value created in the
circulation process, for there is none. Rather it derives from the
fact that productive capital sells its products to commercial capital
below their values, or prices of production, so that commercial
capital may then resell the products at their values. Productive
capital realises a certain portion of the unpaid labour materialised
in the product, then commercial capital realises the remainder.
4 Of course commercial capital does employ workers. In Marx's
argument this is because of the pressure to reduce the time of
circulation so that capital may remain in the sphere of
production for as long as possible during its cycle of
reproduction, and thus produce a greater mass of surplus value in
a given time.
3. If commercial profit does not derive from surplus labour
performed in the sphere of circulation, this raises the question of
whether the workers employed by commercial capital are 'exploited*.
Marx does not talk of 'surplus labour'in the sphere of circulation but
he does talk of 'unpaid labour'. This points to the notion that while
commercial workers are not exploited in the same way as productive
workers (direct extraction of surplus value) none the less they are
compelled to perform a greater number of hours of labour than they
receive in the form of a wage.
This second distinction, between workers employed in production and
those employed in circulation functions, is considerably more
problematic than the first. Berthoud (1974) argues that it represents
the dialectical completion of Marx's theory: the first distinction is
inadequate on its own, while the second complements and refines it .
But there is a tension between the two criteria which cannot be argued
away. According to the first version, the actual tasks performed by
the workers are irrelevant to the determination of their labours as
productive or unproductive. All that matters is whether or not they
are employed in order to expand capital. Yet in the second version
the tasks do matter: operating a lathe or driving a truck in the pay
of a capitalist enterprise is productive, while keeping accounts,
arranging finance, advertising or selling the product, is not. The
criterion to which Marx appeals in the second case is the production
of 'use value' . Driving a truck to take a commodity to the point of
sale is a contribution to the use value of the product (altering its
spatial location) but selling it, or keeping account of its sale, is
not. It doesn't matter what particular task the 'productive' worker
performs, _so_ long as he is producing _a use value - the precondition
for creating value.
Now the principle of this exclusion is not that the circulation work
fails to be 'really useful'. Marx is quite clear that the concept of
'use value' is not to be used as a moral category, defined in relation
to a theory of 'true human needs'. Even the most frippery luxury
destined for capitalist consumption is a 'use value' provided someone
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is willing to buy it. Rather, the labour of circulation is excluded
from the sphere of 'use value' because it is supposedly necessitated
solely by the fact that products take the form of private property in
a capitalist economy.
It is this conception which is problematic. True, buying and selling,
payment of money incomes, borrowing and lending money, keeping
monetary accounts are all activities specific to a monetary economy,
but on the other hand they represent certain functions in relation to
the distribution process which would have to be performed in any
developed economy. The form is specific to generalised commodity
production but certain of the 'content' is not. Take for instance the
labour involved in the payment of money incomes and in the sale of
consumer goods to workers. As I mentioned in the Introduction, in
criticism of Marx's idea of 'abundance' in communist society, it seems
very likely that in any forseeable form of economy the output of many
consumer goods will be less than the volume which people would like to
consume if they could do so at no cost. Unless one envisages a system
of universal rationing (which would itself require considerable labour
to administer), a socialist economy would need some system of
consumption allowances. These need not take the form of wages - they
could be distributed on the basis of 'need' (however defined) rather
than on work/bargaining-power/cost of development of labour power -
but all the same there would be a need to calculate and distribute the
allowances, and to 'cancel' acquisitions of consumer goods against the
allowance. This is effectively what a part of commercial work
accomplishes at present, through the form of money. Of course, it may
be possible to reduce considerably the routine labour this activity
currently involves, with the development of information technology, as
well as the reorganisation of social relations, but then the same goes
for a lot of routinised labour in eminently 'productive' manufacturing
industry. I am not suggesting here that all the commercial and
financial work in the sphere of circulation performs a necessary
social function, irrespective of the form of property relations. The
point is merely that 'keeping accounts' in the broad sense is not a
specifically capitalist requirement. Indeed it may be argued that
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certain of the functions performed by accounting within the capitalist
circulation process, while they would be transformed in a planned
economy, would actually be expanded upon. 'Socialist accounting' in
the context of planning would have to be more elaborate than
capitalist, in that it would not deal in only the single dimension of
monetary magnitudes but would have to construct indices of social
costs and benefits.
If there is truth in this contention, that the labour involved in
'circulation' is at least in part a specifically 'monetarised' form of
activities necessary in any developed economy, then Marx's 'second'
distinction between productive and unproductive labour must be
problematic. Marx took Smith to task for taking an overly 'Scottish '
or arbitrarily literal view of what labour was to count as productive
(Smith reckoned it had to be worked up in a solid, enduring 'vendible
commodity'), and we have seen that Marx would include drivers, singers
and teachers as productive provided they are employed in order to make
profits, yet he seems to draw an equally arbitrary distinction himself
in' labelling the 'circulation' workers employed by capitalist
enterprises as unproductive.
I would argue, therefore, that Marx's second distinction between
productive and unproductive labour is a shaky foundation for class
analysis. Nonetheless, let us proceed to see what use Poulantzas
makes of the criterion. I shall concentrate on his arguments
concerning the middle classes of capitalism, for in his view 'the
definition of the petty bourgeoisie is the focal point of the Marxist
theory of social classes', in that it reveals very clearly the problem
of the criteria to be used in defining the boundaries of class.
Poulantzas on Social Classes
In the third section of 'Classes in Contemporary Capitalism',
Poulantzas deals with the complex of problems associated with the
'middle classes' of capitalism: how is the working class to be
delimited? What is the class determination of those agents who are
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strictly speaking neither bourgeois nor proletarian? Among these
latter what are the significant lines of division into strata and
fractions? He sums these problems up as the 'question of the new
petty bourgeoisie'. Here is the skeleton of his argument in attacking
this question:
1. Productive labour is a necessary condition for membership of the
working class, since for Marxism 'productive labour' in the capitalist
mode designates the place of exploited labour within capitalist
relations of production. Only workers who produce surplus value are
exploited in the strict sense and thus they are the only candidates
for membership of the proletariat proper .
2. On the other hand productive labour is not a sufficient condition
for membership of the working class. The category of productive
labour becomes extended, with the development of the 'collective
labourer' in industry, to include those supervisors, low-level
managers, engineers, technicians, draughtsmen, etc., whose labour
forms a necessary part of the total 'productive organism' within
capitalist machine industry. But not all of these agents are members
of the working class. This is because the structure of the collective
labourer is not a 'neutral' outgrowth of the development of
production, based on a technical division of labour alone. Rather it
carries within it the specifically capitalist social division of
labour - a double division between mental and manual labour and
between supervisors and supervised, which forms the basis of a class
division.
The division of mental and manual labour cannot be understood in terms
of general descriptive criteria ('handwork' vs. 'brainwork') but
should be grasped as 'the form taken by the political and ideological
conditions of the (production) process within the process itself'.
Basing his arguments on Marx's treatment of the collective labourer in
Volume One of 'Capital', Poulantzas maintains:
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"(a) that the supports of mental labour tend to become part
of the productive collective worker, but that (b) at the
same time, and even for the same reasons (capitalist
socialisation), mental labour separates off from manual
labour in an 'antagonistic contradiction'. (Poulantzas,
1975, p.235).
Thus he argues that the 'support of mental labour' within the
collective worker do not form part of the working class. The agents
who perform mental labour occupy a place in the social division of
labour which is antagonistic to the proletariat, since the whole
apparatus of 'mental labour' functions to exclude the workers from
'knowledge', such as it is, and to give them the impression that they
are fit for no more than donkey work.
For Poulantzas, the division between mental and manual labour is
primarily an ideological structure, and an 'ideological' criterion of
class membership, but it also has a political aspect. Poulantzas
maintains that some of the 'supports of mental labour' are at the same
time agents of a directly political domination over the working class:
the foreman and supervisors. That is, he proposes that the relations
of domination and subordination between supervisors and foremen and
rank-and-file workers be understood as the reproduction in miniature
of the global domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat.
These relations of power at the place of production become a
'political' criterion of class differentiation.
3. Poulantzas therefore defines the working class by the
intersection of the criteria of productive labour and manual labour.
In his argument this is a particularly restrictive definition, since
he gives a rather narrow definition of both productive labour and
manual labour.
a) Productive labour: Poulantzas starts off with the traditional
Marxist definition of productive labour, i.e. labour which
produces surplus value. But then he makes an addition to the
definition:
"We shall say that productive labour, in the capitalist mode
of production is that labour which produces surplus value
while directly reproducing the material elements that serve
as the substratum of the relation of exploitation: labour
that is directly involved in material production by
producing use-values that increase material wealth".
(ibid ., p.216).
b) Manual Labour: Poulantzas does not define mental and manual
labour by reference to the content of labour, but rather by
reference to the structure of ideological social relations
within which labour is carried out .
"We could thus say that every form of work which takes the
form of a knowledge from which the direct producers are
excluded, falls on the mental labour side of the capitalist
production process, irrespective of its empirical/natural
content, and that this is so whether the direct producers
actually do know how to perform this work but do not do so
(again not by chance), or whether they in fact do not know
how to perform it (since they are systematically kept away
from it) or whether again there is quite simply nothing that
t needs to be known", (ibid., p.238).
By the use of this criterion Poulantzas consigns to the realm of
mental labour all the work involved in "accounting, banking,
insurance, 'services' of various kinds, 'office work', and the greater
part of the civil service" (ibid., p.258). 'Manual labour' then
becomes restricted to the labour of the productive industrial
proletarians.
4. Having defined the working class, Poulantzas then has the problem
of analysing the class determination of the substantial category of
wage and salary earners who are excluded from the proletariat on his
definition - all but the manual industrial workers. He delimits the
bourgeoisie proper by reference to 'real economic ownership' - that
is, the power to assign the means of production to given uses and to
dispose of the products obtained - and argued that all wage labour
which does not fall into the categories of proletariat or bourgeoisie
should be considered as forming a 'new petty bourgeoisie'.
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Clearly the economic position of wage-workers engaged in 'mental
labour' as employees of capitalist enterprises or the state is very
different from the economic position of the traditional petty
bourgeoisie of Marxist theory, since the latter class depends upon
independent artisanal production and small scale trading. But
Poulantzas argues that the 'structural determination' of social
classes involves political and ideological, as well as economic,
determinants, so that if seemingly disparate economic positions in
fact produce similar effects at the political and ideological levels,
the agents occupying those positions must be considered as members of
the same social class. Broadly speaking, Poulantzas' contention is
that the atomised bureaucratic organisation of 'mental labour' in
capitalism and the possibilities for 'career advancement' in the
sphere of 'mental labour', provide the material basis for 'petty
bourgeois' politics and ideology. So the 'mental' wage workers should
be considered as a petty bourgeois class fraction.
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This, then, is the bare skeleton of Poulantzas' position: the working
class is defined by the intersection of productive labour (economic
determination) and manual labour (political and idological
determination), and the non-proletarian wage workers are to be grasped
as a 'new petty bourgeoisie' by virtue of the effects of their
intermediate position with respect to the antagonism of bourgeoisie
and proletariat.
Of course Poulantzas' argument for this position is not as bare as is
suggested in the summary above. In fact his argument is complex but
clear, and is supported by a wide variety of suggestive observations.
So it is not surprising that the critique of Poulantzas should have
formed the starting point for two of the most serious recent attempts
to develop the Marxist theory of classes - those of Olin Wright, and
Cutler et al. Having exposed the skeleton of his argument, let us
consider the ways in which it can be criticised and developed. I
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shall first examine some problems in Poulantzas' use of the concepts
of productive labour and manual labour, then move to Olin Wright's
criticism, which centres on the conceptualisation of capitalist
property relations.
I said earlier that Poulantzas adopts a restrictive definition of both
productive labour and manual labour. In fact, even if one accepts his
definition of the proletariat by the intersection of productive labour
and manual labour there is room for argument over the precise
application of these criteria.
1. Productive Labour: Poulantzas defines this as labour producing
surplus value in 'material production'. He presents this
qualification of the definition of productive labour by reference to
the production of surplus value alone, as a mere explication of what
is implicit in Marx, but it is clear that Marx did not hold this
position. He held firmly to the determination of productive labour by
the production of surplus value, regardless of the material form of
the' product. In order to be productive, a labour must produce use
values which contain a surplus value, but these 'use values' need not
be durable physical objects. Surplus value may just as well be
materialised in the performance of a song, or the reading of a
lecture, or the serving of a meal, as in nuts and bolts, if the
workers performing these services are being employed by a capitalist
in order to expand his capital.
We have seen that Marx himself undermines the principle of the
irrelevance of the 'determinate content' of the labour in the case of
'circulation' workers, but the license for this inconsistency was the
supposition that circulation workers do not produce any use values. I
argued that this license was spurious, but even if that argument is
not accepted, Marx's qualification cannot validate Poulantzas'
'explication'. His addition to Marx's definition of productive labour
is reminiscent of the Physiocrats, who saw the production of surplus
value as the piling up of physical surplus wealth, rather than as a
social relation.
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2. Manual Labour: We have seen that Poulantzas detaches the
definition of mental and manual labour from the nature of the tasks
performed. From a Marxist perspective it is quite correct to
emphasise that the present division between 'mental' and 'manual'
labour is not reducible to a neutral 'technical' division of tasks,
and that it has the effect of reinforcing the class division of
society, but there are problems in the way Poulantzas applies this
conception. He seems to imply that only productive workers can be
real 'manual' workers, since all unproductive labour is invested with
ideological 'know-how', however spurious, which makes it socially
'superior' to industrial labour and inaccessible to the industrial
workers. This position is hardly tenable. There is a substantial
category of 'unproductive' labour which surely falls on the 'manual'
side of the socially-constructed division between mental and manual
labour: for example, the work of state-employed hospital porters and
auxiliaries, the work of caterers and cleaners in state institutions,
the work of local authority roadmen and transport drivers. This work
is 'unproductive', in the sense that such workers are employed by the
state to provide social use values rather than to expand capital
value, yet the conditions of work, and the social status with which
the work is invested, do not differ significantly from the case from
the case of employment by private capital.
If one accepts that the concept of 'manual' labour must have a broader
application than Poulantzas admits, this opens up an anomaly in his
delimitation of the working class. Poulantzas notes that not all
productive workers are manual workers, but I also argue that not all
'manual workers' are productive workers. If this is the case, what is
the class determination of the unproductive manual workers?
Poulantzas maintains that productive labour is a necessary condition
for membership of the working class, so on his reckoning they must
form a fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie. But how does this
square with his mode of argument in defining the new petty
bourgeoisie? In that argument he maintains that agents occupying
different economic places will be considered as members of the same
social class if the positions with respect to the structure
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of political and ideological domination and subordination,
corresponding to those different economic places, are sufficiently
similar. So surely the division between mental and manual labour,
which according to Poulantzas expresses the capitalist social division
of labour, should be decisive in delimiting the working class. The
working class should be defined by manual labour, regardless of
whether the workers in questions are productive or unproductive, since
manual labour corresponds to the place of political and ideological
subordination in capitalism. Poulantzas avoids this inconsistency by
sweeping the possibility of unproductive manual labour under the
carpet, and thus he leaves himself open to the charge that he is
deploying his criteria in an attempt to establish essentially
'proletarian' status for a pre-given social category - manual workers
in industry - without following through the logic of his concepts.
This problem of the relative decisiveness of the 'economic' criterion
of productive labour as against 'political and ideological' criteria
in delimiting social classes, forms the starting point of Erik Olin
Wright's critique of Poulantzas.^ Olin Wright points out that while
Poulantzas maintains that the economic determination of social classes
is the primary determination, in practice he lays much more weight on
the 'political and ideological' criteria, both in excluding 'mental'
productive workers from the working class and in establishing the
unity of his 'petty bourgeoisie' . Poulantzas sets up a topology of
criteria of class determination which looks something like this:
Economic criterion: Productive labour/Unproductive labour
Political criterion: Supervision and policing of the workforce.
Ideological criterion: Mental labour/Manual labour.
5 This critique was first put forward in New Left Review (Olin
Wright, 1976) and it is this article that I refer to here. It
has subsequently been developed in Olin Wright ( 1978).
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Apart from the anomaly of the unproductive manual workers noted above,
he makes the political and ideological criteria bear the main weight
in defining both the working class and the 'new petty bourgeoisie'.
Olin Wright argues that the distinction between productive and
unproductive labour is not the relevant 'economic criterion' in
differentiating social classes. He gives two arguments in support of
this position. First he maintains that the distinction between
productive and unproductive labour does not isolate two distinct
categories of workers, but rather two 'dimensions' of labour activity.
That is, many workers perform both productive and unproductive labour
in the course of their work. This does not appear to be a valid
objection. On the basis of Marx's second distinction
(production/circulation) some workers could be regarded as performing
both productive and unproductive labour. Consider an assistant in a
supermarket: insofar as he or she is engaged in transporting and
storing products his/her labour would be 'productive', but when he or
she is tending the till and supervising payment for products as
commodities his/her labour would be part of the 'unproductive' work of
circulation. I have noted above the problems in maintaining this
distinction, but even if one does subscribe to it this case of overlap
would be seen as exceptional. The greater number of manual industrial
workers perform, on this criterion, productive labour alone and all
the employees in banking and finance are unproductive. Further,
Marx's first distinction (labour employed by capital/labour employed
out of 'revenue') draws a definite line between two categories of
workers.
Olin Wright's second argument on this point is more telling. He
maintains that even if productive and unproductive labour are
generally distinct there is no good reason to believe that
unproductive workers will, by virtue of their 'unproductive' nature
alone, have a class interest which is distinct from that of productive
workers. Olin Wright supports this point by reference to the
'interest in socialism' on the part of the unproductive workers. Now
this reference to 'interest' is untheorised in his paper, and it
rather begs the question, but it is possible to sustain the point in
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another way. Colliot-Thelene (1975) attacks the use of productive
labour as a criterion of class division, from a different angle. For
Marx, 'unproductive labour' is an economic category which covers all
labour, in capitalist social formations, which does not contribute
directly to the production of surplus value. As such it includes
labours located in a wide variety of social positions, from domestic
service and the labour of independent petty producers, to state
employment in all its forms (other than commodity-producing
nationalised industries), to the commercial labour of circulation
which forms a necessary stage in the cycle of capital reproduction.
Colliot-Thelene concentrates on the question of the workers employed
in the sphere of circulation, and argues that they are just as much
proletarians as the productive workers. Of course if this point is
carried it does not prove that all unproductive wage-earners are
'proletarians', but it does show that Marx's concept of productive
labour is not in itself relevant to the question of class
determination.
Col'liot-Thelene supports her position by pointing out that the problem
Marx is addressing when he develops the concepts of productive labour
in the sphere of production and unproductive labour in the sphere of
circulation, is the problem of the functioning of the different
fractions of capital in the global process of capital accumulation,
and not at all the question of the class membership of commercial
employees. It is true historically that in the earlier stages of
capitalist development commercial workers were paid higher wages and
salaries than industrial workers, that they had greater access to the
'secrets' of management, and that their labour carried a higher
'social status'. But as Marx pointed out, even in his day these
relative advantages were being eroded. Commercial employees were paid
higher wages because of the relatively high level of qualification
presupposed by office work. But with the advance of public education
there is no longer a premium on the skills of reading, writing, and
arithmetic, and also office work has become greatly simplified and
reduced in scope by the increasing division of labour in the spheres
of commerce and finance, so the initial advantages of such employment
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have been largely eliminated. The privileged position of commercial
workers was a feature of the historically uneven development of
proletarianisation, and not a structural feature of the capitalist
mode of prodcution. Just as industrial capital on the one hand and
commercial and financial capital on the other form fractions of one
class - the bourgeoisie - so the industrial, commercial and financial
workers they employ are all fractions of the proletariat.
In short, there is no evidence that Marx intended the concepts of
production and unproductive labour as definitive of a class division
(he even wrote of the 'commercial proletariat'), and although that
does not prove the point either way Poulantzas has not produced any
compelling reasons why we should take the concepts in that way.
A different criterion of 'economic class place':
Olin Wright
If we reject Poulantzas' identification of productive labour as the
relevant 'economic criterion' for defining the proletariat, we topple
the keystone of his argument, and we have to re-think both the content
of the idea of 'economic class place' and the relation between
economic and other determinations of social class. Both Olin Wright
and Colliot-Thelene attempt to do this in such a way as to establish
property relations as the key element in the economic determination of
classes, and to relate the effectivity of determinations at the level
of mental labour/manual labour and supervisory powers to the position
of agents within the property relations of capitalism.
As I argued above the core property relations of capitalism can be
summed up schematically in the formula of a two-fold separation: (i)
the separation of the units of production from one another, as objects
of private property, and (ii) the separation of the direct producers
from the means of production, such that the producers can operate the
means of production only on terms laid down by their owners (the wage
contract) .
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Olin Wright and Colliot-Thelene take this second separation - the
separation of the producers from the means of production - as their
point of departure, and anlyse its forms and conditions. We have seen
how Poulantzas analyses the concept of property in the means of
production, breaking it down into the levels of economic ownership and
possession. Olin Wright takes this analysis a stage further, and
examines the way in which the differentiation of the functions of
capital has affected the class determination of the agents in the
capitalist production process. That is, he argues in terms of various
'degrees' of ownership of, and separation from, the means of
production. His central thesis is that 'ownership of the means of
production' and 'separation from the means of production' are not just
two poles. Rather they may be considered as the ends of a spectrum.
At the one extreme, full economic ownership of the means of production
defines an unambiguously bourgeois class place, and at the other
extreme complete separation from control over production defines an
unambiguously proletarian class place, but in between we find what
Olin Wright describes as 'contradictory class locations'. Employees
who fall within the category of contradictory locations cannot be
defined as proletarian or bourgeois at the level of economic relations
alone. He represents this categorisation schematically as overleaf.












































In terms of Poulantzas' categories of property relations, Olin Wright
retains the concept of asconomic ownership, to refer to control over
investment and resources, but argues that 'possession', the concept
which Poulantzas used to denote 'ability to put the means of
production into operation', must be further analysed. The
differentiation of the functions of capital through the increasing
division of labour means that 'possession' is not a unitary power, but
is broken down into the levels of control over the means of production
and control over labour power.
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So, reading from the top we can see that Olin Wright defines the class
place of the bourgeoisie by reference to the union of the power of
economic ownership and the powers of possession over means of
production and the labour-power of others. In this category he places
the 'traditional' capitalist entrepreneur, who enjoys both legal
ownership and economic control over his enterprise, and the top
executive of the modern capitalist concern, who may or may not have a
substantial shareholding in the enterprise but who, it is argued,
exercises full economic ownership. Further down, the proletariat is
defined by complete exclusion from control over the means of
production and labour power, or in other words by economic
'propertylessness'. Between these class places Olin Wright identifies
a series of 'contradictory locations', from the top managers, who
exercise powers of possession over the means of production and
labour-power but only limited access to the powers of economic
ownership, down to the foreman and supervisors who are separated from
the proletariat only by their limited control over labour-power.
Using the same categories he marks out the class place of the
traditional petty bourgeoisie of independent production by reference
to economic ownership and possession of small-scale means of
production, without any control over labour power. The petty
bourgeois has his own means of production, but he works this by
himself, or with family help, and does not hire wage workers. Two
other kinds of 'contradictory location' close to the petty bourgeoisie
are considered: the semi-autonomous employees, who differ from the
proletariat proper by virture of their limited control over their
production process, and the small employers, whose control over the
labour power of others is minimal. This configuration of classes can
be shown diagramatically as overleaf:^
6 This is taken from Olin Wright (1976, p.27).
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There are thus two kinds of 'contradictory locations' in Olin Wright's
theory. There is a contradictory location within the capitalist mode
of production itself between the two major classes of that mode, and
there are contradictory locations between each of the two classes of
the capitalist mode and the petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie,
based on petty commodity production and exchange, is not itself a
class of this mode.
How does Olin Wright analyse these 'contradictory locations'? His
position is that when an agent has a contradictory location at the
economic level, political and ideological relations enter into the
determination of his class position:
"The extent to which political and ideological relations
enter into the determination of class position is itself
determined by the degree to which those positions occupy a
contradictory location at the level of social relations of
production", (ibid., pp.39-40).
or again:
"....it is the indeterminacy of class determination at the
economic level which allows political and ideological
relations to become effective determinants of class postion"
(ibid ., p .40) .
This conception solves the problem which Wright identifies in
Poulantzas' theory: if the economic determination of social class is
supposedly primary, how can political and ideological criteria
over-ride the economic criterion? Wright argues that if we develop
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the correct economic criterion the other criteria fall into place.
'We need a criterion for use of political and ideological relations
which is itself determined by economic relations' - and property is
the basis for that criterion.
So much for the schematic presentation. Let us pause on this
conception and consider in more detail the adequacy of Olin Wright's
development of the concept of property relations.
Property relations once more
I have already argued in favour of taking property relations as the
basis for defining the pattern of economic class relations. In
Chapter 1, I showed the link between the concepts of bourgeoisie and
proletariat and the form of exclusive possession of the means of
production in capitalism. But Olin Wright's arguments oblige us to
consider this point in more detail: what precisely do we mean by
'ownership' or 'possession' of the means of production? Can we
properly talk of 'degrees' of possession? Can we make a precise
identification of the class of 'owners' in modern capitalism?
Let us recall the Poulantzian conception of property which Olin Wright
is concerned to develop. This conception involves a double
distinction: first between the formal legal right to ownership of the
means of production ('juridicial ownership') and the substantive
powers of control; second, within the latter set of powers,
Poulantzas distinguishes 'economic ownership' ('the power to assign
the means of production to given uses and so to dispose of the
products obtained') and 'possession' ('the capacity to put the means
of production into operation'). According to this schema, during the
phase of 'manufacture' there was a dissociation between 'economic
ownership' and 'possession' - the former being held by the capitalists
and the latter by the artisans whom they employed, who were still in
the position of directing their own labour process. With the rise of
capitalist production proper (the 'real subsumption of Labour under
capital' in Marx's terminology) 'economic ownership' and 'possession'
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(and also juridical ownership) are united in the hands of the
capitalist entrepreneur. Henceforth, within capitalist development,
economic ownership and possession are said to correspond to the 'place
of capital'. The rise of the joint stock company complicates the
issue, since it introduces a dissociation between juridical owners
(shareholders) and the agents who carry out the substantive functions
of economic ownership and possession (i.e. managers at various
levels), but it does not change the essentials. Poulantzas is
critical of the Berle and Means/Burnham 'managerial revolution'
arguments: there is not really a 'divorce of ownership and control'
in the modern corporation, since on his definition economic ownership
is control. The partial 'divorce' between juridical and economic
ownership does not mark any fundamental discontinuity in the
reproduction of capitalist production relations. Poulantzas,
employing Marx's conception of the individual capitalist as merely the
'bearer' or 'support' (Trager) of the capitalist property relation,
argues that if the 'supports' of private property in early capitalism
(i.e. the owner-entrepreneurs) were members of the bourgeoisie, then
the 'supports' of corporate private property (the managers) are
equally bourgeois.
We have seen that Olin Wright takes over this conception, only he
develops it at one point: he argues that economic ownership and
possession have become differentiated into matters of degree. The
managerial functions are carried out by a hierarchical bureaucracy
within the corporation and depending on his position within the
hierarchy an individual may be more or less in control of means of
production and labour power. This gives rise to the 'contradictory
location' of those individuals who have sufficient powers of control
to be classed as participating in capitalist property, (and are
therefore not proletarians in economic terms) yet do not have
sufficient autonomy and 'high-level' sway to count as outright
'economic owners' (and so are not economically bourgeois either).
Now the distinction between juridical or formal property rights and
effective economic control is important, and clearly stated by
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Poulantzas. But I would argue that the twofold schema of economic
ownership/possession is too vague to be very useful in analysing the
form of property in the modern joint-stock company. Holesovsky (1977)
provides a more adequate breakdown of the substantive powers of
ownership in his fourfold schema, quoted below:
1. Custody rights, i.e., authority to make decisions associated with
the actual utilization of the owned asset. This is what is meant
by "possession", real "control", or "management" of the asset.
2. Usufruct rights, i.e., authority to claim the appropriation of
new assets resulting from the utilization of the object of
ownership (such as value added in production), either directly in
the form of real products or in the form of income (wages,
interest, rent or profit).
3. Alienation, in the sense of transferring the ownership through
sale or bequest to another subject.
4. Destruction, which needs no comments.
(Holesovsky, 1977,p.41).
In the following discussion, I propose to use this categorisation in
place of that of Poulantzas. A terminological point should be
noticed: in the Holesovsky scheme (as also in Cutler et al ( 1977))
the term 'possession' is used to refer to real exclusive control over
an asset, and is not used in Poulantzas' narrower sense (carried over
by Olin Wright) . Let us put these concepts to work. In the case of
personal ownership of the means of production by a capitalist
entrepreneur, all the substantive ownership powers are centred in the
individual capitalist, along with the juridical title to those powers,
but in the case of the public joint-stock company the property
relations are much more complex. It may be useful to set out the
formal juridical relations first, then discuss any discrepancies
between these relations and the allocation of substantive powers. In
formal terms the owners of a joint-stock company are its shareholders.
The rights attached to this position include the right to receive part
of the usufruct of the firm's assets (i.e. the profit) in the form of
dividend payments, and the right to elect the board of directors who
in turn appoint the top managers. The managers are conceived as the
salaried employees of the owners, and their function is to conduct the
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affairs of the company in the best interests of the owners. At the
same time, however, the joint-stock company is itself a legal
'personality', capable of entering into contracts and of owning
assets. The powers of custody and alienation of the means of
production employed by the firm will generally belong not to any
individual person but to the joint-stock company as such.
Now, it is a commonplace to point out that effective control over the
policy of larger joint-stock companies by shareholders is a rarity.
Shareholders who are also directors or top managers may be party to
major decisions, but shareholding as such is not sufficient to ensure
effective possession. In the economic literature, the credit for this
observation is generally given to Berle and Means ( 1932) but Marx had
argued the same point in Volume Three of 'Capital*. He wrote that the
development of stock companies meant
"Transformation of the actually functioning capitalist into
a mere manager, administrator of other people's capital, and
of the owner of capital into a mere owner, a mere
'money-capitalist... The total profit (for the salary of the
manager is, or should be, simply the wage of a specific type
of skilled labour, whose price is regulated in the
labour-market like that of any other labour)... is
henceforth... mere compensation for owning capital that now
is entirely divorced from the function in the actual process
of reproduction, just as this function in the person of the
manager is divorced from ownership of capital". (Marx, 1972,
pp.436-7).
One could hardly wish for a clearer statement of the 'divorce of
ownership and control' thesis. In the same pages Marx refers to the
dividend payments received by the rentier shareholders as 'interest',
emphasizing the similarity of the position of shareholders and simple
creditors of a company. Shareholders have a legal title to part
ownership of the company while creditors do not, but according to Marx
this legal title is an increasingly irrelevant fiction. The rentier
shareholders are essentially functionless parasites ('mere
money-capitalists') who take no part in the actual direction of the
firm's activities. Now when Burnham (1944), following Berle and
Means, argued the thesis of the divorce of ownership and control, he
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gave it a particular political inflection: history had played a trick
on the Marxists, capitalism had indeed been superseded, not by
socialist but by a 'managerial' system. Ironically, Marx's own
reflections on the implications of the joint-stock form appear
consistent with this kind of equivocation. He saw the stock company
as a 'transitional' form, representing a contradictory break with the
essential features of capitalist property.
"...the stock company is a transition toward the conversion
of all functions in the reproduction process which still
remain linked with capitalist property, into mere functions
of associated producers, into social functions" (Marx, 1972,
p.437).
Or again:
"...This is the abolition of the capitalist mode of
production within the capitalist mode of production itself,
and hence a self-dissolving contradiction, which prima facie
represents a mere phase of transition to a new form of
production" (ibid.).
In t^arx's view, then, the managers of the joint-stock companies were
hired employees, the price of whose labour-power was determined on the
market, and not a new property-owning class. Private property became
an irrelevant vestige, ripe for outright abolition. But there has now
existed for some considerable time an economic system in which the
major branches of large-scale industry are dominated by public
joint-stock companies. Either Marx really did 'overlook' the
possibility of a post-capitalist 'managerial' system, or else the
present system is still capitalist, in which case the concept of
property which Marx used in his analysis of the joint-stock company as
a mere 'transitional' form was faulty. I take the latter view. As
Cutler et al (1977) have argued, these remarkable passages from
'Capital' show that Marx was unable to distinguish clearly personal
private property in the means of production, and exclusive possession
by capitalist enterprises. The former was characteristic of the
earlier stages of capitalist development but is in no way essential to
the concept of capitalist property relations. It is true that in most
cases the shareholders of a joint stock company do not exercise any
substantive powers of direction over the company's resources. What
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they 'own' in effect is merely a marketable financial asset - the
share - which offers them the prospect of a dividend depending on the
firm's ability to pay. But this does not imply that the means of
production are about to pass into the hands of the 'associated
producers' as collective social property. The means of production
remain the object of an exclusive possession, by the capitalist
enterprise (stock company) itself. Capitalist enterprises remain
separate legal subjects and separate units of possession, producing
commodities for the market and bound by the requirements of
profitability, and the 'producers', whether manual workers or
managers, can gain access to the means of production only if they are
able to conclude a wage contract with a capitalist enterprise. In
this light, the joint-stock company may be seen as a form of
capitalist property - a form distinct from personal ownership, but in
no way representing the 'abolition of the capitalist mode of
production' .
What then of the Poulantzian view of the managers, and Olin Wright's
differentiated powers of possession within the managerial hierarchy?
We have seen that Poulantzas' position is in a sense at the opposite
extreme from that of Marx. For Marx the managers represent 'a
specific type of skilled labour' and are 'divorced from the ownership
of capital'. The emphasis is on the discontinuity between the
business run by an owner/manager and the stock company. For
Poulantzas, if we strip away the legal fictions then the managers can
be seen as exercising the powers of economic ownership and/or
possession, so that "In all cases, therefore, the managers are an
integral section of the bourgeois class" (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 180).
Here it is the essential continuity between personal ownership and the
joint-stock company which is stressed - a continuity which extends to
the fact that a particular category of individuals (the managers) can
still be seen as the 'bearers' of private ownership, regardless of the
complications introduced by the discrepant attribution of juridical
ownership to shareholders.
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Marx's view was criticised above, but the concept of exclusive
possession by capitalist enterprises which was outlined in that
context also provides a means of criticism of Poulantzas. It is the
enterprise, as legal subject, which has possession of the means of
production and in an important sense this is not a juridical fiction:
certainly the enterprise must hire managers to make effective that
possession, yet the managers as individuals do not have unconstrained
custody of the means of production, ,nor do they have the right to
alienate the firm's assets. There are two points here: first the
individual manager is a salaried employee and while his 'job security'
may be greater than that of the shop-floor worker it is quite possible
for him to be dismissed. Such powers as he does exercise are
conditional upon the salary-contract. Secondly, in the case of large
enterprises under 'managerial' direction it may be more correct to
attribute the decision-making power to the 'managerial apparatus'
rather than to managers as individuals. Aside from the continuity of
the management structure while individuals are appointed or leave, I
mean by this to emphasize the importance of the network of departments
wivfhin the company, collecting and processing information and
preparing recommendations, and the prevalence of boards and committees
as units of decision-making. Cutler (1978) has argued along these
lines that individual managers are 'responsible' for certain decisions
not in the (existential) sense that they are the unique authors of
those decisions but in the sense that they are accountable for those
decisions, as a matter of administrative procedure.
On this view, capitalist property in the means of production is an
increasingly impersonal institution. Cutler et al have argued through
to the logical conclusion: to a significant extent the class of
agents exercising exclusive possession of the means of production is
made up not of human persons but of capitalist enterprises as such,
and the salaried recruits to the managerial apparatus of such
enterprises are 'separated' from the means of production in the
classic sense. This conception is given a further twist by the fact
that increasingly even the shareholders in public joint stock
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companies are non-human individuals: principally financial
institutions which themselves have their own legal and economic
identities. The extent and pace of this 'depersonalisation' of
capitalist property are examined comparatively, but with emphasis on
the British economy, in the following chapter. In the present context
the problem is to assess the implications of impersonal exclusive
possession for the theories of class which I have been discussing. If
one maintains the basic conception of 'economic' classes as defined by
property relations then the implications appear disturbing: the
capitalist class includes institutional 'individuals' as well as human
individuals, and the managers of modern stock companies, as salaried
employees separated from the means of production, form part of the
working class. The objection may be made that this conception spirits
away a distinction that is socially and politically 'obvious',
between, say, managerial employees and manual industrial workers. I
have already argued, in the company of Olin Wright and
Colliot-Thelene, that Poulantzas misses the mark in using the
productive/unproductive labour distinction as a criterion for
differentiating classes within the broad category of wage or salary
earning employees. Now it appears I have undermined even property
relations as a basis for such a differentiation since I have claimed,
against Olin Wright, that the managerial employees of a joint-stock
company cannot properly be conceived as the economic owners or
possessors of the means of production. But the intention behind my
arguments concerning property relations is not to reduce the theory of
classes jid absurdum. Echoing the conclusions of chaper 1, the
intention is to make a clear distinction between 'economic classes'
defined at the level of property relations, and socio-political
collectivities. If one rejects the notion of 'correspondence' between
the two, in favour of an examination of the always-specific
connections between them, then the conclusions derived from the
analysis of property relations become less odd, and more useful, than
they may appear at first sight. This argument is developed in the
final part of this chapter, which presents the theoretical conclusions
of my investigation of recent Marxist writing on class. But first,
lest I should be accused of neglecting an important contribution to
104
the debate, I shall briefly consider one other attempt to draw a line
of class division within the ranks of wage and salary earning
employees - that of Carchedi.
Carchedi: the function of labour and the function of capital
Carchedi (1977) employs a similar conceptual framework to Poulantzas,
in that he too defines social classes in terms of a series of
overlapping dichotomies, but he gives this position a rather different
slant. He attempts at the outset to derive his three dichotomies as
'aspects' of capitalist relations of production:
1st aspect: capitalist relations of production bind together the
owner, the non-owner and the means of production.
2nd aspect: they bind togehter the producer (typically exploited),
the non-producer (typically the exploiter) and the means of
production.
3rd aspect: they bind together the labourer (who performs the
'function of labour') and the non-labourer (who performs the 'function
of capital').
The first aspect, ownership and separation, refers to a Poulantzian
conception of real economic ownership. According to Carchedi this is
the 'determinant' aspect of the relations of production and the other
two are in some sense subordinate. The second aspect refers to the
production of surplus value, and hence the distinction between
productive and unproductive labour. But in fact this latter
distinction is redundant in Carchedi's analysis. He does not make
productive labour into a necessary condition of proletarian status.
Only productive workers actually create surplus value, and are
exploited in the strict sense, but many other wage-earners are
'economically oppressed' in the sense that they perform more hours of
labour for their employers than are embodied in their wage. Even if
their labour does not create value, Carchedi does not want to exclude
these 'economically oppressed' workers from the proletariat.
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It is the analysis of the 'third aspect' of the relations of
production - the separation of the 'function of labour' from the
'function of capital' - which is Carchedi's most distinctive
contribution to the debate. In Carchedi's view the 'pure' classes of
the capitalist mode of production are defined by a correspondence
between the owner/non-owner division and the function of
labour/function of capital division: the bourgeoisie both own the
means of production and perform the. function of capital, while the
proletariat are both separated from the means of production and
perform the function of labour. But the 'hybrid' new middle classes
are defined by a non-correspondence: they do not own the means of
production but they nonetheless perform certain functions of capital.
Carchedi's definition of the 'new middle class' is therefore quite
distinct from Olin Wright's definition of 'contradictory locations':
it does not depend on the proposition, criticised above, that managers
participate in the economic ownership or possession of the means of
production. Rather Carchedi puts the emphasis on the 'functions'
performed by different categories of non-owners. So let us examine
thd basis for this division of functions. Carchedi traces it back to
the two-fold nature of management and supervision. The capitalist
production process is the 'unity-in-domination' of the labour process
(production of use-values) and the process of production of surplus
value, with the latter 'dominating' the former. Correspondingly,
capitalist management has a double function: (i) In relation to the
labour process, management is concerned with the technical
co-ordination of production, (ii) In relation to the exploitation
process, management carries out control and surveillance of the
workforce to ensure the extraction of surplus value. The functions of
technical co-ordination, design, etc., while they may fall within the
job-titles of 'management' or 'supervision', are in fact functions of
the collective labourer, but the function of control and surveillance
is purely a function of capital. It is a part of the surplus value
producing process, but quite external to the labour process. The
agents performing this 'capital function' are by definition
'non-labourers' and excluded from the working class. On this basis,
Carchedi distinguishes two categories of 'new middle class' agents:
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(i) those who do not own the means of production, but whose function
is exclusively that of control and surveillance, (ii) those non-owners
whose job includes a mixture of certain labour functions alongside
certain capital functions.
These arguments are presented by Carchedi as a clarification and
expansion of what is implicit in Marx's discussion of the double
nature of supervision and management in 'Capital', and it is useful to
refer to that discussion as assessing Carchedi's views.
In 'Capital', Marx conceives capitalist production as a process in
which the production of use-values, or real appropriation of nature,
takes on the form of the production of value and surplus value.
Enterprises produce goods and services, but only if the selling price
is right and there is a prospect of profit. There is no question of
two separate processes going on - rather the production of commodities
for profit is the social form of the appropriation of nature in a
capitalist economy. By the same token, Marx's conception of the
twc1-fold nature of management and supervision does not imply a
separation between two distinct functions:
"The labour of supervision and management, arising as it
does out of an antithesis, out of the supremacy of capital
over labour, and being therefore common to all modes of
production based on class contradictions like the capitalist
mode, is directly and inescapably connected, also under the
capitalist system, with productive functions which all
combined social labour assigns to individuals at their
special tasks". (Marx, 1972, p.386).
Or again:
"The control exercised by the capitalist (nowadays typically
by management A.C.) is not only a special function arising
from the nature of the social labour process, and peculiar
to that process, but it is at the same time a function of
the exploitation of a social labour process...." (Marx,
1976, p.449 - emphasis added).
Co-ordination and control of production is a necessary task in any
social form of production. In capitalism it is generally organised in
a despotic manner, but it is no less a necessary moment of the real
production process for that.
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"Moreover, the co-operation of wage-labourers is entirely
brought about by the capital that employs them. Their
unification into one single productive body, and the
establishment of a connection between their individual
functions lies outside their competence. These things are
not their own act, but the act of the capital that brings
them together and maintains them in that situation" (ibid.,
pp.449-450).
On this view, it is highly problematic to try to separate out the
'function of labour' from the 'function of capital', with the latter
conceived as external to the actual production process and purely
concerned with the exploitation of labour. Marx reinforces the point
in a striking passage from the 'unpublished chapter' of 'Capital'
('Results of the Immediate Production Process'). The context is the
move from the 'formal subsumption of labour under capital' - the stage
at which the capitalist form of property is imposed on a pre-existing
artisanal labour process - to the 'real subsumption' in which the
production process itself is fundamentally altered through the use of
machinery, the application of science to production, and the increased
*
scale of industry:
"This entire development of the productive forces of
socialised labour..., and together with it the use of
science... in the immediate process of production, takes the
form of the productive power of capital. It does not appear
as the productive power of labour..." (Marx, 1976, p.
1024).
In a sense the whole production process becomes a 'function of
capital', since it is the capitalist enterprises which organise the
collective labourer and carry out the application of new technologies.
In relation to the earlier stage of 'manufacture', in the narrow sense
(corresponding to Marx's concept of the merely formal subsumption of
labour), it may make sense to talk of a distinct 'function of
capital', since at that stage the actual production process still had
its traditional form and the intervention of the capitalist was
largely restricted to enforcing discipline on the workforce:
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"The work may become more intensive, its duration may be
extended, it may become more continuous or orderly under the
eye of the interested capitalist, but in themselves these
changes do not affect the character of the labour process,
the actual mode of working" (ibid., p.1021).
But this was before the 'specifically capitalist form of production'
has come into being. In the latter form of production the external
relation between exploitation and production proper is abolished.
I am not, of course, arguing that Carchedi is wrong merely because he
is in disagreement with Marx. I do wish to contest the claim that
Carchedi is merely making explicit a conception which is already
implicit in Marx, but the more important point is that I find Marx's
version more convincing.
If one accepts this view then Carchedi's concept of the
'non-labourer', the agent involved purely in the exploitation process
and quite apart from the labour process, must fall. To avoid
9
misunderstanding: Carchedi admits that certain individuals may
perform both the function of capital (of the non-labourer) and
functions of labour. Indeed his second category within the 'new
middle class' is defined as those non-owners who perform this mixture
of functions. Yet his concept of the 'non-labourer' requires that
these functions be kept distinct, and he claims that in the case of
mixture of functions we are dealing with a juxtaposition of temporally
discrete tasks. One can perform both functions, but not at the same
time (Carchedi, 1977, p.8). If, on the other hand, the despotism of
the factory is the social form of the organisation of productive
labour in capitalist enterprises then the Carchedian concept of the
'non-labourer' is undermined. It is quite legitimate to describe
rentiers as non-labourers, living off their property income, but
Carchedi wants to use the term to include employees whose work




The contemporary writers discussed above have all, in one way or
other, been concerned to mark out a 'middle' place within the class
structure of capitalism. This project has shown up in sharp relief
the principle of definition of classes - not surprisingly, since to
mark out such a middle place is at the same time to mark the
boundaries of the bourgeoisie and the working class, and that depends
on precise definitions. It may be useful at this stage to summarise
my critical comments on the various criteria which have been advanced
for defining the places of the different classes.
1. Production labour/Unproductive labour: I argued that this
distinction is somewhat problematic within Marx's writing. In
particular if one holds to Marx's 'first' definition of productive
labour as labour employed by capital, regardless of its material
content, then the designation of labour of circulation as unproductive
appears arbitrary. But even if we leave aside that criticism, the use
of 'productive labour as a necessary condition of membership of the
working class was regarded as arbitrary by all the writers considered,
except Poulantzas. There was little evidence that Marx intended the
concept of productive labour to be used in that way, and Poulantzas
produced no compelling arguments as to why even the humblest (or for
that matter, most militant 'unproductive' clerical worker or council
road-sweeper should be denied the 'working class' designation.
2. Mental labour/Manual labour: Taken literally this dichotomy is
practically useless, since there are no labours which involve either
pure physical manipulation unaccompanied by any brain processes, or
pure ratiocination without any material implementation. But if the
distinction is given an 'ideological' interpretation, as with
Poulantzas, it again appears to license arbitrary exclusions:
typists, for instance, can't be working class because their work
involves 'know-how' which is denied to industrial workers; all
employees of the service industries are excluded from 'manual labour'
in Poulantzas' sense. The use of this criterion leads to a 'class
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map' which has little to do with the supposedly fundamental issue of
property relations. Nonetheless certain of the phenomena which
Marxist writers have condensed under the concept of the
'mental/manual' division are of considerable importance - this point
will be taken up below.
3. Property Relations: Position with respect to the property
relations of capitalism gave a basic means of defining the bourgeoisie
(owners of the means of production as capital) and working class
(separated from the means of production and obliged to work for a wage
or salary). Olin Wright tried to use property relations to mark out a
middle place ('contradictory location') by arguing that
ownership/possession is a matter of degree - a spectrum extending from
top to bottom of the managerial hierarchy. I argued against this that
it is capitalist enterprises and not the managerial employees that
have exclusive possession of the means of production .
4. Function of labour/Function of Capital: Carchedi argued that the
middle place is occupied by employees (non-owners) who nonetheless
perform the function of capital: promoting the exploitation of others
without taking a real part in the production process themselves
(non-labourers). I argued that this notion depended on an external
relationship between 'exploitation' and 'production' which has not
existed since the early days of the formal subsumption of labour under
capital.
All these critera seem to be flawed in some way as bases for defining
class boundaries. One is not, however, denying that there are
significant socio-economic distinctions to be made within the broad
category of wage and salary earning employees. It is not possible to
draw a precise line in the abstract, but there are certain obvious
dimensions of differentiation: level of autonomy at work; level of
remuneration; degree of control over the labour-power of others;
degree of access to information regarding enterprise performance and
plans; degree of participation in enterprise decision-making; degree
of intellectual or 'skill' content of work.
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These kinds of differentiation form an important object of attention
for socialists, since the socialist project involves major changes on
all counts: democratisation of decision-making in the enterprise,
free and equal access to information, greater equality of
remuneration, abolition of despotic forms of control over labour,
extension of the intellectual scope of work and minimisation of
repetitive humdrum tasks.
Certain points regarding this differentiation among employees should,
however, be noted. First, it is not an exclusively capitalist
phenomenon. A similar differentiation is to be found in the Eastern
bloc economies (although inequality of income is much less than in the
West). The institution of state property and central planning does
not automatically eliminate these distinctions and it cannot,
therefore, be argued that they are purely an 'effect' of capitalist
relations of production.'' Second, the degree of differentiation
differs among capitalist economies, as does the degree to which it is
crystallised into a dichotomous division between distinct categories
of employees within the enterprise (e.g. 'staff' vs. 'shop-floor') and
the extent to which differentiation of work situations correlates with
broader cultural and political divisions. The often-made comparison
between the U.K. and Japan is relevant here. Such variations depend
on the particular history of the social formation - again it is not
possible to deduce the form of differentiation or its political
consequences from the bare existence of capitalist production
relations.
The tendency of these observations is the following: it is not that
Poulantzas, Olin Wright and Carchedi have just failed to come up with
the 'right criterion' which would generate a 'correct' general
7 Admittedly this argument begs the question of a Marxist
conceptualisation of the Soviet-type economies. Some writers
have claimed that these economies should be analysed as 'state
capitalist'. I shall not get involved in this debate here, but
the point remains that the kinds of differentiation among
employees referred to above are found in economies with widely
differing forms of property relations.
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definition of the new petty bourgeoisie/middle class, but rather that
this project is mistaken. It is not possible to define such a
boundary in the abstract. The concept of the new 'middle class' of
employees, in all its variations, is not at par with the traditional
Marxist concepts of class (bourgeoisie, proletariat, peasantry,
landowners, petty bourgeoisie) which are based on forms of
property-holding. In terms of the basic property relations the 'new
middle class' employees are members of the working class, since they
do not possess any means of production and are therefore constrained
to sell their labour power. Marxists have been reluctant to accept
this conception, in view of the undoubted divisions within the
'working class' so defined, but in their attempts to define certain
categories of employees out of the working class they have been pushed
into arbitrary conceptual gerrymandering. Better to admit that the
divisions within the working class, in the broad sense, are not such
as to permit a conceptual segregation at the level of the 'capitalist
mode of production', or even 'modern capitalism', but have to be
investigated more specifically in the context of particular social
formations. Certainly, one can find common features, but in reducing
all the aspects of differentiation to a single dichotomy of universal
application (proletariat/new middle class or proletariat/new petty
bourgeoisie) one loses too much information which is relevant to
questions of socialist strategy.
I am arguing here for a dissociation of certain elements which have
been systematically conflated within traditional Marxist analyses of
class: on the one hand the analysis of economic class relations, on
the basis of the forms of possession of/separation from the conditions
of production; on the other hand the anlysis of the social
collectivities and political forces existing in definite social
formations. I am not suggesting that these kinds of analysis be
pursued in isolation from one another, only that the assumption of
'correspondence' be dropped in favour of the investigation of specific
connections. The object of the following chapters is to put this
conception to the test in an analysis of classes in Britain, but the
remainder of this chapter is concerned with drawing out in more detail
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the problems faced by the 'traditional' theories. The arguments of
Poulantzas and Olin Wright concerning the relation between economics
and politics in the theory of class are given explicit consideration,
and it is argued that the problems which they encounter are not
confined to their particular writings but are in fact endemic to
mainstream Marxist class analysis.
'Structure' and politics in class analysis
I have examined in some detail the particular criteria put forward by
Poulantzas and others in order to distinguish a 'middle class' of some
kind among wage and salary earners, and found these to be severely
problematic. I now turn to the way in which these writers
conceptualise the relationship between class analysis and strategic
political calculation. The arguments given below are intended to
reinforce the critical conclusions already outlined.
We have noted Poulantzas' insistence that 'economic' criteria alone
(property, productive labour) are insufficient for distinguishing
social classes, and that 'political' and 'ideological' relations must
enter into the definition (basically authority relations within the
enterprise, and the mental/manual labour divide respectively). But
Poulantzas makes a firm distinction between these political and
idological 'structural features' which enter into the definition of
classes, and the actual political or ideological stand taken up by
individuals or groups at any given moment. He argues on two levels.
In the first instance there is a 'structural determination' of social
classes by the structure of social relations. This structural
determination assigns the 'class places' of the agents in the social
formation. On a second level there is the question of the 'class
positions' adopted by the agents. By 'class position' Poulantzas
means position on the current economic, political and ideological
issues in a social formation. The idea is that the structural
determination of class places in some sense fixes the limits of
variation of class positions in the conjuncture, but that within these
limits an agent's class position may diverge from the 'class interest'
defined objectively by the agent's structural class place.
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"A social class, or a fraction or stratum of a class, may
take up a class position that does not correspond to its
interests, which are defined by the class determination that
fixes the horizon of the class's struggles" (Poulantzas,
1975, p.15).
According to Poulantzas the determination of structural class place
involves economic, political and ideological relations. The
structural class place of the proletariat is defined by productive
labour (economic relations) in conjunction with manual labour
(political/ideological relations), and that of the new petty
bourgeoisie by unproductive labour in conjunction with mental labour.
Political and ideological relations are given in a predominant place
in conceptualising the structural unity of the 'new' and 'old' petty
bourgeoisie:
"...the petty bourgeois class can be seen to contain two
main ensembles of agents, with nothing in common, at first
sight, in the productive process. If, confronted with these
two groups, we can speak of a single petty bourgeois class,
' it is because their two distinct places in the relations of
production have the same effect on the political and
ideological plane. The petty bourgeoisie is thus unified,
in fact, in political and ideological relations" (ibid.,
p.237).
But, ironically, according to the theory of 'class positions' this
does not mean that a 'petty bourgeoisie' employee cannot take up
'proletarian' class positions in the conjuncture, or vice versa.
If we can fit Olin Wright's theory into these categories, we can say
that for him 'structural class determination' is basically economic.
Poulantzas was mistaken to regard the supervisory role as an instance
of 'political' domination, and the mental/manual divide as an
'ideological' phenomenon. For Olin Wright the proletariat and the
bougeoisie are defined by their position with respect to property
relations (economic relations) and since the 'intermediates' in
capitalist production have a 'contradictory' position at the economic
level they do not have a well-defined 'structural class place'. Olin
Wright appears to assume that where agents do have a well-defined
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economic class place, their class position in the conjuncture will
vary within limits set by that place, but where they have a
'contradictory location' at the economic level, he argues that their
class position is determined by 'political and ideological relations'.
Thus Poulantzas and Olin Wright share the conception that if one can
define a structural class place for a category of agents then one can
determine the limits of variation of their 'class positions'. They
differ only on this point: Poulantzas maintains that all the agents
in a social fomation must have a well-defined structural class place,
whereas Olin Wright, taking his distinctive conception of property
relations as the criterion of structural class place, argues that not
all agents can be so categorised.
These theories throw up two related problems: first, what is the
relation between economics, politics and ideology in the 'structural
determination' of social classes?; and second, what is the relation
between the structural determination of 'class places', and the 'class
position' which agents may take up in the conjuncture?
These problems are not to be found only in Poulantzas and Olin Wright.
It is traditional in Marxism to conceive of social class both as
categories of agents defined by their place within the structure of
social relations, in some sense, and as social forces active in the
conjuncture (as we have seen already in the case of the 'Communist
Manifesto'). Let us step back from the specific arguments put forward
by Poulantzas and Olin Wright and consider the ways in which these
questions have been treated by the various currents of Marxist
thought.
Corresponding to the two questions posed above there are two axes in
relation to which we can place the various Marxist conceptualisations
of social class. First, the structural determination of social
classes can be conceived either as a purely economic determination, or
as a global determination by the overall structure of economic,
political and ideological relations. Secondly, the relation between
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the structural determination of social classes and the class positions
which agents may take up has been thought in two ways: either class
position is rigorously determined by class place, or else class
position 'varies within limits' set by class place, without being
reducible to class place. We can represent these possibilities
schematically as below:
definition of structural class place
economic economic, political & ideological
rigorous determination




limits set by class
place.
Let us explain this categorisation. In the views presented by Stalin,
g
in his essay on 'Dialectical and historical Materialism', the real
essence of history is the development of the productive forces. The
9
productive forces develop with an autonomous dynamic, and then the
relations of production change so as to conform with the new
productive forces. In this schema social classes perform the
historical tasks assigned to them by the development of the productive
forces. According to this position the structural determination of
social classes is exclusively economic, and the social action of class
forces merely reflects the structure of the productive forces.
Althusser has attacked this position, which achieved the status of
orthodoxy in the Third International, as 'economistic'. The relations
of production are not merely epiphenomena of the productive forces;
rather the development of the productive forces is shaped by the
character of the dominant relations of production. And as well as
criticising Stalin's position on the primacy of the productive forces,
Althusser re-thinks the relation between the economic base,
constituted by the unity of the relations of production and the
productive forces, and the other levels in a social formation. The
economic is 'determinant in the last instance', but the political and




8 Franklin (ed.) (1973, pp.300-333).
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Althusser represents the social formation as a structure with three
levels, in which the economy plays a double role: it as at once a
level in the structure, and the instance which determines the
relations which hold between the three levels. His conception of
social classes reflects this'position on the social formation:
"To conceive of the nature of a social class it is essential
to bring together the determinations of the economic base,
of the juridico-political superstructure, and of the
ideological superstructure. It is equally essential to be
aware of the interplay within this combined determination so
as to account for the way in which dominance may shift
between the different determinations..." (quoted in Terray,
1972, p.144).
Just as the social formation comprises three structural levels, not
reducible to each other, so the structural determination of social
classes involves economic, political and ideological determinations.
The dominance within this 'combined determination' is assigned by the
economic, by virtue of the 'matrix' role of the economy in the social
formation.
«#
Althusser does not make the structural determination of social classes
an exclusively economic determination, but nonetheless his position on
social classes has an important feature in common with Stalinist
orthodoxy. Althusser also makes social classes rigorous effects of
the structure of the social formation. We have already noted the
9
deficiencies in Althusser's concept of 'structural causality' . To
recap, Althusser rejects the Hegelian notion that each structure
contains an immanent contradiction which ensures its supersession.
Such a teleological conception is found in Stalin, in his idea that
the development of the productive forces automatically brings about
the historical sequence of modes of production: slave mode, feudal
mode, capitalist mode, and communism. But if one rejects the idea
that the structure has a necessary historical movement inscribed
within it, and if class struggle is an effect of the structure, then
how can the class struggle ever result in the overthrow of one
structure and the construction of another? In principle, Althusser's
conception of social classes as 'effects of the structure' makes it
impossible to think the class struggle as a revolutionary process.
9 See the Introduction.
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Thus, if one conceives of social classes and class struggle as
rigorous effects of the structure of social relations, there are two
theoretical possibilities: either historical movement takes place by
virtue of a teleology of the structure, or it does not take place at
all. Neither conception is, I submit, at all satisfactory.
If we return to the schema above, we can see that in opposition to the
views of Stalin and Althusser, both Lukacs and Poulantzas present a
conception in which the 'class positions' of the agents in a social
formation are not directly reducible to their structural class
determination. We must now see whether these theories can make a
consistent escape from the above dilemma. Let us first consider
Lukacs' theory of social classes, then make a return to Poulantzas.
Lukacs argues on three levels. At the most basic level we have the
structural determination of social classes, by the place of agents
with respect to the production process. At the next level, we can
'impute' or attribute a particular form of 'class consciousness' to
each of the structural class places:
"By relating consciousness to the whole of society it
becomes possible to infer the thoughts and feelings which
men would have in a particular situation if they were able
to assess both it and the interests arising from it in their
impact on immediate action and on the whole structure of
society. That is to say, it would be possible to infer the
thoughts and feelings appropriate to their objective
situation.... Now class consciousness consists in fact of
the appropriate and rational reactions 'imputed'
(zugerechnet) to a particular typical position in the
process of production" (Lukacs, 1971, p.51)
What distinguishes Lukacs' argument from the positions we have just
considered, in which social classes are rigorous effects of the
structure of the social formation, is his insistence that this level
of 'imputed' class consciousness must not be confused with the
empirically given ideas held by the agents in a social formation.
"This consciousness is, therefore, neither the sum nor the
average of what is thought or felt by the single individuals
who make up the class" (ibid.).
119
The thoughts and feelings of the agents who make up social classes
constitute a distinct third level in Lukacs analysis.
"This analysis establishes right from the start the distance
that separates class consciousness from the empirically
given, and from the psychologically describable and
explicable ideas which men form about their situation in
life" (ibid.).
From the basic structure of social relations it is possible to deduce
the objective possibilities for class consciousness on the part of the
social classes defined by that structure, as a function of their
'vantage point' within the social totality. But the realisation of
those objective possibilities cannot be deduced from the structure,
rather it depends on the historical growth to awareness of the social
classes. Referring to the 'gradations' of class consciousness within
the proletariat, Lukacs maintains that
"These gradations are then on the one hand, objective
historical necessities, nuances in the objective
^ possibilities of consciousness (such as the relative
coherence of politics and economics in comparison to
cultural questions). On the other hand, where consciousness
already exists as an objective possibility, they indicate
degrees of distance between the psychological class
consciousness and the adequate understanding of the total
situation. These gradations, however, can no longer be
referred back to socio-economic causes. The objective
theory of class consciousness is the theory of its objective
possibility" (Ibid., p.79).
So between 'imputed class consciousness' and the actual ideologies
current among social classes there is a theoretical gulf, and the
discrepancies between the two levels cannot be 'referred back to
socio-economic causes'. At the crucial point, reductionism is denied
and the actual thinking and behaviour of classes becomes
indeterminate: it may or may not coincide with structurally-defined
class interest or true class-consciousness. Class analysis seems to
announce its impotence at the very point where it might become
directly relevant to political calculation and practice. Why should
the members of certain structurally-defined classes take up certain
definite political and ideological positions? How can socialists best
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detach workers and others from anti-socialist ideologies and foster
popular support for socialist politics? Silence. All we know is
that, a priori, true class consciousness exists as an objective
possibility.
Now, for all his criticism of Lukacs' 'historicism', for all his
refusal to talk in terms of class-as-subject endowed with a
'consciousness' true or otherwise, Poulantzas ends up in an
equivocation strikingly similar to that of Lukacs. The Poulantzian
distinction between class interest, as defined by structural class
place, on the one hand, and conjunctural class position on the other
plays the same role as Lukacs' dichotomy of objectively appropriate
class consciousness and the empirically given ideas held by
individuals. All that holds Poulantzas apart from Lukacs is his
insistence that structural class place cannot be conceived as an
economic determination, but also involves political and ideological
relations. The distance between the two writers is further reduced if
one accepts the criticism that the 'political' and 'ideological'
relations which Poulantzas adduces in the case of his new petty
bourgeoisie are really mis-specified economic relations.^
Poulantzas does not appear to notice how the equivocation over
conjuctural class position plays havoc with the political project of
'Classes in Contemporary Capitalism'. He makes it his object to
produce a theoretically founded critique of the PCF's strategy of a
popular 'anti-monopoly alliance' and clearly reckons that he has
carried his point by discovering the 'structural class division'
within that putative alliance, between the proletariat and the new
petty bourgeoisie. But, whatever the failings of the PCF strategy,
Poulantzas' treatment of conjunctural class position denies him the
political conclusion he would wish to draw: there is no reasons, on
his analysis, why the 'new petty bourgeoisie' in France should not
happen to take up a proletarian position in the conjuncture.
10 The point made by Olin Wright and Colliot-Th^lene, and also by
Hunt and Hirst in their contributions to Hunt (1977).
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It appears that the dominant traditions within Marxist class analysis
offer us Hobson's choice: either a structural reductionism, simple or
complex, or else a disjunction between structure and political
behaviour which produces a theoretical indeterminancy at the crucial
point.
I have argued in favour of a different mode of analysis - one which
moves at several levels (investigation of economic classes at the
level of property relations, investigation of social and cultural
collectivities, investigation of political forces) unencumbered by the
a priori assumption of correspondence between these levels and able to
identify the specific connections in particular social formations.
Each strand of such an analysis has a contribution to make to the
development of socialist thinking and socialist politics. The
investigation of property relations makes it possible to specify more
closely what is at stake in political struggle in the long term, and
to pose more accurately the problem of what attitude and policies
should be taken up in relation to the organisation and accountability
of enterprises and the question of the planning of production. The
analysis of social and cultural collectivities, and forms of shared
experience and organisation, helps in the identification of
potentially fruitful modes of approach to different social groups in
the attempt to develop a popular socialist politics. The analysis of
political forces, their policies and their bases of support helps to
identify opportunities for undermining the support for anti-socialist
forces, breaking up reactionary alliances, and confronts socialists
with the problem of finding the appropriate 'vehicle' for advancing
socialist politics.
It is hoped that the following chapters will at least make a start in
demonstrating the validity of these claims.
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CHAPTER 3
PROPERTY RELATIONS AND THE IMPERSONAL CAPITAL
"In the last instance capitalism aims at the expropriation of the
means of production from all individuals". (Marx, 1972, p.439).
In this chapter and the next my focus is on the economic class
structure, defined at the level of property relations. In the
preceding chapter I argued that the institution of private property in
the means of production has undergone a progressive
1depersonalisation' with the rise of the joint stock company. This
chapter is concerned with investigating the conditions which have
given rise to this depersonalisation, and the particular forms it has
taken. The first section gives a broad historical outline of the
development of the impersonal capital and draws some comparisons
between the USA and Britain, then the second section concentrates more
specifically on the developments in post-war Britain. The last part
of this chapter deals with the 'second order depersonalisation' of
capitalist property, i.e. the trend towards the replacement of
individuals by financial institutions as the dominant holders of
shares in industrial and commercial enterprises, and examines the
principal forms of relationship between financial institutions and
other enterprises. The following chapter then extends this analysis
to comprehend the broad issue of 'classes and the financial
circulation', and finishes by examining the consequences of certain
aspects of the depersonalisation of property, in terms of the
constraints placed upon, and opportunities opened up for socialist
politics.
The conditions for the rise of impersonal property
Marx's 'Capital' maintains a strong link between the changing forms of
capitalist property and the process of concentration of capital.
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Capitalist production exhibits an intrinsic tendency towards increased
concentration: the development of the productive forces under the
impulsion of competition between capitals takes the form of a
progressive socialisation - production on an ever larger scale and
informed by an increasing application of scientific knowledge - and
this mobilisation of the productive power of social labour demands
ever larger blocs of capital. The larger, progressive, capitals
prosper and grow while the smaller businesses are undercut and driven
into bankruptcy or taken over. The personal or family fortune becomes
an increasingly restrictive limit to the possible size of capital
blocs, just as management by the sole owner or traditional partnership
becomes increasingly inappropriate to the complexity of the leading
enterprises. But the development of a system of credit makes it
possible to centralise the capital of many wealthy individuals or
families, and the development of a market for skilled managerial
labour means that the operations of large centralised capitals can be
directed effectively.
As 'a rough outline of the historical trend this is not inappropriate,
but one should be careful to identify the limits of this form of
explanation. The emergence of new forms of capitalist property is not
simply the effect of a pre-given tendency towards concentration: the
credit system, the managerial labour market, and the legal forms which
are necessary conditions for the development of impersonal capitals
are not secured by any autonomous dynamic of the productive forces.
Also the particular form in which these conditions have been met has
differed between national economies, with important effects on the
pattern of control over resources and on industrial performance, and
further, the incentives for increased concentration (in terms of the
competitive advantage it affords) have differed between national
economies, between branches of industry, and over time in response to
technological and social change. So the image of an inexorable and
uniform tendency is misleading. The following pages (which draw on
the research collected by Chandler and Daems (1980)) chart the
development of the modern 'managerial' enterprise - or impersonal
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We may begin this account with the USA, generally acknowledged to be
the birthplace of the large-scale integrated capitalist enterprise.
Chandler (1980) dates this birth in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. In the earlier part of that century American businesses
experienced considerable growth, but this was mainly of an extensive
nature: an expansion of the number of firms rather than of their
average size. At this stage there was an increasing specialisation
('division of labour in society' in Marx's terms) and most of the
enterprises dealt with a single line of goods and had a single
function within the overall reproduction process (i.e. wholesaling or
retailing or production). Coordination between these enterprises was
principally achieved through market mechanisms. There were very few
middle managers employed at this time, and the top managers were
generally owners, either partners or major shareholders.
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From the 1850s onwards, however, new forms of enterprise begin to
appear, characterised by a multi-divisional structure: one enterprise
comprises a number of operating units and the transactions between
these units are internalised within the firm. A new hierarchy of
middle and top salaried management supervises the work of the
operating units and coordination is increasingly achieved by means of
this hierarchy, rather than through decentralised market mechanisms,
although this trend does not, of course, abolish competition between
the large enterprises. Such enterprises tend to develop where
managerial coordination offers a competitive advantage over market
coordination, and this competitive advantage can stem from a variety
of sources: by routinising transactions between operating units it
may be possible to reduce transaction costs; by integrating
production, purchasing and distribution the cost of information on
markets and supplies may be reduced; 'economies of speed' - the more
intensive use of labour power and fixed capital - may be obtained
through the scheduling of flows and standardisation; administrative
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coordination makes possible a more ready adjustment of product
specification and market services to meet market demand; a steadier
cash flow can lower the cost of credit. These potential advantages
only became activated, however, when the development of technology and
the growth of markets increases the level of economic activity to a
speed and volume which runs up against the practical limits of the
existing mechanisms of market coordination. It is only then that we
see the rapid growth and professionalisation of the managerial strata.
Chandler isolates two broad transitional paths in the development of
the large managerial enterprise from the owner-managed traditional
firm, depending on the extent to which the enterprise has to rely on
external financing for its expansion. What these transitional forms
have in common is the recruitment of salaried middle managers with
little or no share in legal ownership to coordinate the flow of
products and supervise the operating units. The difference arises in
that if expansion is financed mainly from retained earnings then the
founding entrepreneurs and their families may continue to own
controlling shares and participate in top management ('family
capitalism'), while a reliance on external finance is likely to mean
that bankers and other financiers come to participate in the top-level
decisions ('financial capitalism'). Both of these forms are conceived
as transitional in that no family or financial institution is big
enough to staff the managerial hierarchy of a large multi-unit
enterprise. As salaried managers develop specialised knowledge and
techniques, and as the profits generated by expansion come to sustain
a greater level of self-financing, the managerial apparatus takes over
even the top level decision-making from the owners and financiers.
The latter either become full-time professional managers themselves or
participate in top-level management only in their capacity as board
members, in which case they may have a 'veto power' and some control
over managerial appointments, but little else.
These conceptions can be given more substance if we examine the
sectors in which the large managerial enterprises first took hold: in
chronological order, transport and communication then distribution,
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then production. The railroads became the first 'big business' in the
USA, due to the need for centralised operating control and scheduling
in the context of an expanding network. Middle managers, responsible
to the president and directors of the railroad companies, were
employed to supervise and monitor the 'divisions', which operated
between fifty and a hundred miles of track each. Concentration
proceeded apace so that by 1890, thirty large companies owned and
operated two thirds of the US railroad mileage. Since railroad
building on such a scale required large amounts of capital the
companies developed links with Eastern investment bankers who had
access to European funds, bringing financiers onto the boards. Along
with the steampship companies, urban transport, utilities and
communications, the railroads became prime examples of 'financial
capitalism' in the USA.
The sphere of distribution, by contrast, provides an example of a
sector which long remained a bastion of 'family capitalism'. The
1850s saw the development of full-line, full-service wholesalers
relying on the new transport and communications infrastructure, and
these replaced the old factors and commission agents, but by the 1880s
the wholesalers were themselves being displaced by new mass retailers:
the city department stores, the mail order firms, and the chain
stores. These latter again had a multi-divisional structure with a
buying office for each major product line, and they were able to
undercut the wholesaler/retailer nexus, making their profit from
volume rather than mark-up. At this stage the distribution firms did
not move into manufacturing to any great extent, and with their high
cash flow and low capital requirements they had little need for
external financing. These enterprises therefore remained under the
control of the founders and their families to a much greater extent
than the more capital-intensive and long-term undertakings in
transport and communications.
The development of new forms of enterprise was slower in production
than in the other spheres. While the cost-cutting innovations in
distribution mainly involved organisational change, comparable
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innovation in production had to await the technological changes which
would give mass production a decisive competitive advantage. An
incentive for such changes was provided by the development of railroad
and telegraph: if materials and products could be shifted faster then
there was a premium on innovation for higher output. Again in the
latter part of the nineteenth century, three mass production
techniques were developed which permitted the exploitation of this new
infrastructure by industrial capitals^ namely large batch production,
continuous flow processing, and the making of machinery by the
fabrication and assembly of standard parts. The large batch and
process methods became especially important in refining and distilling
industries in the 1860s and 70s. In the following years process
machinery was developed for consumer goods such as cigarettes, flour,
breakfast cereals and canned goods. Development was not so rapid in
the metal-making and metal-working industries; the processes involved
were relatively highly complex. But the 70's saw the integration of
blast furnaces, Bessemer and open hearth convertors, and rolling and
finishing mills at single sites, giving the advantages of lower
transport costs and improved scheduling. In the metal-working
industries close attention was paid to improving machinery, plant
design and 'workforce organisation' - the studied fragmentation and
'rationalisation' of traditional labour functions, in search of a
higher 'density' of labour and increased productivity, which reached
its apogee in Taylorism.
But the application of mass production methods in industry did not in
itself require very large managerial hierarchies. The mass producers
became fully fledged 'managerial enterprises' only when they
integrated forwards into sales and distribution, and this when the
existing channels of distribution couldn't shift and sell their
products fast enough. When this form of integration did take place,
in the 1880s, the enterprises concerned were to become dominant
oligopolies and in a sense the leading examples of the 'modern
corporation'. Enterprises linking mass production and mass
distribution first emerged clustered in four industry-types:
low-priced packaged goods, perishable products for national markets,
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new mass-produced machinery (all mass consumer markets or Marx's
Department II), and high-volume, complex but standardised, producer
goods (Department I) . Examples of the former include cigarettes,
matches, flour, meatpacking, brewing, sewing machines, while the
producer goods included agricultural implements and business machines.
Aside from the substantial economies of scale realised by the
enterprises in these branches, the integration of purchasing,
production and distribution established barriers to entry on the part
of potential competitors with the result that the dominant firms were
able to stabilise their position as market leaders.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890, somewhat paradoxically, gave a
further boost to the formation of large-scale integrated enterprises
in the USA. By outlawing cartels and trusts it encouraged such
federations to take the form of holding companies, which partly
accounts for the big merger movement that lasted till 1903. Over time
these merged enterprises were in a sense 'selected' for their degree
of» real integration, in that where effective integration under the
control of a managerial hierarchy was not achieved the mergers were
often commercially unsuccessful. The branches of production in which
mergers were most successful remained those which offered the greatest
opportunities for mass production and mass marketing, so that by the
time of the first world war the largest enterprises were still
clustered in the industry-groups where they had first emerged,
although they had also developed in the new chemical and automobile
industries. By contrast the more labour-intensive industries (such as
cloth, wood, leather and printing) saw a much slower development of
managerial enterprises.
The merger movement had a significant effect on the pattern of
ownership. Growth through mergers generally resulted in a relatively
rapid dispersion of shareholdings, which advanced the position of
salaried top-level management. Chandler argues that by 1918 the
majority of large industrial enterprises founded in the pre-war period
were under managerial control. Members of their founding
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families continued to have an impact on top-level decision-making only
if they were trained as managers, and while some capitalists did make
this move there was not in general much financial incentive for them
to do so if they were already wealthy as rentiers.
After the first world war there were further changes in the economic
structure and strategy of the largest enterprises which put an
increased premium on managerial coordination. Many of them adopted a
strategy of diversification, in order to make full use of their
techniques and marketing apparatuses, and the operation of several
product lines under one overall ownership led to a generalisation of
the multi-divisional structure, as described by Chandler:
"In this type of organisation the general managers of the
several autonomous divisions became responsible for
coordinating the flow of goods and supervising the operating
units that produced and distributed one major product line
to one major market; a general office with no operating
responsibilities, assisted by a large general staff,
concentrated on allocating resources to the various product
t divisions" (Chandler, 1980, p.32) .
These multi-divisional enterprises achieved a relatively high rate of
internal financing. Retained funds were supplemented when necessary
by working capital from the commercial banks and long-term funds from
the securities markets. Security issues took the form of shares
(which confer part legal ownership) more often than bonds (which do
not), which led to a further dispersion of the formal ownership of
enterprises. The representatives of founding families or outside
financial interests rarely opposed this trend since the growth which
was achieved permitted a steady increase in dividends, and capital
gains on the market value of shareholdings. The famous 'conflict of
interest' between 'owners' and 'managers', which has become a
commonplace proposition in much writing on the 'theory of the firm'
since Berle and Means, was not much in evidence!
The rise of managerial and impersonal capitals was permitted by, and
in turn accelerated, the professionalisation of management after the
turn of the century. Prestigious universities began to set up
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business schools providing a flow of trained personnel into the
managerial labour-market, and the managerial employees formed
themselves into a number of professional associations producing
professional journals. In this way the managerial employees in the
USA became a relatively distinct social grouping: specific common
interests and ideologies were constructed.
Over the years since 1945 managerial enterprises have clearly attained
an increasingly dominant position, whether this is measured by
employment, assets, or value-added in production. This has gone along
with a rise in diversification and an increasingly important role for
international operations. All this is well-documented by Marxist, and
other, writers. What is particularly interesting in Chandler's
account is the demonstration that the process dates back, in the USA,
to the late nineteenth century at least, and the investigation of the
particular conditions which permitted the emergence of impersonal
capitals/managerial enterprises. We shall have more to say about
post-war developments, but first let us compare the pre-war U.S.
experience with that of Britain and Europe.
In outline, the rise of managerial enterprises has been slower and
more recent in Britain and Europe. Multi-unit enterprises first
appeared in the late nineteenth century in certain capital-intensive
industries with a need for professional management, but mass
production (and assembly in particular) was not so well represented as
in the USA. Owners continued to manage their enterprises for longer;
the managerial class was smaller and showed less signs of
professionalisation. There was more reliance on existing market
mechanisms, and less integration of mass production with mass
distribution - the combination which gave rise to the most dynamic US
enterprises.
In seeking to explain this differential development Chandler places
most emphasis on the size and nature of the markets faced by
enterprises in Europe and in the States. The discrepancy in growth
rates of the market between the USA and Britain is certainly striking:
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in 1880 the National Income and population of the USA were roughly 1.5
times greater than that of Britain - by 1900 the difference had
widened to a factor of 2, and by 1920 to a factor of 3. Further,
tight labour markets in the USA brought higher wages and a greater
potential consumer demand. And it can be argued that the distribution
of incomes was more skewed in Britain and Europe, and regional and
class tastes in general more differentiated. The conditions of
existence of large-scale mass production/mass retailing Department II
enterprises were not met on a broad scale till after 1945. So, with
the exception of the integrated food and brewing enterprises in
Britain, the first large integrated enterprises in Europe were
concentrated in producer goods (Department I): primary metals,
shipbuilding, heavy machinery, chemicals.
The first giant European enterprises mainly supplied either
non-standardised goods for industrial firms, or materials for building
transportation systems and establishing basic industries in nations
beginning to industrialise, or arms for the growing militarisation of
the rest of the world. These latter emphases obviously reflect the
relatively strong colonial/imperial interests of the European powers
and Britain in particular. The production and distribution of
consumer goods remained for much longer the preserve of smaller
enterprises using craft techniques, and commercial middlemen. In this
context 'family capitalism' continued to flourish. The case of
Germany was rather different: arriving late among the imperialists it
had at first smaller markets and lower cash flows which led to a
greater dependency on external finance, and gave rise to a continuing
strong interventionist role for the banks ('financial capitalism').
Legal conditions also played a part. Until the post war years the
American preoccupation with 'Anti-Trust' and 'freedom of competition'
did not form a dominant stand in European bourgeois ideology. Indeed,
in Germany cartels were viewed favourably after cartellisation had
proved effective in weathering the recession of 1873. As a result
there was not the same incentive as in the USA to circumvent
anti-trust legislation by forming large integrated enterprises:
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federations of family enterprises remained a legally acceptable form
of organisation. Such federations, which took the form of holding
companies in Britain and cartels in France and Germany, permitted some
coordination of marketing and pricing while placing relatively little
reliance on managerial coordination and leaving room for
decision-making by individual owners or their representatives. There
was possibly a greater social value placed upon such autonomy, and
family identification with particular enterprises, in Europe, so that
owners sometimes chose not to expand rather than losing personal
control. In the British motor industry, for example, Morris and
Austin resisted merger during their own lifetimes, and in the British
steel industry during the inter-war years family trusts and boards
inhibited the horizontal and vertical mergers required to take full
advantage of the advances in production technology.
Emphasizing the role of mass consumer markets, Chandler argues that
the big shift towards dominance by managerial enterprises came after
1945. With relatively full employment, higher wages, and the
formation of the EEC, Europe developed the markets which could sustain
dynamic mass production/mass distribution enterprises. And once this
condition was met the other constraints loosened: there was a
large-scale takeover of US managerial structures as such enterprises
outgrew control by family or financiers and 'professional management'
emerged at last.
These arguments are taken up by Hannah (1980) (the British case) and
Kocka (1980) (the German case). Hannah accepts the broad outline of
the Chandler case but argues, on the basis of a more detailed
investigation, that the rise of managerial enterprise in Britain
should be dated from the inter-war years: the post war growth of
impersonal capitals started from a strong base established during the
'20s and '30s. He points out that the contribution of the hundred
largest firms to total value-added in manufacturing, which reached 20
percent in the USA in 1909, reached the same proportion in Britain in
the 1920s. And although the absolute size of British firms was
smaller, the UK had its share of industrial giants. Overall figures
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for industrial concentration are not necessarily a very good index of
forms of organisation of enterprises and unfortunately the evidence on
corporate structure in Britain is somewhat sketchy, but Hannah shows
that by 1930 the multi-unit enterprise was dominant: 136 out of the
top 200 manufacturing companies (measured by market value of their
capital) had a multi-unit form.
The multi-unit form, with a number of operating units under one
overall legal ownership, is not however equivalent to the
'multi-divisional' structure which Chandler regards as characteristic
of modern managerial enterprises: the latter involves a high degree
of manageral coordination of the operating units. While examples of
multi-divisional enterprise can be found in inter-war Britain (the
indigenous ICI, the US-owned Ford and Vauxhall) nonetheless many of
the British multi-unit enterprises were really only loose federations
of firms, which often continued to be managed separately and even to
compete in the same market. In this context, the separation of formal
ownership and control was less developed: in 1930, 70 percent of the
200 largest British firms still had family board members. (Strong
financial interests were rarely present on company boards; British
companies have traditionally tapped diverse sources of funds, and the
social distinctions between financiers, family-owners, and management
are less well-defined than in the USA or Germany) . Chandler has also
argued (Chandler, 1980 a) that managerial techniques were generally
much less developed in the UK in the inter-war years: sophisticated
procedures for scheduling of flows and for costing only became
widespread in the post war years and then generally in imitation of
established American methods.
So although Hannah is correct to point out the already-high degree of
industrial concentration in the UK economy of the 1930s, and the
existence of certain strongly 'managerial' enterprises, it remains
true that the dominance of the integrated 'impersonal capital' was not
realised until after 1945.
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Apart from questions of accurate periodisation, the other issue which
arises from Hannah's contribution is the adequacy of Chandler's
explanation for the relative 'late arrival' of managerial enterprises
in the UK. Chandler's principal explanatory factors were the size,
growth-rate and character of markets and the legal forms available for
large-scale enterprises. As regards markets, Hannah's arguments can
be seen as supporting the Chandler view: in general regional and
class tastes were more highly differentiated in the UK and Europe than
in the USA, reducing the scope for the mass marketing of consumer
goods, but in the food market, where tastes were fairly standardised
in Britain, mass production and retailing grew rapidly; relatively
low wages did limit the market for cars and electrical goods before
world war two, and also affected the demand for producer goods by
reducing the incentive to substitute electrical or mechanical power
for labour. However, changes in this respect were incipient before
the war. Deflation brought a rise in the real wages of those in
employment during the '30s: electricity was installed in most homes;
and the middle-income groups at least could realistically aspire to
car-ownership.
While agreeing that markets are important, Hannah stresses some
further points. First, the particular character of markets may be as
relevant as their size or rate of growth. The UK market, even by the
turn of the century, was highly compact and urban (in 1901 75 percent
of the British population was classified as urban), so that the cost
of information and transactions would be low relative to the USA.
Combined with Britain's imperial role as international centre of
commerce, bringing competitive pressure for efficiency in the system
of markets, this suggests that there may have been less competitive
advantage for managerial as opposed to market coordination in the
British case. (Again, one can contrast the German case, in which the
low level of development of market mechanisms encouraged hierarchical
coordination through banks, the state, and large-scale integrated
enterprises).
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Second, there is evidence to suggest that even when opportunities
presented themselves for mass production/mass marketing activities,
British firms were less ready to take advantage of them. Before 1914,
for instance, the British textile industry presented a very large
market for dyes, yet it was the German chemical giants which were
first to exploit it. British companies made less of a more promising
market for urban electric lighting than Edison and Westinghouse in the
USA. This may be partly due to the conservative bias in the British
capital market, which has made it difficult to finance investment
projects perceived as 'risky' or innovatory.
Third, Hannah argues that the slow development of 'managerial'
capitalism should not be conceived solely in terms of a lack of demand
for managerial staffs to coordinate enterprises. The supply of
managerial labour - the substantial lack of technically or
commercially trained manpower - is also important, and can be traced
in part to the low social valuation placed upon manufacturing industry
by a dominant ideology which has a strong aristocratic colouring.
Patronage rather than professionalism remained for longer the key to
the control over enterprises in Britain. This contrasts not only with
the early rise of the 'business school' and managerial professionalism
in the USA, but also with the rather different professionalism of
salaried management in Germany, where the emphasis was on technical
rather than commercial training, and the links between universities
and state technical colleges and industrial enterprises helped to
foster the early development of high-technology industry.
It would seem that the slower development of managerially-controlled
impersonal capitals in Britain was 1overdetermined' by a whole range
of economic, social and cultural factors. And the particular course
of development in Britain has arguably left a legacy in some of the
structural problems underlying the declining international
competitiveness of the UK economy over the post-war years. The
technological innovations necessary to secure a strong competitive
position have most often been carried out by the large integrated
corporations, and the British economy, with its relative paucity of
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such enterprises and low level of commercially applicable research and
development*, proved to be in a weak position when the old imperial
trade preferences dissolved and the domestic industry was exposed to
greater competition at home and abroad.
The impersonal capital in post war Britain
In the previous section it was argued that the development of
large-scale impersonally-owned capitals has been relatively slow in
the British economy, and that such large-scale units of ownership
which existed in the inter-war years generally displayed less real
integration than in the USA. The perogatives of personal ownership of
capital remained important for longer and this affected the
competitive strategies and internal managerial practices adopted by
enterprises, probably limiting the ability of many British enterprises
to sustain a rapid pace of technological change or to adapt to more
cost-effective modes of internal organisation.
Thd objective here is to assess the extent to which large-scale
impersonal capitals have achieved dominance in the post war years. I
have already pointed out that measures of industrial concentration and
the size of enterprises do not in themselves indicate the mode of
possession (formally large enterprises can comprise relatively
autonomous operating units which preserve personal possession) but it
may be useful to begin by considering these indices, which show a
striking increase in the importance of large enterprises. Table 3.1
below shows the estimates of industrial concentration made by Hannah
( 1976) and Prais ( 1976).
1 Pavitt (1980) has shown that while the overall level of research
and development spending in the British economy compares
favourably with other economies, this expenditure has been
excessively concentrated in government-sponsored 'big technology'
such as aerospace, defence and nuclear power. The principal
exception is in the chemicals industry, not accidentally the









* 1948 for Hannah, 1949 for Prais
1953- 1958 1963 1968 1970
26 33 38 42 45
27 32 37 41 41
The above measures relate to output; for employment the indices are
equally striking:
TABLE 3.2
Analysis of enterprises by total employment
size : manufacturing industry in the UK 1972.
Size of enterprise Enterprises Employment
(number employed) (No.) (% of total) (% of total)
10,000 and over 85 0.12 35.02
2,000 - 9,999 375 0.52 21.75
500 - 1,999 1,047 1.45 13.77
200 - 499 1,823 2.52 7.96
100 - 199 2,852 3.94 5.55
1 - 99 66,119 91.45 15.96
All enterprises 72,301 100.00 100.01
Source: Devine et al (1979).
It can be seen that companies employing over 2,000 workers, while less
than one percent of the population of firms, employ over half of the
manufacturing workforce. The other side of the coin was demonstrated
in the findings of the Bolton Committee (Bolton, 1971) which estimated
that employment by 'small enterprises' (with less than 200 workers)
had fallen from around 38 percent of the manufacturing workforce in
1935 to 20 percent in 1963.
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A third measure of concentration is by ownership of assets. In this
regard Aaronovitch and Sawyer ( 1975) have estimated that among quoted
manufacturing companies with 1957 assets of £5 million or more, the
100 largest enterprises owned 58 percent of the assets in 1957, and 73
percent in 1968.
Giving a broad summary, the Department of Industry (1976) showed that
the 100 largest private-sector manufacturing enterprises in the early
1970s accounted for around 40 percent of manufacturing industry's net
output, net assets, and employment; 40 to 50 percent of visible
exports, and 70 percent of expenditure on industrial scientific
research and development.
These indices show up clearly the importance of the largest 100
enterprises, and of large enterprises generally, in the manufacturing
sector of the British economy. Although it is hard to construct
comparable figures for other economies because of differing legal
forms and classification of enterprises, it is generally reckoned that
the' level of industrial concentration in Britain is now higher than in
any of the continental European countries. George and Ward (1975),
working with a rather different measure, estimated the following
figures for the four-firm employment concentration ratios in
manufacturing industry in selected EEC countries (i.e. the weighted
average of the percentage of the labour force employed by the largest
four firms in each of the various branches of manufacturing) :
UK West Germany France Italy
Four-firm employment
concentration ratio (%) 32 22 24 20
All the statistics quoted above are limited in the sense that they
apply only to manufacturing industry. But although such aggregated
figures are not available for the financial and commercial sectors it
seems clear that they have undergone a parallel process of increasing
concentration. The present 'big four' London clearing bank groups
have emerged from eleven independent banks since 1968, and from
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hundreds since the nineteenth century; among the fastest growing
financial institutions the building societies have decreased in
numbers from almost three thousand in 1890 to around a thousand in the
1930s, to around 480 today, while the largest ten societies account
for over 64 percent of their total assets and the biggest single
society, the Halifax, for over 18 percent. The activities of life
insurance companies and pension funds have also grown rapidly over the
post war years, and in this field the dozen largest companies account
for over 60 percent of long-term premium income. In retailing, the
widespread development of chain stores and supermarkets demonstrates a
similar trend.
As regards the legal form of property, the overwhelming majority of
large scale enterprises take the form of public joint-stock companies
with limited liability (as against only 20 percent of British
businesses in 1914). The only major exception to this rule is in the
case of the financial sector, where the building societies retain the
mutual form from their origins as friendly societies, as do some
insurance companies. In both the joint-stock and the mutual forms the
enterprise exists as a legal entity distinct from its shareholders and
therefore private individuals cannot be said to own the means of
production employed by the enterprise. Possession rests with the
enterprise itself. In this sense, we have already said enough to show
that possession of the means of production by impersonal capitals is
now the dominant mode. The question remains, however, of the
importance of individual shareholders in enterprise decision-making:
of whether the formally impersonal possession conceals the continued
existence of a 'capitalist class' of individuals who have substantial
de facto powers over the allocation of enterprises' resources by
virtue of their participation in beneficiary ownership.
In Chandler's argument, although it was not posed in precisely these
terms, the move towards large, formally impersonal capitals went
together with a real shift towards coordination and policy-making by
salaried managerial employees. Shareholders become marginalised as
such and can only participate in policy-making if they become
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specialist managers themselves. This view rests on a particular
conception of the competitive advantage acheived by 'managerial'
enterprises. Large scale enterprises are 'selected' for survival and
growth only if they achieve significant economies over traditional
smaller firms by exploiting the opportunities for coordination and
resource allocation offered by professional management. Large
enterprises which do not move in this direction but continue to
produce or trade as a set of operating units under more personal
control, are liable to disintegrate, as happened to a number of
British holding companies of the 1920s.
There remains the possibility that certain features of the economic
environment may 'select' large enterprises for survival and growth
even if such enterprises do not justify themselves on the grounds of
economies of scale and integration. Researchers investigating the
very rapid rise in industrial concentration in post war Britain, to
levels in excess of the other major capitalist economies, have claimed
to find such 'environmental features' in the British financial and
taxation systems. Prais (1976) for instance argues that the preference
for the shares of larger enterprises on the part of the financial
institutions has encouraged the exceptional rounds of mergers and
takeovers in the British case. This preference is seen as grounded in
caution: large diversified enterprises with interests in several
markets tend to show a lesser variability of profits than smaller
single-product firms, a financial advantage which would appear to be
independent of real integration between the operating units of the
large enterprise. Devine et al ( 1979) also cite the tax situation
during the 1960s, when income was taxed relatively heavily but capital
gains were not, as an incentive for entrepreneurs to capitalise their
prospective profits by submitting to takeovers rather than continuing
as independent owners. Financial factors of this kind can put a
premium on large size which goes beyond any competitive advantage in
production and trading, and studies (e.g. Singh, 1975) have shown
relatively poor real integration and profitability on the part of many
large enterprises which were formed in the British 'merger booms'.
The suggestions here is that some of the large British enterprises may
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lack centralised managerial coordination, and their operating units
may continue to be directed by their erstwhile major shareholders,
preserving a more personal mode of control within the legal form of
large impersonal capital.
One widely-adopted approach to judging the degree of defacto control
by major shareholders, is through analysis of the pattern of
shareholdings. Berle and Means ( 1932), backed up their argument on the
'divorce of ownership and control' by citing the increasing dispersion
of share-ownership. In their view the decline of majority shareholding
on the part of individuals or families signalled a general decline in
shareholder-control, since there was no longer a dominant beneficiary
owner of the enterprise to contest control with the incumbent
managerial employees. This line of investigation was taken up by
Florence (1961), who showed that among larger British companies in
1951 there was only a small minority (around 3 percent) in which the
largest single shareholding accounted for 50 percent or more of the
voting shares. Further, in 62 percent of companies with share capital
of'£3 million or more the largest twenty holdings accounted for less
than 30 percent of the voting strength. This showed a greater
dispersion than the corresponding figures for 1936. Florence's
findings that share-ownership was becoming more dispersed and that the
concentration of share-ownership less among larger companies, were
supported by Revell and Moyle ( 1966) in their investigation of share
issues quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1963. Larner (1966)
also confirmed a declining concentration of shareholdings among larger
US enterprises.
It has been pointed out however, (e.g. by Beed, 1966) that it is not
clear what conclusions can be drawn from data of this kind. The
dispersion of share-ownership may signal a general decline of
influence over enterprise policy on the part of shareholders, but it
may equally give rise to a situation in which only a relatively small
percentage holding of the voting stock is required to exercise
dominant influence: the majority of small shareholders lack any
leverage over company policy, and their shares figure as mere titles
142
to revenue, but the decision-making power becomes centred in the hands
of the larger minority shareholders. The first possibility is the
Berle and Means 'separation of ownership and control', but the second
is more ambiguous - a separation of shareholding as such from control,
but one which preserves the dominant controlling role of the larger
shareholders. It is not possible to decide this issue a priori.
If investigation of the pattern of shareholding does not in itself
substantiate any definite conclusions regarding the direction of
enterprises, the kind of analysis undertaken by Channon (1973) may be
more productive.
Channon's undertaking was the detailed examination of the
organisational structure and business strategy of the hundred largest
British industrial enterprises over the period 1950 to 1970, using a
Chandlerian framework of analysis. One of his central concerns,
therefore, was the question of the pattern of control over resources
as manifested in the structure of the managerial hierarchy. He
distinguished three models:
1. The 'functional' form of organisation: This is a form in which
'the enterprise is broken down into a series of specialised
hierarchical functions culminating in the office of the chief
executive who performs the role of coordinator and general
manager of all the specialist functions'. This form offers the
potential at least for overall direction of the enterprise by a
single substantial shareholder or 'owning-family' representative,
managing from the top the specialised functions of production,
sales, finance and so on.
2. The holding company form: I have remarked earlier on the use of
this form in the British economy. To recap, it draws together
under one legal ownership a collection of enterprises which may
continue nonetheless to be managed separately. The holding
company is unlikely to exhibit central policy-making,
coordination or strategic functions in relation to the subsidiary
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enterprises. The perogatives of personal direction of the
subsidiaries may be circumscribed in certain ways, but the
possibility of such personal direction is not eliminated.
3. The multi-divisional form: I have cited Chandler's description
of this form above. Channon's definition is in the same vein.
This form is one which features a 'general office, usually
divorced from operations, which services and monitors the
operating divisions'. The operating divisions, which may be
defined on product or geographical lines depending on the
character of the enterprise, have a certain autonomy and have
their own specialist staff but are subordinated broadly to the
strategy of the enterprise as a whole. The top managers of the
divisions will generally be appointed by the general office. The
establishment of this form generally marks a break with the
dominance of personal or family direction, and a decisive shift
towards control by a 'managerial apparatus' employing specialised
salaried employees.
Tracing the developments within the population of the hundred largest
enterprises, Channon shows that while in 1950 only 8 percent had a
multi-divisional structure (and most of these were subsidiaries of
foreign-owned enterprises), by 1970 the figure was around 70 percent.
He periodises this development into three stages: in the 1950s the
functional form was dominant; by the 1960s the former was proving too
inflexible to manage effectively enterprises which were growing larger
and more diversified, and the holding company form achieved dominance;
by the '70s it was apparent that the holding company form was in turn
too ramshackle to permit the formulation of a rational overall
strategy for the enterprise in many branches, and maintained a
wasteful duplication of effort among the subsidiaries. The
multi-divisional form acquired dominance. This last step was not, of
course, achieved without difficulty: in many cases it involved
recourse to outside management consultants, since although managements
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consciously wished to install a more rational control over the
enterprise many did not have the internal resources to accomplish such
a change successfully. Change also met resistance from the managers
of some subsidiary units within holding companies, jealous of their
own autonomy.
If this is the broad picture - one which confirms the thesis of the
increasing importance of the impersonal capital - it is also possible
to be more concrete, with regard to development within different
groups of enterprises. For this purpose, Chandler categorised the
population of enterprises according to their degree of
diversification, and the degree of importance of technological
development to the enterprise.
1. Single or 'dominant product' enterprises: These enterprises, for
which diversification was relatively unimportant, were found
concentrated in drink, tobacco, power machinery, oil, metals and
materials. These branches tended to show a high degree of
* concentration, and barriers to entry on the part of new
enterprises, but relatively low profits.
Most enterprises in these branches had only a low level of
'transferable technology'; many were processors of specific raw
materials. In this context, strategic change was found to be
generally rather slow, especially among firms for which 'family'
influence remained important. This influence seemed to correlate
with stagnation, and maintenance of the original product/market
scope of the enterprise. By 1970, however, most of the
enterprises in these branches had evolved some kind of
multi-divisional form, partly in order to cope with the limited
diversification which was attempted through acquisition, and
partly to organise geographically-based divisions.
2. The 'technological diversifiers': For these enterprises,
technological expertise was the basis for diversification into
new products and markets. They were concentrated in the
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industry-groups of electrical and electronic engineering,
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and mechanical engineering. These
branches of production clearly played a leading role in the
economic expansion of the 'postwar boom', with growth rates well
in excess of the average for manufacturing industry. Large
'family' companies were rare relative to the low technology
industries: most of the dominant enterprises developed
thorough-going multi-divisional structures - making this sector
the locus classicus of the large-scale impersonal capital - but
the breadth and openness of markets allowed space for the
continuing presence of a penumbra of smaller specialist
enterprises .
3. The 'acquisitive diversifiers' : Enterprises in this category
carried out significant diversification, but less by development
of their own technological and marketing resources and more by
acquisition and merger (main branches: food, textiles, paper and
packaging, printing and publishing). In some cases the
» diversificiation was related either by market (food and
packaging) or in the sense of vertical integration (textiles and
paper), but in this category we also find the 'conglomerates'
whose various diversified activities bear little economic
relationship to one another. In many cases the candidates for
'acquisitive diversification' were enterprises suffering
relatively low growth and profitability (the main exceptions were
in 'convenience foods', plastic packaging and synthetic fibres),
and those under 'family' influence in particular tended to be
narrow in their operational scope and vulnerable to competition.
In this context, diversification through acquisition could be
seen as a defensive move. As such, it was often a failure:
profits were rarely improved, "since the managerial and
structural reorganisations that were needed to achieve the
potential benefits from acquisitions were rarely made.
Deficiencies in management skills, inadequate financial controls
and poor rationalisation actually often compounded the earlier
difficulties" (Channon, 1973, p. 194). Many of the large
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enterprises formed in this way remained at an intermediate stage
between the holding company and the multi-divisional forms, with
loose control and planning systems and a poorly developed central
office, especially in the case of enterprises led by a 'dominant
personality' of the 'tycoon' type. We see here in more detail
the roots of the poor profitability of many products of the
'mergers and acquisitions booms' of the '60s, as analysed by
Singh.
Channon's account reinforces the thesis argued above, that there has
been a distinct trend towards the impersonal capital, whose operations
are directed and managed by an 'apparatus' of salaried employees, but
it also permits one to qualify and render more precise that thesis.
The trend has been distinctly uneven across branches of production,
strongest in the 'leading sectors' of post war development (Channon's
'technological diversifiers') but relatively weak among the
single-product enterprises and those that diversified 'defensively'
through stock-market acquisitions. By 1970 'family connections' among
the" directors of the larger British enterprises, while still
significant and probably more important than in other industrial
capitalist economies, were diminishing. On Channon's calculation 15
percent of directors had such links with owning families, but the vast
majority had 'little or no significant equity stake in their
companies', and remuneration was mainly by straight salary.
I shall return below (Chapter 4, Section 2) to the implications of
these developments at the level of the enterprise for socialist
politics and ideology. For the present though I shall follow up my
comments on the depersonalisation of capitalist property relations at
enterprise level by considering in more detail the 'second-order
depersonalisation' noted briefly in Chapter 2: that is, not only are
the means of production largly possessed by the impersonal legal
subject of the joint-stock company, but the shares of those companies
are increasingly held by other impersonal subjects viz. joint-stock,
or mutual, financial institutions (and to a lesser extent
governments). The investigation of patterns of shareholding, it was
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argued above, does not in itself lead to very conclusive results
regarding the internal direction and management of enterprises.
Nonetheless, in this context of the second-order depersonalisation,
such investigation is of considerable interest. Devine et al (1979)
have collected the results of research by Errit and Alexander (1977)
and Moyle (1971) which show the following trends in ownership of
ordinary shares quoted on the UK stock exchange :
TABLE 3.3
Ownership of Ordinary Shares, by Market Value
0
I of market value
Sector of beneficial holder 1957 1963 1969 1975
Personal 67.7 56. 1 49.5 39.8
Financial Sector 21.3 30.4 35.9 47.9
Overseas 4.4 7.0 6.6 5.6
Public 3.9 1.5 2.6 3.6
Industrial and Commercial 2.7 5.1 5.4 3.0
Within the financial sector it is the pension funds and insurance
companies which are the most substantial beneficiary holders,
accounting jointly for 32.7 percent of market value in 1975. That
this trend has continued since 1975 is shown in the recent financial
2
data. Over the years 1975-79 the personal sector has 'disinvested'
in company and overseas securities at a rate of substantially more
than £1,000 million per year and this has more than been made good by
the net acquisition of company securities by life assurance and
superannuation funds. Meanwhile the personal sector has acquired the
liabilities of these latter institutions at an annual rate exceeding
£5,000 million. We have clearly now reached a situation in which the
majority of ordinary shares in the UK are held by the big financial
institutions, and the greater part of personal wealth is held in the
form of the liabilities of these institutions rather than in 'titles
to ownership' of companies.
2 The information below is taken from 'Financial Statistics',
February 1980 (CSO).
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The transformation raises a number of questions of interest in the
context of class analysis. These can be ordered into two problem
areas: first, what is the extent and significance of intervention in
the operations of companies by the financial institutions? Second,
the broader 'systemic' issue which may be posed in this way: what
does the rapid growth of the financial institutions which collect
personal savings, and lend these to enterprises and governments,
suggest about the class structure of modern British capitalism? The
point about this latter question, which will be more clearly defined
in the following chapter, is that it directs attention not only to the
'power relations' between financial and industrial enterprises but to
the overall pattern of financial flows within which those relations
are inserted.
I shall refer to the first issue under the heading of 'financing and
control over the enterprise', and then address the second issue under
that of 'classes and financial circulation'.
Financing and control over the enterprise
Although this issue has been raised in relation to the current pattern
of shareholding in the British economy it may be useful to begin by
referring back to the discussion of external financing in Chandler,
and comparing the conclusions of that discussion with the views of
certain Marxist writers. Note first that the shareholding relation is
not the only relevant relation between financial and
industrial/commercial enterprises in this context. If the financial
institutions simply buy up shares already held by the personal sector
then they are not providing any additional finance for the companies
concerned, and on the other hand financial institutions may provide
substantial funds for use by companies without acquiring an equity
stake (e.g. in the case of bank loans). The following discussion is
concerned with the broad question: do the financial institutions
exercise important leverage over company policy either by virtue of
their stake in beneficiary ownership £r_ by virtue of their provision
of substantial external finance (purchase of new shares or bonds, or
provision of loans)?
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Chandler has drawn out the importance of the mode of financing of
enterprises in his distinction between 'family capitalism' and
'financial capitalism' as different routes to the formation of
managerial enterprises. In the case of enterprises which require
substantial external financing, the original owners of the firm's
share capital will generally be unable to retain a monopoly over
top-level decision-making and representatives of financial interests
are likely to be placed on the board of directors. But a high level
of external financing is not a universal feature of capitalist
enterprises: in the US case large enterprises could be built up in
retailing without taking on board specifically financial interests,
and even in the more capital-intensive branches of industry
enterprises could over time outgrow the need for large-scale
borrowing, thereby reducing the leverage of financiers'
representatives on company policy. Besides, the increasing complexity
and professionalisation of management means that the financiers'
capacity for detailed intervention in company policy becomes more and
more limited: financial capitalism gives way to managerial.
This analysis of the US case sustains criticisms which have been
levelled at Hilferding's conception of 'finance-capital'. In this
conception, taken up by Lenin (1964), Hilferding generalised from the
situation in Germany before the first World War and argued that
increasing fusion between financial and industrial capital, under the
dominance of the former, was a necessary feature of advanced
capitalism. This 'unity-in-dominance' (to use more modern jargon) of
financial and industrial interests he labelled 'finance capital'.
Lenin took finance-capital in this sense as an essential feature of
'imperialism' - a concept which he did not restrict to the colonial
adventures of certain capitalist powers but which supposedly denoted a
whole structural 'stage' of capitalism (the final and most decadent
stage at that). Lenin's expressed view, in what was admittedly a
political pamphlet rather than a full and measured analysis, was that
the carving up of industry by the big banks and the carving up of the
world by the big capitalist powers were intrinsically linked, and were
3
a prelude to proletarian revolution on a world scale.
3 Although I cannot discuss it here, Warren ( 1980) has produced a
very interesting and detailed critique of Lenin's 'Imperialism'.
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While Hilferding's conception may have been applicable to the Germany
of the time, his view that this showed the necessary future of
capitalism in general has not been borne out. In retrospect, the
dominant position of banks appears as a rather particular feature of
the German case: banks have had controlling interests in certain
branches of industry at certain times in other national economies but
we have seen how this was less widespread, and arguably a transitional
phase, in the case of US capitalism. Sweezy (1939) made this argument
within a Marxist framework, dating the transitional phase of 'banker
dominance' from 1890 to 1929. More recently Hussain (1976) has argued
that the Hilferding/Lenin conception of 'finance-capital' has tended
to block off specific analysis of modern financial institutions on the
part of Marxist writers. In particular the emphasis placed by the
Hilferding/Lenin tradition on the financing/domination of industrial
capitals by 'finance-capital' has obscured the increasing role of the
financial institutions in collecting personal savings, extending
personal credit and financing government borrowing (of which more in
the following chapter).
0
The thrust of the foregoing remarks is not to deny the importance of
the financial institutions or, more specifically, of the external
financing of industrial and commercial enterprises at the present
time. It is rather to clear aside one influential but misleading
conception within the Marxist tradition - that of universal 'banker
dominance' - so as to open up some useful areas of investigation.
'Finance-capital' in the fullest sense may have been a geographically
and temporally circumscribed phase but it should not be concluded that
full financing from retained profits is the natural state for 'mature'
managerial capitalism. In this regard Chandler may be criticised for
his implicit proposition that managerial enterprise has outgrown the
need for large-scale external finance. Partly, no doubt, this is an
effect of the periodisation of his detailed studies: the industrial
cases he considers are fully documented only up to the early post war
years, when the leading managerial enterprises had a generally strong
liquidity position. The Radcliffe enquiry into the British financial
system during the 1950s found the leading companies placing little
reliance on external financing (and drew the conclusion, now notorious
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to economists, that variations in the rate of interest had little
effect on industrial investment plans) . But from the vantage-point of
the 1980s we can see that this state of affairs was not to continue
indefinitely. Four points may be made in criticism of the notion of a
'natural' self-financing on the part of industrial capitalist
enterprises.
1. A high rate of internal financing cannot be 'read' unambiguously.
Theoretically, it can indicate either a strong financial position
of the enterprises concerned (profits sufficient to finance a
high level of investment) or a weak investment record (low
borrowing a correlate of unambitious investment plans). British
companies have shown a relatively high degree of internal
financing (around 70 percent of capital funds over the last ten
years), but an increasing proportion of company funds has been
required merely to 'keep going' (i.e. to cover cost of stocks and
depreciation of fixed assets) . Relatively low borrowing by
enterprises has been associated with weak profitability and an
' even weaker investment record.
2. Industries which at one time sustained rapid accumulation on the
basis of retained profit have run into crisis. The problems of
the motor industry in the USA and Britain in face of rising oil
prices and severe foreign competition provide an obvious example.
In such cases it is rather unlikely that the private sector
financial institutions will come to the rescue with the funds
required for structural change and improved competitiveness. The
prospects for e.g. Chrysler in the USA and BL in Britain look too
'risky' and in both cases it is the state which is providing the
external finance, fearful of the reverberations of the collapse
of such giant employers (both directly and in their capacity as
consumers of intermediate output from other branches of
industry). The 'strings attached' to state aid in these cases
show up very clearly the leverage over company policy which the
monopoly provision of external finance grants the state under
these circumstances, although of course that leverage can be
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exercised in different directions (insistence on a degree of
worker participation in the case of Chrysler under Carter;
strong support for a 'hard-line' management policy over
work-practices and wages with BL under Thatcher) .
3. Impersonal capitals have become more diversified and are thus
better able to maintain their dominant position even in the face
of significant changes in demand and in technology. But the
development and exploitation of radically new technologies still
give birth to (or at least permit the birth of) new large
enterprises. This has happened with the rise of semiconductor
technology and the microelectronics industry. In this field, the
investment costs of setting up in manufacture of semiconductors
or even of remaining competitive in the market have escalated
rapidly with the increasing technical complexity of the products
and the production process, and the enterprises concerned are
unable to finance their growth by means of their (very
substantial) retained profit alone, forcing reliance on external
* funds. The general point here is that the emergence over time of
new capital-intensive branches of industry will bring a need for
large-scale external investment finance, even if established and
profitable enterprises in other branches have achieved
self-financing growth.
4. Government economic policy and world trading conditions can have
an important impact on the borrowing needs of all enterprises.
In Britain in 1980, for instance, the sharp and severe drop in
effective demand precipitated in large measure by the
government's attempts to cut public sector borrowing and tightly
control the money stock has forced many otherwise profitable
enterprises into trading losses and unwanted borrowing to cover
costs.
We saw earlier that financial enterprises have become increasingly
important as major shareholders in industrial and commercial
enterprises. The above remarks also show that the provision of new
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external finance, both by financial institutions and by governments,
is of continuing importance even for 'managerial' enterprises. Such
funds may be required for expansion, for investment in new technology,
for restructuring in the face of shifts in the pattern of demand, or
to cover current costs when markets are depressed. It is worth noting
that in the British case these two relationships between financial
enterprises and industrial/commercial enterprises (acquisition of
equity stake, provision of new finance) have been relatively
distinct. This is shown in table 3.4 overleaf. For most of the years
considered, industrial and commercial companies have relied on
external sources for around 30 percent of their capital funds but
within their total external financing bank borrowing has generally
accounted for a greater proportion than capital issues (i.e. sales of
new shares and bonds) . That is, although the pension funds and life
assurance companies have taken over an increasing proportion of
shareholdings it is the banks (which in Britain are not significant as
shareholders) which have provided the greater part of new external
finance. Generally speaking, less than half of the massive flow of
funds from the personal sector into the life assurance and pension
funds has been used to acquire shares and bonds issued by UK
industrial and commercial companies, the balance being invested mainly
in government bonds, shares of other financial enterprises, and landed
property.
In contrast to the Lenin/Hilferding 'finance-capital' thesis, it is
argued here that these financial relationships do not carry any
necessary implications concerning control over the strategy and
operations of industrial and commercial capitals on the part of
financial interests. Under certain circumstances financial
enterprises may use the financing relation as a means of leverage over
company policy, but they often act as passive collectors of dividends
and interest payments. This point may be sustained by examining in
more detail the major forms of financial relationship.
1. Shareholding on the part of non-bank financial institutions: I












































































































































pension funds in this regard. It should be added that investment
trusts and unit trusts are also substantial shareholders, although
their rate of growth has been less dramatic than that of the former.
The point about all of these institutions is that they are not really
equipped to intervene in regular company decision-making. Their
acquisitions of shares and bonds are geared to rather narrow financial
considerations and they often behave in a speculative manner rather
than entering into substantial long-term relations with particular
enterprises. In their written evidence to the Committee to Review the
Functioning of Financial Institutions (Wilson, 1978) the institutions
stated that
"In discharging their role as owners of capital, few
institutional investors would interpret this as requiring a
regular detailed monitoring of a company's progress... For a
normal portfolio of soundly based companies, the investor
would not be able to justify on economic grounds the
expenses of the necessary team of experts to do the
monitoring to which should be added the costs that would be
incurred to the companies" (Wilson, 1978, p.90).
9
The evidence continued to the effect that 'in the ordinary way good
managements should be allowed to get on with the job' although
'regular communications' should be maintained. The institutions did
however, recognise certain situations in which 'other forms of action'
might be taken if necessary: cases of inadequate management,
contested takeover bids, boardroom disputes. In such instances the
institutions generally try to keep a low profile and avoid publicity
which might have an adverse effect on share prices, but from time to
time a case reaches the newspapers. It has been reported (Devine et
al, 1979) that the successful £400 million takeover bid by Grand
Metropolitan Hotels for Watney Mann in 1972 was completed, against the
wishes of most individual Watney Mann shareholders, with the help of
the big institutional shareholders. But if there is not much evidence
of direct intervention by the institutions other than on such
occasions, this does not mean that the behaviour of the shareholding
institutions is without effect on industrial and commercial capitals.
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I mentioned earlier the role of the financial institutions in
fostering an 'artificially' high level of industrial concentration in
the British economy: this effect may be seen, somewhat paradoxically,
as in part due to the wish of the institutions to avoid entering into
too close a relationship with any one enterprise. To the extent that
they acquire shares of only the largest enterprises, the institutions
leave themselves a freer hand for the speculative management of their
funds, since it may be impossible to sell off a major shareholding in
a smaller enterprise without driving down the market price of its
shares. This preference for larger enterprises on the part of the
institutions puts a premium on their shares and hence encourages
mergers and takeovers even where they may not be justified on the
grounds of production and trading performance.
In the ideology of the institutional investors, the capital market is
a smoothly functioning mechanism for allocating resources in the best
possible way. Share prices are supposed to reflect the 'quality of
management' and economic performance, and a falling share price acts
as 'a spur to increased efficiency on the part of weak enterprises in
order to avoid becoming a 'takeover bargain'. With such faith in the
beneficial effects of competitive markets, the institutions can blind
themselves to their own economic effects.
2. Bank lending: It is useful here to distinguish between lending
by means of the overdraft facilities grants by the clearing banks
(i.e. the 'big four' of Barclays, Lloyds, Midland and National
Westminster), and the provision of medium term loans by the 'merchant
banks', or merchant banking subsidiaries of the clearing banks.
Overdraft borrowing is very important as a source of marginal credit
to enterprises, yet this financing relationship does not generally
involve intervention by the lending bank. Overdraft loans are
generally secured on the assets of the company involved so that if the
company should go into liquidation the bank will be able to reclaim
its funds. Beyond determining the credit-worthiness of the potential
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borrower on this criterion it is unlikely that the clearing bank will
carry out further detailed surveillance of, or intervention in, the
affairs of the company.
Term loans, on the other hand, carry the implication of a more
detailed inspection of the borrowing enterprise's affairs. Such loans
are often secured not on the borrowers present assets, but on the cash
flow expected from the investment project for which the funds are
borrowed. This is advantageous for the borrower since it implies a
broader view of credit-worthiness and may make possible access to
external finance on a larger scale. From the lending bank's point of
view such loans must involve making a critical assessment of the
company's trading prospects. This may extend to offering advice or
setting conditions. Term loans have become a very substantial source
of funds for companies, particularly over the 1970s. On the
calculations of Revell ( 1973) the position in 1970 was one in which
almost all clearing bank advances to companies took the form of
4
overdrafts and the greater part of secondary bank advances were term
loans. On this basis the ratio of clearing bank advances to secondary
bank advances gave a rough index of the relative importance of
overdrafts and term loans. This ratio stood at around two to one,
indicating that the overdraft was the dominant form of bank loan but
that term loans were already substantial. By the end of the '70s, the
Bank of England reckoned that term loans accounted for 40 percent of
total clearing bank advances. Meanwhile, the relative magnitude of
seconday bank advances to the UK private sector had also increased.
Repeating Revell's calculation, this suggests that around 60 percent
of bank sterling advances to the UK private sector now take the form
of term loans.^
4 'Secondary banks' include the British merchant banks, foreign
banks operating in Britain, and Consortium banks.
5 Figures taken from Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Vol. 20 No.
3 September 1980.
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Insofar as term loans imply a closer relationship between financier
and borrower this at least suggests an overall shift in the pattern of
bank lending favouring a closer engagement of the banks in the affairs
of other enterprises.
There are signs that the severe deflation being pursued by the
Conservative government at present ( 1981) is forcing the banks to
consider accelerating this shift. In this context it is worth quoting
a leader from the 'Times' business news of 30/1/81, which reflects
both the pressure for change and the 'traditional' arm's length
relationship between banks and industry in the British case.
"In the German slump of the 20s the banks became deeply
embroiled in industry. This has not always been a
successful partnership but at the same time it was felt
essential for the survival of German industry. With
bankruptcies mounting and the recession continuing such
strategy might even become part of discussions on the sort
of problems which the banks and their industrial customers
are now facing, though it would of course run quite counter
to traditional prudential banking practice in this country".
With many industrial customers collapsing into ruination, more
'interventionist', longer term lending policies 'might even become
part of discussions'!
Aside from the pattern of lending, there are other relevant
relationships between the merchant banks in particular and industrial
and commercial enterprises. The merchant banks, with their important
position in the City of London financial network, can act as 'Issuing
Houses', giving advice to enterprises on new capital issues. Further,
Minns ( 1980) has argued that although the pension funds own a high
proportion of company shares, the control over their share portfolios
often reverts to the merchant banks which contract to 'manage' many
funds under only the most general guidance from the funds' trustees.
Minns suggests that about twothirds of pension fund assets are under
external control, and that merchant banks control 65 percent of such
assets .
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The merchant banks also have strong overseas connections and conduct a
high proportion of their banking activities in currencies other than
sterling. This reflects their early involvement with empire trade and
overseas investment (during the nineteenth century this formed the
basis of their business; at the time British manufacturing industry
was in the main self-financing from the personal wealth of the owners,
according to research cited in Scott (1979)) but in present conditions
it puts them in a strong position for providing financial services for
multi-national enterprises operating in Britain.
Given all these relationships between the merchant banks and other
enterprises it is hardly surprising to find channels of communication
and influence formalised in 'interlocking directorships', with
representatives of the merchant banks sitting on the boards of other
financial institutions and top industrial companies. Such links have
been investigated by Aaronovitch (1961), Barratt Brown (1968),
Stanworth and Giddens ( 1975) and Overbeek ( 1980) , and their evidence
suggests that the links have grown closer with the increase in overall
economic concentration since the Second World War. But Scott (1979)
has argued that while the interlocking of personnel does indicate the
existence of 'spheres of influence' of strategically-placed financial
enterprises it does not sustain the notion of banking 'empires',
according to which the allocation of productive resources is
determined by a few dominant banking concerns pursuing policies of
active intervention in relation to the financially dependent
. . 6
enterprises.
6 Poulantzas also offers a reminder that the phenomenon of
interlocking personnel at top level cannot be 'read' in any
simple manner. He notes that "... the presence of
representatives of the big banks on the board of directors of
large enterprises is found both in France and in Germany, but it
does not have the same significance in each case. In Germany in
particular, banking monopoly capital has always had a direct
policy of intervention and investment in industry, while banking
capital in France has even today an extremely speculative
character (stock-exchange operations or massive investments in
landed property)" (Poulantzas, 1975, pp.182-3).
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Scott's position squares with that of Chandler, who took the view that
the 'banking empire' was no longer an appropriate form of control over
large-scale managerial enterprises although such 'empires' may have
existed as a transitional form particularly in the USA and Germany, as
well as with the conclusions of my own discussion above.
3. Government grants, loans, and shareholding: In contrast to
private-sector financial institutions, governments rarely enter into
financial relationships with industrial and commercial enterprises
merely for the sake of the revenues to be gained in the form of
interest payments and dividends. If financial capitals may be content
not to intervene in the affairs of their industrial and commercial
clients providing that their flow of revenue is not seriously
threatened, the rationale for governments acting as financiers is
generally to affect the behaviour of enterprises according to the
priorities of economic or social policy, and to produce an allocation
of resources which 'market forces' would not otherwise produce. In
other words, government financing of enterprises is usually explicitly
a means of leverage over company policy whether it be employment
policy (e.g. provision of Temporary Employment Subsidy or subsidy of
short-time working), location of industry (finance available as part
of government regional policy), furtherance of new technology (e.g.
finance for development of microelectronics) or cushioning the demise
of industries whose market has collapsed.
The general tendency of the leverage exercised by the
state-as-financier has depended on the political complexion of the
government and on the political constraints it has faced. For
instance the Industry Act of 1975, which set up the National
Enterprise Board (NEB) was originally intended by the Labour left as a
means of gaining control over the activities of large capitalist
enterprises and subordinating them to a form of planning which would
promote 'industrial regeneration' along with a measure of industrial
democracy. Financial leverage, as well as the possibility of
sanctions against uncooperative firms, and further nationalisation,
was to be used to push industrial development in a socialist
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direction. In the event, the proponents of this strategy did not
manage to mobilise sufficient popular support for their objectives to
be able to avoid the watering-down of the NEB and the associated
planning agreements at the hands of the parliamentary Labour
leadership and the Civil Service. Plans for a coherent and
thorough-going reallocation of productive resources and restructuring
of social relations in industry went by the board, and although the
1974-79 Labour government continued to provide finance for industry
through various channels this provision was shaped in response to ad
hoc political pressure: to protect employment in particular sectors;
to shore up important but financially-ailing enterprises such as BL;
to be seen as not ignoring the need to promote certain new
technologies (Microelectronics Applications Project, NEB funds for
INMOS).
The Conservative government elected in May 1979 clearly finds itself
embarrassed by even the level of intervention-through-financing
bequeathed by Labour. The Tories claim to believe in the 'unfettered
working of market forces' and see, in principle, no role for state
financing of industry. They have, all the same, devoted more state
funds to INMOS after a long period of indecision on the part of the
Industry Secretary, and even used that provision as a means of
leverage over the siting of that enterprise's new microelectronics
factory (South Wales rather than Bristol). They have also continued
to fund BL's losses, in this case making it plain that finance is
conditional on the success of a new hard-line policy against militants
within the BL unions. That is, even an 'anti-interventionist'
government finds it very hard to relinquish the option of state
financing of industry at least as a means of staving off disastrous
industrial collapse or of making good the blatant shortfall in private
sector finance for 'risky' but strategic industries.
The pressures operating on the present government in relation to the
financing of industry, and the possibilities for using state finance
as part of a programme of transformation of industry and society in a
socialist direction, will be considered in greater depth in later
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chapters. In the present context the point being made is that
although public sector financing of private industry is small in
relation to financing by private sector financial capitalist
enterprises, the former is by nature more 'interventionist' than the
latter.
Reprise
Let us take stock of the foregoing arguments concerning financing and
control over enterprises, in the context of the theme of this chapter,
i.e. the rise of the impersonal capital as the dominant mode of
possession of the means of production in modern industrial capitalism
and more specifically in Britain. I have charted the increasing
importance of fewer and larger enterprises in the spheres of both
industry and finance. I have pointed out that the larger enterprises
almost exclusively take the legal form of joint-stock companies,
meaning that the actual means of production are possessed not by
individual persons but by impersonal legal subjects. I have also
examined the arguments of Chandler, Channon and others concerning the
direction of the larger joint-stock enterprises and their managerial
structures, arguments which indicate that impersonal possession is in
the main not merely a convenient juridical fiction: the leading
enterprises have generally outgrown the possibility of genuine control
by founding families or narrow banking oligarchies, and are highly
dependent on the recruitment of salaried management. Further, the
provision, or lack of provision, of definite forms of education and
training of managerial employees in different national economies has
had a significant impact on the trading success of enterprises in
those economies.
I have argued against the Leninist conception of 'finance-capital' in
which industrial enterprises are taken to be under the control of
dominant banking interests, but at the same time I have stressed that
the 'impersonal capital' or 'managerial enterprise' in industry or
commerce is not an autonomous centre of decision-making.
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Self-financing by such enterprises is not in the natural order of
things and industrial capitals maintain definite links with the
financial enterprises which can provide funds either through
acquisition of shares or the extension of credit. By reference to the
pattern of shareholding, I have shown that a second-order
depersonalisation of capitalist property is well under way and is
likely to continue. Individual persons own a decreasing fraction of
company shares and more and more tend to accumulate wealth in the form
of claims against financial institutions. In the British case it is
the life assurance companies and pension funds which have tended to
take up the company shares relinquished by the personal sector,
although it is the banks which have provided most of the new capital
funds for companies over recent years.
The object of the following chapter is to put these propositions
regarding the changed legal form, managerial structure, pattern of
shareholding and mode of financing of capitalist enterprises back into
the framework of the broad economic class structure of capitalism.
That is, I have been concentrating on one aspect of that structure -
the capitalist enterprise - with the intention of showing that the
traditional Marxist conception of the 'capitalist class', as a
category of persons owning the means of production and employing
wage-labour, must now be considered seriously problematic given the
widespread development of the impersonal capital. The problem now is
to integrate this account of the capitalist enterprise into an overall
view of the changed economic class relations of capitalist national
economies, and the British national economy in particular.
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CHAPTER 4
CLASSES AND THE FINANCIAL CIRCULATION
This chapter is relatively lengthy, and I have used numbered
sub-headings to clarify its overall structure. Section 4.1 deals with
the economic ramifications of the dominance of the impersonal capital
and the advanced separation of individuals from the means of
production. I examine the increasing importance of personal saving on
the part of employees separated from the means of production and
therefore unable to carry out real accumulation. I then draw out some
of the implications for the financial circulation process, for
aggregate profits and for the Marxist theory of surplus value.
Section 4.2 then deals with some of the implications for the socialist
project of the analyses of chapter 3 and section 4.1. The first part
of this section (4.2.1) considers the question of 'socialisation' and
planning, and the second part (4.2.2) examines the issue of democracy
within enterprises. Finally in the 'reprise' I take stock of the
proceeding arguments and offer a 'map' of economic class relations,
showing certain strategic sites of intervention and transformation.
First of all, it should be noted that if the formation of impersonal
capitals, analysed in the previous chapter, is a significant feature
of the development of the economic class structure, the other side of
the coin is the increasing proportion of the economically active
population appearing as employees (or unemployed) as opposed to
employers or self-employed. In 1975 in the UK out of an estimated
labour force of 25.6 million, 1.9 million or 7.4 percent were
employers or self-employed. For a detailed breakdown of this category
we have to go back to the 10 percent sample of the 1971 census^. In
1971 the overall percentage of self-employed and employers out of the
economically active was also 7.4, but only 2.9 percent were employers,
i.e. the other 4.5 percent were strictly petty bourgeois: small
1 Office of Population Censuses and Surveys ( 1975) .
165
traders or producers hiring no employees. Further, employers
directing establishments with 25 or more workers were a mere 0.06% of
all of those in employment. Most of the employers were operating on a
very small scale, and were concentrated in those branches of the
social division of labour which have succumbed least to what Marx
referred to as the 'real subsumption of labour under capital': almost
30 percent were in small-scale retailing; many of the others were
either in farming, small-scale construction work, the service sector,
or in the professions, especially law, medicine and accountancy.
The overall picture is one in which the overwhelming majority of the
working population is made up of wage or salary-earning employees.
The category of employers and self-employed receive a disproportionate
share of personal income, but as a fraction of personal income from
employment and self-employment this has fallen from 14.5 per cent in
1951 to 11.8 per cent in 1978.
If the term 'working class' is used in an economic sense to denote the
class of individuals in a capitalist economy who possess no means of
production and are constrained to sell their labour power for a wage
or salary, then one can say that the vast majority of the economically
active population in Britain is working class. If one took this to
imply that socialism has a crushing built-in majority in Britain,
albeit not yet 'realised', then one would indeed fall foul of
Poulantzas' strictures against the notion of the 'wage-earning class'
as politically misleading. No presupposition is made here that the
common economic position of sellers of labour power has necessary
unifying effects at the political level. Indeed, even setting aside
lines of political and cultural differentiation the class of employees
is divided by further 'economic' factors: possession of property
other than means of production e.g. housing; degree of development of
labour-power through education and training; level of income;
security of employment; access to information and to decision-making
at work... this list is by no means exhaustive. All the same, it is
analytically useful to identify the 'working class' in this broad
sense, i.e. at the level of property relations. Although it is not a
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category which displays any political or cultural homogeneity, its
development as the obverse of the impersonal capital is of great
importance for the financial circulation process.
4.1 The Question of Savings
The point is that except for the increasingly marginalised private
capitalists it is impossible for individuals to carry out real
accumulation of capital (in Marx's terminology) or real investment (in
Keynes' terms). To the extent that personal income is greater than
current expenditure individuals can do nothing else but save the
balance, and with rising real incomes over most of the post war years
the volume of personal savings has expanded enormously. This is shown
in a particularly striking manner by the figures for the personal
savings ratio (i.e. the proportion saved out of personal disposable
income) in Britain.
TABLE 4.1
Personal savings ratio in Britain (%)
1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1978
0.9 3.8 4.7 8.6 8.8 7.9 11.0 13.9 15.2
Source: Economic Trends (CSO)
These figures are not greatly out of line with those for other
industrial capitalist economies. In the late 1970s the personal
savings ratio in France and Germany was within a percentage point of
the British figure, although the Japanese figure was considerably
higher (24.5 percent in 1977) and that for the USA was much lower, at
5.0 per cent in the same year (Falush, 1978). What was unique about
the British case was the rapid rise in the savings ratio over the
1970s.
In the following pages I propose to investigate the reasons for a high
level of personal savings, the make-up of savings and the ways in
which they are channelled to borrowers, and the implication for the
accumulation of capital.
1. Theories of saving
The breakdown of personal income into consumption on the one hand and
saving on the other was one of the key elements of Keynes' economic
theory, and Keynes' theory of the 'consumption function' (Keynes,
1936) forms the starting point for modern theories of personal
savings. Keynes acknowledged that the 'propensity to consume' out of
personal income (and therefore also the propensity to save) would be
influenced by a wide range of factors including the level of personal
income; the prevailing level of interest rates; social practices and
institutions relation to consumption; the 'psychological propensities
and habits' of individuals, and the distribution of income. But all
the same he maintained that it was a reasonable simplifying assumption
that consumption would be a fairly stable function of income in a
given economy, if there were no 'revolutionary' changes in social
habits:
» "... men are disposed, as a rule and on the average, to
increase their consumption as their income increases, but
not as much as the increase in their income" (Keynes, 1936,
p.96).
On this view, rising incomes will lead to an increase in savings, and
further, an increase in the proportion of income which is saved.
There is also the implication that higher income groups within the
population will tend to have a higher propensity to save, so that,
e.g. greater equality in income distribution will tend to lower the
overall savings ratio. Little matter that Keynes presented this
principle as a 'fundamental psychological law' in grand ahistorical
manner. Let us examine its adequacy in accounting for the movement of
savings in the post war period.
Over the 1950s real personal disposable income (PDI) rose at an
average annual rate of 3.1 per cent, and only fell in one year of
exceptionally rapid inflation, 1950-51 (the 'Korean War boom'). Over
the 1960s, the average annual rise was 2.6 per cent and there was no
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year of falling real PDI. Therefore it is not surprising, on
Keynesian grounds, to find a gradual rise in the personal savings
ratio over these decades. But problems of explanation arise in the
1970s when change in the level of real PDI became much more erratic,
with sharp rises over 1971 to '73 followed by relative stagnation then
falls from 1973 to '77 while the savings ratio remained at an
historically high level.
TABLE 4.2
Personal disposable income and savings in the '70s




1971 64,585 1.9 7.8
1972 69,597 7.8 9.5
1973 74,069 6.4 11.0
1974 75,051 1.3 14.2
1975 74,707 -0.5 14.7
1976 74,773 0.1 14.6
1977 73,560 -1.6 13.9
1978 78,682 7.0 15.2
+ at 1975 prices.
Source : Economic Trends (CSO)
Keynes' simplified consumption function does not provide an adequate
explanation for this, and neither does Friedman's modified version
(Friedman, 1952). The main point of the latter theory is actually a
development of a qualification which Keynes made in relation to the
short run behaviour of savings:
2 Figures calculated from Economic Trends Annual Supplement 1980
edition (CSO).
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"... a man's habitual standard of life usually has the first
claim on his income, and he is apt to save the difference
which discovers itself between his actual income and the
expense of his habitual standard... Thus a rising income
will often be accompanied by increased saving, and a falling
income by decreasing saving, on a greater scale at first
then subsequently" (Keynes, 1936, p.97).
Friedman's 'permanent income hypothesis' follows this suggestion,
maintaining that consumption will be not so much a function of current
income, but rather of an agent's perceived 'permanent' or long-term
income. Therefore the observed propensity to save may be more erratic
than Keynes' simplified theory suggested. This principle perhaps
offers some explanation of a rising savings ratio during the early 70s
when the rise in real PDI was considerably 'above trend', but it also
carries the counter-factual implication that the ratio should have
fallen substantially in the years to 1977 when real PDI was stagnant
or falling. Faced with the behaviour of savings over the years to
1975, the OECD admitted that it was difficult to do more than "hazard
guesses" as to their determination (OECD, 1975). Factors which were
reckoned to be disrupting the more predictable behaviour of earlier
years included rising unemployment (which could induce 'precautionary'
savings), accelerating inflation, in particular following the oil
price rises of 1973-74, and exceptionally high interest rates.
Over recent years an alternative theory of saving in times of
inflation has been proposed (e.g. Bean, 1978). The suggestion is that
since inflation reduces the real value (purchasing power) of the
financial assets held by savers, it may induce a higher level of
savings as agents attempt to rebuild their stock of financial assets
in 'real' terms. As a basis for this claim, it may be pointed out
that despite the high savings ratio, the ratio of financial assets
held by the personal sector to PDI has been on a falling trend since
its peak in 1969 . Over the years from 1972 to 1976 it fell from 2.73
to 1.7 (CSO, 1978). As we shall see, this attempt to build up the
real value of accumulated savings by saving a higher proportion of
current income is deeply ironic since increased savings have
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contributed to falling profitability and weak real investment,
retarding the growth of output of goods and services over which
financial assets are a deferred claim.
Another possible link between inflation and personal savings is that
mediated by government economic policy. Personal saving is calculated
as total personal disposable income minus personal sector expenditure
3
on goods and services (consumers' expenditure). Now, a part of the
latter is financed by borrowing so when governments have reacted to
rapid inflation by raising interest rates and/or restricting the
availability of consumer credit, and this has led to a fall in the
amount of consumers' expenditure financed by borrowing, this has led
to a rise in the savings ratio.
2. The pattern of savings
The theories of saving considered above share a common weakness: they
all deal with savings as an aggregate, and attempt to construct some
kind of function relating this aggregate to disposable income,
inflation or some other macroeconomic variable. In so doing, they
ignore a good deal of relevant information. We can get a better
picture of the dynamics of personal sector savings by considering the
various different kinds of assets acquired by different groups within
the personal sector rather than just the overall savings ratio.
Broadly speaking if agents in the personal sector are able to save,
i.e. are in receipt of an income in excess of current consumption
requirements, then there are two possibilities: they can either
accumulate financial assets or else acquire property in the form of
housing. Let us first consider the acquistion of financial assets.
This can be broken down into the accumulation of liquid assets on the
one hand (e.g. cash, deposits with banks and building societies) and
3 In other words, saving is calculated as a residual - which means
that the figures for personal sector saving are subject to quite
a wide margin of error. Nonetheless the trend increase in
personal saving noted above is well-established even if the
absolute figures may be inaccurate.
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illiquid assets such as claims against life assurance companies and
pension funds, government bonds and company shares, on the other. The
latter forms of savings (payment of life assurance premiums,
contributions to pension funds) may be labelled 'contractual savings'
since in this case individuals enter into a definite contract to set
aside a part of their incomes and pay this to the financial
institution concerned. It is clear that contractual saving has become
increasingly important in Britain.
Take life assurance. Originally, this was not so much a means of
saving but a means of providing for dependents should the wage or
salary earner in a family meet an early death. But more recently the
big growth area of life assurance business has been in endowment
policies - in this case premiums are paid over an arranged term and at
the end of that period (or on prior death) the sum in the endowment is
paid to the policyholder. Further, 'with profits' policies are
available, whereby the sum paid out reflects the income earned by the
«>
assurance company on the financial assets which it in turn acquires
using the funds subscribed by its policyholders. The 'endowment
policy' still functions as an insurance against the financial
consequences of early death, but in addition it provides a means of
accumulating a financial claim for the purposes of, for instance,
provision for retirement, paying children through the education
system, or passing on wealth intergenerationally. Superannuation -
contribution to a pension scheme - is also obviously a means of
providing for a level of income greater than the basic state pension
in retirement. The increasing participation in pension schemes, and
increasing holding of life assurance policies, over recent years is
shown in table 4.3 overleaf:
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TABLE 4.3
The spread of life assurance and pension commitments
1966-78
a) Estimated total membership of pension and life assurance
schemes :
1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
Millions 5.02 5.56 6.24 6.83 8.02 8.72 9.76
as % of
working 19.6 21.9 24.7 27.1 31.3 33.4 37.0
population
b) Ordinary life assurances in force at end year :
1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
millions 11.4 12.3 13.9 15.1 17.0 18.5 19.7
Sources: 'Life Assurance in the UK' (London, Life Offices
Association), various issues, and Economic Trends Annual Supplement
1980 edition (CSO).
The financial importance of these forms of saving may be gauged by the
£7.7 billion, or 41.2 per cent of total personal savings which flowed
into life assurance and superannuation in 1978. The full breakdown of
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But aside from using the excess of income over current consumption
needs to accumulate financial assets, wage and salary earners do have
*
one other option which has become increasingly popular: the
acquisition of physical assets, not in the form of means of production
but in the form of housing. For most people it is not possible to buy
a house outright, but it is possible to take out a mortgage loan from
a building society. Thereafter, a part of their income is earmarked
for repayment of the principal plus interest. The end-point of this
process is the full repayment of the mortgage loan, but even before
this it may be possible to sell the house and realise any gains
arising from increase in the market value of the property above its
purchasing price. This can seem especially attractive when house
prices are rising faster than the general price level, as has been the
case over the 1970s. The extent of owner-occupation of the UK housing
stock, much of it financed through the building societies, is one
indicator of this trend: in 1914, only 10.6 per cent of the housing
stock was owner-occupied, by 1950 the figure was 29.5 per cent and by
1979, 54.6 per cent. In international terms this is a high
proportion, exceeded only in the USA, Canada and Japan.
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The repayment of mortgage loans to the building societies occupies a
somewhat ambivalent position in relation to the savings/expenditure
balance of the personal sector. In one sense mortgage repayment may
be regarded as similar to the payment of rent to a landlord, but while
rent payment can legitimately be seen as 'consumer spending' (in
exchange for the use value of housing), mortgage repayment is more
than that. It is not merely a payment for enjoyment of a use value,
but rather a progressive writing-off of a liability to the building
society, which eventually results in full ownership of the house. Now
it is clear that the house itself is not 'consumed'; rather it is a
durable physical asset ('bricks and mortar') which may be seen, to
some extent, as a substitute for paper financial assets. In 1978, in
addition to the acquistition of financial assets noted above, the
personal sector paid £6.3 billion in mortgage repayments to the
building societies. The substantial acquistion of building society
deposits shown in table 4.4 is also in part linked to personal sector
'investment' in the proverbial bricks and mortar: a building society
deposit as such is a financial asset, and a fairly close substitute
for a bank time deposit, but within the life-cycle of housing finance
it can function as a means of establishing a favourable credit-rating
with the society.
The importance of housing as a locus for the accumulation of property
is further demonstrated if we consider not just year-by-year financial
flows but the stock of assets held by the personal sector. At the end
of 1978 housing accounted for 37.5 per cent of this stock, as against
41 per cent in the form of financial assets (the balance being made up
4
of consumer durables and other physical assets) .
Having outlined the broad pattern of savings, two related questions
arise: who precisely is doing the saving, and why should it take
these forms? On the first question, it is unfortunate (and somewhat
surprising) that there has been no proper official survey of savings.
4 The Economist, January 17 1981.
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The personal sector balance sheets published in 'Economic Trends' (CSO
1978) do not give any breakdown by level of income or social status.
One can, however, make a rough inference from (a) the distribution of
income and (b) the distribution of wealth-holding, both areas in which
government statistics are available. A priori it seems likely that
saving year-by-year will be more unequally distributed than income
(The Keynesian 'consumption function' cited earlier suggests that
higher income groups will save proportionately more) but less unequal
than wealth-holding (since the latter is a cumulated effect of saving
over the years, and will therefore lag any tendency towards greater
equality of income). In addition, the data from the Department of
Employment's Family Expenditure Survey give an idea of the incidence
of various important forms of saving within different income groups,
although the authors are careful to point out that this survey cannot
be taken as a basis for calculating savings ratios for different
groups since the income and expenditure figures given do not refer to
a standardised accounting period.
As'regards income distribution, we can build up a picture from Central
Statistical Office and Department of Employment information. The
broad distribution of income by 'tax unit' (married couples or single
people over school leaving age and not in full-time education) has not
changed very markedly over the post war years, although there has been
a slow and fairly steady fall in the shares of the top 1 per cent and
the next 9 per cent, mainly taken up by the increasing share of the
next 40 per cent, i.e. those above the median. This left a situation
in 1976-77 in which the top 1 per cent accounted for 5.5 per cent of
income pre-tax (3.8 per cent after tax), the top 10 per cent accounted
for 26.2 per cent of income (23.1 per cent after tax), and the next 40
per cent account for 49.8 per cent (50 per cent after tax). It can
be seen that the tax system does not make income distribution greatly
more even - in fact it has acted to cushion to some extent the fall in
pre-tax income share of the top 1 per cent and the next 9 per cent of
5 Social Trends 10, 1980 Table 6.19 (CSO).
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tax units. This distribution, however, does not tell us much about
the social characteristics of the 'tax units' involved or give any
direct idea concerning their saving behaviour.
More information on this score can be drawn from the Family
Expenditure Survey and this is presented in Table 4.5.
Some comments on the table. The payments included in column (1) are
the following: life assurance premiums, including those for mortgage
endowment policies; and contributions to pension and superannuation
funds deducted by employers. The average weekly payment (for all
housholds) in this category was £3.69. The payments included in
column (3) should not all, perhaps be regarded as 'savings': payments
for house purchase, including deposits; mortgage capital and interest
repayments; and payments for structural alteration. Nonetheless this
figure gives an index of the accumulation of property in the housing
stock. The average weekly payment was £4.90. Column (2) includes
purchase of savings certificates and bonds, premium bonds, stocks and
I
shares, unit trusts etc.; deposits in savings banks, building
societies etc.; and contributions to Christmas, savings and holiday
clubs. The average weekly payment was £1.25. The relative magnitude
of these average weekly payments shows up again the importance of life
assurance, pensions and housing as opposed to other forms of saving.
Now let us consider the profile of the different income groups shown
in table 4.5, drawing upon all the statistical sources cited:
i) Those households with a pre-tax weekly income of less than £60:
In this category fell about 30 per cent of households, accounting
for only 10 per cent of income. Among this group, wages and
salaries were a minor source of income compared to social
security benefits, and the average number of workers per
household was less than 0.4, indicating the predominance of
elderly households living on state pensions, along with large
families only partly supported by a low-paid wage worker. As can















































































































































ii) Households in the income range £60 - £110 per week: This
category also contained about 30 per cent of households,
receiving 23.5 per cent of household income. Wages and salaries
accounted for the major part of income, with the relative
importance of social security falling towards the top of the
range. We are evidently dealing with workers' households in the
main (the range straddles the mean and median weekly earnings of
both 'manual' and 'non-manual' male workers). Many households in
this range must sustain a significant level of saving, since the
table shows that this category contributed over 20 per cent of
the forms of saving noted.
iii) Those in the income range of £110 - £170 per week: here we find
26 per cent of households, accounting for 33.7 per cent of income
and with wages and salaries representing over 80 per cent of
income. According to the New Earnings Survey^ we are well past
the peak of the frequency distribution of male manual earnings,
although by no means out of reach of a houshold including one
' male 'manual' worker and one 'non-manual' working woman. All the
same, many of the earners in this category will be salaried
'non-manual' males. As can be seen, households in this range are
responsible for a substantial fraction of total savings,
proportionally greater than the fraction of total household
income received.
iv) Households with an income in excess of £170 per week: these were
the top 15 per cent of households, receiving 33.5 per cent of
income. Wages and salaries were again the dominant source of
income, although among those with an income in excess of £200,
'self-employment' contributed to 10 per cent. At least at the
lower end of the range, the income level is not unattainable by
manual men with working wives (the average number of workers per
household was in excess of two in this range) although households
6 Social Trends 10, 1980. Chart 6.5 (CSO).
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comprising non-manual workers must predominate. This 15 per cent
of households account for more than a third of the forms of
saving considered here, despite the fact that the households are
on average larger than others, and that their share of income
after tax will be a few percentage points lower than the 33.5 per
cent quoted above.
Checking the profile above against the distribution of wealth, one
finds that the latter is much more unequal. As regards marketable
wealth in 1977 the top 1 per cent accounted for 24 per cent of the
wealth, the top 10 per cent for 61 per cent of wealth, and the next 40
per cent for 34 per cent of wealth. All the same, these figures are
considerably less unequal than those for 1966, which supports the idea
that the rise in the savings ratio over the 1970s has been relatively
broadly based. Further the Royal Commission on the Distribution of
Income and Wealth has shown that the measurement of marketable wealth
alone may be misleading. If one includes non-marketable assets such
as state and other pension rights in measuring the distribution of
wealth this nearly halves the 1976 share of the top 1 per cent, and
nearly doubles the share of the bottom 80 per cent.'' It might be
objected that the Royal Commission's 'correction' of the wealth
figures is itself misleading, since pension rights are not at par
with, say, company shares or country houses. But the point here is to
1 ind an index of saving on the part of different strata, and pension
rights indicate that the holders of those rights have saved in order
'o acquire them. On this criterion, however, it would be fair to
point out that basic state pension rights should be left out of the
r'-ckoning, since these are not dependent on saving out of disposable
'• n come .
broad conclusion from these statistics is that while saving is
' '
" h 1'ni7 skewed towards the upper earning groups, it is by no means the
"Sf*rve of the very rich alone. It appears that a not inconsiderable
' '"-tion of salary, and even wage earners are accumulating financial
'''■Is and a stake in the housing stock.
'•'OcLal Trends 10, 1980, p. 156 (CSO).
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Investigation of the second question noted above (why should saving
take the particular forms its does?) leads to results which reinforce
this conclusion. There is one major and rather obvious pecuniary
factor promoting saving in the form of building society deposits,
acquistion of houses, and acquistion of life assurance and pension
claims in the British case: the tax-favoured status of these forms.
It has been estimated that in 1978 a taxpayer claiming the main
personal allowances who takes advantage of mortgage, superannuation
and life assurance allowances could cut his real tax liability from 30
per cent to 19 per cent if he earned twice average earnings, and from
46 per cent to 34 per cent if he earned five times average earnings
(Kilroy, 1979). This provides a powerful incentive to save in these
particular forms for higher income groups, but it should also be noted
that these forms of saving are more characteristic of the 'middle
classes' (to use a descriptive tag without prejudice to subsequent
analysis) and even 'affluent workers'. Inland Revenue (1975)
investigations suggest that life policies form a higher proportion of
asset holdings for those towards the bottom of the wealth
distribution, and dwellings are also most significant as a proportion
g
of wealth for those in the middle to lower wealth ranges. By
contrast, those at the top of the wealth distribution still hold a
major, if dwindling, fraction of their wealth in the form of company
shares and bonds. The 'middle class' salaried employee or highly paid
wage worker who finds household income to be in excess of current
expenditure is not, in Britain at any rate, likely to wish to play the
stock market and gamble on speculative gains. He or she will have
little or no knowledge and expertise regarding stock market
'investment', will not have a large reserve of personal wealth
sufficient to write off speculative losses as 'bad luck' with
equanimity, and will rather save
8 The Family Expenditure Survey includes an estimate of the
distribution of owner-occupation among 'social classes' in 1978.
Among households where the head of household was in a
'professional or technical' occupation, 77.8 per cent were
owner-occupiers; among 'administrative and managerial'
householders, 79.0 per cent; skilled manual workers, 50.1 per
cent; semi-skilled manual workers 39.9 per cent; and unskilled
manual workers 28.9 per cent (Department of Employment, 1979,
table 24).
in the 'safe and solid' forms of bricks and mortar or life assurance
and pension claims. That is, the fact that these forms of saving have
been made attractive to even the highest earners because of open-ended
tax concessions should not hide their greater relative importance to a
broad stratum of salary and wage earners some way further down the
income/wealth pyramid.
A further point should be stressed here: the importance of
'contractual savings', in the principal forms of life assurance and
pension contributions and the repayment of mortgage loans, which
emerges strongly from the discussion above, has important implications
for the 'theories of saving' considered earlier. It has been standard
practice among economists to consider saving as a residual (i.e. as
the obverse of a 'consumption function' of some kind). Individuals or
households are assumed to make deliberate choices concerning the
proportion of income which will be used for consumption, and the
result of these decisions taken in aggregate is supposed to be a
function, of more or less complexity, relating consumption, and hence
saving, to income. The problem with this kind of procedure is that it
leaves out of account the definite social factors which govern the
level of contractual saving. If one is looking for an explanation of
the trend rise in the personal savings ratio in post war Britain, then
these factors cannot be ignored. Consider the fraction of personal
disposable income (PDI) devoted not to current consumption but to
pension contributions and mortgage repayment: it may well be that
rising PDI is a necessary condition for the increase in such payments,
but to explain why such payments should have increased it is necessary
to go beyond the 'psychologism' of the 'consumption function'. The
first point to notice is that for many employees contributions to a
pension scheme are deducted from 'disposable' income by the employers
at source - these payments are therefore not a residual at all.
Second, to the extent that people do enter 'voluntarily' into
endowment, annuity or other schemes, one must enquire why they feel
this is necessary: here one has to consider the effects of earlier
retirement and long life expectancy, leading to a longer period of
retirement for many people, coupled with the breakdown of the
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'extended family' which previously cared for old people to a much
greater extent. Also one has to consider the adequacy or otherwise of
socialised provision for the elderly. Third, once people have entered
into such contractual commitments then there is considerable pressure
to maintain them. The 'cashing in' of a life assurance policy prior
to its maturity generally entails substantial losses, and people will
often maintain their level of current consumption by means of consumer
credit, bank overdraft and so on rather than break their contractual
savings commitments, if they find themselves financially squeezed.
Similar arguments apply in the case of mortgage repayments. I have
already pointed out that mortgage repayments are in one sense a
substitute for rent payments (an element of 'consumption') although
they also lead to the eventual acquistion of a durable asset
comparable in some ways to a financial asset. Why should so many
people decide to buy houses by means of building society loans rather
than rent? Again 'psychologism' cannot provide a satisfactory
explanation: here one had to refer to the taxation policies of
successive governments, to the balance between public and private
sector building programmes (also subject to political determination),
to the availability and quality of rented accommodation and so on.
And again, once mortgage commitments are acquired they may be
difficult to break even if current real income falls, or fails to rise
as expected, particularly if rented accommodation is hard to come by.
If these points are taken into consideration, it is hardly surprising
that theories of saving which operate at the level of functional
relations between personal consumption and other macroeconomic
aggregates have only limited success in 'explaining' or predicting the
behaviour of savings.
3. Savings and financial flows
I have considered above the pattern of savings carried out by agents
separated from the means of production, yet receiving an income in
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excess of current consumption needs. This section is concerned with
analysing the effects of such savings on the pattern of financial
flows, and on the prospects for real accumulation, in British
capitalism.
A first point to notice is that the important financial circuit bound
up with house purchase is mainly internal to the personal sector
(mediated by the building societies) . That is, some agents save in
the form of building society deposits and the societies then use the
funds raised in this way to extend credit to other (or even the same)
9
agents who wish to buy houses. Given the very high ratio of the
existing housing stock to any year-by-year additions to the stock in
response to additional demand, and given that credit extended for new
building forms only a small fraction of total building society credit,
a strong inflow of funds to the societies and consequent increase in
available mortgage credit acts as a powerful means of inflating house
prices. Here the attempt to accumulate is self-defeating: the
inflation of house prices is possibly advantageous to some speculators
but positively disadvantageous to 'first-time buyers' and of no real
benefit to the majority of owner-occupiers who will never 'realise'
the market value of their property since they will only sell to buy
again, either elsewhere or up-market. This effect is not lost on
these responsible for managing the financial system. The Deputy
Governor of the Bank of England was reported in the 'Times' (14/1/81)
as noting that "tax incentives originally designed for the best of
motives... have created or magnified distortions in the process of
saving and investment which are later found to require corrective
measures". The problem is that if the 'best of motives' involved a
bi-partisan appeal by governments to the rising stratum of savers - at
least appearing to facilitate their acquistion of property in the
9 The building society financial circuit may, however, have
redistributive effects within the personal sector. If, as seems
likely, the distribution of building society deposits is more
unequal than the distribution of mortgage loans, then the result
will be a net transfer of funds, through the mechanism of the
collection and payment of interest, in favour of the larger
depositors.
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housing stock - then the required 'corrective measures' may be highly
unpopular with that stratum. This would be the case if tax
concessions were reduced in the absence of an accelerated
house-building programme and a mechanism for controlling house
prices - a calculation particularly to be borne in mind by the Tories.
The other major flow of personal sector savings - into the life
assurance companies and pension funds - gives rise to a rather
different financial circuit. We have already seen that these
institutions deploy most of their funds in acquiring the liabilities
of the corporate sector (i.e. capitalist enterprises) and the public
sector (i.e. the state) as well as landed property. To analyse the
implications of this, it is necessary to develop an adequate theory of
the financial circulation process, and its relationship to real
accumulation. Volume Two of Marx's 'Capital' contains many suggestive
insights into this matter, but not a coherent and adequate theory.
The following exposition draws on the theories of Keynes (1930 and
1936) and Kalecki ( 1968) . Kalecki based himself on the insights of
'Capital' but developed these into a lucid and coherent whole; Keynes
may be faulted from a Marxist standpoint for having an inadequate
conception of production (this he largely carried over from
neoclassical economics in the Marshallian tradition) but this does not
detract from the brilliance of his analysis of the savings/investment
nexus.
First, the point may be established that total saving must equal total
borrowing, so that net savings on the part of the personal sector
implies an equal amount of borrowing by the other sectors of the
economy. This follows from the formal properties of monetary
transactions. Let us distinguish between transactions involving the
exchange of money against use values whether consumer goods or means
of production - the 'industrial circulation' - and those involving the
exchange of money against financial assets, which may be referred to
as the 'financial circulation'. Consider the industrial circulation:
any transaction within this circulation can be viewed from two sides -
for the recipient of the money it constitutes income while for the
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other party it constitutes expenditure. Because money is not
destroyed during the transaction the income of one party must equal
the expenditure of the other. But what holds true for each and every
transaction will also hold true for all transactions in aggregate:
Income and Expenditure are just two ways of looking at the one
monetary flow.
If Y = total income and E = total expenditure then we have:
Y = E (Identity 1)
But it is clear that for many economic agents their expenditure does
not equal their income. If the economy is viewed as a set of agents
engaging in monetary transactions then it may be partitioned into
three disjoint (separate) subsets.
a) Those whose income and expenditure are equal.
b) Those whose income exceeds their expenditure: the savers. If
' income exceeds expenditure within the industrial circulation,
then these agents must either be accumulating money balances,
acquiring financial assets, or repaying debt contracted
previously. For convenience I shall refer to all of these
activities as 'saving'.
c) Those whose expenditure exceeds their income: the borrowers. If
expenditure exceeds income within the industrial circulation, the
agents must finance the balance of their expenditure either by
new borrowing (bank credit or new issues of financial claims), by
running down their accumulated money balances (if any), or by
selling financial assets previously acquired (if any). For
convenient exposition I shall refer to all this as 'borrowing'.
Let Ya, Yb and Yc be the incomes of the respective sectors and let Ea,
Eb and Ec be their expenditures. It follows that :
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Ya + Yb + Yc = Ea + Eb + Ec (from Identity 1)
But by definition Ya = Ea
so Yb + Yc = Eb + Ec
thus Yb - Eb = Ec - Yc
but Yb - Eb = Savings
and Ec - Yc = Borrowing
so Saving = Borrowing
This can be seen to be the principle behind the national financial
accounts published by the Central Statistical Office, where any
divergence between recorded savings and borrowing is attributed to the
'residual error' - due to inaccuracy in compiling the Income and
Expenditure figures.
So savings and borrowing must be equal. But what are the implications
of this under different economic conditions? To conceptualise fully
the relationship between saving and borrowing one has to make a
distinction between the actual, realised level of saving/borrowing at
any point in time ('ex post') and the planned or desired level of
savings and borrowing ('ex ante'). It is clear that although ex post
saving and borrowing are always equal, the desired level of saving at
any given time need not equal the desired level of borrowing. It is,
however, a fundamental conclusion of the economics of Keynes and
Kalecki that if the desired level of borrowing does not equal the
desired level of savings then forces come into play which tend to
bring them into equality. Since we know that actual saving always
equals actual borrowing, a discrepancy between the desired or planned
levels must mean that some agents' intentions are frustrated (they
find themselves borrowing or saving more than they planned) . The
argument is that the agents concerned will respond in such a way as to
alter the level of income, output and employment, bringing the planned
magnitude of saving and borrowing into line.
Let us consider first the 'Keynesian case', in which we abstract from
the existence of government and overseas trade. In this case the
relevant form of financing identity is simple. The only economic
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sectors considered are households and firms. If the household sector
is a net saver and the corporate sector a net borrower, then it
follows from the exposition above that net personal savings = net
borrowing by firms.
A. Assume an autonomous rise in the desired level of savings, so
that ex ante savings exceeds borrowing. The extra saving will
mean that less income is passed back to firms (consumer
spending/sales revenue) than they were expecting. Faced with
unexpectedly weak demand firms either drop their prices or suffer
an unplanned rise in stocks. Either way income falls further
short of expenditure than planned, and involuntary borrowing
rises. Firms then respond by cutting back on their expenditure
(therefore also an output and employment - the latter possibly a
lagged effect). As a result the personal sector finds its income
reduced, and so, according to the Keynesian 'consumption
function', settles for a lower level of savings. Planned savings
are brought back in line with planned borrowing through the
* mechanism of a fall in the level of income. This effect is often
referred to as the 'paradox of thrift': the individual saver
imagines that he can increase his wealth by saving a larger
fraction of current income, yet if savers in aggregate attempt to
do this, the net effect is likely to be recessionary, merely
reducing current income without stimulating any increase in
accumulation. If savers were able to carry out real investment
in place of current consumption the effects would be very
different, but as we have argued above the agents responsible for
saving are separated from the means of production so that their
saving decisions do not have any direct and positive influence on
the investment decisions of capitalist enterprises.
B. Assume an autonomous 'investment boom', so that ex ante borrowing
by firms exceeds savings. The extra expenditure in this case
increases the pressure of demand for commodities, which will lead
to 'windfall' profits and/or destocking on the part of firms. In
either case this provides a stimulus to expand output and
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employment. Income rises and (the consumption function again)
the planned level of saving also rises. Here the ex ante
discrepancy is overcome through a rise in income which raises
planned saving to meet planned borrowing. In effect, additional
investment is 'self-financing' since it will generate savings to
match.
These Keynesian arguments are interesting from a Marxist viewpoint, in
that they draw out the consequences of the continuing separation of
individuals from the means of production. Perhaps the 'owner-manager'
of earlier years could channel his own savings directly into real
accumulation within his own enterprise, but once the 'saving strata'
have lost this option then their savings become a possible source of
stagnation in real accumulation. The important question is whether
enterprises are willing to borrow, for investment purposes, the funds
which the personal sector wishes to save at a level of income and
demand consistent with rapid accumulation. Neoclassical economists
imagined there was a mechanism to ensure this, in the rate of
interest. The rate of interest was conceived as the price of
'loanable funds'^ and was supposedly set, like all prices, by the
balance of supply and demand. An increase in saving would increase
the supply of loanable funds which would lead to a reduction in the
interest rate, which would in turn increase the demand for loanable
funds on the part of enterprises. One of the great merits of Keynes'
and Kalecki's arguments was the demonstration that saving and
borrowing were always and necessarily equal regardless of the rate of
interest, and that the rate of interest, insofar as it has a general
determination, is the 'price' which balances the 'demand' for money
against the stock of money in existence. There _is_ a mechanism which
brings the desired level of saving and borrowing into equality, but it
operates through variation in the level of income and output and may
well be inconsistent with rapid accumulation.
10 Marx also conceptualised the rate of interest in this way. For a
critical discussion of this point see Cutler et al (1978, Chapter
6).
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So far I have been using a model in which the personal sector and the
corporate sector are the only participants in the circulation process.
This model demonstrates the possibility of stagnation induced by a
high level of personal savings, but it does not follow that personal
saving always produces that effect. In Japan, a savings ratio higher
than that in Britain co-exists with rapid capital accumulation. To
take the inquiry further we must consider a more developed model in
which the state finances and international transactions are given
consideration.
The state in the circulation process
I established above the identity of total saving and total borrowing.
In the simplified model, the only net borrower was the corporate
sector, but if the public sector (state) is also a net borrower then
the financing identity becomes:
Personal Saving = Corporate Borrowing + Public Sector Borrowing
#
That is, the borrowing imposed on the other sectors by virtue of
personal sector saving may be shared between capitalist enterprises
and the state. To a certain extent, capitalist states over the post
war period have willingly accepted financial deficits in the pursuit
of 'Keynesian' demand-management policy: if the economy showed a
tendency towards recession the government could expand demand by
either increasing public expenditure or reducing taxation so as to
stimulate private expenditure. This mode of thinking attained the
status of conventional wisdom in place of the earlier doctrine of
'sound finance' (i.e. the state should make all efforts to avoid a
financial deficit, except of course in the prosecution of war). It is
possible to dispute whether government-engineered variations in the
level of demand were particularly effective in a 'counter-cyclical'
sense, indeed it has been suggested that because of timing problems
(information lag, delays in implementation of policy, lag between
introduction of policy and its full effects) these variations may have
exacerbated rather than damped the fluctuations in economic activity
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(Dow, 1965). Also, of course, there has been the notorious 'stop-go'
cycle of alternating fiscal expansion and balance of payments crises
(the political dimension of which will be considered in Chapters 5 and
6) . But aside from discretionary variations in expenditure and tax
rates, the pattern of state finances established in the 'post
war settlement' has produced an automatic mechanism for expanding the
state's financial deficit in times of recession. I refer here to the
combination of generalised income tax and the principle of income
maintenance for the unemployed: if recession involves a fall in
private spending and rise in unemployment then it simultaneously
reduces the state's tax base and increases the amount payable in
unemployment benefit and social security. This effect (known to
economists as the "built-in stabiliser") can offset to some extent the
recessionary tendencies implicitly in the rising personal saving ratio
and analysed in the Keynesian 'Case A' abovebut although it
moderates the fall in demand it does not necessarily stimulate
accumulation. Borrowing to support the unemployed is not at par with
borrowing to finance real investment.
»
This latter point was clearly recognised by Keynes. Contrary to
widespread misrepresentation, Keynes was not exclusively concerned
with 'short run', conjunctural questions of demand management. He saw
a dangerous secular tendency in capitalist development: rising income
would raise the level of savings which the personal sector would wish
to carry out, and there was no guarantee that borrowing for investment
on the part of capitalist enterprises would keep pace with this.
Borrowing for real investment would be expanded only if its
prospective marginal profitability were greater than the marginal cost
11 It can also frustrate 'monetarist' attempts to return towards
'sound finance*. If governments cut discretionary expenditure,
e.g. on health and education, and the resulting fall in demand
increases unemployment, then tax revenues will tend to fall and
statutory 'income maintenance' spending will rise. This point,
which has been quantified by the Treasury ( 1981) , is dealt with
more fully in Chapter 6.
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of funds (interest rate) and there were two problems here: the
marginal profitability of investment might fall due to diminishing
returns as the capital stock expanded (a version of the 'tendency for
the rate of profit to fall'), and there were likely to be severe
difficulties in engineering a fall in the interest rate sufficient to
offset this. If the level of investment continued to be determined by
calculations based on comparison of the prospective yield of real
capital assets as against paper financial assets, then there was a
real danger of secular stagnation, not merely 'cyclical fluctuations' .
For this reason, Keynes advocated "a somewhat comprehensive
socialisation of investment" (Keynes, 1936, p.378) as a means of
sustaining an adequate pace of accumulation.
In the practice of British governments, 'Keynesian' economic policy
has fallen a good way short of this kind of radicalism. Insofar as
public sector borrowing has been expanded as a policy measure this has
been merely conjunctural. A favourite means of boosting demand has
been a cut in the rate of personal taxation - a ploy which has obvious
attractions in terms of electoral calculation but which has generally
led to an unsustainable growth of imports, and does very little to
promote the longer term growth of productive capacity. The general
point here is that state borrowing for socialised investment could in
principle absorb rising personal saving and avoid stagnation, but it
has not played this role in the British case. The state sector has
indeed been saddled with a high level of borrowing, through the
'automatic mechanism' sketched above, but its real investment
programme has been cut to the bare minimum - increasingly the borrowed
funds have been used merely to finance the unemployment, and the
losses sustained by state industries, consequent upon stagnation or
recession (Bain, 1980).
The role of the 'Overseas Sector'
The case of the Japanese economy, where high savings are combined with
rapid accumulation, has been mentioned above. The differences from
the British case can be partly explained by a higher level of
voluntary borrowing for investment on the part of Japanese
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enterprises, and partly by a state economic policy which, despite the
relatively low level of public expenditure, has concentrated
successfully on developing strategic investment in key sectors of
industry. But at the level of the financial circulation there is
another crucial difference: the trade surplus run by the Japanese
economy has absorbed a major part of Japanese savings. If we return
to the financing identity and include the 'overseas sector', i.e.
other economies, then the saving/borrowing equivalence becomes:
Personal Saving = Corporate Borrowing + Public Sector Borrowing
+ Overseas Sector Borrowing
If economy A runs a trade surplus with others, then it is effectively
lending to the other economies, and this 'overseas sector borrowing'
reduces the level of borrowing which would otherwise be borne by the
corporate sector or the state. The deficiency of demand within
economy A which might otherwise be the consequence of the excess of
personal sector income over expenditure is redressed by the excess of
other countries' expenditure (on A's exports) over income (from A's
imports). Conversely, a trade deficit corresponds to a financial
surplus on the part of the overseas sector, so that for any given
level of personal saving the financial deficit to be borne by the
corporate and public sectors is increased.
In seeking to explain the Japanese trade surplus one is, of course,
led to consider factors beyond the financial circulation: the
institutional arrangements which act as 'import controls' for Japan;
the rapid growth of productivity in Japanese factories which has
enabled them to compete so successfully in export markets. This
latter phenomenon is related both to the long-term lending policies of
the Japanese banks, which encourage investment in technological
innovation, and to the social relations within Japanese enterprises:
the active involvement of much of the workforce in raising
productivity and quality; the relative absence of
'management'/'workforce' antagonism and trade union 'defensive'
strategies, which in part depends on the life-time employment policy
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of the big industrial companies. The analysis of the social
relations of Japanese capitalism would be a massive task in its own
right; the point here is simply to emphasize that the financial
identities considered above only show the formal possibilities arising
from a substantial personal sector financial surplus, while the actual
distribution and effects of the corresponding financial deficit depend
on the overall development of the national economy in question,
including the social relations at the 'point of production'.
Kalecki: saving and profits
Before leaving this question of the effects of the savings of
employees on the financial circulation, it may be useful to adapt the
model employed above to take account of the implications for aggregate
profits. For this task it is appropriate to refer to Kalecki's
13
version of the Income/Expenditure equivalence thesis. It was
determined above that
' Income = Expenditure (Identity 1).
If we consider an economy composed exclusively of impersonal capitals
employing wage and salary earning workers, then the only categories of
net income are enterprise profits (P) and wages-plus-salaries (W) .
Similarly, the only categories of net expenditure are consumer
spending by employees (C) and investment spending by enterprises (I).
It follows that
P + W=C + I(2).
If we assume that all wages and salaries are spent on consumption
(i.e. C = W) then equation (2) reduces thus:
P = I (3).
12 This point is developed by Hirschmeier and Yui (1975).
13 Kalecki (1968, Ch.3)
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The profits made by capitalist enterprises depend on the investment
expenditure which they carry out. This should not be surprising:
since the capitalist class has exclusive possession of the means of
production, the only net 'cost' to that class is the purchase of
labour power. Any expenditure by capitalists over and above the
purchase of labour power (i.e. 'investment') must flow back to the
capitalist class as profit (i.e. income in excess of costs).
If employees save part of their incomes, this models shows the
effects:
Let employees' saving = S
then S = W - C.
But we can re-arrange equation (2) to give
P = I (W - C) = I
so P = I - (W - C)
so P = I - S (4).
For any given level of investment, profits will be reduced by the
amount of employees' savings. This is because the full price paid for
labour power is no longer returned as income to the capitalist class.
If the state sector is included, then the income/expenditure equation
must be modified to take into account state expenditure (G) and
revenue (T):
P + W+ T = C+ I + G (5)
so P = I + (G - T) - (W - C)
so P = I + (G - T) - S.
That is, the state's budget deficit will increase aggregate profit,
ceteris paribus. In the same way that employees' saving represents an
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excess of expenditure over income from the point of view of the
capitalist class, a budget deficit represents an excess of income over
expenditure for the rest of the economy. This effect should make
Marxists rather more cautious than they have been in going along with
the 'New Conservative' proposition that 'state expenditure squeezes
profits' (cf Rowthorn, 1980, Ch. 4). State expenditure in excess of
revenue can sustain aggregate profit in the face of high personal
savings, while state spending balanced by revenue will be neutral in
its effect on profit, ceteris paribus.
To complete the picture the overseas sector must be included in the
income/expenditure model, adding overseas income (M) and expenditure
(X). Then we have:
P + W+ T+ M= C+ I + G + X (6)
or P = I - (W - C) + (G - T) + (X - M)
or P = I— S+(G — T) + (X — M).
(X *- M) , the excess of expenditure by the overseas sector over income,
represents the trade surplus of the economy in question. As Kalecki
remarks, "it follows directly that an increase in the export surplus
will raise profits pro tanto if other components are unchanged"
(Kalecki, 1968, p.51). The full picture is one in which the mass of
profit is determined by investment, diminished by savings but
augmented by both a state budget deficit and an export surplus. Two
points emerge: first, state expenditure in excess of revenue will
boost profits unless it causes a fall in investment, rise in savings
or fall in trade surplus/rise in trade deficit. Second, one can trace
both 'vicious' and 'virtuous' circles relating investment and
international trade: if a strong export performance stimulates
further investment (and vice versa) then profit will tend to rise,
while if a high import penetration and poor export performance reduce
the incentive to real investment (and vice versa) profit will tend to
fall.
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Some implications for the theory of surplus value
I have described a situation in which saving by employees has become a
significant element within the financial circulation, and have
analysed the possible effects of this within the framework of an
income/expenditure model of the circulation process. We may now take
stock of the implications for the classical Marxist theory of surplus
value in capitalism.
Marx operated, in 'Capital', with a theory in which the price paid for
labour power by capitalist enterprises was tendentially equal to the
'value of labour power', i.e. the wage would just cover the
subsistence and reproduction needs of the workers:
"...the value of labour power is the value of the means of
subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner"
(Marx, 1976, p.274).
Marx's views on whether this 'subsistence' level would tend to fall
towards the minimum 'biological' requirement, or would rather have a
social determination over and above the former, changed over time
(Rowthorn, ,1980, Ch.7). In 'Capital' he took the latter view:
"... the number and extent of (the worker's) so-called
necessary requirements, as also the manner in which they are
satisfied, are themselves products of history, and depend
therefore to a great extent on the level of civilisation
attained by a country; in particular they depend on the
conditions in which, and consequently on the habits and
expectations with which, the class of free workers has been
formed" (Marx, ip.cit., p.275).
Unlike the value of other commodities, therefore, the value of labour
power contains an 'historical and moral element'. All the same, Marx
did not envisage a situation in which the wages or salaries of a broad
stratum of sellers of labour power would be more than sufficient to
cover current consumption needs, leading to the acquisition of
financial assets and durable property other than means of production.
When Marx did consider the question of workers' savings, in the
'Grundrisse' , he claimed that although some workers
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individually might be able to accumulate money balances by exceptional
industriousness or frugality, it was impossible that workers
in general could save, for this would contradict the idea of the wage
as tendentially equal to the 'value of labour power':
"If they all save, then a general reduction of wages will
bring them back to earth again; for general savings would
show the capitalist that their wages are in general too
high, that they receive more than its equivalent for their
commodity" (Marx, 1973a, p.286).
It seems that in present circumstances, and on Marx's definition, the
existence of saving on a broad scale shows that the aggregate payment
of wages and salaries is considerably in excess of the aggregate
'value of labour power'.
What are the consequences for the concept of surplus value? Let us
first recall the role of this concept in Marx's theory of capitalism.
The essential feature of any class society, according to Marx, is the
existence of a social surplus product, i.e. a product over and above
that (the 'necessary product') required to maintain and reproduce the
'direct producers', the disposition of which is vested in the hands of
a class distinct from the direct producers. In pre-class societies
either there was no surplus product or else such surplus product as
did exist was appropriated communally. In communist society there
will still be a surplus product (required for consumption by those
unable to work and for augmentation of the stock of means of
production) but this is to be appropriated through social planning by
the 'associated producers'. The labour required to produce the
necessary product may be designated as the necessary labour, while the
labour embodied in the surplus product is surplus labour. Class
societies differ in their modes of extraction of surplus labour - the
social means by which the direct producers are compelled to produce a
surplus product. In capitalist society, as a consequence of its
particular property relations, both the necessary and the surplus
product assume the form of collections of commodities, produced for
exchange against money. The necessary product is purchased with the
wages of workers while the surplus product is purchased with the
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profits of capitalist enterprises (which may or may not be owned by







The labour-times (2) are embodied in the products (1), in general. In
capitalism the the products (1) take the form of commodities (3) which
are purchased with the incomes of the two classes (4). In
'equilibrium' (Marx does not use the term, but the concept is often
implicit in his analysis), and = P^. Further, maps onto
N and P^ maps onto S: this can be interpreted in the sense that W^/P^
is equal to N/S. In this context, the concept of 'surplus value' can
be seen as effecting an essential expressive relationship between all
the levels (1) to (4) above: surplus labour 'takes the form' of
surplus value, and profit in turn is the monetary 'expression' of
surplus value.
My argument is that to analyse adequately workers' savings one has to
drop the 'expressive' relationship between the levels (1) to (4)
embodied in the concept of surplus value. Money incomes must be
conceptualised as claims over output which may or may not by fully
exercised in any given period, and which may be augmented through
borrowing. If workers save, then W is greater than W^, and part of
workers' current income is not used to claim current output but may
instead be used to puchase financial claims against financial
institutions which in turn acquire financial claims against other
capitalist enterprises (and states). This introduces two
discrepancies between profit on the one hand and disposition of the
surplus product by capitalist enterprises on the other. First, part





I aggregate monetary value
wages, aggregate
^monetary value
: surplus product (1)
surplus labour,
: aggregate labour-time S (2)
surplus commodities
: aggregate monetary value P^ (3)
: profits, aggregate
monetary value P^ (4)
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financial institutions (in the form of dividends, rent and interest)
and distributed to the holders of life policies, pension schemes and
other financial claims. In this case the final claim over the surplus
product may be exercised by retired wage-earners, as well as the
'idle-rich' rentiers (i.e. the product disposed of by the capitalist
class falls short of above). Second, retained profit does not set
a limit to the appropriation of the surplus product by capitalist
enterprises. To the extent that they finance real accumulation by
means of borrowed funds (either ex ante personal savings or new bank
credit which will generate £x post saving to match, as analysed
above) , real appropriation by enterprises can outrun their
profitability even in aggregate (i.e. the part of above disposed of
by capitalist enterprises exceeds P ) .
Now, if the payments made by workers currently employed into savings
schemes were exactly matched by payments made out to retired workers
then one could conceptualise this by saying that the aggregate payment
of wages and salaries was actually equal to the aggregate consumption
needs of the entire working class (employed and retired). Saving
would merely be a means of transferring current wages and salaries to
retired workers, and in terms of the schema above W would be equal to
Wj plus that fraction of P^ required to support retired workers. But
this is not the case. In 1978, for instance, contributions to life
assurance and superannuation schemes amounted to £8.9 billion, while
pensions and other benefits paid out amounted to only £4.6 billion.
In addition, the life assurance and pension funds received an income
from rent, dividends and interest of £4.6 billion, and had
administrative and tax costs of £1.5 billion, leaving an overall
14
surplus for further 'investment' of £7.4 billion. In other words,
saving out of current income was greatly in excess of real
appropriation by retired workers (both measured in money terms), and
was greater than the total monetary expenditure by workers employed
or retired.
14 Figures taken from the National Income and Expenditure 'Blue
Book', 1979 edition, table 4.6.
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Should one then say that, insofar as they save, the working class
receive part of the 'surplus value' in the form of their wages and
salaries? I am inclined to resist this formulation, for it would seem
to imply that employed workers are able to appropriate part of the
surplus product. The only sense in which workers can be said to
appropriate the surplus product is by continuing to consume when they
are no longer employed; their separation from the means of production
means that they cannot appropriate the. surplus product in the sense of
disposing of means of production as capital. I would rather say that
wage and salary earning employees receive a 'surplus income' (in the
sense that is greater than W^), but there is no guarantee that this
'surplus income' will be channelled by the financial institutions into
the real accumulation of capital. Rather, as I have already
indicated, it is more likely under the present arrangements to be
channelled into the acquisition of landed property or state debt.
This mode of analysis also allows us to take further the comments made
above on the relationship between the state finances and profits. I
showed that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the state's budget
deficit (or reduction in its surplus) will increase aggregate profit,
unless it leads to an equivalent rise in savings, deterioration in the
trade balance or fall in investment. More formally, one can say that
provided the sum of the marginal propensity to save and the marginal
propensity to import is less than unity (surely the case), and
provided the enlarged public sector financial deficit does not reduce
investment, then the net effect of an increase in the budget deficit
must be to raise profits. But profit is a monetary magnitude: this
analysis does not immediately tell us about the capacity for real
appropriation of the social product on the part of capitalist
enterprises. The effects of an increase in the budget deficit at the
latter level depend on the degree to which means of production and
labour power lie idle, and on the responsiveness of employment of
these to an increase in monetary demand. If productive resources are
currently not fully utilised, and can be brought into use by means of
increased monetary expenditures, then the increased profits will
permit an increased appropriation of real output. But if the rise in
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demand merely gives rise to an inflation of prices and money incomes
then the rise in profts will be offset by a decline in the
purchasing-power of money. The only condition, however, under which a
rise in state expenditure (greater than or equal to any change in
state revenue) could actually reduce the 'real value' of total profit
as a claim over output on the part of capitalist enterprises, would be
if it gave rise to a price inflation of Department I commodities in
excess of the rise in money profits. This effect may occur, but we
can see that it is highly over-simplistic to assert in general terms
that 'state expenditure squeezes profits'.
The analysis above deals with monetary magnitudes (the state's budget
deficit, total profits) on the one hand, and with real appropriation
of the social product on the other. But what of the Marxist focus on
labour-times? In relation to this question it might appear 'obvious'
that labour-time appropriated by the state is labour-time which cannot
be appropriated by capitalist enterprises, so that there is indeed a
trade-off between state expenditure and profits: the greater the
proportion of social labour-time appropriated through state
expenditure, the less the surplus value available to capitalist
enterprises. But this argument rests on a conflation, a conflation
which is encouraged by the use of 'value' concepts. Certainly, the
labour-time available within a given national economy in a given
period is finite, and therefore the greater the appropriation of
social labour by the state the less, in principle, is available for
appropriation by capitalist enterprises. But two points have to be
made. First, this argument tells us nothing about causality. It
cannot be legitimately inferred, for instance, that increasing state
employment in Britain had reduced the appropriation of labour-time on
the part of capitalist enterprises below what it otherwise would have
been. It may be argued, on the contrary, that workers employed by the
state would otherwise have been unemployed. There is only a direct
trade-off if full employement is assumed. Second, even if it is
argued that workers employed by the state would otherwise have been
employed by capitalist enterprises, this point concerns state
employment and not state expenditure - and this is the crucial
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conflation. Part of state expenditure takes the form of payment of
wages and salaries to state employees, and in this case state
expenditure functions as a means of appropriating social labour-time,
but to the extent that state expenditure takes the form of purchases
of commodities from capitalist enterprises, or indeed grants and
subsidies to the latter, it does not function as a means of
appropriating labour-time. In this latter case state expenditure
figures directly as revenue for capitalist enterprises, without
diminishing the fraction of social labour-time available for
exploitation by those enterprises: there is no diminution of the
available labour force.
I consider it important to make these points (and to insist on the
distinctions between monetary magnitudes within the circulation
process, the appropriation of the social product by different
categories of agent, and the distribution of social labour-time
between sectors) because of the role they play in the following
arguments. Positively, I wish to argue in favour of an 'economic
strategy' involving state investment expenditure, and to maintain that
such expenditure will not cause a self-defeating decline in profits
which would restrict private sector investment. Negatively, I shall
argue later that the 'Thatcherist' economic programme, with its heavy
emphasis on cutting state expenditure, is in no sense consonant with
the supposed 'needs' of capitalism.
4.2 Some implications for Socialist politics and ideology
The preceding chapter outlined the development of the impersonal
capital as arguably the dominant mode of possession of the means of
production in contemporary British capitalism; this chapter has
extended the analysis to consider in broad economic terms the position
of the 'personal sector' wage and salary-earning employees, and the
effects of the savings of this sector on accumulation - the expansion
of the salaried strata in particular being at least in part the
obverse of the rise of the impersonal capital. In these
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investigations I have dealt with the question of possession/separation
from the means of production in a rather more concrete manner than is
common in modern Marxist class analysis. Given my concentration so
far on the possession/separation issue and its relation to the
circulation process, and given my earlier insistence that economic
class relations at the level of possession/separation cannot be
conceived as the underlying 'essence' of social and political
collectivities and movements, which demand analysis in their own
right, I am not yet in a position to draw definite 'political
conclusions' (the following chapters will take us some way further in
this direction). All the same, it will be useful at this stage to
offer an account of some of the implications of the foregoing analyses
for socialist objectives.
It will be argued that the developments noted above open up certain
opportunities for socialism, but also mark certain constraints on what
a socialist movement can hope to achieve. But before investigating
these opportunities and constraints it is necessary to outline what
one-takes 'socialist objectives' to be, in broad terms. Some comments
on this score have been made above (in particular, see the final
section of the Introduction); for present purposes I can summarise my
view of these objectives as follows:
1. The development of economic planning directed towards the
well-being of workers and their families, retired workers and
those unable to work, both immediately - in terms of material
living standards - and in the longer term (planning of investment
in industrial capacity, social 'infrastructure' and social
amenities; avoidance of long-term environmental degradation).
This may be conceived in terms of constructing a 'socialised
appropriation' of the social product and progressively
restricting the sphere of commodity production and circulation,
and monetary calculation based on profitability (although the
elimination of the latter may be an unattainable theoretical
limit).
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2. The development of participative popular democracy both 'at work'
and in a broader social context - in itself a distinction the
sharpness of which socialists wish to reduce, by such means as
Marx's 'polytechnic' education and the creation of closer links
between industry and community.
3. As an integral condition of democracy at work and beyond, the
progressive destruction of social hierarchy in the division of
labour, whether this hierarchy is thought in terms of
mental/manual labour (Poulantzas), function of capital/function
of labour (Carchedi), 'conception' versus 'execution'
(Braverman) , or in some other way. Linked with this, also the
compression and restructuring of income differentials.
These points are not exhaustive^, but they will serve my purpose.
The object now is to analyse the implications of the current structure
of property relations for these objectives, and therefore also to
render more precise the objectives. I shall consider first the issue
of socialisation of production and planning, then address the question
of 'industrial democracy'/'workers' control' at the level of
enterprise.
4.2.1 Socialisation and Planning
It is a central thesis of Marxism that the accumulation of capital
creates certain of the economic conditions of existence of socialism.
In 'Capital' Marx wrote that the "immanent laws of capitalist
production itself" lead to "the growth of the cooperative form of the
labour process, the conscious technical application of science ... the
transformation of the means of labour into forms which can only be
15 Questions of sex and race, for instance, are not mentioned. This
is not at all because I consider these unimportant for
socialists. Rather, I believe they are 'relative autonomous'
issues and the foregoing investigation of property relations does
not provide a basis for saying anything new or important
concerning them.
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used in common, the economising of all means of production by their
use as the means of production of combined, socialised labour" (Marx,
1976, p. 929). The concentration and centralisation of capitals
(growth and merging respectively) lead to a "constant decrease in the
number of capitalist magnates" and increasingly the "monopoly of
capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has
flourished alongside and under it" (ibid.). Production, that is,
becomes progressively socialised under capitalism, and hence
progressively incompatible with the "capitalist integument".
At the same time there also grows the "revolt of the working class",
which is "trained, united, and organised" by capitalism itself
(ibid.). In Marx's more 'deterministic' formulations these two
tendencies - socialisation of production, growth of the working class
revolt against exploitation - together guarantee the historical
triumph of communism, "capitalist production begets, with the
inexorability of a natural process, its own negation" (ibid.).
I have already argued (Chapter 1) that capitalist development does not
of itself lead to the political unification of the working class.
Marx's arguments for this position, as elaborated in the 'Communist
Manifesto', were examined and found to be seriously problematic. And
this discussion will be taken further in the following chapters.
Within the present context, however, I shall concentrate on the
question of the socialisation of production. If capitalist
development does not lead automatically to the formation of a united
opposition class determined to 'expropriate the expropriators', does
it not at least lay the 'economic' foundations for socialism,
constructing a system of socialised production in relation to which
capitalist property becomes increasingly inappropriate?
But this question, which Marx answers in the affirmative, is badly
posed. 'Socialisation' is the problematic concept: for Marx
socialisation of production stands in inevitable contradictory tension
with capitalism. We have seen above how he conceptualised the
joint-stock company as a mere 'transitional' form, an unstable
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half-way house between capitalism and its abolition: this was because
the joint stock form represented the socialisation of capital itself,
which had to be a 'self-dissolving contradiction'. Modern Marxist
writers as far apart in other ways as Poulantzas and Cutler et al have
stressed against this view that there is socialisation and
socialisation. Joint stock capitalism of the multinationals has
produced a specifically capitalist 'socialisation' of production,
embodied in social forms and practices which in many cases will have
16
to be destroyed before socialism can be developed. This is a
powerful criticism. It does indeed seem as though Marx's concept of
'socialisation' was too general and too poor. It was linked with a
general philosophical theme deriving from Hegel: socialisation within
capitalism was the "negation of the negation" (Marx, loc. cit.). As
Bachelard ( 1972) has argued for the case of the natural sciences,
general philosophical conceptions can often function as
'epistemological obstacles', providing a simple and apparently clear
answer where there should be a series of well-defined questions. In
the spirit of this observation, however, it is not enough to argue
that Marx's views have been shown to be false by the continuing
development of capitalist socialisation. One must try to locate the
precise questions with which to replace Marx's schematism.
Let us therefore re-pose the problem. Considering the particular
forms of 'socialisation' which have emerged with the development of
the impersonal capital, to what extent do these increase or limit the
opportunities for socialist transformation of the economy? How can
socialists develop their arguments and strategies to gain the maximum
purchase over the reality of contemporary capitalist property
relations? In what ways can planned and democratic economic forms be
presented as a feasible and superior development/transformation of
existing forms? If it is clear enough that capitalist development
brings social planning of the economy closer to the realms of
possibility than, say, peasant and artisanal production it should also
be clear that socialists must pose and answer these questions if they
are to intervene effectively in politics.
16 See for instance, Poulantzas ( 1975, pp 62-65) and Cutler et al
( 1977, pp 149-152) .
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First it may be noted that the development of large-scale impersonal
capitals, integrating purchasing, production and marketing within a
multidivisional form, substantially increases the element of
'planning' within capitalism. As Chandler has it, the 'invisible
hand' of market relations between independent enterprises is
progressively displaced by the 'visible hand' of managerial
coordination. And if 'planning' is now possible at the level of the
giant enterprise, perhaps straddling several branches of production,
then the planning of the economy to meet social objectives is at least
'put on the agenda': what was only a long run historical speculation
in the era of smaller-scale entrepreneurial capitalism begins to look
like an economically feasible proposition. But this general remark
has immediately to be qualified, in two important ways. First,
neither the development of the 'visible hand' in coordinating
'vertical' flows from the extraction of raw materials through to final
sales, nor the rise of the diversified corporation carrying out a
planned allocation of resources between different product divisions,
abolishes competition between capitalist enterprises. In fact,
contrary to a persistent theme in neoclassical economics, competition
between giant 'dominant firms' is often fiercer than the competition
between small enterprises in unconcentrated markets: increasing scale
often goes along with the development of a keener rationality of
profit. Planning on the part of large-scale enterprises, that is,
remains a planning directed towards the production of commodities at a
profit, in competition with other large enterprises. Second, the
development of capitalist integration and planning in the pursuit of
profit cuts across national boundaries. The rise of the
'multinationals' has recieved much comment^ and it is not necessary
to go into great detail here. What is of particular interest is that
direct investment overseas by such enterprises has become increasingly
important over the post war years (as opposed to portfolio investment,
of which British capital has a long tradition) , and that this
phenomenon is especially important for the British economy. In 1971
17 See for instance the collections edited by Kindleberger ( 1970)
and Radice ( 1975) .
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the UK was second only to the USA as a home base for multinational
companies; overseas production by British-based multinationals as a
proportion of domestic output in 1977 was, at 40 per cent, higher than
the corresponding figure for any other national economy except
Switzerland; and in 1971 nearly 20 per cent of UK output was produced
by overseas based companies. Both 'foreign' multinationals operating
within Britain and British enterprises with substantial overseas
production facilities can 'plan' the international distribution of
their profit-making taking into account comparative costs, the state
and growth rate of national markets and the degree of militancy or
subordination of labour. They can also play off national governments
against one another, taking advantage of both discrepancies of company
law and taxation policy, and governmental competition to attract
investment through regional and industrial policy.
Planning: the international dimension
These two points - capitalist planning is planning for profit, and is
increasingly conducted on an international scale - together pose
severe problems for the socialist project. If simultaneous
international revolution is counted unlikely, and if it is recognised
that socialist strategy for economic transformation must be aimed in
the first instance at the level of the nation state, the project of
planning the development of a national economy according to 'social
need' is constrained by the development of the international division
of labour under capitalism. The initiation of such a project by a
left-wing government (I am not concerned for the moment with the
question of how such a 'left-wing government' would be formed) would
under any circumstances encounter more or less concerted resistance
and hostility form capitalist enterprises, but the present degree of
internationalisation adds a new dimension to the problem, in that the
large international enterprises will be able to 'counter-plan',
shifting the emphasis of their investment and production to protect
their own interests and freedom of action in the face of undue state
' interference'.
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This issue has been faced in forthright manner by Rowthorn ( 1980,
Chapter 3) , in the context of a general discussion of the
'international problems' which would confront a left government in
Britain. He envisages three possible stages of measures to counter
resistance on the part of international capital. First a government
could take emergency measures to prevent a flight of capital:
suspension of dealings on the foreign exchange and stock markets;
freezing of foreign assets in Britain. But these could only be a
stopgap and would have to be replaced by "a more flexible and
comprehensive system of controls on capital movements, both short-and
long-term, together with controls on the behaviour of multinational
firms covering their production, investment and foreign trade
policies, the transfer prices they charge and so on." (Rowthorn, 1980,
p.82). But these controls in turn could not be relied upon as
effective, given the scope for the evasion of regulations and
withholding of information on the part of 'threatened' enterprises.
An effective system of controls would be impossible without the active
cooperation of other states and although that could be forthcoming if
a move to the left in Britain were part of a more general European
movement, it is otherwise highly unlikely. So Rowthorn considers a
third stage in which more radical measures are necessary: dismantling
of much of the international business of the City of London; takeover
of many international firms. He develops a detailed discussion of the
feasibility of requisitioning and selling off much of the private
sector's overseas assets in order to pay compensation for the takeover
of foreign-owned productive assets in Britain (which he argues would
at least reduce the chances of direct counter-revolutionary
intervention by other capitalist states).
These 'third stage' measures would involve a substantial realignment
of property relations. Rowthorn is suggesting that the continued
existence of large scale impersonal capitals possessing production
facilities in several countries could render impossible the
development of planning for social need in one particular national
economy, so that a determined left government would be forced to break
up such capitals and transfer the possession of the principal means of
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production to the planning authority at the level of the nation state.
That is, one aspect of the 'socialisation of production' under
capitalism - the international capitalist enterprise - would have to
be dismantled to permit a socialist 'socialisation'.
This can be represented schematically as below:
National







The Left government in nation state 2 may be obliged to sever the
relations of possession linking the operating units of the
multidivisional international firms to their general offices
(indicated by crossed arrows) in order to gain control over the
allocation of resources within the nation state.
There is, however, a further problem here: even assuming that a left
government could sustain sufficient popular support through the period
of economic dislocation which would inevitably accompany such a
realignment, even if the required 'nationalisation' of possession were
accomplished, it would not be possible to opt out of the international
division of labour with other capitalist economies. Many of the
production facilities currently possessed by international enterprises
are integrated within a Europe-wide plan of production.
"A substantial part of Britain's trade takes place within
multinational firms; components produced in one country are
shipped to a subsidiary of the same firm in another country,




European-wide basis. If a foreign subsidiary in this
country were nationalised its parent company might refuse to
supply necessary components or purchase its output..."
(ibid ., p . 89) .
'Nationalisation' of capitalist property does not abolish the real
economic interdependence of units of production in different national
economies. But this cuts both ways: if units of production located
in Britain are necessary to the overall operations of international
capitals then this could give a certain leverage to a left government
in Britain in its dealings with those capitals.
Rowthorn's argument is important, in that it focuses attention on the
very real problem which would confront any determined left government
in this country, in face of the specifically capitalist international
socialisation of production. In my view he is quite right to argue
that although internationalism is of vital importance to socialism, it
will not do to assume that political development in different nation
states will be sufficiently 'synchronised' to avoid the problems of
'sqcialism in one country' (or at least transition in one country).
While a left government in any one European country attempting a
radical break with existing capitalist property relations could expect
some support from the labour movement in other countries, it is naive
to bargain on support at state level.
But if Rowthorn's discussion is salutory, it must also be said that it
is rather speculative. It is predicated on the existence of a left
government with a substantial and determined popular following,
sufficiently convinced of the gains to be made in the long run from
socialist planning to tolerate the dislocation and disruption arising
from a confrontation with large international enterprises. Socialists
do need to consider what options are open in such u situation, but
more immedately the problem is how to prepare the ground. How to help
to generate and sustain popular support for socialist objectives in
Britain? How to foster developments at an international level which
would reduce the isolation of a left-governed Britain and would
increase the chances of gaining effective control over the activities
of internationally integrated enterprises?
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I propose to direct most of my remarks to the first of the questions,
and to examine the opportunities for socialism opened up by the form
of development of capitalist property relations analysed earlier, but
first a brief comment on the international question. This comment
relates to the EEC: although I cannot sustain the point in detail
here, I believe that the international socialisation of capital makes
it very important for socialists to intervene in policy discussion at
the EEC level. There is a tendency among British socialists to argue
in favour of internationalism in the abstract while jealously guarding
British political institutions against encroachment from the EEC.
This is seen as justifed by the fact that the EEC represents
capitalist internationalism; proletarian internationalism has
therefore to be constructed against the former. But as Nairn (1973)
trenchantly argued, this choice between internationalisms is not open
to us. The point must be to intervene in the really existing
international institutions, to present socialist arguments within
them, fight for socialist policies and in the process to develop links
18
with other socialist movements. To do otherwise is to reinforce a
strong strand of chauvinism in British political culture which owes a
lot to Britain's history as an imperialist power. In the socialist
version, this chauvinism takes the form of the assumption that the
conditions for socialism are uniquely advanced in Britain, that the
British 'working class' is especially strongly organised and can draw
on especially propitious traditions of democracy (e.g. Benn's stress
on the 'sovereignty of parliament') in its fight for socialism. The
EEC threatens to 'hold us back', to enforce allegiance to
international capitalism on the part of a Britain which is ready to
make a break with the system. But surely the phenomenon of the
Thatcher government is enough to show that Britain in the late 20th
century has no special socialist virtues, and surely if EEC
policy-making is any more dominated by capitalist concerns and
interests than policy-making at the national government level, that
reflects the failure of socialist forces to direct enough attention to
the former, and also something which socialist would rather ignore -
differences of interest between the working people of different
countries, as articulated by their political parties and trade union
organisations. One cannot appeal to
18 The 'Campaign for a Socialist Europe' has been a rather lonely
voice arguing for serious consideration of the EEC along these
lines.
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a 'Europeanism' of fighting links between trade unions as something
opposed to the EEC; the European trade unions have no inherent
political homogeneity and the best chance of developing common
political interests is in the process of discussing and fighting for
progressive policies at an EEC level. The point of these remarks in
the present context is to stress the need for constructive thinking
about socialist industrial policy, company law and the regulation of
international enterprises at an EEC level. Rowthorn is right to
investigate the options open to an isolated left government in
Britain - such a situation is not impossible - but the chances of
successful socialist planning would be greatly increased, and the
scope for the multinationals to play governments off against one
another reduced, if European socialists could make a more effective
impact on the making of EEC policy and legislation. Holland (1980)
has shown some of the obstacles in the way of such a development: we
all know that the EEC spends a disproportionate amount of its budget
on farm support, and although there are some resources available for
industrial policies which socialists can support, one of the dominant
strands in EEC policy is promotion of freedom of market competition.
Bui? there are obstacles in the path of socialist development at
national level too, and the gains to be made at EEC level are
extremely valuable: although one country attempting to carry out
socialist measures in advance of others might be obliged to
'nationalise' the property of international enterprises (therefore to
expand the scope of economic calculation by transferring that property
to state ownership, but at the same time to restrict the scope of
calculation by tying it to national objectives) , it must in the long
run be more progressive to develop social planning of the economy on
an international scale, and even small steps towards this at a
19
European level are important.
19 Lavigne (1974) has argued that national economic planning by the
member countries of Comecon has restricted the growth of trade
between them. She points out that "within the framework of
Comecon the tendency of each country towards autarky is
counter-balanced by policies of plan coordination, cooperation
and specialisation, policies which are proving very difficult to
implement", (p. 342). Socialist coordination at the EEC level
might help to ensure that a West European country moving towards
socialist planning did not have to relinquish useful relations of
cooperation and specialisation with other European states.
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Rowthorn, Mandel and others stress the need for a socialist Britain to
re-define its place within the international division of labour, and
to develop closer links with 'Third World' countries and the Eastern
bloc. Well and good, but to wish away our interdependence with the
rest of 'capitalist Europe' would indeed be to posit a highly abstract
internationalism.
End of digression. I shall now return to the opportunities which, it
was claimed above, have been created by the development of capitalist
property relations. If I have stressed the difficulties connected
with the internationalisation of large-scale impersonal capitals, I
shall also try to identify the points d'appui offered for socialist
argument by the impersonal capital.
The historic opportunity of investment planning
"... There is no doubt that the credit system will serve as
f a powerful lever during the transition from the capitalist
mode of production to the mode of production of associated
labour..." (Marx, 1972, p.607).
To recall the conclusions of my earlier analysis: we now have a
capitalism in which the greater part of the means of production is
possessed by impersonal capitalist enterprises - legally distinct
subjects employing salaried managerial labour - the majority of whose
shares is held by further impersonal enterprises. And the latter
enterprises (financial institutions) have drawn the funds to acquire
this equity stake from the savings of the personal sector, that is
mainly wage and salary-earning employees. This veritably 'socialised'
capitalism may be construed ideologically in a variety of ways. In
the USA Peter Drucker has talked of a 'pension fund socialism': the
workers, through their pension funds, 'own' a large part of private
business and profits have become pensions, or 'deferred wages', so
that surplus value has disappeared. Sir Harold Wilson has gone along
with this view, saying that trade union members control "some 50 per
cent of the equity capital of the 250 or so biggest industrial
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companies, through pension fund trustees in the main accountable to
them" (quoted in the 'New Statesman' 24/10/80). This amounts to a
form of nationalisation, and represents 'the biggest social revolution
we have had in this country' . Tories such as Sir Keith Joseph put a
different slant on the phenomenon, talking of a 'people's capitalism'
or 'property-owing democracy' rather than 'pension fund socialism',
but the basic conception is the same: shareholding on the part of the
financial institutions which collect personal savings and pay out
pensions, annuities or endowments gives everyone, trade unionists
included, a stake in the production of commodities for profit. There
is no longer really a 'propertyless class' who might have nothing to
lose but their chains. When enterprises plan their production on the
criterion of profitability they are only honouring their obligation to
their shareholders - to earn them a reasonable return on their money -
and if those shareholders are institutions which are in turn merely
trustees of the people's savings ... well, evidently notions of class
struggle and exploitation must be out of date.
But this ideological construction is highly vulnerable, one might even
say feeble. There has been a real enough change in the form of
capitalist property but the notion that the workers 'control' industry
through their pension funds or life assurance contributions is
manifestly absurd. Most workers have no idea of what is done with
'their' savings, even in the case of pension funds which are not
farmed out to the merchant banks for management. They do not know
where the money is 'invested', whether in British enterprises or
overseas, in speculation on property or 'art treasures', or in lending
to the government to finance unemployment. All they are interested
in - all they are permitted to be interested in - is whether they get
a reasonable pension at the end of the day. And the financial
institutions, subscribing fully to the ideology of the 'smoothly
functioning capital market', take it for granted that the best
interests of their personal sector customers are served by placing
funds where they can get the 'best' and 'safest' monetary returns,
regardless of the consequences for productive investment. So the
right to a pension or endowment is a far cry from any power of
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possession over means of production, or positive influence over the
allocation of resources.
This blatant discrepancy between the actual structure of property
relations and its ideological reflex in 'pension fund socialism' or
'people's capitalism' should form an excellent starting point for
socialist argument and propaganda at a number of levels. Workers and
trade unions could be encouraged to insist that the management of
their massive savings should be made accountable to them, and should
be directed towards employment-creating, socially useful investment.
Of course, if the financial institutions were forced to explain
themselves we know what they would say. They have already said it to
the Wilson Committee: we are doing our best to preserve the value of
the funds entrusted to us, and any attempt to force us to invest in
projects offering sub-optimal returns for 'social' reasons is an
attempt to make us break faith with our customers. This shows the
importance of attacking the ideologies of British financial capital,
and in this attack Keynes is a valuable ally of Marx. Even from the
point of view of 'saver', let alone 'worker', conservative/speculative
management of funds can be shown to be damaging: savers' interests
lie in ensuring that when they retire, or reach a specified age, the
pensions, endowments or annuities they receive will support a
reasonable standard of living. But this fundamentally depends on the
level of output of the economy when the savers reach old age. Simply
setting money aside now does not in any way guarantee the output of
goods and services x years hence to meet the needs of old people;
neither does lending money at a profit. That future output depends on
real investment in productive assets now and in the future, while the
piling-up of financial assets in excess of real investment can only be
inflationary in the long run (a 'long run' which is already with us).
So any changes in the financial system which promote a higher level of
productive investment will permit a higher living standard for today's
savers in the years to come. Thus far, the effective popularisation
of basic Keynesian arguments would help strengthen a socialist case
for the social planning of investment as in the interests of workers,
both immediately (in terms of employment prospects and living
standards) and in their capacity as savers for the future.
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From a socialist viewpoint, however, the argument must be taken
further than Keynes. Keynes imagined a socially painless "euthanasia
of the rentier" which would be "nothing sudden, merely a gradual but
prolonged continuance of what we have seen recently in Great Britain,
and will need no revolution" (Keynes, 1936, p.376). The 'functionless
investor' would fade away in face of the eminent reasonableness of
social planning of investment. He did not foresee the rise of the new
rentiers - the financial institutions collecting workers' savings -
yet these are more organised, powerful and ideologically-armed than
the old-style rentiers (even they haven't faded away). It will take a
fight, not merely a debate and the passing of time, to disarm the
financial institutions and restructure the control over investment
funds. Notice, though, that the socialist case can be advanced on
stronger ideological ground than ever before. Within the British
political culture it is rare for workers (even manual industrial
'proletarians') to consider the wholesale expropriation of the
property of another class as a reasonable political option, but if the
financial institutions insist they are only guardians of the people's
savings then why should the 'people' not call them to account? This
argument will not force the financial institutions to surrender, but
it can help to 'legitimate' the case for investment planning and
develop the popular support which would be needed in the ensuing
political battles.
Broad political support will not, of course, be won merely by
appealing to the inherent rationality of planning as opposed to the
profit-oriented allocation of resources. Socialists will have to say
more about how such planning would operate: its mechanisms and the
criteria employed for allocating resources. It is a serious lacuna in
socialist thought to imagine that the virtues of 'planning for social
need' are self-evident, that the only grounds for doubt must be vested
interest in the workings of the 'free market*. It is all too easy to
counterpose 'need' versus 'profit' as the criterion for production -
in fact it is just the mirror-image of the apologetic proposition that
production for profit is essentially the same thing as production for
need. Many people who are not committed to the market mechanism as
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the 'best of all possible worlds' nonetheless feel a justifiable
scepticism about planning. What is to ensure that the allocation of
resouces is not arbitrary, subject to the sway of ad hoc political
pressure? Even if the planners are enlightened, how will planning
actually work? Marxists have often been reticent on these questions.
This is partly because of Marx's strictures on Utopian socialism.
Marx argued, quite correctly, that any broad change in the property
relations of a society would involve sharp political, if not military,
struggles and that the course of such struggles could not be
legislated in advance according to the blueprints of some would-be
social reformer. He therefore made a radical break with the French
socialist tradition of speculation on the details of a socialist
society, in favour of developing the real working class movement
against capitalism which would work out the 'details of socialism' in
the process of struggle. But if Marx's arguments were valid in their
historical context, they should not be allowed to block the
development of concrete proposals which, although not acting as
historical blueprints, could help to more accurately define, and hence
mobilise support for, socialist objectives.
So the question is this: if the developing property relations and
pattern of financial flows within British capitalism increasingly open
up a space for socialist argument in favour of planned investment to
benefit both 'workers' and 'savers' (substantially overlapping
categories), how is that space to be exploited? What credible
proposals can be advanced to catalyse support? What means can be used
to isolate the implacable opponent of such a change?
First, the financial institutions could be short-circuited to some
extent by increasing taxation of the wealthy. We have perhaps
conceded too much to the 'pension fund socialism' ideology: although
workers' savings are very important it remains true that income (and
hence saving) is highly unequally distributed. The flow of funds from
the personal sector to the financial institutions does not only
represent workers providing for ther retirement, but also represents
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the accumulation of wealth whereby socially privileged strata transmit
their cultural patrimony (e.g. saving through endowment policies to
20
provide for private education) . This latter aspect of personal
saving could be reduced by instituting a more steeply progressive
income tax and/or a wealth tax. In the long run it may be possible to
go further than this, to appropriate in the form of tax revenue a
large part of the income which workers would otherwise have put into
long-term savings schemes, and to expand commensurately the socialised
provision for retired workers (state pension plus appropriate social
amenities). More immediately, however, this may be politically
inopportune, and widely resented as 'robbing the people of their
savings'. It would be possible instead to preserve the formal
relationship between the financial institutions and the personal
sector savers but to alter substantially the deployment of funds by
obliging the institutions to contribute to a national investment bank,
giving them in return bonds with a rate of return linked to the real
21
growth rate of the economy.
Probably more important that the detail of how a left government could
appropriate personal saving, is the question of deployment of the
funds. It is after all the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the
socialised deployment of the personal sector surplus which would over
time build support for (or resentment against) any such scheme. So we
have to consider the criteria of operation of a national investment
bank. Part of the funds raised could be channelled into public sector
investment projects, of which there is presently in Britain a
substantial backlog (e.g. modernisation of the railways, energy
conservation measures, renewal of urban sewage systems, accelerated
20 This has been argued by Bourdieu (1971).
21 The present argument works on the assumption that the principal
target of such a policy would be the contractual savings
institutions which collect the greater part of personal savings.
It could be argued, however, that such measures should also be
extended to cover the banks, which, as we have seen above,
provide the greater part of external finance for companies at
present. An interesting discussion of possible measures to
control the banking system which goes beyond the simple call for
nationalisation is contained in Thompson (1981).
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house-building programme). There could be problems of ranking
priorities here, become more acute as full employment of labour and
means of production is approached. These would best be resolved by a
form of cost-benefit which pays close attention to the social
22
'externalities' involved in investment projects, which compares the
time profiles of return on projects competing for resources at
23
non-usurious rates of discount , and which does not operate with the
technocratic pretension that all factors in an investment decision can
be rigorously quantified (i.e. which does not disguise as purely
technical questions matters which should properly be open to politcal
debate).
But apart from public sector projects, the question of providing
investment funds for private sector enterprises also arises. Of
course, if one envisages the nationalisation of all the major
enterprises ('top monopolies'), then the problem becomes internalised
within the 'public sector', but two points here: first the present
discussion is predicated on the hypothesis that there is a fruitful
ideological space within which to argue for socialist investment
planning - it does not depend on the (counterfactual) proposition that
there is wide popular support for sweeping nationalisation of
enterprises. Second, even if the major private capitalist enterprises
were nationalised this would not abolish the problem of allocating
resources between the kind of 'infrastructural' provision, and social
services, which are already within the public sector in Britain and
those areas of commodity production which are at present the domain of
'private enterprise' . It is widely accepted that one of the main
factors contributing to the relative decline and adverse trading
position of the British economy is a shortfall of investment in
private industry, and socialists cannot afford to be indifferent to
22 Nove (1973) has developed an interesting discussion of
cost-benefit analysis along these lines, providing a counter to
both the technocracy with which this form of analysis is often
invested and the dismissiveness of many on the left.
23 Kalecki's suggestion was that returns should be discounted at a
rate equal to the projected real growth rate of the economy.
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this since the employment prospects and livelihood of millions of
workers are at stake. A national investment bank deploying a major
part of personal savings would have to find means of channelling funds
to private industry, and develop control measures to ensure that the
funds are used productively. When the TUC representatives on the
Wilson Committee argued along these lines, the financial institutions
poured scorn on them: how can you 'force-feed' industry with
investment funds? If capitalist enterprises see the prospect of
adequate profits then they will borrow investment funds without any
government having to insist, and if they do not see investment as
profitable then it is useless to try to force them. And it is not
only the financial institutions which present this objection; it has
also been put forward by Cutler et al (1978, Conclusion) in criticism
of the TUC/Labour left 'Alternative Economic Strategy'.
In answer to this, there are cases in which the notion of force
feeding is very wide of the mark. The conservatism of the British
financial institutions biasses them agains 'high risk' investment
projects which nonetheless may have a strategic importance for the
development of the national economy. INMOS is an obvious case in
point: this enterprise is very willing to invest state funds, but
unable to raise sufficient capital privately. All the same there is a
strong argument that low investment in the British economy is not just
a matter of funds being unavailable; there is a reluctance to borrow
for investment purposes on the part of many enterprises.
So let us examine this problem of 'force feeding' more closely. It is
true that capitalist enterprises will invest only if they expect an
'adequate' rate of return on capital. But what conditions are
required for a given investment project to offer such profitability?
Cutler et al ( 1978, Chapters 10 and 11) have argued forecefully that
the calculation of profitability is by no means a transparent and
unambiguous exercise, and that the method and effects of such
calculation can vary between enterprises. All the same it is useful
here to set up a paradigm of the profitability calculation against
which to assess the prospects for investment planning, while accepting
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that there is considerable scope for variation in the actual
calculations performed by particular enterprises. Leaving aside the
problems of precise definition of revenues and costs, we can say that
the profit accruing to an enterprise equals revenue minus costs. Most
investment projects, however, will involve substantial initial costs
and will generate sales revenue over an extended period, so the
problem arises of comparison of present costs and future prospective
revenues. The method of comparison which is increasingly accepted as
most 'rational', at least by large-scale enterprises with
sophisticated calculation procedures, involves discounting future
revenues (or costs) at a rate of discount equal to the 'cost of
(money) capital' to the enterprise. The Net Present Value
calculation, for instance, yields a figure of merit for an investment
project which effectively shows whether the rate of return on a
project is in excess of the compound interest to be paid on the money
capital required to finance it. If the Net Present Value is positive,
this shows that an enterprise borrowing funds at the given interest
rate would make a profit after meeting interest payments, or
alternatively that an enterprise possessing surplus money capital
would make a better return on the funds by carrying out the investment
project rather than lending the funds at interest.
If a given investment project within the domain of operation of
capitalist enterprises were considered desirable as part of an
investment plan (to satisfy a definite 'social need', to gain export
revenue, to develop a 'growth industry', to preserve employment) and
yet the capitalist enterprises concerned were unwilling to invest then
the investment planning authorities would have two broad options:
either nationalise the enterprises and force them to invest on
criteria other than those of profitability, or 'distort' the market to
render the project sufficiently profitable to appeal to the
enterprises. Without wishing to rule out the first option I should
like to consider the second, to examine the possibilities of indirect
leverage over investment decisions. First, note that there are two
general factors influencing the profitability calculation which could
be substantially altered by the institution of a national investment
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bank appropriating the personal sector surplus and also promoting
large-scale public sector investment projects. On the one hand the
cost of money capital could be reduced, by offering funds for projects
consistent with the overall investment plan at low interest rates, and
on the other the level of aggregate demand could be boosted by the
public sector projects. This latter effect would directly influence
the calculations of suppliers of commodities to the public sector, and
indirectly influence other enterprises through its 'multiplier'
repercussions. In this way, many investment projects which
enterprises are at present unwilling to undertake could be made
attractive: the 'cost of capital' would fall while the prospective
returns rise. Far from 'force feeding', the problem would be to
assess selectively the enterprises deserving investment funds.
These effects would be real enough, but it would be naive to suppose
that cheap loans and the raising of aggregate demand would render all
socially desirable investment projects in the sphere of commodity
production sufficiently profitable to make capitalist enterprises come
clamouring for public funds. The closure of the Talbot works in
Linwood in Scotland, announced in February 1981, with its resulting
localised mass unemployment, is a pointed reminded of the limitations
of cheap loans or grants as a means of maintaining the allegiance of
capitalist enterprises to given investment projects. And in this case
it seems likely that even if it were not for the depressed state of
aggregate demand in the British market, the commodities produced by
Talbot at Linwood would not have generated 'sufficient' profit for
Peugot. We have to identify the factors other than usurious interest
rates and deficiency of aggregate demand which can make investment
projects unattractive to enterprises. First, it may be that some
commodity-producing projects deemed socially useful are unprofitable
because the 'social need' that are supposed to answer fails to find
expression as a monetary demand on the market. If the 'need' can be
clearly justified on social grounds then there is a prima facia case
for either altering the distribution of income (if that would permit
the need to be translated into monetary demand) or producing the
product for social non-commodity distribution (which would presumably
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involve nationalisation of the enterprises concerned). The second
obvious point here is competition. The 'cost of capital' may be low
enough and there may be a strong demand for the type of commodity
which the investment project aims at producing, but if other competing
enterprises are able to supply the same commodity or a close
substitute more cheaply (or of a higher quality) then the project will
not be 'commercially viable'.
At this point it is necessary to ask on what grounds socialists would
wish to see an investment project of this nature (i.e. unprofitable in
the face of market competition) supported within the framework of
investment planning. Without claiming to treat the question
exhaustively, we can identify some possible reasons. First the
competition may be from 'cheap imports'. It is rather too easy to
rally chauvinistic backing from the support of industries against
foreign competition but nonetheless there may be good grounds for
protection. The 'cheap imports' may be the result of an over-valued
exchange rate for the national currency. If that is the only problem
faced by certain investment projects then it can be solved fairly
easily be an interventionist government willing to regulate
international capital flows in order to adjust the external value of
the currency (it is upward adjustment of the exchange rate which may
be very difficult). But even if the exchange rate is at a 'realistic'
level certain industries may still face severe problems of
international competition. In some such cases specific protection, in
the form of import controls, subsidies or state purchasing, may be
justified on socialist grounds, for instance if the industry is a
struggling 'infant' with good future prospects ('good', that is, in
respect of the efficient satisfaction of social need), or even a
struggling 'geriatric' which stands a good chance of reviving its
fortunes through a thorough re-investment programme. And in cases
which merit protection, if that is still not enough to induce
voluntary investment of funds offered by the national investment bank
there is again a prima facie case for nationalisation. On the-other
hand there may be industries within the national economy in which
enterprises stand to be progressively undercut by the international
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competition in the long run. In such cases protection may be
justified in the short term to alleviate the employment effects of a
rundown of the industry but long run protectionism would reduce the
potential material living standards of the working population. In
such cases there has been a shift in the pattern of 'comparative
advantage' on an international scale. Even if this shift is due to
the availability of cheap labour power in other countries it is by no
means obvious that socialists should support long-run protectionism:
it may represent considerable progress for a 'Third World' worker to
be exploited by capital in the production of labour-intensive
commodities rather than by a landlord. Here there is a good case for
devoting social funds to retraining programmes and the development of
new enterprises (public sector or cooperative) on a scale properly
commensurate with the problem, rather than trying to 'force feed' the
industry with investment funds.
I have discussed international competition, but of course there are
also competitive pressures within the national economy. 'In
principle', such pressures could be abolished by means of widespread
nationalisation but again even if this had sufficient political
support the problem of optimising the allocation of resources would
remain. However unpalatable, socialists have to consider the idea
that profitability may function to some extent as an indicator of
relative efficiency in the use of resources, especially as between
substitutes for meeting a given social need. Of course, differential
profitability may reflect differential exploitation of labour: In
this case a left government could intervene to the advantage of
enterprises which were less profitable because of less intensive and
oppressive working and/or better wages by, for instance, minimum wage
legislation or fostering union organisation in the more oppressive
o /
enterprises.- Consider, though, a case in which a given enterprise
is unwilling to invest because of low expected profitability, yet this
24 The difference between this case and competition from -'cheap
labour' on an international scale should be evident. In the
latter case although socialists may express solidarity with the
wage struggles of foreign workers there is not a great deal that
can be done from outside to advance that struggle, while in the
matter of internal 'cheap labour' there is much than can be done.
low prospective profitability can be traced neither to faulty
managerial calculations, not to foreign competition of a kind
justifying protection, nor to the failure of an identified 'need' for
the enterprise's product to register as monetary demand, not to
internal competition from other enterprises operating a more intensive
exploitation of labour. The 'bourgeois economist' would certainly
claim that such an enterprise was not using resources efficiently to
satisfy 'consumers' wants' and therefore would not merit investment
funds and we have to ask whether he would be wrong.
Well, there could still be a case for investment in such an enterprise
if it were shown that the lack of profitability was the result of
higher costs than competitors stemming from locational disadvantages.
Say, for instance that transport costs are high relative to
competitors', but yet if the enterprise were to be run down this would
cause large-scale local unemployment. Then one could argue for stable
long-term subsidies to be granted to offset the higher transport
costs, recognising that the higher resource cost of delivering the
commodities to their consumers should be borne by the state which
would otherwise have to bear the cost of unemployment, (and which is
also in a position to take account of the 'social cost' to the
community involved). But if it is not possible to identify any factor
such as this, then the 'economist's' verdict is probably correct: the
enterprise is socially inefficient. This may be due to managerial
incompetence, in which case the state (having taken over the
investment side of the financial institutions' business) could
exercise its perogative as 'trustee of the people's savings' to force
managerial changes. This could involve the institutions of worker
management (discussed more fully in the following section) with access
25
to a state 'management consultancy' service. On the other hand, the
low prospective profitability could be due to the enterprise becoming
trapped in a clearly sub-optimal line of production i.e. one in which
25 This raises a rather important issue: the need for socialists to
have something to say about the 'nuts and bolts' of running
enterprises in an efficient but non-oppressive manner. The lack
of interest in such questions on the left has been noted by the
CSE Money Group (e.g. Fishman 1980 p. 175).
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consumers were simply not willing to pay a price for the commodity
sufficent to cover its costs of production (including the opportunity
cost of investment funds expressed in the rate of interest charged by
the national investment bank). This poses a problem similar to that
of enterprises being progressively undercut by international
competition but where long term protectionist measures are not
justified: the best response may be to seek means of re-deploying the
workers involved.
The intention behind the preceding arguments was not to examine
exhaustively the investment criteria to be employed by a national
investment bank with socialist pretensions. It was rather to identify
some of the concrete problems which would have to be faced in any such
exercise. I hope the discussion has this value: it addresses the
question of intervention to further social objectives within the
system of commodity-producing enterprises and, rather than positing
nationalisation as panacea (a theme with a pronounced minority
appeal) , it identifies certain cases in which nationalisation could be
argued as necessary to further social objectives as well as cases in
which nationalisation might be of no obvious advantage. The starting
point was the issue of the opportunities offered to socialists by the
current form of capitalist property in Britain, and my conclusion is
that the socialised deployment of the personal sector financial
surplus would permit a greatly accelerated rate of productive
investment, yielding dividends in terms of socially useful output and
employment, provided that the deployment of funds be carried out
according to fairly well-defined criteria of rationality rather than
26
merely in response to ad hoc political pressure.
26 One must be careful here. It would be quite Utopian to imagine
that any socialist government could put its programme into effect
without reference to 'ad hoc political pressure' - any more than
a 'monetarist' government can. All governments run into
particular forms of opposition, and compromises are necessary
where the opposing social forces cannot be tacked head-on. The
point being made here is that the better rationalised the
criteria for investment planning, the better the chance of
retaining the overall coherence of the policy in face of ad hoc
pressures. If the criteria for planning remain at the level of
pious generalisation, which provides little guidance for dealing
with concrete cases, then ad hoc decisions will become the rule
rather than the exception.
At present the non-bank financial institutions collect the greater
part of the personal sector financial surplus - the 'surplus income'
which individuals are unable to use to finance real accumulation due
to their separation from the means of production - and channel this
into financing the government's deficit, acquiring company shares,
investing in property or overseas, all under the guidance of a
speculative mode of calculation. Despite their increasing equity
stake in capitalist enterprises they provide relatively little new
investment finance and for much of the time act as passive collectors
of dividends. Their mode of calculation has definite ef fects on
industrial enterprises, but they do not generally intervene actively
in the determination of company policy. In contrast, a state
investment bank under the guidance of a planning apparatus could make
funds available for socially useful investment projects, and where
these projects were demonstrably in the interests of working people,
yet were not profitable enough to attract capitalism enterprises, the
state could either adjust the parameters of the market to make them
profitable (not always easy, but the state does have considerable
means at its disposal to effect such adjustments) or failing that,
nationalise the enterprises concerned, on relatively strong
ideological ground. I believe that by arguing along these lines
socialists may be able to raise more popular support than by arguing
for 'nationalisation' and 'planning' in the abstract.
Some criticisms considered
I accept that in arguing in this way one must be aware of the
objections which socialists are likely to raise. It may be argued
that these proposals amount to no more than state capitalism. True
enough, insofar as the state provides investment funds for
commodity-producing enterprises within this scheme 'state capitalism'
is an accurate tag. Only it is not clear that the identification of
27
such a project as state capitalist is damning.
27 A qualification here: One component of the argument above
involves creating conditions under which certain 'socially
desirable' investment projects become sufficiently profitable to
induce capitalist enterprises to undertake them. As a complement
to this it would be necessary, to retain any socialist
credentials for such a scheme, to ensure that the profit
generated does not simply line the pockets of the privileged
(this points to an incomes policy) but is in turn re-appropriated
for further useful investment.
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My argument is that state capitalism of the kind outlined above would
be a highly progressive development. It could sustain a more rapid
development of the 'productive forces', contribute to the greater
satisfaction of social needs and produce a high level of employment
which would increase the social power of the working class. In the
long term such a state capitalism could develop towards a more fully
socialised appropriation incorporating the physical planning of
production, as political and economic circumstances permitted. My
analysis, that is, can be located close to the 'Alternative Economic
Strategy' (AES) - which has been given its most lucid expression by
the CSE London Working Group ( 1980) - in its acceptance of the need
for socialists to offer constructive and credible proposals for
regenerating economic growth and reducing unemployment even if these
appear to fall short of 'true socialism'.
Apart from the objection of principle that this is merely state
capitalism I shall consider four other points. First, if the
foregoing appears to ignore questions of democracy within the
enterprise that is only because of the order of exposition. I fully
accept that socialism is not just about productive investment and full
employment, and questions of democratic enterprise organisation are
considered in the final section of this chapter which is conceived as
complementary to the foregoing.
Second, and more substantial, there is the kind of objection to
proposals linked to an Alternative Economic Strategy which has been
raised by Cutler et al. Their objection is actually twofold.
Discussing the proposals of Holland and Benn designed to rectify the
short-fall in investment in the British economy Cutler et al make this
point:
"We would argue that these positions which tie socialist
politics to the success of a programme of 'industrial
regeneration' are not a viable basis for socialist strategy.
This is for two reasons: first, these strategies largely
ignore the political conditions of their implementation, and
second, they fail to answer the question of whether such a
'regeneration' is possible and whether, if possible, it can
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take place under conditions which will be of benefit to
socialist politics. Holland and Benn stake their politics
on the prospect of particular outcomes of the practice of
management of capitalist national economies" (Cutler et al,
1978, p.277).
The first objection, concerning the political conditions of
implementation of AES-type proposals, is a telling one. In
elaborating such proposals there is admittedly a strong temptation to
indulge in political rationalism: they ate by nature proposals wnich
give an important role to action of the part of a 'socialist
government' or the 'state' within which a socialist government is
installed, yet it is often unclear what such a socialist government
would look like, how it might come into being and from where it would
draw its mass support, likewise it is often not sufficiently
recognised that the 'state' which would supposedly execute the
progressive measures might be very much disinclined to do so and
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anyway may be the object of considerable public mistrust. I have
attempted to guard against this temptation by qualifying the foregoing
arguments, and pointing ahead to the later chapters in which the
particular social forces (as opposed to economic classes) active in
British society will receive a fuller treatment. My arguments
concerning the broad possibilities and constraints given by the
present structure of capitalist property are not supposed to have the
status of a ready-made political programme, and in discussing the
possibilities for investment planning as a fruitful avenue for
socialist argument I make no pretence to have identified the means of
conversion of 'social reason into social force' (to use Marx's
29
formula ) . But although I cannot do so systematically at this
juncture some limited anticipatory comments may be in order. My
hypothesis is that there is a space for a socialist argument in favour
of investment planning; that such an argument could be presented in
such a way as to appeal to organised
28 The CSE London Working Group (1980) cannot really be accused of
dodging these issues. Nonetheless they are weaker on the
'conditions of implementation' than on the proposals for policy.
29 Marx ( 1974, p.89).
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labour and even to broader strata of the population concerned about
employment prospects and their standard of living in retirement; that
if organised workers were to support the proposal they could use their
union organisation to press for social accountability of their savings
funds; and that if the proposals were not linked to a 'dogmatic'
pursuit of nationalisation they would stand a chance of recruiting
some support from the more progressive elements of the state and
corporate salariat - those whose technical expertise would be required
in any such project, even if it is overlaid with oppressive
'professional' and 'managerial' ideologies - helping to isolate, so
far as possible, the reactionary financial bourgeoisie. And one
institutional point in this context: it would be crucial in any
socialist investment planning project to bypass the control over state
finances on the part of the Treasury. The combination and
interpenetration of private financial capital and the Treasury sets up
a formidable obstacle to radical change in the management of financial
flows. Even given substantial popular support, a socialist
government/movement would have to give very careful thought to the
development of a competent planning cadre able to hold its own against
Treasury influence.
The latter part of the objection raised by Cutler et al, i.e. their
agnosticism concerning the possibility of a broad economic
'regeneration' on terms favourable to socialism, is based on weaker
ground. In expanding on this point they do develop some important
arguments concerning the constraints which would face a socialist
government attempting to advance an AES (for instance, the problems of
'forcing' investment referred to above; the potential conflicts
between such a government and the trade unions, given the need to
raise labour productivity in order to develop a tenable trading
position for the national economy) yet ultimately their position tends
to a form of defeatism. They set up a dichotomy thus: "Rather than
scheming as to what a Left-Labour government should do, it is vital to
consider the political basis on which such a government will become a
possibility." They then argue that this means starting at a "more
basic level" by considering the following three sets of issues:
232
"the political obstacles to advance within the practices of
the Labour Left and the labour movement itself; ...
broadening the base of mass support, creating institutions
and organisations which extend the socialist movement beyond
the minority of organised labour; ... fighting for specific
reforms in the organisation of capital that will create new
positions of struggle and control for working people
(limitations of shareholders' and managements' powers,
workers' representation etc.) and fighting for reforms in
non-commodity areas such as health, education, and welfare
that introduce elements of popular administration and
control" (Cutler et al, 1978, p.283).
I have quoted these latter points at length because I can readily
agree with them, and consider them important, but what I find
politically weakening is the dichotomy between promoting socialist
developments which do not depend on the existence of a socialist
government and the stigmatised "scheming" as to what such a government
should do. The point is that working people are bound to be concerned
about issues which cannot be tackled effectively without central
government involvement, issues such as mass unemployment, inflation,
industrial decline, poverty, the social effects of government
expenditure cuts. These are important to a great many people, whether
they are perceived in terms of localised effects .impinging on their
everday lives or in terms of the national picture which emerges from
news media coverage and wider reading. If socialists aim at the
formation of a government as a part of their strategy they must be
ready to make their views known on these issues: how to reduce
unemployment? how to avoid inflation? where the money would come
from to provide better social services? Granted, if socialists merely
develop a list of pat answers to these questions (nationalisation,
'planning') while failing to fight for more immediately realisable
socialist gains outside of government they will not get much of a
hearing, but equally to write off the macroeconomic questions as too
difficult to speculate about is to forego the right to contest the
policies of a reactionary national government. At the level of
parliament, the news media and opinion poll data, management of the
national economy has been the dominant issue in British politics for
much of the post war period and however important it is for socialist
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to insist that 'the political' be given a broader definition, they
cannot afford to be silent on so important a concern. I therefore
contend that 'scheming as to what a Left-Labour government should
do' - in the sense of attempting to elaborate credible options for
policy at a national level, while recognising the real problems
involved - is actually a rather important part of developing 'the
political basis on which such a government will become a possibility'.
This, in brief, is the framework of political calculation within which
I have found it useful to investigate the idea of investment planning
as a means of appropriating within socialist argument the changing
structure of capitalist property in Britain. The final section of
this chapter will now extend this investigation to consider the
complementary issue of the development of democratic forms of control
within the enterprise.
4.2.2 Democracy at the Level of the Enterprise
For Marxists, one of the most basic features of capitalism is the
separation of the workers from the means of production and within this
perspective one of the most basic aims of socialism is to abolish that
separation, to regulate the allocation of resources and the
expenditure of labour time according to the "republican and
beneficient system of the association of free and equal producers"
(Marx, 1974, p.90). It is clear, however, that the socialist
abolition of the separation of workers from the means of production
cannot take the form of re-establishing the personal property of the
individual worker in his/her own means of production on the model of
peasant or artisanal conditions. Small-scale production may have a
30
certain place within a socialist economy but as a general
30 To be somewhat speculative, one could say that the possibility of
increasing automation of large-scale industry permits a future in
which a substantial fraction of the 'working day' is available
for the pursuit of creative projects on the part of individual
workers or small-scale collectivites, including 'craft'
production. On this point see for instance Gershuny (1978).
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alternative to modern large-scale industry it is merely Utopian. As
Marx argues,
"This mode of production pre-supposes the fragmentation of
holdings and the dispersal of the other means of production.
As it excludes the concentration of these means of
production, so it also excludes cooperation, division of
labour within each separate process of production, the
social control and regulation of the forces of nature, and
the free development of the productive forces of society,
it is compatible only witn a system ot production and a
society moving within narrow limits which are of natural
origin" (Marx, 1976, pp.927-8).
In the context of large-scale industry, I have already shown that a
substantial part of the means of production is the object of
possession by impersonal institutions - capitalist enterprises - and
the object of socialism must be to reconstruct this impersonal
possession in such a way that enterprises both follow a plan of
production consistent with the maximum satisfaction of the
democratically-constructed 'needs' of the working population as a
whole, and are open to democratic participation, on equal footing, of
the workers within the enterprise. The foregoing discussion of
investment planning represents an essay in definition of the first of
these conditions within the context of British capitalism; I now turn
to the second condition, and the relationship between the two.
Following the same pattern as before, I shall approach this in terms
of the possibilities and constraints connected with contemporary
capitalist property relations.
To begin with a general point of caution: this concerns the
relationship between socialised economic planning and enterprise
democracy. I have claimed these to be complementary features of the
socialist project, and in an important sense they are, yet there is an
inherent tension between the two which must be faced up to. This
tension surfaced in particularly acute form on the morrow of the first
proletarian revolution as the Bolsheviks attempted to construct a
system of coordinated workers' control over industry in face of the
proliferation of relatively independent factory committees. As
Bettel'neim notes ( 1974, p. 125):
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"The task was not easy because along with the rise in
numbers of factory committees each one had a tendency to
multiply its prerogatives and to treat each factory as an
independent unit of production, the collective property of
its own workers, determining by itself production, sales and
pricing, while the social domination of the working class
over the means of production required that the atomised and
contradictory powers of the factory committees be
subordinated to a common political end" (my translation
A.C.).
We know how this tension was eventually resolved: the exigencies of
'War Communism' demanded the abolition of the authority of the factory
committee and its replacement by a centralised authority. We also
know the long term political cost of the suppression of the kind of
'spontaneous' workers' initiative represented by the rise of the
factory committees. Of course, the conditions of Russia in 1917 and
the following years posed 'special problems' for the Bolsheviks, but
it must be recognised that the tension between the tendency to treat
each factory as the 'collective property of its own workers' and the
need to ensure the subordination of production to a 'common political
end' is in no way unique to the Soviet experience. Neither can this
tension be ascribed to 'false consciousness' on the part of workers,
'failing to recognise' the identity of their own particular interests
and the general interests of their class: that line of thought leads
to a variety of utopianism with strongly oppressive overtones. So
long as production is carried on in units of production which have a
degree of real economic autonomy and 'employ' distinct groups of
workers (despite their general interdependence in terms of
input/output relations) there will exist real grounds for conflict
between particular groups of workers and the 'social interest',
however democratirsHy the latter is generated. For ins Lance, where
labour is either particularly demanding or is not in itself
particularly fulfilling or interesting one could reasonably say it is
in the interests of the workers concerned to work short hours and/or
work at a relatively low intensity of labour. Also so long as
consumption is not fully socialised (surely an impossibility)
particular groups of workers will have an interest in raising their
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own particular level of consumption. But both of these points can
conflict with the interest of the rest of the working population.
Shorter hours of labour and less intensive working will, ceteris
paribus, reduce the volume of output, while raising consumption
standards means making a larger claim over available output, leaving
less for personal consumption on the part of other groups or for
investment and social provision. This kind of conflict cannot be
legislated out of existence.
If this point is conceded, it has important implications for one's
view of the future of politics. Even under 'socialism' there will be
scope for quite genuine conflicts of interest between regions,
localities and enterprises. It is naive to imagine that all social
conflict is 'class' conflict at root and that socialist planning can
be a wholly harmonious process. It is therefore wrong to counterpose
'politics' under capitalism (i.e. realm of conflict of interests)
against 'administration' under socialism (harmonious pursuit of common
31
objectives), as certain of Marx and Engels' formulations suggest.
One general problem of socialism is to find a satisfactory mode of
institutionalizing conflict over the allocation of resources within
the context of planning, and minimizing the antagonisms it could
generate.
This is, however, a long term consideration, given that neither social
planning of the economy nor enterprise democracy exists in Britain.
Let us return to the question of the possibilities for enterprise
democracy under present circumstances. I have discussed earlier two
salient features of the developing forms of impersonal capitalist
property at the level of the enterprise: the increasing scale of
enterprises and rising level of industrial concentration; and the
increasing adoption of the multi-divisional form of enterprise as a
means of control over geographically - and/or product-diversified
operations. I shall consider the implications of these points in
turn.
31 In particular I have in mind Engels' formulations in his
'Anti-Duhring' (Engels, 1962). But the idea is also found in
Marx's writings.
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1. The question of scale: Marx identified the rise of large-scale
industry as one of the progressive features of capitalism. Increasing
scale of the enterprise was a necessary condition for the development
of the productive forces, and it also (a) put social planning on the
agenda and (b) produced an increasingly concentrated and homogeneous
workforce. I have already cast some doubt on point (b), or at least
on the political effects which Marx assumed would be consequent on the
concentration of labour (Chapter 1), while in the discussion of
planning I argued that although point (a) may be broadly accepted it
is by no means unproblematic, particularly given the fact that
large-scale enterprises increasingly straddle national boundaries.
But what of the potentiating/constraining effects on democracy within
the enterprise? Tomlinson ( 1980) has developed an interesting
discussion of this point in relation to the ideas of Cole (1917),
arguing that large-scale enterprises can pose severe problems for
enterprise democracy. Cole had written "... it is at least a
half-truth that the measure of control he (the worker) will have will
vary inversely to the total number of votes, so in the workshop the
control of the individual will be real in most cases only if the
workshop is small, unless, as in the coal mine, only the simplest and
most uniform questions have, as a rule, to be decided" (Cole, 1917,
p. 233). Tomlinson in his commentary argues that this notion need not
lead to a simplistic 'small is beautiful' position.
"Instead it can, for example, be based on the argument that
any particular agent's capacity to absorb information is
finite, and that broadly therefore the smaller the unit to
be controlled the greater the likelihood of competence
sufficient to make the necessary judgement. Of course such
conceptions do not yield any simple size limit to
organisations which can be democratically controlled. This
will depend, as Cole suggests, on the basis of decisions
which are pertinent to any particular production process,
and is therefore not a simple function of the number of
agents involved" (Tomlinson, 1980, p. 170).
Despite this qualification, however, Tomlinson is prepared to argue
that "smallness of operation in production and distribution is
something socialists should generally favour" (ibid.). Interestingly,
this position is backed up by the experience of the Mondragon
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cooperative enterprises in the Basque region of Spain. As Campbell
( 1980, p. 13) has pointed out "the MondragOn planners have decided that
there is a limit to the number of people able to make industrial
democracy work 'under one roof'. They now put this figure at around
400 people."
If one accepts this point, that effective democratic mechanisms within
the enterprise may depend, in many branches of production, on having a
relatively restricted number of agents involved in decision-making,
then a rather awkward question arises: does enterprise democracy then
come into conflict with the exploitation of economies of scale and the
progressive development of the productive forces? Is increasing
industrial concentration an obstacle rather than an opportunity as
regards this socialist objective? Perhaps one can shed some light on
this by being rather more precise in defining both 'the enterprise'
and 'economies of scale'. First, if the enterprise is defined as the
unit of legal ownership then it is clear that enterprises may comprise
a number of operating units, plants, sales outlets and so on. And
although the dominant enterprises in this sense have undoubtedly grown
considerably in size, by any measure, over the post war years it is
not obvious that the operating units have grown in the same way. For
instance, according to the calculations of Prais (1976) the share in
total manufacturing output of the largest 100 manufacturing plants
(i.e. single geographical entities, producing predominantly one
product) has remained fairly static over the last fifty years. In
some branches of production technical economies of scale have led to
significant increases in plant sizes (e.g. process production of
chemicals), while in others technical changes such as the development
of small cheap electric motors, and the partial displacement of metal
casting by plastic moulding, have favoured or at least permitted
smaller-scale production.
In Tomlinson's argument, this discrepancy between the marked growth of
the dominant enterprises and the relatively static overall position as
regards plant-sizes is taken as throwing doubt on the notion that the
growth of the dominant enterprises has been based on the exploitation
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of economies of scale. Economies of scale are seen as operating at
plant level and it is therefore argued that the growth of the
multi-plant enterprise reflects narrowly financial considerations
rather than any 'progressive development of the productive forces'.
The implication is that if effective democracy at the enterprise level
depends on the existence of relatively small units, there may be a
case for dismantling large-scale capitalist enterprises. As Tomlinson
(op. cit., p. 167) puts it, "building on the technological
achievements of capitalism does not necessitate a defence of
enterprises on the scale currently common in capitalist countries".
I believe that the earlier discussion of the multi-divisional
enterprise in the USA and Britain (Chapter 3) permits a more
differentiated and rigorous judgement. It is true that the increasing
scale of certain enterprises in post war Britain can be traced to
speculative financial considerations (primarily among those which
Channon identifies as 'acquisitive diversifiers'), and that many such
enterprises have failed to exploit economies of scale and have shown a
poor record even in terms of profitability. But on the other hand
many large multi-divisional enterprises probably can 'justify
themselves' in terms of economies of scale, if the latter are given a
broad interpretation. Tomlinson operates with a very narrow
conception of 'economies of scale', effectively restricting the notion
to cover the technical advantages to be gained by scaling-up a given
production process, but the arguments of both Chandler and Channon
enable one to identify other important economic advantages of
large-scale integrated enterprises: economies of efficient scheduling
of internal transfers; advantages of linking purchasing to production
and production to marketing, the latter providing a feedback mechanism
for changing the product-specification; economies of 'horizontal'
coordination of output plans and reduction of wasteful duplication;
economies of administration; advantages of technology-transfer.
Different large-scale multi-divisional enterprises may exploit these
advantages in different degrees, according to the form and degree of
diversification they have developed and according to the particular
effectiveness of their management, but the general point here is that
these advantages cannot be written off as financial/speculative
considerations.
If one takes a broader view of economies of scale along these lines
then one must also take a more differentiated view of the large-scale
enterprise. Some conglomerates may be unwieldy economic units with a
primarily speculative rationale, which could usefully be dismantled,
but the dismantling of other large enterprises (one example:
full-line chemical companies) might involve genuine losses in
productive efficiency even if plant sizes, and hence purely technical
scale economies, are not affected. Referring again to the Mondragon
experience, it is clear that the planners there recognise the economic
advantages to be gained from the formation of larger units. These
larger units have taken the form of 'cooperative combines' run by
nominees from the control committees of member cooperatives. Since
the formation of the first such combine in 1968, comprising six units
of production with a total of around 6,000 individual members, the
Mondragon planners have made it a recommended practice to group
individual cooperatives into such units. They judge that this form of
organisation permits the cooperatives to obtain advantages of scale at
the level of administration, coordination and planning while retaining
the benefits of relatively small operating units i.e.. maximum scope
for democratic accountability (Campbell, 1980, pp.12-13). The
question arises as to what extent such arrangements can provide a
model for the democratisation of the multi-divisional capitalist
enterprise.
2. The multi-divisional enterprise: The tendency of the argument
here is the following: if_ the exploitation of economies of scale on
the part of capitalist enterprises primarily involved the development
of ever larger units of production, in the technical sense,
concentrating progressively larger numbers of workers into massive
factories, then there could indeed be a conflict between the wish to
retain the benefits of economies of scale on the one hand and the
requirements of 'manageable' enterprise democracy on the other. I am,
however, suggesting that many significant economies of scale have been
realised at the level of the large enterprise comprising a number of
units of production rather than at plant, or operating unit, level.
Further, recall Channon's argument that many such multi-unit
enterprises in Britain have, over recent years, found the 'functional'
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model of organisation - i.e. the monolithic top-down hierarchy - to be
too inflexible and have quite deliberately changed over to a
multi-divisional form, reforming the managerial apparatus to restrict
the role of the general office and permit a greater degree of autonomy
for the management of the operating units. Certainly, examples can be
found where the growth of the enterprise has involved the creation of
massive technical operating units (in the car industry and the
shipyards for instance) but it is not clear that this trend will
continue, and in some cases technological change is already
undermining the competitive advantage of those enterprises operating
32
very large-scale units. The prospects may therefore be good for a
long-term strategy which aims at both restricting the scale of most
operating units and granting them a reasonable degree of operational
autonomy in order to make participative democracy a feasible
proposition, while developing further the economies of administration,
co-ordination, etc. which are at present realised by large-scale
enterprises. This would mean re-examining the current grouping of
units of production into larger enterprises: the development of
social planning of the economy might, for instance, involve the
re-grouping of units of production into some kind of 'all-industry
enterprises' headed by industrial planning boards, enterprises with a
technical rationale which would in many cases cut across the present
divisions. The point is that 'enterprises', as groupings of operating
units, would be reconstructed rather than simply dismantled into small
independent components.
This position requires a more differentiated conception of 'enterprise
democracy'. Democratic mechanisms must be conceived as operating at
different levels: within the operating units there may be scope for
direct participative democracy perhaps also involving factory
committees in close touch with the workforce; at the level of the
enterprise, direct democracy would probably be impractical and some
32 See for instance the argument in the 'Economist' of 19/4/80
concerning the implications of flexible programmable automation
in the car industry.
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form of representative mechanism would be required. It is not
possible to say in the abstract what kind of decisions would be taken
at these different levels, or at least not with any precision, since
this would depend on the character of the economic relations between
the general office of the enterprise and its operating units, and
between the operating units themselves, quite apart from the
particular forms of struggle at local and national level which would
be required to implement any such scheme. All the same, some general
remarks may serve to give this conjecture more substance. One could
argue, for instance, that the conditions of work and the forms of
division of labour within the operating unit should be the subject of
democratic decision-making within that unit while the general
investment policy of the enterprise should be decided at the 'higher'
level, by means of a mechanism involving representatives from the
operating units, central enterprise staff and national planners
(assuming, that is, the kind of investment planning referred to
above). Such decision-making at enterprise level could, of course,
involve encouraging the development of 'workers' plans' from the
'bottom upward' - only rational planning would require that the
implementation of these be considered in the light of broad social
objectives.
What is envisaged here is a 'pincer movement' for democratising the
operations of large multi-divisional enterprises and subjecting them
to popular accountability. From 'above', a left government could
attempt to gain control over the deployment of investment funds, in
particular the 'surplus income' of the personal sector, while from
'below' workers could struggle for democractic control over the
particular enterprises which employ them, breaking down the managerial
hierarchies and commercial secrecy of these enterprises. If the
'pincers' were to meet then the space for conventional capitalist
'management' - i.e. the hierarchial direction of enterprises in the
pursuit of profit, recognising some form of responsibility to
'shareholders' but not to working people - would be at least severely
restricted and at best eliminated. It is clear, however, that our two
'pincers' are not at par. The institution of national investment
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planning would certainly require broad and determined popular support,
but by nature it would depend on the formation of a socialist
government and would give an important role to organisations operating
at a national level. Enteprise democracy differs from this in that
(a) workers can begin to fight for such an objective in the absence of
a socialist government and (b) it is by nature impossible for even the
most 'socialist' of governments to develop enterprise democracy 'from
above'. Any such development depends crucially on popular initiative
and cannot simply be legislated (there are, however, important ways in
which a socialist government could help to foster enterprise
democracy, by making changes in company law, e.g. turning shareholders
into mere bond-holders, granting the right to set up democratic
mechanisms where this was approved by the workforce, and by means of
preferential funding for democratic enterprises and 'workers' plans').
So investment planning and enterprise democracy stand in rather
different relations with national politics. This also means that they
have differing status as socialist objectives under present
circumstances. In the absence of a left government, developing the
objective of investment planning is primarily a matter of developing
ideas, policies and strategies and attempting to win broad support for
these. Developing the objective of enterprise democracy, while it too
involves theorectical/ideological activity, can also be a matter of
practical struggle. The following section offers some comments on
this point.
Enterprise democracy and industrial democracy
In the preceding arguments I have deliberately used the term
'enterprise democracy' to refer to democratic control by workers over
the enterprises which employ them, within the context of the socialist
project. Enterprise democracy, that is, was presented as the
complement to social planning of investment at a national or even
supra-national level. 'Industrial democracy' on the other hand is a
term which is generally taken to refer to particular practices of
management already operating in certain capitalist economies (e.g.
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West Germany) or specific proposals such as those of the Bullock
Committee (HMSO, 1977), practices and proposals which give some role
to workers or their representatives in enterprise decision-making, but
which are not necessarily linked to the overall social planning of the
economy in the interests of working people. The problem now is to
assess the relationship between enterprise democracy (as socialist
objective) and 'Industrial Democracy' (as object of current struggle
and debate) .
Broadly speaking, socialists appear to be divided into two camps over
this question. There are those who argue that 'Industrial Democracy'
as it exists and as it is proposed by Commissions of Inquiry and
certain trade unions, is a dangerous diversion. So long as the broad
configuration of the economy remains capitalist, with enterprises
producing commodities for profit, 'Industrial Democracy' is bound to
function merely as a means of incorporating workers' representatives
into a capitalistic rationality. Clarke ( 1977) gives a clear
presentation of this view, marshalling the support of Mann (1973) the
TUC (1974) and Mandel among others. His case depends on the
constraints placed upon any enterprise attempting to survive in the
market:
"The capitalist market would immediately overwhelm any
formal redistribution of authority at the enterprise level:
reform of the authority relations of the factory is impotent
in the absence of structural reform of the production
relations of society" (Clarke, 1977, p.364 - emphasis in the
original).
Clarke goes on to argue that Industrial Democracy as currently
envisaged would actually tend to suppress industrial militancy and
weaken entrenched working class resistance to capitalist control,
thereby reducing the chances of 'genuine' workers' control over
production at some future date, On this view, then, there is a sharp
dichotomy between workers' control at enterprise level - as an element
of socialism - and Industrial Democracy. The latter does not offer a
route to the former, and should be strenuously opposed as a mere
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manipulatory gambit on the part of 'capital'. It would probably be
fair to say that views of this kind have been dominant among British
socialists from the Labour-Left leftwards, but over recent years they
have come under increasing criticism, on both theoretical and
political grounds. Let us examine some of this criticism.
First, there has been criticism of the role of the 'market' in the
theoretical position of writers such as Clarke. In this position the
forces of market competition impose a basically unitary practice of
management onto individual enterprises, rendering workers'
participation and even workers' cooperatives nugatory. This view of
capitalist management can be traced back to Marx's conception of the
individual capitalist as the mere 'personification of capital'. As
Cutler et al ( 1978) point out, this leads to the denial of any
specific effectivity on the part of the management of particular
enterprises: each enterprise will function according to a uniform mode
of calculation, as a mere 'aliquot part of the total capital'. This
kind of universalism has been strengthened more recently by the work
of Braverman ( 1974) who argued that 'Taylorism' represents the essence
of capitalist management, the profoundly anti-democractic invariant to
be found within all branches of capitalist production, imposed by the
rationality of profit. It is these conceptions which have come under
attack. Cutler et al have argued that Marx's 'personification of
capital' thesis depends on an untenable conception of the capitalist
economy as a rational totality, a conception which obliterates the
real distinctions between particular branches of production, markets
and enterprises. Enterprises are constrained by the need to make
'adequate' profits, but there is more that one way to make profits and
the general constraint of market competition by no means exhaustively
determines the calculations of managements. Tomlinson ( 1980a) has
drawn out the implication that there may be a space to begin to
develop democratic and cooperative forms of enterprise management,
even given the continuation of the production of commodities for
profit. Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) have also contested the
determinism of market forces, which they describe as the 'wicked
uncle' of socialist demonology. They identify a certain circularity
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in the classical Marxist view that market competition necessarily
enforces the real subordination of labour to capital:
"Once labour is formally subordinated, then its real
subsumption has to follow - it occurs as the realisation of
capital's 'essence': the 'inversion' at the heart of
capitalist society imposed by the logic of competition. Yet
such market forces are produced by ... the immanent
tendencies of capital!" (Cressey and Maclnnes, 1980, p. 17).
Rejecting the conception of the 'immanent tendencies of capital',
mediated by market forces, imposing a unitary subordination of labour,
these writers are also led to the conclusion that it is not futile for
workers to contest hierarchical and oppressive managerial structures.
'Industrial Democracy' is the site of a potentially fruitful struggle,
not merely a manipulatory diversion.
Second, there is the political criticism which can be levelled at the
dichotomous view which makes 'structural reform of the production
relations of society' a precondition for any meaningful
democratisation of the enterprise. The nub of this criticism is that
such views give rise to a kind of political paralysis: everything
must wait until the revolutionary moment in which the production
relations are transformed; until then labour must play a purely
oppositional role, a role which precludes struggle of a
' pref igurative' kind. It becomes very hard to see how the
'revolutionary moment' will ever rise in the absence of struggles to
construct alternative forms of social organisation of production which
might 'prefigure' and win support for socialist objectives unless, in
a surely discredited formula, oppositional industrial militancy has an
intrinsic tendency to revolutionary socialism. This kind of criticism
has been made by the writers mentioned above, and has also been
amplified by Kowbotham et al ( 1979).
Taken together, these criticisms have important implications for the
question of Industrial Democracy. 'True' workers' control will never
spring into existence in fully fledged form and socialists must fight,
within the present society, for democratic measures which can help to
'de-mystify' management and raise radical questions concerning the
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organisation of work and the goals of production, whether these
measures involve the accountability of managerial agents or the
promotion of workers' plans. If workers should be encouraged to
resist the blandishments of managements offering responsibility
without power, in an attempt to 'regain control by (ostensibly)
sharing it', they should also be encouraged to reach beyond the status
of a 'permanent opposition' to managerial control. The suggestion
here is that even if democratisation of the enterprise is limited
within an unreconstructed market, it can provide a field of struggle
which helps to develop the constructive objectives of socialism, and
which may, in running up against the limitations of the market,
generate popular pressure for social planning on a national scale.
I have argued earlier that control over production by the 'associated
producers' - a central aspect of the socialist project - must involve
two elements: democratic planning on a national or international
scale, relating to the broad development of the economy, and
'enterprise democracy' i.e. democratic mechanisms of participation and
accountability within individual enterprises. The main point which I
wish to make in this section is that it is seriously misleading to
pose a rigid demarcation between 'workers' control' as an aspect of a
future 'socialist' state of affairs (highly approved) on the one hand,
and 'Industrial Democracy' as a capitalist con-trick (object of
unqualified rejection) on the other. 'Enterprise democracy', as the
de-centralised aspect of the socialist control over production by the
associated producers, will never be realised unless workers begin to
struggle under capitalism for control over the policy and operations
of enterprises, and this means exploiting rather than rejecting
outright the kind of 'Industrial Democracy' proposals raised by the
Bullock Commission, and more recently by the EEC. This is not to say
that such proposals must be accepted at face-value but they should be
subjected to specific criticism rather than rejected in toto as merely
a device for getting workers to 'participate' in their own
exploitation. In later chapters I shall make some comments on the
importance of incomes policy in the development of the socialist
project. I shall not anticipate the arguments here, but it is worth
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pointing out that in a context of incomes policy, struggles over
enterprise policy and operations would assume an increased importance:
if wage-determination were conducted on a more centralised basis then
the focus of collective bargaining at enterprise level would have to
change. The shop stewards movement, contrary to the arguments from
some quarters, would not necessarily be demobilised in a context of
incomes policy, but would be able to use its bargaining strength at
enterprise level to insist on measures of control over the broader
issues of enterprise policy. This would imply that any particular
'Industrial Democracy' proposals which attempted to bypass or
undermine the strength of the shop stewards should be resisted, but
such particular resistance would be quite different from a total
rejection of the supposedly malign effects of accepting any
responsibility for the operation of enterprises under capitalism.
Reprise
In the latter part of this chapter I have been concerned to draw out
some of the implications for socialist politics of the analysis of
capitalist property relations given earlier. I have concentrated on
two main issues: the possibilities for social planning of investment,
by means of a state appropriation of the working class and rentiers'
surplus income at present channelled through the private financial
institutions; and the possibilities for enterprise democracy in the
context of the economic dominance of large multi-divisional
enterprises. It has been suggested that these two projects could form
a pincer movement to circumscribe the operations of hierarchic
managements pursuing the profitability of the enterprises which employ
them without regard to the interests of working people, and therefore
to reconstruct the impersonal possession of the means of production in
the direction of (socialist) social appropriation. The two projects
were seen to have differing conditions of implementation and are
therefore unlikely to be synchronised in a 'revolutionary moment', but
nonetheless they can be seen as mutually supportive: struggles for
democratic forms within enterprises may help to build support for
broader democratic planning, while a sympathetic government pursuing
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the latter project could also greatly expand the opportunities for
enterprise democracy by means of legal changes and financing.
Government industrial policy could make all the difference between a
demoralising defeat for workers' initiatives taken at enterprise
level, and the development of inspiring examples of 'workers' plans'
for socially useful production, popular accountability of management
and workers' self-management.
It may be useful at this stage to attempt a schematic synopsis of some
of the points raised in the preceding discussion. This is offered
cautiously, not as a blueprint but as a map showing certain
potentially fruitful sites of struggle. The diagram below shows
certain relationships between economic agents, and enables one to
identify some lines of reconstruction of those relationships.
Relation (1) shows the flow of savings from workers and rentiers.
This l elation could be maintained, or replaced by tax revenue (.7)
beari-nv particularly on the rentiers. Relation (2) represents lending
to the government, which could be transformed by a system of
compulsory subscription of funds to a national investment bank, which
would provide funds on a planned basis for both public projects and
commodity-producing enterprises (3 and 4). Relations (5) and (6)
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represent shareholding on the part of financial institutions and
individual rentiers respectively. The perogatives attached to
shareholding at present would have to be broken to permit the
development of social planning and enterprise democracy. Relation (8)
represents the provision of labour-power by the working class. This
relation would have to be transformed in the sense that workers would
not merely provide labour power but also participate in the management
and planning of enterprises. While this transformation depends
fundamentally on workers' initiatives it could be aided by a
government using the financing relation (4) as a means of leverage.
Many important political questions are, of course, left unanswered in
this presentation, and it would be naive to suppose they are readily
answerable: I have made some qualifications to this effect in the
course of the argument. To reiterate the point, the main concern of
this discussion has been to locate certain strategic possibilities, as
well as constraints, in relation to the currently dominant structures
of capitalist property, or in other words to argue the mutability of
the economic class relations of possession and separation from the




CLASS, SOCIAL COLLECTIVITIES AND POLITICAL FORCES
Chapters 1 and 2 presented arguments in favour of 'disaggregating' the
classical Marxist conception of social classes. In place of the
attempt to produce a synthetic totalising definition of classes it was
argued that an analysis which respects the specificity of economic
class relations (defined at the level of property-holding), social
collectivities and political forces is likely to be more fruitful.
Chapters 3 and 4 followed this up by investigating the principal forms
of capitalist property, with particular reference to the British case,
and by drawing out some of the political implications of that
investigation. I now turn to the question of social collectivities
and political forces. This question will be approached in two stages:
this chapter develops the conceptualisation of social collectivities
and the relations between these and political forces, and attempts an
historical outline of the development of these relations in Britain
since 1945, while the following chapter is an essay in the analysis of
the specific relationships between economic class structure, social
collectivities and political forces in the period of Margaret
Thatcher's government 1979-81.
To expand on the plan of the present chapter: I shall begin by
discussing the notions of 'social collectivity' and 'political force';
the relevance of the division of labour to the formation of social
collectivities will then be considered; the content of the notions of
'middle class' and 'working class' (in the British context) will be
explored, and finally I shall offer an overview of the development of
the dominant political forces and their constituencies in the post war
period.
Some Preliminary definitions
By 'social collectivity' I shall mean a category of agents broadly
sharing some aspect of culture and orientation to politics,
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susceptible to organisation into a political constituency of some
kind. This definition is necessarily somewhat open-ended: the
existence of social collectivities will be a matter of degree, and
what is more, such collectivities may cut across one another - there
will be no unique map of social collectivities such that each agent is
a member of one and only one. Nonetheless, certain collectivities
acquire a certain salience or pertinence in relation to the dominant
political issues of a given period. To refer to this phenomenon I
shall use the term 'pertinent social collectivity*. By 'political
force' on the other hand I shall mean specifically political parties
and movements, or tendencies within these, with explicit shared
objectives. Another generic term will be useful: I shall employ the
term 'corporate body' to refer to a formal grouping of agents such as
a trade union, staff association, or employers' organisation.
These preliminary definitions of concepts may be given some more
substance by considering the relations between them, and also their
relations with the concept of economic class. We have already seen
(Chapter 1) how Marx conceptualised the formation of the 'proletariat'
into an active political force, in the 'Communist Manifesto'. In
terms of the concepts outlined above we could express Marx's views
thus: the economic class of proletarians (propertyless sellers of
labour power) will necessarily become increasingly homogeneous in
respect of income levels and conditions of life and work; this will
result in the increasing 'non-pertinence' of social collectivities
based on industry, religion, region, nationality, sex etc. and the
increasing pertinence of the social collectivity coterminous with the
proletariat itself; eventually as a result of the process of struggle
this social collectivity will become organised into a corporate body -
the trade union movement - and a political force: the communist






The arrows indicate an order of determination which is supposed to
operate on a long historical time scale. Marx clearly did not
formally abandon this schema even in his later writings. In Volume
Three of Capital (Marx, 1972), in the tantalising unfinished fragment
on 'Classes', Marx notes that even in England, where "modern society
is indisputible most highly and classically developed in economic
structure.... the stratification of classes does not appear in its
pure form. Middle and intermediate strata even here obliterate lines
of demarcation everywhere" (Marx, 1972, p.885). But immediately the
pertinence of this point is denied:
"However, this is immaterial for our analysis. We have seen
that the continual tendency and law of the development of
the capitalist mode of production is more and more to
divorce the means of production from labour, and more and
more to concentrate the scattered means of production into
large groups, thereby transforming labour into wage-labour
and the means of production into capital" (ibid.).
I noted earlier that Marx recognised the social and political
'materiality' of lines of demarcation other that those of property
holding in the 'Eighteenth Brumaire': nonetheless what is striking in
this passage is that he never settled accounts with the general theory
which denied such factors any pertinence in the long run.
Unfortunately the 'obliteration of lines of (economic class)
demarcation' is still highly material despite the undoubted continuing
transformation of 'labour into wage-labour and means of production
into capital', and a theory which asserts 'correspondence' of economic
classes and political forces as the norm can only block specific
politically relevant analysis. Now, it is in the nature of the
critique of this aspect of 'classical Marxism' which has already been
proposed that it is not possible to erect an alternative 'general
theory'. I have emphasised that the relations between economic
classes, social collectivities and political forces must be
investigated specifically, in a given historical context. All the




i) Political forces may crystallise and channel 'inputs' from social
collectivities and corporate bodies, in the sense of recruiting
personnel from the latter, developing relatively amorphous social
ideologies into a focussed political project, and 'processing'
policy-recommendations from corporate bodies. On the other hand,
at particular junctures political forces can 'break loose' from
the social collectivities and corporate bodies which
traditionally support them, either in pursuit of a relatively
autonomous political project or in the face of intolerable
contradictions among the demands of their 'constituents'.
ii) Political forces may build (or attempt to build) support for
their objectives by fostering the development of certain
pertinent social collectivities (e.g. 'the nation', the
'anti-monopoly alliance', the 'revolutionary proletariat'),
unifying their own supporters in specific ways while dividing or
confusing their opponents.
iii) The actions of political forces and corporate bodies, within the
resistant medium of social collectivities over which they have
some influence but which they cannot shape ex nihilo, may either
conserve or transform in various ways the system of economic
class relations. The character of this
conservation/transformation effect may or may not correspond to
the 'intentions' of certain of the forces involved. Political
forces and corporate bodies may be more or less able to calculate
the likely effects, ceteris paribus, of the implementation of
their policies and demands, and the conservation/transformation
effect is anyway likely to appear as the 'resultant vector' of
non-coherent activities on the part of a whole range of such
forces and bodies (although, for instance, dominant positions
within a government may give one political force more leverage
than others).
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Note that economic classes are nowhere in this account presented as
'actors'. It would indeed be the exception if the pertinent social
collectivities were exclusively formed on economic class lines (even
though this may be the plan of certain political forces) , as it would
be if such social collectivities were to appear on the 'political
stage' as political forces in their own right.
It should be clear how far from a 'general theory' such remarks take
us: to progress any further one must be more specific. The first
step in this direction will be by way of a discussion of the division
of labour within capitalist economies, and the possibilities for the
formation of social collectivities connected with this. This problem
is selected because of the importance given to the division of labour
within modern Marxist discussions of social class * and also within
more orthodox 'sociological' analyses of class (i.e. 'occupational
classes'). It will be argued that the division of labour does not
determine the pattern of pertinent social collectivities but along
with certain other factors constitutes a complex grid of social
differentiation within which social collectivities may be formed.
The division of labour and social collectivities
Discussion of the 'division of labour' in Marxist theory has been
rendered somewhat opaque by the development of various conflicting
terminologies. I propose to begin therefore with a terminological
clarification. One of Marx's fullest accounts of the various aspects
of the division of labour is contained in 'Capital' Volume One (Marx,
1976, p. 470-80). In this context he distinguishes the 'division of
labour in manufacture' (i.e. the detailed division of tasks between
workers employed by a single capitalist) from the 'social division of
labour' (i.e. the division of social production as a whole into
various distinct 'branches'), He then goes on to develop a more
detailed schema:
1 See Chapter 2.
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"If we keep labour alone in view, we may designate the
division of social production into its main genera such as
agriculture, industry, etc. as division of labour in
general, and the splitting of these broad divisions into
species and sub-species as division of labour in particular.
Finally, we may designate the division of labour within the
workshops as division of labour in detail" (Marx, 1976, p.
471 - emphasis added).
What Marx here calls the 'division of labour in general', I shall
refer to as the division of labour by sectors or by branches, as
appropriate. What he calls the 'division of labour in particular', I
shall refer to as the division of labour by enterprises, or
enterprise-groups, as appropriate. Finally, what he calls the
'division of labour in detail' will here be referred to as the
division of labour within the enterprise. These terminological
changes are not made merely for the sake of variety but because I
believe the substitute terms convey their meaning more pointedly than
Marx's originals.
The main point of potential confusion, however, arises because of the
quite distinct meaning attached to the term 'social division of
labour' by modern Marxist writers. Whereas Marx used this term to
refer generally to what I have called the division by sectors or
branches many recent writers have used it to refer to the division of
functions, found within all branches in a capitalist economy, between
the 'exploiters' or 'controllers' of labour power and the direct
production workers. In this sense, it is opposed to the 'technical
division of labour' between different productive tasks. For instance
Balibar (1970, p. 214) writes that the 'double function' of the
capitalist (at once exploiter of labour power and organiser of
production) "is an index of what I shall call the double nature of the
division of labour in production (the 'technical' division of labour
and the 'social' division of labour)." This formulation has been
taken up by Poulantzas, Carchedi and others. It usually goes along
with the claim that the 'technical' division of labour, i.e. the
actual distribution of tasks, is in some sense subordinate to the
social division. For instance, Poulantzas ( 1975, p.21): "it is the
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social division of labour, in the form that this is given by the
specific presence of political and ideological relations actually
within the production process, which dominates the technical division
of labour." I do not propose to employ this terminology. The notion
of the 'technical' division of labour is much too poor, and elides
Marx's interesting discussion of the different levels and forms of
division of labour. The notion of the social division of labour as
employed by these writers will, however, be reconstructed below under
the name of division of labour by strata.
Let us now examine the characteristics, and possible effects on the
formation of social collectivites, of the various aspects of the
division of labour which have been identified.
1. The division by sectors or branches: This, as Marx points out,
is an ancient principle of division. It can be traced back, for
instance, to the rudimentary sexual division of labour between hunting
(male) and horticulture (mainly female) in certain 'primitive'
societies (Terray, 1972, pp. 108-110). At a 'later' stage of social
development, this division by branches becomes the basis for commodity
exchange between the units of production within the different
branches. For Marx, the further development of this form of division
of labour in society appears as a prerequistite of the division of
labour within the enterpise under capitalism:
"Since the production and circulation of commodities are the
general prerequisites of the capitalist mode of production,
division of labour in manufacture requires that a division
of labour within society should have already attained a
certain degree of development" (Marx, 1976, p.473).
Once established, capitalist commodity production then pushes yet
further the division of labour by branches:
"Inversely, the division of labour in manufacture reacts
back upon that in society, developing and multiplying it
further. With the differentiation of the instruments of
labour, the trades which produce these instruments
themselves become more and more differentiated" (ibid.).
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If the division of labour between branches is conserved and extended
within capitalist economies, it can form the principle of a particular
kind of social collectivity which cuts across 'class' lines and
inhibits the formation of class based collectivities. That is,
'common interests' can be formed on the basis of the branch of
production, which in some respects unite wage-workers, managers and
employers in a particular branch, possibly in opposition to the
'interests' of wage-workers in other branches. Witness for example
the common front of workers and employers in the textile industry in
Britain in 1980/81 calling for import controls, which - although they
may be justified - would raise the price and restrict the choice of
clothing for other workers. If one recognises the materiality of the
division of production and labour by branches, it is no good writing
off such conflicts as 'false consciousness'. The possible divisions
between workers considered as car workers, textile workers, railwaymen
etc., are not merely the product of a Machiavellian manipulation on
the part of 'capital' (although of course managers and politicians may
exploit and amplify such divisions).
2. The division by enterprises: I have earlier remarked on two
features of the development of the enterprise in modern capitalism -
increasing scale and diversification. While the increasing scale of
many enterprises means that more workers are grouped under a single
'employer' it clearly does not abolish the divisions between
enterprises, which again can form the basis of social collectivities.
Given diversification, this principle of division can cut across
branches of production, adding a further complexity to the social
differentiation of labour. In many cases, identification of workers
with the enterprise which employs them may be only weakly formed but
again a community of interest may be established at this level,
depending perhaps on the degree of 'paternalism' of the management,
the character of employment conditions in the enterprise, and the
degree of craft skill or other interesting aspect of work within the
enterprise. A striking example of the formation of pertinent social
collectivities on enterprise lines is found in the Japanese
industrial/commercial combines which provide life-time employment for
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many workers as well as extensive 'welfare' and social services. As
Hirschmeier and Yui (1975, p. 300) remark:
"It is sometimes held that Japanese would be ideal Marxists
considering the importance of group-centredness and the
tendency to follow the masses. But one could argue against
this that Japanese groups have nothing to do with classes.
A Japanese worker at Mitsubishi feels closer to his own
manager than to a co-worker at Hitachi."
Of course, there are unions and parties within Japan which cut across
enterprise identification, but the point made by Hirschmeier and Yui
is that for many workers, for much of the time, the enterprise is a
more strongly pertinent collectivity.
3. The division within the enterprise: As Marx argues, this
division of labour is of a different kind from the others. He takes
Adam Smith to task for conflating the division of labour in society
with the division within the enterprise. For Smith, the difference is
'merely subjective': the division within the enterprise is confined
to one location and can be surveyed synoptically while in the case of
the division of labour in society "the spreading-out of the work over
great areas and the great number of people employed in each branch of
labour obscure the connection" (Marx, 1976, p. 475). For Marx on the
other hand the difference is more material: the division of labour
between branches exists on the basis of the interchange of products as
commodities, whereas within the enterprise the specialised worker
produces no commodities - "It is only the common product of all the
specialised workers that becomes a commodity" (ibid). The point at
issue here is the form of connection between the divided labours:
"The division of labour within society is mediated through
the purchase and sale of the products of different branches
of industry, while the connection between the various
partial operations in a workshop (or more generally, in an
enterprise - A.C.) is mediated through the sale of the
labour-power of several workers to one capitalist, who
employs it as combined labour-power" (Marx, 1976, pp.
475-6) .
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The latter is a 'planned and regulated' system while the former is
established 'a posteriori' through the workings of the market. What
Smith's conflation effectively conceals is the authority of the
capitalist over his employees, who are "merely the members of a total
mechanism which belongs to him" (p. 477).
In Marx's view, this 'total mechanism' or regulated system of division
of labour within the enterprise develops in two stages: those of
manufacture proper, and large-scale machine industry. Within
manufacture, the precise form of division depends in the first
instance on the historical precursors of the capitalistic form of
production in the given branch of industry - whether the
'manufacturer' (a) draws together previously separate trades into one
workshop to produce a common product or (b) splits up a previously
unified craft production process into its component tasks. But over
time a certain common rationality is imposed, as 'capital' seeks both
maximum control over labour power and its progressive cheapening.
Here Braverman (1974) buttresses Marx's case by reference to the
'Babbage principle'. Babbage had argued that one of the main reasons
for the cheapness of manufactured articles was
"that the master manufacturer, by dividing the work to be
executed into different processes, each requiring different
degrees of skill or of force, can purchase exactly that
precise quantity of both which is necessary for each
process; whereas, if the work were executed by one workman,
that person must possess sufficient skill to perform the
most difficult, and sufficient strength to execute the most
laborious, of the operations into which the art is
divided" .
In commentary on this principle Braverman claims that it is
"fundamental to the evolution of the division of labour in
capitalist society. It gives expression not to a technical
aspect of the division of labour but to its social aspect.
Insofar as the labour process may be dissociated, it may be
separated into elements some of which are simpler than
others and each of which is simpler than the whole.
Translated into market terms, this means that the labour
power capable of performing the process may be purchased
more cheaply as dissociated elements than as a capacity
integrated in a single worker" (Braverman, 1974, pp. 81-82).
2 Babbage (1832, pp. 34-35), quoted in Braverman (1974, pp. 79-80).
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Alongside the technical advantages of the division of labour noted by
Adam Smith (specialised dexterity, time saving, development of
specialised means of production) the 'Babbage principle' imposes, it
is argued, a specifically capitalist form of division.
In Marx's second stage - large scale machine industry - the craft
skill of the worker in handling his tools "passes over to the machine"
(Marx, op.cit., p.545). This "destroys the technical foundation on
which the division of labour in manufacture was based" (ibid.), but it
does not destroy the advantages which the division of labour offers
the capitalist in terms of controlling and cheapening labour power:
"Thus although, from a technical point of view, the old
system of division of labour is thrown overboard, it hangs
on in the factory as a tradition handed down from
manufacture, and is then systematically reproduced and fixed
in a more hideous form by capital as a means of exploiting
labour power. The lifelong speciality of handling the same
tool becomes the lifelong speciality of serving the same
machine ... In this way not only are the expenses of (the
worker's) reproduction considerably lessened, but at the
same time his helpless dependence upon the factory as a
whole, and therefore upon the capitalist, is rendered
complete" (ibid., p. 547).
Within large scale industry, the crippling specialisation of the
individual machine-minders is one aspect of the division of labour.
The others are (i) the 'separation of the intellectual faculties of
the production process from manual labour' and (ii) the division of
the workers into 'manual labourers and overseers, into the private
soldiers and the N.C.O.s of an industrial army'.
In Braverman's analyses, this 'separation of the intellectual
faculties of the production process from manual labour', or division
between 'conception' and 'execution', is taken as the fundamental and
enduring feature of the capitalist division of labour. Already
rationalised by Babbage, it was later given its most explicity and
systematic expression by F.W. Taylor, whose project was to eliminate
the autonomy of the worker by appropriating for management any
remaining knowledge or skill involved in the direct production
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process, to analyse and codify the components of the labour process
and thereby to permit the management to lay down standard rules for
the expenditure of labour power. 'Taylorism' is seen as the quite
self-conscious pursuit of what Braverman calls the 'general law of the
capitalist division of labour', according to which
"Every step in the labour process is divorced, so far as
possible, from special knowledge and training and reduced to
simple labour. Meanwhile, the relatively few persons for
whome special knowledge and training are reserved are freed
so far as possible from the obligations of simple labour"
(Braverman, 1974, pp. 82-3).
Most of Marx's comments on the division of labour are concerned with
industrial production, but Braverman sets out to show that the
capitalist division of labour between 'conception' and 'execution' is
to be found equally in routine clerical work and in fact within any
developed capitalist enterprise.
To summarise this conception: for both Marx and Braverman the
developed form of the division of labour within the capitalist
enterprise is not so much a technical division of tasks - as in early
manufacture - but a socially-determined structure, reflecting the
exigencies of the production of surplus value. It has a dichotomous
aspect, in that most workers are degraded to the status of mere
machine minders while a restricted cadre is invested with the
scientific/technical knowledge necessary for the development of
production. We see why Marx felt it important to attack Smith's
generalised conception of the division of labour, and to insist on the
different conditions governing the division of labour be tween and
within commodity producing enterprises.
However, in emphasising the specifically capitalist form of the latter
division, both Marx and Braverman exaggerate what they take to be its
essential features: rationality and authoritarianism. It is one
thing to argue that a 'rational' capitalist would wish to subordinate
and cheapen labour to the greatest possible extent, but quite another
to claim that this 'rationality' is uniformly imposed in practice as a
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function of the 'undisputed authority of the capitalist' (Marx). The
specific claims of Marx and Braverman in this regard have been
contested in a number of recent writings. Lazonick (1979) argues that
when Marx took the self-acting mule as a prime example of a technology
permitting the increased subordination of labour to capital he was in
fact relying, at second hand, on the claims made by the machine's
manufacturers, and that in practice the mule-spinners held a
relatively superior position in the division of labour; Sohn Rethel
(1978) points out that Taylor's project at the Midvale Steel Company,
of extracting all the technical knowledge of the machinists working
under him took him 26 years rather than the six months he had
originally planned; Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) argue more broadly
that Taylor's project of minute and exact control over labour was
actually a failure, and that Braverman's tendency to take Taylor at
face-value is a case of confusing the 'fetish of capital' for its
reality. Gershuny (1978) provides a counter-example to Braverman's
law of job degradation for the majority, by showing that over the
1960s in UK manufacturing industry the proportionate decline in
skilled manual employment was significantly lower than the
proportionate increase in the 'administrative and technical' section
3
of the workforce.
This kind of qualification is of considerable importance for the
problem of the formation of social collectivities. The sense of
outrage on the part of both Marx and Braverman at the crippling
effects (physical or spiritual) on many workers of the division of
labour within capitalist enterprises is fully justified, but their
rather rationalistic conception of the total subordination of labour
to capital leads them to an over-estimation of the role this division
of labour must play in the formation of social collectivities: the
3 In this calculation 'skilled' manual work was defined as manual
work requiring an apprenticeship or other lengthy period of
training. The 'administrative and technical' category explicitly
excluded clerical work. Gershuny is aware of the problems in
defining 'skilled work' but concludes that, on the best available
evidence, his general point holds.
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extraction of any 'skill' content from labour for the mass of workers;
the homogenisation of 'simple labour' in all branches of production;
the cheapening of labour power; increasingly intolerable oppression -
these tendencies are bound to overwhelm any secondary differentiation
of the workers by branch or by enterprise and lead to the formation of
a revolutionary proletariat. But the division of labour within the
enterprise is not a juggernaut which crushes out all trace of 'skill'
or peculiarity in the wage-labour of each and every branch of
production, and neither can the 'capitalist' attain the Taylorist
ideal of total control over labour. Homogeneous 'simple labour' is
not inexorably established as the norm for wage-labour in capitalist
economies, and by the same token it is not inevitable that a uniform
structure of division of labour within enterprises will progressively
undermine any ties of social identification other than those of
'class'. While not inevitable, it is however clearly possible that a
broadly common position within the hierarchical division of labour
forms the basis for a corporate body or social collectivity embracing
workers in different enterprises and branches. I refer to this below
as the 'division of labour by strata'.
4. The division by strata: This concept refers to the broad
division among all employees of capitalist enterprises (and state
apparatuses) into different hierarchical categories, in respect of
character of labour power (more or less skilled/qualified)^, role
within the functioning of the enterprise (autonomy/restriction of
work, control powers, access to information), and conditions of
employment. If the division of labour within the enterprise were as
(tendentially) uniform as Marx and Braverman suppose then there would
be little problem in specifying this 'division by strata': it would
simply be the paradigmatic division within the enterprise (mass of
simple labour, restricted cadre of intellectual workers and N.C.O.s)
writ large. If on the other hand the form of division of labour
within enterprises is not homogenous then the concept of 'division
4 It is this feature of hierarchy, with its implications for the
'market position' of the employee, which Weber (1970) takes as
definitive of classes.
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by strata' must be more nebulous and approximate. We may talk of such
categories as 'professionals', 'managers', 'technicians', 'foremen'
and 'manual workers' (and sub-gradations of these), but we have to
recognise that these terms do not have homogeneous referents, and the
degree of real social distinctiveness and cohesiveness of these
categories may be highly variable. Despite the emphasis placed on
this aspect of the division of labour by Marxists and non-Marxist
sociologists alike, it cannot be said that the division by strata
forms the 'naturally' pertinent basis for social identification in
capitalist societies.
It is now possible to draw together the comments made above on the
various aspects of the division of labour. The divisions by branches
and by enterprises, within the enterprise, and by strata, form a grid
or matrix of differentiation within which social collectivities may be
formed, collectivities whose political pertinence is riot given in
advance, but is always constructed in historically specific ways. Let
us take just a few examples of strongly formed collectivities with a
broadly socialist orientation to illustrate the point.
First, Bologna (1976) has argued that the remarkable political
vitality of the International Workers of the World (IWW) can be traced
in part to the character of the American proletariat which it
organised, in the early years of the twentieth century, as a "mobile
proletariat... completely against identification with any task or
skill" (Bologna, 1976, p.72). In this context the IWW could "exploit
the extraordinary level of communication and coordination allowed by a
mobility-based struggle." In a lyrical passage Bologna describes the
"absolutely original type of agitator" which the IWW succeeded in
creating: "not the mole digging for decades within the single
establishment or proletarian neighbourhood, but a type of agitator who
swims within the stream of proletarian struggles, moves from one end
to the other of the enormous American continent and calculates the
seismic wave of the struggle.." (ibid.). In this case the weakness of
the division of labour between branches or enterprises as a principle
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of social collectivity, on account of the substantial movement of US
workers, both geographically and in and out of various kinds of work"*,
is a condition of existence of a strongly formed radical proletarian
collectivity cutting across branch or enterprise lines. On the other
hand, the British National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has developed as
a stongly-formed collectivity in a very different way. The sources of
its solidarity and strength lie in part in the continuity of tradition
in the (relatively closed) mining communities - the opposite of the
mobility of the proletariat organised by the IWW. The NUM is firmly
based within a definite branch of the division of labour, although it
cuts across enterprise (i.e. colliery) boundaries and although its
political interventions often find an echo in other branches. The
contrast between these two cases should warn us against generalising
propositions which make either fluidity and mobility of the working
class, or tradition and community within particular branches, into
uniquely favourable conditions for socialist organisation (the first
is perhaps Bologna's temptation; the second appears to be the
temptation of the work done under the auspices of the 'History
Workshop').
A third contrasting example of collectivity can be found in the
Scottish Trades Councils in the latter part of the 19th Century, which
formed a much stronger focus for working class politics than national
trades unions at that time. Here a collectivity was developed on a
regional or local basis, drawing together workers from the various
trades, rather than in a national body for the members of a single
trade. Fraser (1978, pp. 1-2) explains this by reference to the
particular position of Glasgow within the Scottish economy:
5 This 'mobility' is powerfully portrayed by Dos Passos ( 1938) .
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"The stress on local autonomy arose fairly naturally from
the structure of the Scottish economy. Glasgow had a
dominating position, both in population and in concentration
of industry. Clydeside workers were unwilling to accept
decisions emanating from Aberdeen, Kirkcaldy or wherever, or
to subordinate their own needs to those of other parts of
the country. As soon as any efforts to form national unions
were made, they came up against the imbalance between
Glasgow and the rest of the country."
The local Trades Councils were nonetheless able to organise quite
effectively around demands for city improvements and municipalisation
of utilities, campaigned against excessive salaries for local
bureaucrats, and had an important role in discussing and pushing for
parliamentary reform. Here the principle of collectivity cut across
trade and enterprise boundaries, but did not surmount what Marx called
the 'territorial division of labour' between regions.
These examples show something of the variety of ways in which social
collectivities can be formed, 'within' some aspects of the division of
labour while cutting across others. But the stress so far on the
division of labour is somewhat one-sided. The matrix of social
differentiation which can form the basis for collectivities includes
other dimensions, such as parentage, region, religion, income level,
form of housing tenure. Where these latter principles of
differentiation are coterminous with certain aspects of the division
of labour (and with each other), the chances of formation of a
politically pertinent collectivity within the 'division of labour
grid' may be increased (e.g. 'working class' catholics in the west of
Scotland as a traditional Labour Party support-base); where they cut
across the division of labour the chances may be diminished (the
difficulty of developing 'class' politics in Northern Ireland).
The 'working class' and 'middle class' as social collectivities
I have built up a conception in which the agents belonging to a given
economic class (defined at the level of property holding) may be
distributed in various ways into more or less strongly formed social
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collectivities of various degrees of political pertinence. It is not
possible or useful to provide an encyclopaedic account of the
collectivities existing 'within' the economic classes in Britain but
this section pursues the analysis of two rather broad and vaguely
defined, yet nonetheless politically and culturally important, social
collectivities: the 'working class' and the 'middle class', as these
terms are used by 'ordinary people' and formalised by sociologists.
This analysis is necessary to an understanding of politics in Britain,
and yet it is too ofen dismissed by Marxists, at least implicitly, as
irrelevant. The kinds of theorisation of classes discussed in Chapter
2, theorisations concerned with demarcating the working class and the
new middle class/new petty bourgeoisie on Marxist criteria, do not
address the problem of assessing the importance of the 'classes'
(broad collectivities, in my terms) which are perceived to exist in
particular social formations - the 'classes' which are recognised by
the people as such, and to one or other of which many people regard
themselves as belonging. There can be no presumption that these
collectivities correspond to the classes of Marxist theory (however
conceived), and where they fail to correspond it will not do to reject
them as unimportant. I am not arguing that there are no uses for a
conceptual demarcation of classes quite distinct from the demarcations
present within popular ideology - on the contrary - but I am arguing
that the latter demarcations have a real importance and should not be
dismissed as merely 'subjective'.
We may begin by considering the meaning which the notion of 'class',
and the 'working class'/'middle class' distinction in particular, has
within popular ideology in Britain. Here one has to rely on the
indices produced by survey techniques, which do not provide
unambiguous definitions and which are open to a variety of
intepretations but which nonetheless do provide a starting point for
analysis. One important qualification here is, however, that answers
to survey questions are variable over time and the fullest surveys
available are now somewhat out of date: one must be alert to the
changes since the late 1960s when the surveys of Butler and Stokes
(1974) and Townsend (1979) were conducted (these form the basis of the
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following discussion). Nonetheless, one can get some useful mileage
out of the '60s surveys, before moving on to an historical account.
A first question is the extent to which some notion of 'social class'
is pertinent to people; whether it forms a part of their everyday
conceptual apparatus. Here the variability of survey responses
immediately becomes apparent. In answer to the question 'do you ever
think of yourself as belonging to a particular social class?' Butler
and Stokes got a 50 per cent positive response in. 1964 and a 43 per
cent positive response in 1970. With a rather different question
Townsend's survey team in 1968-69 found around 80 per cent of
respondents willing to assign themselves 'spontaneously' to a social
class. In both cases, however, it was clear that among those
respondents who thought in terms of 'class' the most common
designations were 'working' and 'middle'. Further, with a little
prompting (i.e. respondents presented with a standard list of classes
and asked to place themselves) the overwhelming majority of
respondents were willing to assign themselves to the 'middle' or
'working' classes or some sub-division of these. If quantification is
risky, it does at least seem that the two-class, middle/working
conception is quite deeply rooted in popular ideology. When
questioned on the basis for class determination, however, Townsend's
respondents were not surprisingly rather vague: 'Way of life' came
first among the principles which Townsend offered, followed by family
and occupation, with money and education also being mentioned.
Interestingly but not surprisingly, a higher proportion of men than
women took occupation to be the principal factor determining class.
If the popular conception of 'class' does not involve any rigorous or
well-elaborated notion of class determination, it is of interest to
examine whether people's self-assignation correlates strongly with
certain 'objective' features of their economic and social location.
It is often assumed that what I have earlier called the 'division of
labour by strata' is the prime objective content of the British
'class' system but there are severe methodological problems in
investigating this hypothesis, since the schemas proposed for the
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classification of occupations are not actually independent of the
phenomenon to be explained. Occupational classifications, from the
Registrar General's of 1911 to the Hall-Jones scale (Hall and Jones,
1950) and all its variants, involve some kind of ranking by 'prestige'
or 'standing in the community'. They are therefore nearer to being
attempted systematisations of popular ideology than objective scales
which could be used to explain that ideology. As Townsend (1979,
p.371) aptly remarks of the 'grading' of occupations- "the whole
procedure is.... a mixture of presupposition and the partial
representation of social perceptions." It is interesting, however, to
see the extent to which occupational classifications fail to
'correspond' with self-assigned social class. Two examples of this
are shown overleaf, in tables 5.1 and 5.2.
271
Table 5. 1
'Occupational class' and self-rating
according to Townsend
Self-rating
Occupational class * Middle Working
Men % Women % Men % Women
Professional 81 86 15 12
Managerial 69 72 29 26
Supervisory-High 62 68 38 30
Supervisory-Low 50 55 47 43
Routine non-manual 45 47 54 51
Skilled manual 22 30 76 68
Partly skilled manual 16 23 82 74
Unskilled manual 11 15 86 82
* Women classified according to husband' s occupational class.
Source : Townsend ( 1979).
Table 5.2
Occupation and self-rating according
to Butler and Stokes
Occupational class Self-rating
Middle % Working %
I Higher managerial or professional 80
II Lower managerial or administrative 60
III Skilled or supervisory non-manual 57
IV Lower non-manual 46
V Skilled manual 26







Source : Butler and Stokes ( 1974).
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What is clear from these comparisons is that 'occupational status' is
not the only factor which individuals consider when assigning
themselves to a given 'social class'For instance, nearly 30 per
cent of the men in Townsend's sample in 'managerial' occupations
regarded themselves as working class, and at the other end of the
scale 20 per cent of Butler and Stokes' 'unskilled manual' workers
regarded themselves as middle class. What one finds is a continuum
extending from top to bottom of the occupational scale; the 'lower'
on the scale, the lower the proportion identifying as middle class and
the higher the proportion identifying as working class. But there is
one 'break' in the continuum, in that there is a relatively sharp rise
in the proportion of 'working class' identifiers when we reach the
'manual' occupational categories. I argued earlier that there are
problems in attempting any rigorous theoretical definition of the
'manual work/mental work', or 'manual/non-manual', distinction but all
the same this classification, conceived as a socially-constructed
principle of division, has a certain social validity. 'Manual'
workers within the British classification, although their precise work
situations may vary quite widely, have in general considerably less
job-security and less access to various benefits provided by employers
than 'non-manual' workers. Despite this, it is worth noting that in
Townsend's sample 31 per cent of men assigning themselves to the
middle class has 'manual' occupations, and 25 per cent of men
assigning themselves to the working class has 'non-manual'
occupations.
A fuller account of the factors active in people's class
identification would no doubt have to consider income, wealth, housing
tenure, education, style of consumption, social origins, family and
local connections. For some groups, for instance, it is clear that a
relatively high income, and the style of consumption which accompanies
that, can induce a 'middle class' self-identification despite having a
6 It is clear that some people use 'working class' simply to mean
'employees', or 'those who work for a living'.
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'manual' occupation . Butler and Stokes found that income level was
particularly important in individuals' self-image by class for their
occupational groups III, IV and V (for the meaning of these see Table
5.2). The particular importance of housing tenure has been noted
already: Townsend found that among respondents renting council
accommodation only 20 per cent rated themselves as middle class while
among owner-occupiers 40 per cent did so. It seems likely that the
spread of owner-occupation may undermine the 'working class'
identification of some 'manual' groups.
It is not being suggested here that the various factors bearing on
class identification are totally independent variables. The
correlations between occupational status, income, educational
opportunity and attainment have been well-established (see for
instance Westergaard and Resler, 1975), and it can be politically
important to stress these systematic connections when opposing the
notion that 'class inequality' is disappearing. It is clear that
individuals in the 'higher' occupational groupings are far more likely
to have high incomes and to be owner-occupiers than those in the lower
groupings, and it is also clear that children of higher category
parents have a much better chance of extending their education beyond
the minimum, and of qualifying for higher status occupations
themselves (Goldthorpe, 1980, Halsey et al, 1980). Nonetheless, these
linkages are not so tight that one can read off class
self-identification from the hierarchical classification of
occupations, in any of its variants: there is an area of overlap
between manual and non-manual earnings; many manual workers are now
owner-occupiers; many individuals in the higher occupations have come
from manual backgrounds. The general point here is that 'class' as a
cultural phenomenon in British society, as a form of broad and loose
social collectivity, is not only quite distinct from the classical
Marxist conception in which classes are defined on the basis of
7 The study of 'affluent' car-workers by Goldthorpe et al (1969)
showed, however, that high income is not a sufficient condition
for 'middle class' self-identification.
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property relations - neither is it reducible to the sociological
conception of 'occupational class'. In fact it is futile to search
for a rigorous definition which will 'correctly' locate the division
between the 'working class' and the 'middle class' in Britain. It is
more appropriate to regard these social collectivities as based on
what Wittgenstein called 'family resemblances'. Wittgenstein (1968,
pp. 31-32), exploring the philosophy of language, posed the question
of what was common to all the things which we call 'games':
"What is common to them all? - Don't say: "There must be
something common or they would not be called 'games"' - but
look and see whether there is anything common to all. For
if you look at them you will not see something that is
common at all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole
series of them at that ... I can think of no better
expression to characterise these similarities than "family
resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members
of a family ... overlap and criss-cross in the same way."
The same might be said of the individuals in Britain considering
themselves members of the 'middle class': there is not an essential
characteristic common to them all, which could be discovered by
theoretical reflection.
At this point it will be useful to take the measure of the dislocation
between the economic classes defined on the basis of capitalist
property relations and the working class and middle class
collectivities in Britain. First, the 'working class' in Britain may
be seen as a subset of the economically defined working class (i.e.
wage and salary earning employees separated from the means of
production), although it probably also includes sections of the petty
bourgeoisie (in the strict sense of small-scale producers and traders
employing their own means of production and labour power) who regard
themselves as 'working for a living'. The 'working class'
collectivity is, in a sense, centred on manual industrial labour, at
least for the adult male members of working class families, although
(a) by no means all people who consider themselves working class are
employed in that sphere and (b) a not insignificant number of people
employed in that sphere do not consider themselves working class. The
British middle class, on the other hand, includes large sections of
the economically-defined working class (especially salaried employees)
as well as sections of the petty bourgeoisie proper and sections of
the 'individual bourgeoisie' (i.e. personal owners of means of
g
production and employers of the labour power of others) . These are
the two basic 'classes'; in addition there is the 'upper class',
which designation is generally restricted to the hereditary
aristocracy and rich rentiers. To look at the matter differently, one
could say that the members of the economically-defined working class
in Britain are divided between the 'working class' and 'middle class'
collectivities, with this division depending on a range of factors
including place within the division of labour by strata, parentage,
education, home-ownership, and income. In a sense, the paradigm
(male) member of the 'working class' will be a manual industrial
worker, born of a father who was also a manual industrial worker, with
minimal education, living in rented accommodation. The paradigm
'middle class' employee on the other hand will have some kind of
'white-collar' job, will come from a non-manual background, will be
educated beyond the minimum and will expect his or her employment to
have the trajectory of a 'career', and will own a home. The fact that
such consistent 'paradigm' cases are becoming increasingly rare (this
will be discussed later) explains in part why there is no clear
boundary between the 'classes'.
We have seen that the social collectivities often known as 'classes'
in British society are reducible neither to economic classes in the
Marxist sense not to the sociologists' occupational classes. We have
also seen that these collectivities have a considerable pertinence
within popular ideology. I shall now examine the relationship between
these collectivities and politics, first by a further reference to the
surveys of the 1960s, then by developing a broader historical
perspective.
8 In Poulantzian terms (See Chapter 2) the British 'working class'
would include elements of the proletariat, new petty bourgeoisie,
traditional petty bourgeoisie and possibly even bourgeoisie (i.e.
'working class' managers). The British 'middle class' would also
include elements of Poulantzas' proletariat, new and traditional
petty bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie. In other words the British
'classes' cut right across his demarcations.
'Class' and politics; the partisanship surveys of the '60s
In this section I shall consider two aspects: the broad question of
the relationships, within popular ideology, between 'class' division
and the political, and the narrower question of the relationship
between 'class', party affiliations and voting patterns. The work of
Butler and Stokes, and other subsequent research within the same
analytical framework, has shown that 'middle class' and 'working
class' identification have a considerable relevance as regards support
for the two main political parties in Britain. The same research also
shows, however, that the 'class' basis of support for the parties is
now weakening significantly, and that even at its peak this phenomenon
fell a long way short of the Marxist conception of political 'class
consciousness'. Let us examine these points.
In a 1963 survey, Butler and Stokes found that among those with a
'middle class' self-image and who also considered themselves partisans
of the major parties 79 per cent were Tory and 21 per cent Labour
supporters. Among 'working class' identifiers 72 per cent were Labour
supporters and 28 per cent Tories. The correlation between 'class'
and party support is even more striking if one considers sub-divisions
within the broad classes, with the self-confessed 'upper classes'
showing 100 per cent Tory allegiance and the 'lower working class'
showing 77 per cent Labour partisanship. Within the six 'occupational
status' categories (see Table 5.2) the pattern of partisanship was
also quite clear, although in fact at the 'manual'/'non-manual' divide
there was a clearer break in terms of partisanship than in terms of
'class' identification, as can be seen if table 5.2 is compared with
table 5.3 below:
Table 5.3 Party self-image by occupational Status 1963
I II III IV V VI
Conservative 86% 81 77 61 29 25
Labour 14 19 23 39 71 75
Source : Butler and Stokes ( 1974) .
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The discrepancy between 'working class' identification, which showed a
relatively continuous rise across the occupational categories and
Labour partisanship, which displayed an abrupt rise from class IV to V
is ascribed to the somewhat 'anomalous' position of the class IV
(lower non-manual) individuals: in this category there was a majority
of 'working class' identifiers, yet also a majority of Tory partisans.
In all the other occupational categories however, identification with
one class or other carried with it a tendency to identify with the
'corresponding' party.
These correlations, while of interest, do not tell us much about the
political substance of the 'class'/party link, but Butler and Stokes
pursued this further by soliciting 'free' responses concerning the
reasons for identification with one or other party. These reponses
could be organised under four general headings: first, those showing
an appreciation of politics as a domain of representation of opposed
class interests; second, those viewing politics in terms of a 'simple
representation of class interest' without any elaborated notion of
conflict of interests; third, those showing a simple 'cultural
partisanship' without any definite conception of class interests being
involved; and fourth, those seeing no 'interest-related' or normative
class content in part support. The results of this categorisation
show that the bulk of 'working class' labour partisans viewed politics
in terms of the 'simple representation' principle (i.e. Labour was
'out to help the working class' ; working people vote labour 'because
it's their party'), although a quite substantial minority reckoned in
terms of opposed class interests (39 per cent). Among 'middle class'
Tories on the other hand, a substantial majority (65 per cent) took
the fourth view, thinking in terms of 'national interest',
'competence' and so on rather than in class terms. This latter result
is only to be expected: the Tories have assiduously cultivated the
image of the defender of the 'national interest' as opposed to the
supposed trade union 'sectionalism' of the Labour Party, and militant
'class conscious' organisations within the middle classes have never
been made much headway (John Gorst's 'Middle Class Association' for
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instance). What is perhaps more surprising from a Marxist viewpoint
is the restricted provenance even among working class Labour
supporters of a developed conception of politics as 'class conflict'
(let alone any 'revolutionary' conception of the possibility of an
alternative social order). The very names of the 'classes' in Britain
are symptomatic here: 'middle' and 'working'. The 'middle class'
designation logically implies a three-class model, featuring an upper
class, yet as Townsend noted "practically nobody claims to belong to
such a class" (1979, p.374). If the 'upper class' is generally
reckoned to be marginal or vestigial and the two principle classes are
seen as 'middle' and 'working' then it is clear that the British
'class system' of popular ideology is not equivalent to a ruling
class/dominated class dichotomy. 'Working class' people may wish to
see their interests favoured over those of the 'middle classes' but
they are unlikely, in general terms, to see this conflict as a
struggle to displace a ruling class.
I have taken these surveys from the '60s as a starting point, but to
progress any further one must consider the 'class'/politics
relationship in Britain in a broader historical context. Butler and
Stokes have argued that the pattern of party support is a resultant of
three distinct processes: the physical replacement of the electorate
through birth, coming of age and death; the formation of enduring
party alignments on the basis of religion, class or long-term issues;
and response to immediate events and issues. The relations between
these factors may be of considerable complexity. On the basis of this
schema it can be argued that the high-water mark of class/party
correlation in the 1960s, registered above, was not so much related to
the current policies of the political parties, as to the 'delayed'
effect of the social conditions of the interwar years and the
substantial shifts within popular ideology and political alignment
around the end of the second world war.
Only with the cohorts which entered the British electorate from 1945
onwards do we find a "group of electors whose partisan attachments
were less strongly affected by an earlier electoral history and by
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Labour's late start as a national party" (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p.
185) . From 1945 until the 1960s the replacement of the electorate
strengthened the 'working class' support for the Labour Party, but at
the same time the current basis for such an alignment was weakening:
"The newer cohorts entered a politics that was dominated by
the class alignment and divided their loyalties along class
lines more completely than did their elders, those who had
entered politics half a century before. But the new cohorts
felt much less keenly the social conditions from which the
class alignment arose in the first place. Moreover, the
social evolution of Britain, as well as certain political
factors, tended to weaken the class alignment in the
electorate as a whole and not only in the young" (ibid.,
p.193).
A fine illustration of Althusser's conception of 'differential
temporality', and the impossibility of reducing historical time to an
'essential section'! (Althusser and Balibar, 1970, Pt.II, Ch.4) . This
quotation points us towards an historical analysis of both the 'social
evolution of Britain' and the 'certain political factors' which have
weakened the 'class' alignment in British politics.
The intention here is not to construct a full history of the post war
period but it will be necessary to examine some of the main
developments in the class/collectivity/political force relationships
over the post war years, even at a cost of some over-simplification,
in order to establish a basis for the fuller discussion in the
following chapter of these relationships under the Thatcher
government. My scope here is necessarily limited, and I propose to
concentrate on the relationships between the political parties and the
social collectivities which have furnished their support blocs. I
shall not be able to discuss in as much detail as would be desirable
the role of the trade unions and other non-party political forces,
although I shall not ignore these forces. The remit which I set
myself here is to examine in outline the ways in which the political
parties have both responded to and helped to shape the pertinent
social collectivities in Britain over the post war years, and how the
activities of political forces have been constrained by, and have
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served to maintain or transform, the economic class relations of
British capitalism.
Class and politics since the war: an overview
I have already suggested that the decisive electoral victory for the
Labour Party in 1945 reflected a substantial shift of political and
ideological alignment in the later years of the second world war, a
radicalisation of which Calder (1969) gives an eloquent account. It
is clear that by 1945 there was widespread popular support for the
extension of state welfare provision, for a measure of nationalisation
of industry and 'planning' and for a governmental commitment to the
maintenance of full employment. Much of this 'consensus', at least
nominally, cut across party lines: Beveridge, who formalised the
project of 'welfare' expansion was a Liberal; the 1944 White Paper on
employment policy was produced under the war-time coalition; Butler's
educational reforms were also decided in 1944, but evidently many
people thought that the Labour Party was more likely to live up to the
promise of reform. Butler and Stokes argue that the main source of
new electoral strength for Labour in 1945 was the mobilisation of
manual workers who had grown up in homes without a long tradition of
participation in electoral politics. However, the reformism of this
period did not appeal only to manual workers, and among men of the
1945 cohort of votors middle class electors were in fact more likely
to be Labour than working class electors were to be Conservative.
I cannot enter into a detailed discussion of this Labour government,
its programme and its effects, but it should be noted that over the
years to 1951, as more and more of the Party's electoral pledges were
realised, there occurred what is ofen interpreted as a 'weakening of
commitment' of both party and people to 'socialism', and a progressive
exhaustion of the political impetus for social and economic change.
In 1946 the mines were nationalised with the vigorous support of the
miners after sixty years resistance by the coal-owners, and shortly
afterwards the petty bourgeoisie of the medical profession were
organised into a National Health Service. In terms of 'class
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struggle' this was perhaps the high point of the government's
achievements. It is particularly notable that neither in the mines
nor in the other industries nationalised at that time was there any
substantial movement towards 'workers' control'. 'Management'
remained in place, only now it was responsible to a
government-appointed Board of Directors and ultimately to Parliament,
rather than to shareholders' representatives. The Labour leadership
was sceptical about workers' control, indeed Cripps is reported as
having said "I think it would be almost impossible to have
worker-controlled industry in Britain even if it were on the whole
desirable" (Coates & Topham, 1975, p.60). But it would be quite wrong
to ascribe the failure to establish workers' control in the
nationalised industries to 'betrayal' on the part of the parliamentary
leadership. As Nina Fishman (1980) has pointed out, despite the
undoubted idealism and enthusiasm of committed trade unionists in
these industries there was considerable reluctance among NUM members
to go over to the National Coal Board, to run 'their' industry. There
was also a reluctance to attempt the transformation of the unions
which would have been required to turn them into instruments of
workers' control, since this would clearly have introduced an element
of responsibility which was foreign to the previous practice of trade
unionism, and would have meant taking on board the awkward problem of
reconciling, within a reconstructed union framework, the interests of
workers in the given nationalised industry and the interests of
working people as a whole, as regards the running of that industry.
Some miners wanted to take up this challenge, but there was not
sufficient determined popular support to make the break with a more
conventional trade union practice.
At the 'macroeconomic' level, the fiscal and monetary management of
aggregate demand gradually displaced physical planning as the favoured
mechanism for control over the economy (this shift is charted quite
precisely by Budd, 1978). Again, this did not so much represent a
'betrayal of socialist ideals' as a response to the evident absence of
any developed thinking on the part of socialists as to how 'planning'
should be conducted in a peace time economy, without the overriding
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and generally agreed common objective of victory in war as the guiding
principle and without the continuation of 'dictatorial' direction of
labour.
Meanwhile the Conservative Party was regrouping its forces after the
defeat of 1945, building up better-organised and larger constituency
parties and reorganising its ideology. In 1947 the party's
'Industrial Charter', a result of the work undertaken by the
Conservative Research Department under Butler, registered the Tories'
acceptance of the 'welfare state' and the 'managed economy'. In the
1950 election the Tories' share of the vote recovered significantly,
with Labour losing support among the middle classes of the southern
suburbs in particular, although the Labour Party could still rely on
enthusiastic working class support (the turnout at the 1950 election
was the highest ever). Between 1950 and 51, however, the 'political
exhaustion' of Labour became more apparent. The nationalisation of
iron and steel-making was one of the few 'socialist' measures
remaining on the party's agenda. Further, the acceptance of the need
for rearmament connected with the Korean war on the part of the
parliamentary leadership led to a damaging split within the party,
with Bevan and Wilson resigning over Gaitskell's budgetary measures
designed to pay for the arms. Finally the sterling crisis resulting
from the surge in imports induced by the rearmament programme provided
the occasion for the expiry of the administration. In the 1951
election campaign, Labour was on the defensive, trying to arouse fears
of Tory warmongering and mass unemployment, while the Tories promised
more housing and less taxation. In the event Labour received
marginally more votes than the Tories, in an election in which the two
parties took a larger share of the total votes than ever before, but
because of the peculiarities of the geography of electoral support in
relation to constituency boundaries it was the Tories who gained the
majority of seats in parliament and formed the next government -
Labour support tended to be concentrated in already safe seats while
the Tories swung many of the marginals.
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It would seem that by this stage there was little 'class content', in
Marxist terms, to the rivalry of the main political parties. Clearly
the majority of working class voters saw the Labour Party as 'their'
party and wished to see it remain in government, while the majority of
middle class voters supported the Tories, but in neither case did the
party or the 'class' have a radical and distinctive programme for the
transformation of social relations in Britain. The Tories had broadly
accepted 'Attlee's consensus', although Churchill was already critical
of 'socialist bureaucracy' and 'loss-making nationalised industries'
and his party promised a further relaxation of wartime controls on
workers, consumers and private capital; the Labour leadership had
basically achieved what they had set out to achieve in the initial
round of nationalisation and formation of the National Health Service
and had no new radical project to present to their working class
supporters, while the broader 'labour movement' in the country was not
unified around any radical demands for further government action. If
there was still a profound cultural divide between the parties,
related to the social collectivities which furnished their support,
there was little corresponding clash of definite 'class projects' for
social development.
Tory government 1951-64
Once established as the party of government in 1951, the Tories
benefitted greatly from the subsequent rapid development of capital
accumulation and rise in living standards in Britain. From 1951 to
1955 manufacturing output rose 14 per cent, car production 87 per cent
and steel production 21.5 per cent. Apart from in 1952 employment
grew continuously and unemployment rarely rose above 300,000. Real
9
personal disposable income rose 15 per cent over the period. The
marked improvement in the terms of trade for Britain over the early
'50s permitted a rise in real wages despite a decline in Britain's
exports, while a substantial inflow of American direct
9 Data from Economic Trends, Annual Supplement, 1980 edition (CSO).
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private investment helped to boost capital accumulation. In the
chemicals and electrical engineering industries multi-divisional
enterprises such as ICI and Associated Electrical Industries carried
out large investment programmes - the chemicals industry stimulated by
the removal of German competition during and shortly after the war
combined with a world shortage of chemicals, and electrical
engineering stimulated by the rapid growth of electricity generation
under Citrine (Shonfield, 1958). The industrial expansion of the
period was reflected in the sectoral division of labour, which showed
an increase in the proportion of the workforce in 'secondary'
(industrial) employment from 39.7 per cent in 1948 to 41.6 per cent in
1951 and 42.2 per cent in 1956 (Gershuny, 1978).
The fears raised by Labour in the 1951 election campaign therefore
remained unrealised, and the Tories were able to approach the 1955
election, following Churchill's replacement by Eden as prime minister,
with considerable confidence. The Labour Party was deeply divided -
principally over foreign policy and rearmament, issues on which the
Bevanite left was fighting a losing battle against the alignment of
Britain with US imperialism, without mass popular support - and was
unable to present its supporters with a convincing programme. The
manifesto, 'Forward with Labour', left the direction of putative
advance vague in the extreme. The result of the 1955 election,
therefore, seemed a foregone conclusion and this was reflected in a
substantially reduced poll in which the Tories increased their
parliamentary majority. Following this election victory, however,
Tory fortunes were more mixed: Butler's electioneering budget, with
substantial tax-cuts, rebounded as imports rose sharply and the
exchange rate of the pound came under pressure, forcing the
introduction of 'stop' measures; Eden's popularity waned rapidly even
before the ignominy of attempted intervention at Suez in 1956, which
then shook the 'Great British' imperial ideology that provided a pole
of attraction to Toryism for sections of all classes in society. In
1957 Macmillan inherited the leadership of an unpopular government,
lagging behind Labour in the opinion polls, but the policies pursued
10 The British share of this investment in Europe as a whole
rose from around 25% in 1943 to around half in 1950 (Overbeeli, 1980) .
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over the years to 1959 managed eventually to retrieve the party's
position: Macmillan's nuclear 'defence' policy seemed at the time a
plausible way to reclaim the status of a world power on the cheap;
the formation of EFTA was negotiated; Macmillan sacked the
deflationary Chancellor Thorneycroft and substituted Heathcoat-Amory
who instituted another convenient bout of pre-election tax cutting.
Prior to the 1959 election the Tories carried out a highly expensive
campaign, by previous standards, backed up by a business campaign
against Labour nationalisation plans. Labour, vilified as likely to
spoil the Tory prosperity, remained a weak and uninspiring political
force. Despite the disarming of the Bevanite left with Bevan's shift
of position on nuclear weapons, unity was not forthcoming under
Gaitskell's leadership. The left called for more nationalisation;
the 'traditional' right wing of the party argued that this 'needed
more research' and conveniently forgot about it, while the new
'revisionist' current represented by Healey, Jenkins and Crosland saw
public ownership as irrelevant and raised 'equality' as the prime goal
of socialism - a position formalised in Crosland's 'Future of
Socialism' in 1956. The document 'Industry and Society' adopted by
the 1957 party conference reflected a compromise with this
'revisionist' tendency. The continuing failure of Labour to present a
distinctive alternative to the Tories was indicated strikingly in the
opinion poll finding that 40 per cent of electors believed it made no
difference which party was in power. Lacking more substantive
arguments for voting Labour, Gaitskell promised an extravagant
'electioneering'-type budget if returned to office, a ploy which the
Tory leaders were able to ridicule despite the fact that they had
started that particular game. So in the 1959 election Labour support
ebbed further and the Tories' parliamentary majority was again
increased.
This run of Tory election victories over the 1950s prompted the
speculation at the time that the Tories had managed to establish
themselves as the 'natural party of government'. It was suggested
that increasing 'affluence' and the growth of the 'middle class' meant
the decomposition of the social base of the Labour Party (e.g. Abrams
and Rose, 1960). The right wing of the party took this to heart:
Gaitskell talked of the need to^g^ed Labour's 'cloth cap' image and
attempted to ditch the famous clause four of the party constitution,
the charter for nationalisation, as an electoral liability. The
latter gambit failed, since many in the party who were sceptical of
the benefits of further nationalisation saw the removal of clause four
as an unnecessarily provocative step, 'removing Genesis from the
bible' as Harold Wilson put it. Besides, the Gaitskellite strategy
for Labour was more deeply problematic: if the implicit criterion for
political acceptability was resemblance to the Tories, what was there
to convince voters that Labour was preferable, and what was there to
motivate the party activitists to build support? The standard left
response to the kind of argument put by Gaitskell was that the party
should be 'more socialist' and would thereby gain more working class
support, but it is not clear that the left opposition within the party
had a political project which could have commanded mass popular
support among the working class in the 1950s. The foreign policy
issues on which the left fought were of great importance to the
activists but probably of relatively little salience to the mass of
the working class, while nationalisation had faded in popularity,
quite understandable given the failure to develop a popular democratic
alternative to conventional managerial practice in the nationalised
industries, and to develop a coherent set of criteria for allocating
resources with which to counter the charge that they were 'inefficient
loss-makers' . The propaganda onslaught by the Tories and private
business interests must have helped to discredit nationalisation, but
this cannot be the whole explanation. Evan Bevan reckoned that if the
Labour Party were to campaign on a programme fully reflecting the
aspirations of the rank and file party activists 'we could say goodbye
to any Labour government being elected again in Britain'.11"
Fortunately for the Labour Party, the position of the Tories as the
party of government was less secure that it appeared to be in the late
'50s. First of all, it is useful to make a distinction between the
party's parliamentary majority and its share of the popular vote.
11 The context was a criticism of those pressing for unilateral
disarmament in 1957 (quoted in Foot, 1973).
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We have already noted that the Tories received less votes than Labour
in 1951: although they increased their share of the vote in 1955,
this share was actually falling by 1959. The party's greatly
increased parliamentary majority in '59 masked a decline in popular
electoral support as the Liberal Party enjoyed the beginnings of an
electoral revival. In fact over the 1950s the Tories never won as
much as half of the popular vote, and were never more than a few
percentage points ahead of Labour - percentage points which are
nonetheless crucial within the British electoral system.
It is clear that the Tories enjoyed fairly splid electoral support
from the 'middle classes', but given the relative numerical strength
of the 'classes' in Britain, this was never enough to win an election
and a substantial minority of the working class provided around half
of the Tory vote. As Butler and Stokes pointed out, the replacement
of the electorate was working against this kind of 'cross-voting' as
more cohorts from 'working class'/Labour homes entered the electorate,
but evidently the Tories managed to counter this trend. This
maintenance of a working class Tory vote sufficient to return the
party to office can be thought of as having two components: first the
reproduction of relatively stable social collectivities having a
principle of identification outside the conception of 'class' which
prompted most 'working class' people to vote Labour, and second a more
conjunctural conversion of voters. In the first category one can
group, for instance, the traditional Toryism of the working class in
mid-Lancashire, in an area of high home ownership; the traditional
anti-Irish protestant Tory vote in the cities of Liverpool, Manchester
and Glasgow, where the Labour party had become identified with
Catholicism; and the weakly-unionised workforce of the West Midlands
engaged in small and relatively paternalistic businesses. Certain of
the policies pursued by the Tories during the '50s served to
strengthen such stable 'non-class' social collectivities.
Particularly important here was the shift in housing policy from
Bevan's overriding emphasis on council housing to Macmillan's stress
on 'private enterprise' and owner-occupation, fostered by the
extension of local authority mortgates. There is strong evidence from
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Butler and Stokes' surveys that housing tenure overdetermines party
support, in relation to 'occupational class': in council housing only
51 per cent of those in occupational classes I-IV with a partisan
self-image were found to be Tories, as against 76 per cent in
owner-occupied housing. Conversely, in owner-occupied housing 42 per
cent of those in classes V and VI had a Tory self-image as against 28
per cent in council housing (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p. 109) . This
correlation is not of course self-explanatory but three plausible
connections can be identified: the differential formation of 'class
self-image' in the presence or absence of property-owning; the
rational calculation of self-interest on the part of the occupants of
the different forms of housing, with regard to the tax and rent
policies likely to be pursued by the parties; and the flow of
political information within the cultural milieu of the residential
area. At the same time as the evolution of housing tenure was
strengthening one base of working class Tory support, however, certain
other bases were being eroded, for instance paternalistic relations
with industrial enterprises were in many cases being undermined by the
growth of industrial concentration and rise of large multi-divisional
enterprises, and the development of trade unionism within these.
To move to the more 'conjunctural' factors in working class support
for the Tories: it is not plausible, in retrospect, to ascribe all
the votes necessary to the preservation of Tory government over the
'50s to stable and definite 'Tory' social collectivities. In
adddition, the Tories must have recruited crucial marginal support on
two major grounds which affected the mass of the electorate: the
continuing ideology of Britain's imperial greatness and the rapid
increase in national prosperity. And as the 1950s ended time was
running out on both of these scores, as became increasingly evident
during the later years of Macmillan's premiership. As regards
'imperial greatness' or 'world power status', the Tories made a brave
job of trying to patch this up after Suez but in the early '60s Labour
leaders were able to ridicule the so-called 'independent British
deterrent' which had run into the now familiar conflict between
resources available and military pretensions; the attempted
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re-orientation of British trade towards Europe was ignominiously
thwarted by the rejection of Macmillan's application for EEC
membership; the process of 'decolonisation' was becoming increasingly
uncontrollable and chaotic as many British-established federations of
post-colonial states fell apart. As regards national prosperity, the
'stop-go' cycle of populist tax-cutting budgets followed by balance of
payments crises and deflationary measures to protect the exchange rate
was becoming increasingly vicious. Heathcoat-Amory's election budget
was followed in 1960 by the 'stop' measures of credit restriction and
high interest rates. Selwyn-Lloyd, installed as chancellor in '61,
continued the deflation but this time added a 'pay pause' designed to
counter wage inflation. This pay policy, for which there had been no
attempt to establish wide political support, bore particularly hard on
certain groups of relatively weakly-organised workers such as nurses,
teachers and hospital workers whose case commanded considerable public
sympathy, and when the delationary measures had checked the run on the
pound trade union antagonism to the government remained. The unions
refused to cooperate in Selwyn Lloyd's National Income Commission, and
the chancellor continued to pursue deflation in 1962. The emerging
competitive weakness of the economy was demonstrated by the fact that
while the deflationary measures pushed employment up sharply over the
winter of 1962-63, the balance of payments remained in deficit. With
the replacement of Selwyn Lloyd by Maudling Tory economic policy
changed back to 'go' again, this time with the spurious
rationalisation that fiscal expansion would of itself produce a
virtuous circle of increased growth of GDP, increased productivity,
increased exports and a further increase in growth. The game was up
when the resulting record deficit on the balance of payments current
account was registered, and well publicised by Labour, before the 1964
election. It became possible to argue that although the GDP had
undoubtedly continued to grow under the Tories, and more rapidly than
in Britain's past, the jerky 'stop-go' process was helping to weaken
the relative position of the British economy on the world market, a
position which had become exposed with the dismantling of the imperial
trade preferences and the progressive liberalisation of world trade
after Bretton Woods. Further, the 'excessive' commitment to military
expenditure (by the standard of other capitalist national economies)
was diverting resources away from much-needed industrial investment.
Labour in the 1960s
With the ground shifting beneath both 'imperial greatness' and
unproblematic prosperity the Tories' electoral bloc showed increasing
signs of weakness. It became evident that the Tory success of the
'50s had owed more to the 'conjuncture' of that decade and less to an
irreversible shift in class/political alignment than had been thought
earlier by political commentators such as Abrams. It was not obvious,
however, that Labour would be the main beneficiary of this change. It
was the Liberals, under Grimond's leadership, who picked up many of
the disaffected Tories in the by-elections of 1962 and '63 - a party
with a less strong 'class' identification than the Tories or Labour.
But over 1963 and '64 the Labour Party made a come-back as a
distinctive and relatively unified political force. Wilson succeeded
Gaitskell as leader and proved himself a much more astute politician,
able to make considerable capital out of the scandals of Macmillan's
last years (the Profumo affair, Rachmanism). Also a rather
'contingent' factor gave Labour an important political windfall: with
Macmillan ill a new leader had to be selected for the Tory party and
Macmillan reckoned that the two most popular candidates, Butler and
Hailsham (one or other of whom would have won if there had been an
electoral mechanism for leadership at the time) both had too many
enemies within the party. He therefore selected a 'safer bet',
Douglas-Home, the archetypal Tory aristocrat. This both demoralised
the Tory 'progressives' such as Powell and McLeod (who denounced this
selection as a victory for the 'magic circle' of Tory politics) and
gave Wilson a golden opportunity to campaign against the Tories as an
anachronistic party out of tune with the 'realities of modern
Britain'. This was somewhat ironic since within the Tory party as a
whole the early '60s saw a marked decline in the proportion of
Eton-educated aristocratic MPs and a rise in the proportion of the
'professional middle classes' and career politicians, but with the
fourteenth Earl of Home as figurehead, Wilson's charge seemed
plausible.
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The obverse of Wilson's attack on the 'grouse-moor' Tories was his
promotion of the Labour Party as 'modern' and 'scientific', as poised
to release the 'technological revolution'. This gambit, drawing on
the rapid growth of the science-based industries such as electronics,
chemicals and nuclear power over the previous years, proved a
successful means of unifying the party. As Sked and Cook ( 1979 ,
p.215) put it,
"Wilson had provided the Labour Party with exactly the right
means to revive itself. For science not only offered the
movement an image of modernity which it had recently lacked;
it also provided a vocabulary with which Labour's
traditional divisions could be obscured".
The rising 'middle class technocratic' element in the party could
believe this to mean that Labour would support modern managerial
private industry while the left could imagine it meant the
nationalisation of profitable growth industries in the name of
12
state-sponsored technological advance. Along with 'science',
'planning' was an important catchword in building a support bloc for
Labour. Again, this had some appeal both to the industrial managers
of the Federation of British Industry, who had called for 'planning'
at their 1960 conference as a way out of the damaging 'stop-go' cycle
(Jessop, 1980), and to the party activists for whom 'planning' meant
increased government control over industrial enterprises. The kind of
planning which the FBI had in mind - 'indicative planning' involving
the gathering and exchange of information on the development of the
economy and the improvement of coordination, rather than the
formulation and compulsory implementation of a central plan - had
already been attempted under the Tories with the formation of the
National Economic Development Council (NEDC) in 1962 but had
effectively remained subordinated to conventional stop-go demand
management practice: Labour promised a form of planning which would
be 'purposeful' and 'effective', which would 'have teeth in it
somewhere' (Budd, 1978, Chapter 6) .
12 It is interesting to note that both the 'Economist' and the 'New
Left Review' supported Wilson in 1964.
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If the ambivalent Wilsonian 'science' and 'planning' programme was
useful in obscuring divisions within the Labour Party and among its
supporters, it could not provide a basis for a determined and
purposeful popular political movement. In fact, even in electoral
terms there was only a modest revival of Labour support from 1959 to
1964 (from 43.8 per cent to 44.1 per cent of the vote). Labour's
rather narrow parliamentary majority in 1964 was chiefly an effect of
a slump in Tory support and continuing electoral revival of the
Liberals (who received over 10 per cent of the vote for the first time
since the war). Once installed in government, however, the Labour
Party embarked upon an energetic legislative programme including the
establishment of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) under George
Brown with the remit of formulating a national plan, and the Ministry
of Technology under Cousins, a leading light of the leftward movement
in the trade unions since the '50s; the repeal of the 1957 Rent Act
attacked by Labour as a 'landlord's charter' and associated with
'Rachmanism'; the development of comprehensive education; the
development of regional policy in an attempt to alleviate the
relatively high unemployment and slow growth of the depressed areas of
the UK dependent on declining industries; the 1965 Trade Disputes
Act, which gave union leaders full legal protection from actions over
breach of employment contract; and the Redundancy Payments Act. This
activity was evidently quite widely popular. Despite the use of
fiscal deflation in the attempt to maintain the exchange rate of the
pound, and the difficulties experienced by the new National Board for
Prices and Incomes in controlling inflation, Labour's electoral
support had increased markedly by 1966. A main theme of the Labour
campaign was 'planning' (The 'National Plan' had been published in
late 1965) , along with an expansion of the state educational and
medical services. Also, interestingly, Labour was trying to claim for
itself the new prospective owner-occupiers with a promise of low
interest mortgages for low income earners. As for the Tories, Heath
had replaced Douglas-Home as leader in the party's first leadership
election in '65, and was campaigning on the basis of EEC entry, Trade
Union reform and reduction in direct taxation. Heath, 'the grocer',
showed the Tories in a truer light than Home had done, as an
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increasingly 'middle class' party. Possibly because of this the party
forfeited some of its patrician appeal to its traditional supporters.
At any rate, the party's share of the vote continued its slide, giving
Labour a large parliamentary majority.
Despite this electoral success for Labour, the years following the
1966 election showed up starkly the inability of this government to
hold together a determined support bloc which could accomplish
substantial social and economic changes. Cracks appeared in the
'planning' and social expenditure programmes, and in the relations
between the parliamentary Labour Party, the trade unions, and the
party activists.
The 'National Plan' was first to go. This exercise had never had much
susbtance: the government had carried out an 'Industrial Inquiry' by
questionnaire and had collated the results concerning investment
trends, production, manpower requirements, expected exports and
imports and so on, then used this as a basis for formulating some
ambitious forecasts of growth to 1970. Given that previous periods of
rapid growth had been brought to a halt in the face of escalating
deficits on the balance of payments, largely because of the high
marginal propensity to import manufactured goods, the improvement of
the balance of payments figured prominently in the plan. But the
plan's 'Check List of Action Required' in this regard (HMSO, 1965,
p. 17) was hardly adequate to produce a rapid improvement, and in many
cases the 'action' was deferred "studies will be made, industry by
industry of ways of increasing exports"; "Plans will be made,
industry by industry, to save imports" (ibid.). This could mean a
lot, or very little, depending on the urgency of the 'planning' and
the effectiveness of the control mechanisms in the hands of the
government. In practice, the central feature of 'indicative planning'
was that government had no effective control mechanisms over private
capitalist enterprises. As Jessop argues:
"...The indicative voluntary nature of planning in this
period expresses a fundamental problem at the heart of state
intervention in Britain. For, whereas organised Labour has
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considerable 'veto' power at the point of production and
monopoly capital has considerable scope for international
mobility, the 'social partners' of government in the
management of the economy are weak, decentralised, and
fragmented" (Jessop, 1980, p.41).
The TUC is a relatively loose confederation of craft, general and
industrial unions; there was no single peak organisation representing
the management of industrial enterprises until the formation of the
CBI, sponsored by the Labour Party, in 1965. This means that even if
the government, the TUC and CBI were able to agree on a particular
course of development of the national economy "the state and the
social partners alike are unable to enforce compliance with such a
plan at the micro-level" (ibid.) .
If the DEA was unable to organise rapid growth in conjunction with a
stable balance of payments, then one of the objectives had to give,
and in 1966 it was the growth target which was abandoned. Leruez
represents this as a misguided political choice: "Yet again, as under
the Conservatives but in even more striking fashion, the defence of
the pound was put above expansion" (Leruez, 1975, p. 179). The
assumption here is that if the pound had been devalued early on this
would have made it possible to adhere to the growth path of the plan,
but in the light of the comments made above this view is open to
doubt: it gave the plan more credibility than it merited. Further,
if the pound had been devalued in 1964 or 1966, it is likely that the
trade unions would have resisted the cut in real wages which
devaluation implies, as they did after 1967. Both the 1965 'plan' and
devaluation can be seen as technocratic measures, equally inadequate
to abolish the competitive weakness of the UK economy - a weakness
which is inscribed in its industrial structure, and the slow growth of
productivity which is linked to the development of social relations
within enterprises as well as the shortfall of investment.
In the absence of both the 'political will' and the social forces
which would have been required to go beyond the merely 'indicative'
and technocratic attempt to alleviate the balance of payments
constraints, the Wilson government used the only effective levers at
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its disposal to maintain the external balance: the old standby of
fiscal deflation; incomes policy, to hold down both labour costs of
British firms and consumer spending on imports; and then eventually
devaluation of the currency which, although it did not abolish the
trade constraint, at least temporarily pre-empted speculative pressure
on the pound and brought a period of increased price competitiveness.
None of these measures, of course, were popular with Labour's
political constituency. Deflation put a brake on the much-heralded
planned growth; the application of wage restraint lost the government
the support of the union leaders such as Cousins, Scanlon and Jones as
well as many union members; devaluation, as Callaghan pointed out in
orotund fashion prior to his resignation as Chancellor, involved 'a
reduction in the wage levels and the real wage standards of every
member of the working class of this country'. By 1968, the TUC and
the Labour conference overwhelmingly opposed the government's wages
policy and, ironically for the government, this policy was helping to
provoke strikes which were damaging the balance of payments.
The damage to internal party, and party/union, relations was carried a
stage further with the abortive 'In Place of Strife' proposals of
1968/9. These were Wilson and Castle's response to the 'unoffical
strike problem' which had been building up over the '60s but had
acquired particular prominence in 1968 with the publication of the
Donovan Commission's report. This 'problem' reflected the increased
power of the shop stewards movement in a macroeconomic context of
sustained relatively full employment and an industrial context of
increased concentration of labour in the mass production of
13
standardised commodities , and was probably exacerbated by the
restriction of real wages over the late '60s: it was by no means
unique to Britain. Donovan had taken a fairly low-key approach,
refusing to accept the view (promulgated by the CBI) that legal
restrictions on unofficial strikes would achieve the desired
13 The conditions of existence of the 'strike problem' in the car
industry are graphically describe by Beynon ( 1975) .
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industrial peace, but Wilson and Barbara Castle convinced themselves
that penal sanctions were necessary and justified, and in accordance
with public opinion. Wilson had borne a personal grudge against
'politically motivated' militants ever since the seamens' strike of
1966 had spoiled his incomes policy and the attempted revival of the
balance of payments upon which he had staked so much of his
credibility. For Castle and others, unregulated shop-floor militancy
marred the rational, state-controlled Fabian landscape. But whether
or not 'In Place of Strife' accorded with majority public opinion, it
was certainly not in accordance with Labour Party and union opinion,
and although that in itself has not always blocked the parliamentary
leadership this time it became obvious that sufficient Labour MPs
would reject the proposals to make it impossible to establish them as
law. Wilson and Castle had to back down, but not before the
credibility of the leadership had been further dented.
The struggles over incomes policy and trade union legislation were
part of a more general worsening of relations between the Labour
Party, organised labour and the 'intellectual left' over this period.
As regards Labour's traditional connection with the industrial working
class, this was being called into question by the changing social
composition of both the parliamentary party and the constituency
organisations. In 1945, 50 per cent of Labour MPs and half of the
cabinet had come from a 'working class' occupational background, but
by 1970 the proportion had fallen to 25 per cent of MPs and one out of
twenty three in the cabinet. (Butler and Stokes, 1974). This shift
went well beyond the general decline of the traditional working class
in the electorate (discussed below) and reflected the increasing
selection of 'more educated candidates' with 'administrative
aptitudes' under the conditions of electoral competition, and within
the dominant technocratic conception of politics, which had held sway
since the rise of 'Butskellism' in the mid '50s.
At constituency level as well, relations between the party and its
traditional constituency were breaking down. Hindess (1971) analysed
this in detail for the case of Liverpool, and although the detailed
studies of other areas which might support a definite generalisation
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were not carried out, it seems plausible that a parallel evolution was
taking place in other city Labour Parties. The core of Hindess's
argument concerns the differential orientation to politics according
to the definite zones of living conditions within the city. Within
the 'middle class' zones of owner-occupation of housing, politically
active people tended to see politics as an arena for establishing the
broad outlines of policy: the 'details' of execution of policy could
be left to suitably qualified experts and were not really the business
of politics. On this view, politics provides the background or
environment within which individuals pursue their own 'chosen'
careers, living in their own 'chosen' houses. The material conditions
of life support a marked separation of the personal and the political.
Within the 'working class' zones such as council estates, by contrast,
this separation of the personal and the political is less tenable. If
people have very little choice in matters of housing then the details
of planning and the execution of policy become very important, and are
not just to be left to the 'experts'. The government is experienced
not merely as providing background amenities against which individuals
pursue their choices, but as an external constraining and coercive
organisation. There is an unavoidable personal involvement in the
consequences of political decisions and therefore the details of
policy execution are, or ought to be, 'political matters'. With the
decline of private rented accommodation and growth of public housing
programmes these orientations, and the political demands connected
with them, became progressively more differentiated, and this
differentiation was reproduced within the Labour Party. 'Middle
class', owner-occupier, Labour activists pursuing a more 'humane' and
'equal' society by means of general legislative change confronted
'working class' council tenants deeply concerned with the 'parochial'
and 'trivial' issues arising from their everyday interactions with
state apparatuses. And in this confrontation, the evolution of the
parliamentary party strengthened the hand of the former:
" in general, the pressures on the Labour Party from
the institutional environment towards the increasing
bureaucratisation and centralisation of decision-making, the
employment of and dependence on, specialists and the
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emphasis on professional administration, have been entirely
consistent with the basic orientation of party activists in
the middle class areas" (Hindess, 1971, p.140).
This process analysed by Hindess runs deeper than disagreement over
policy. The 'middle class' activists did not necessarily support all
the actual policies of the national party, but what they did support
was the form of policy making, and the right of the leadership to make
policy. If this analysis is correct, then although many 'working
class' people continued to think of the Labour Party as 'their' party
in some vague sense, it was actually losing contact with their
day-to-day political concerns and subsequently losing active working
class support at a local level.
As regards left intellectual radicalism, the party was also losing its
attraction, especially for the young. The Wilson government had
supported the expansion of the universities following the Robbins
Report, but the radicalism which the universities harboured in the
late '60s was not generally translated into active support for Labour.
Hardly surprising, since one of the main components of that radicalism
was opposition to US imperialism and the Vietnam war in particular,
and although nominally defeated at the party conference in 1967,
Wilson's pro-US stand defined the party's position in the eyes of many
young radicals. Also, of course, the ferment in the universities was
in part a revolt against the technocratic role which they had been
assigned in the Wilsonian scheme of things.
However, despite the forfeiture of much active and committed support
among the industrial working class and the intellectual left, the
electoral support for the Labour Party had not collapsed by 1970.
Part of the explanation must be that many of those who were deeply
disappointed by the government's record and lack of 'Socialism' still
regarded the party as the lesser of two evils. But apart from this,
two other points have to be considered. First, the banal but
important point that things were not that bad over the '60s for the
mass of the electorate, so that those Labour voters who had neither
expected not desired revolutionary socialism had no real reason to
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feel betrayed. Despite the successive sterling crises, deflationary
fiscal packages and wage restraint, real personal disposable income
per head had risen by around 12 per cent from 1964 to 1970. By the
end of the period, paid holidays were longer, life expectancy had
increased, accidents at work were reduced and the public services had
been expanded (although as Townsend points out the benefits of this
expansion went disproportionately to the 'middle class').
Second - and this requires discusion at more length - the social
composition of the electorate had been changing in ways which were
beginning to reduce the electoral weight of the 'traditional'
industrial proletariat.
The division of labour and social collectivities:
changes in progress over the 1960s
One can get a first indication of these changes from the statistics on
the division of labour between sectors of the economy. Table 5.4
shows that there appears to be a turning point around 1960: before
then manufacturing employment, and the broader 'industrial'
employment, had been growing faster than overall employment, whereas
over the period 1960-64 (which, taken as a whole, shows a rapid growth
of overall employment) the 'manufacturing' and 'industrial' sectors
showed only a marginal growth of employment, therefore accounting for
a declining share of the total. Of course, neither the 'industrial'
nor the 'non-industrial' sectors were homogeneous in this respect.
From 1954 to 1960 the net expansion of industrial employment was the
resultant of rapid growth in sectors such as chemicals, mechanical and
electrical engineering, vehicles, paper, printing and publishing, and
metal manufacture, set against decline in shipbuilding, textiles,
clothing and footwear, and mining and quarrying. From 1960 onwards
the relative decline reflected a slower growth of employment in the
'growth industries' and an accelerating decline of the 'traditional'
industries. Equally, the relative expansion of the non-industrial
sector was uneven, with a net decline in transport and communications,
with growth in the distributive trades tapering off from 1960, and
with both 'Insurance, banking and finance' and 'Professional and
scientific services' showing an accelerating growth of employment over
the period.
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Table 5.4 Employment Trends 1954-1964






































































Source: adapted from National Plan, 1965, pp. 27-32.
Components may not add to totals because of rounding.
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Following the trends further, we find that over the decade 1961-71
manufacturing employment began to decline absolutely (employment in
1971 was 95 per cent of the 1961 level), while the faster-growing
non-industrial sectors accounted for a substantially increasing
proportion of the workforce. The composition of this 'tertiary
sector' expansion is shown below in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5
Change in employment in the ' Tertiary Sector'
1961-71
1971 as % of 1961 % of G.B. Workforce
employment 1961 1971
Distribution 95 13.9 12.9
Financial 166 2.5 4.1
Professional & Scientific 137 9.2 12.4
Miscellaneous Services 97 9.9 9.6
Public Administration 146 4.9 6.3
All Tertiary 114 40.4 45.8
Source: Gershuny ( 1978, p.96) .
Again, the pattern is uneven. The workforce in distribution began to
decline with increased concentration in retailing, rationalisation and
the development of larger stores. The financial sector showed
particularly rapid growth, connected 'with the growth of financial
transactions implied by the vast expansion of saving and borrowing
(analysed in Chapter 4). The 'professional and scientific' category
also grew rapidly, reflecting the expansion of both professional
services for business and the development of education and the N.H.S.
in the state sector. The 'miscellaneous services' sector declined in
importance, reflecting a switch in popular expenditure patterns - away
from cinemas and theatres and towards television; away from domestic
help and laundries and towards domestic appliances; away from
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transport services and towards the use of private cars.
Finally, the workforce in public administration showed a marked rise,
connected with the expansion of public expenditure programmes and the
development of state apparatuses concerned with industrial
consultation and intervention.
As regards the decline in employment in manufacturing, mathematically
speaking this is equal to the growth rate of labour productivity in
manufacturing minus the growth rate of output from that sector. The
decline can therefore by thought of as, broadly, the result of the
pursuit of higher productivity (in face of declining profit rates and
the weakening competitive position of British industry on the world
market) in a context of constraint on the growth of output. The
balance of payments provided such a constraint, of increasing
tightness over the 1960s.^ More specifically though, the sharpest
decline in employment in manufacturing within this period came in the
later 1960s, with the 'shake-out' associated with the merger boom and
the accompanying 'rationalisation' of enterprises' activities, a
process which was in part stimulated by fiscal deflation and in part
actively sponsored by quasi-state agencies such as the Labour
government's Industrial Reorganisation Corporation.
The discussion above relates to the relative expansion of various
forms of non-industrial employment (division of labour by sectors).
There is, however, another aspect to the changing composition of the
workforce over the 1960s: a shift in what I referred to earlier as
the 'division of labour by strata'. Table 5.6 and 5.7 overleaf give
two views of this shift, considering different time periods and
14 Gershuny ( 1978) has described this as a trend towards the
'self-service economy': the increasing displacement of personal
services by the use of consumer durable goods, which results in
part from the relative cheapening of the latter as labour
productivity in industry moves steadily ahead of the 'service'
sector (particularly in the 'face to face' personal services,
productivity is intrinsically limited).
15 For a detailed account of this constraint see Thirlwall ( 1978 and
1980) . This point will also be taken up again in the following
chapter.
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employing different classifications. Table 5.6 shows the growth rate
of certain major 'socio-economic groups' (the official nomenclature)
over the decade 1961-1971. Note that it is confined to males only,
but includes retired people as well as those economically active
(relevant to the composition of the electorate as a whole).
Table 5.6
Selected socio-economic groups of males




























Source: adapted from Social Trends No. 6 1975 (CSO) Table A. 1 p.30
The contrast between the rapid growth of the 'professional' and
'intermediate non-manual' groups (as well as the 'employers and
managers' category where the growth is slower but the starting point
higher) and the decline of not only the 'manual workers' group but
also the 'junior non-manual', suggests a substantial change in the
balance of these strata among the male population, and reinforce the
idea of a decline in the 'traditional' male working class.
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Table 5.7 has a different focus , dividing the employed workforce
according to form of payment as well as by strata (for the
salary-earners) and sector (for wage earners). It also give some
indication of the pattern of the sexual divison of labour as it was
developing in the late '60s.
Table 5.7
Wage and salary earning categories (as
percentage of those in employment), 1966 and 1971
1966 1971
Salary Earners 32.9 (53.2)* 36.7 (52.1)*
Managerial 6.4 (83.8) 7.5 (83.8)
Technical and Professional 9.8 (60.8) 11.6 (sq.q)
Clerical 16.7 (37.0) 17.7 (33.7)
Wage Earners 67.1 (68.0) 63.3 (67.1)
Industrial 47.3 (81.2) 43.7 (81.1)
Non-Industrial 17.5 (29.9) 17.7 (30.4)
Agricultural 2.3 (86.6) 1.9 (85.6)
* Figures in brackets refer to the percentage in each category who
are male.
Sources : Calculated from sample Census 1966, Economic Activity
Tables. Part III Table 34, and Census 1971, 10% sample Economic
Activity Tables, Part IV Table 34.
The importance of the salary/wage distinction goes beyond the mere
periodicity of payment, since broadly speaking it correlates with the
'staff1/'worker' demarcation, with salaried employees generally having
higher 'status', greater continuity of employment and greater access
to benefits such as pension rights. It is therefore interesting
16 Unfortunately it also has a different, and restricted, time
scale. This is because the only commensurable statistics in this
regard are from the sample Census of 1966 and the 10% sample of
the 1971 Census.
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to find such a marked increase in salaried employment even over this
five year period. As can be seen from the table, the fastest growth
of salaried employment was in the (male-dominated) managerial grades
and the technical and professional grades (which were rather more open
to women). Salaried clerical labour showed a small proportional
increase, along with a reduction in the proportion of male employees.
As would be expected from the previous discussion, the main decline in
wage-earning employment came in the (male-dominated) industrial
sector, while the non-industrial wage-earning category, which includes
a substantial majority of women, showed a slight increase.
The overall picture which emerges from the various statistics
considered is that of (a) a sectoral shift from industrial to
non-industrial employment, plus (b) a shift in the balance of the
'status' categories of employment, towards salaried employment in the
vaious managerial, technical and professional grades in particular.
Further, these shifts took place in the context of (c) a change in the
sexual division of labour as a higher proportion of women took up (at
least part-time) paid employment: both non-industrial waged
employment, and salaried clerical labour are sectors where a
substantial majority of employees are women.
If the combined effect of these rather complex changes in the
distribution of social labour between sectors and strata was to reduce
the size of the 'traditional' industrial working class, it was also to
render the 'traditional' British conception of the middle class more
problematic. As Raynor (1969) noted, the first use of the term
'middle class' in Britain was probably in the early years of the
nineteenth century (Raynor quotes the Oxford English Dictionary's date
of 1812), and it was during the nineteenth century that the 'middle
class' developed into an identifiable and vocal, if rather vaguely
defined, social collectivity. In the early period, the designation
'middle' marked out an intermediate place between the industrial
proletariat and servant classes on the one hand, and the landed and
financial aristocracy on the other - a place occupied not only by the
rising industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, but also by the
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traditional professions and the civil servants, clerks and school
teachers. Ever since then the term 'middle class' has continued in
widespread use, but its referent has undergone radical changes. At
the 'top end' the peculiarly British mutual accommodation and
interpenetration of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy has licensed an
extension of the term 'middle class' until there is only a vestigial
'upper class' against which to draw a contrast, while at the same time
there have been successive waves of new recruits which have enlarged
the base of the 'class': the new groups of professionals, managers
and technical experts which expanded from the latter half of the
nineteenth century onward with the development of capitalist industry
and trade; the more recent expansion of salaried employment in
education, research, health, social welfare, administration and
planning. As Raynor (1969, Chapter 2) argues, the 'middle class' was
never homogeneous (in particular it has never been equivalent to
Marx's 'bourgeoisie'), but nonetheless its degree of heterogeneity has
been greatly increased over the post war years, and the shift in the
distribution of social labour analysed above has accelerated this
process. The fissures between the employers (large and small), the
self-employed, and the rentiers, and between these categories and the
'salariat'of employed professional, managerial and technical
workers, have been added to by the fissure between the private sector
business salariat and the more newly expanding public sector salariat,
so that the notion of the 'middle class' has virtually reached
bursting point. The 'middle class' designation has retained some
validity for so long, covering such disparate socio-economic
categories, largely because of the remarkable tenacity of the amalgam
of cultural values which characterised the nineteenth century middle
classes: part bourgeois (thrift, independence) and part acquired from
the aristocracy and gentry (respectability, 'gentlemanly' behaviour).
But this ideological cement has began to crumble with the accelerating
influx of people from working class backgrounds into new
non-industrial and salarian positions, and the development of 'white
collar unionism'. It becomes less and less feasible to equate the
relative contraction of the industrial proletariat with the relative
expansion of the 'middle class' .
17 The term 'salariat' has been used by Kumar (1976) and Jenkins and
Sherman ( 1979) to refer to the salaried employees of both
capitalist enterprises and the state.
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There are two analytically distinct points at issue here: first, the
nature of the social positions which have been created by the
expansion of non-industrial employment and the relative expansion of
technical and administrative employment within industry, and second
the recruitment of agents to fill these positions. As regards the
first point, I have suggested that the 'tertiary sector' expansion has
increased the heterogeneity of non-manual/industrial positions within
the division of labour. Particularly important here is the expansion
of the public sector salariat connected with the 'welfare state'.
This category, in contrast with the business salariat, owes its
existence to the social democratic expansion of state services under
the sign of an ideology of state-sponsored social improvement, and is
therefore less likely to subscribe wholeheartedly to the traditional
middle class values of personal independence and responsibility, or to
go along so readily with the middle class complaints against 'wasteful
state spending' and 'excessive taxation'. Further, as Jenkins and
Sherman (1979) point out, the public sector has been a relatively
fruitful domain for 'white collar' union organisation since the early
years of the present century. Aside from the development of a public
sector salariat, however, there is also the point that many private
sector salarian posts have been 'routinised' in the search for
cost-effectiveness, eroding the previously valued autonomy of the
middle class occupations (Braverman's analysis of clerical labour,
Oppenheimer (1975) on professionals, Crompton (1979) on insurance
clerks) , and providing conditions under which union organisation could
18
be developed . This development has introduced a definite tension
between the (still widespread) 'middle class' aspirations of many
salaried and non-industrial employees, and the forms of collective
organisation and action which have been employed to defend their
economic position. As argued earlier, I do not consider it useful to
debate the significance of these phenomena in terms of an essential
theoretical designation of the new strata as either 'new working
class' or 'new petty bourgeoisie' (although I have argued that in
18 Nonetheless, Poulantzas (1975, Part III Ch.9) is quitq right to
point out that this transformation remains very uneven.
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terms of property relations alone they are working class) . But what
is of interest in the present context is the particular ramifications
of these developments within the British social formation, i.e. the
weakening hold of the 'middle class' designation within popular
ideology, and of the middle class/Tory nexus.
As regards the second point (the recruitment of agents to the salaried
and non-industrial positions) , the investigations conducted by
Goldthorpe (1980) are of considerable interest. Goldthorpe shows
that, contrary to the 'closure' and 'buffer zone' theses, there has
been a very substantial recruitment of people from manual working
class family backgrounds into even the 'highest' strata of salaried
19
employment . This does not reflect a radical social openness or free
circulation of agents between social positions, since the offspring of
the higher occupational grades still have a much greater relative
chance of ending up in those grades than people from lower
occupational backgrounds, but all the same it represents de facto
social mobility on a large scale. Given the rapid expansion of demand
for managerial, technical, professional and administrative labour, it
was quite impossible to restrict recruitment to the offspring of the
existing middle classes.
Writers of a Marxist persuasion have often denied the importance of
'social mobility' as a factor in class analysis. Within the English
tradition of radical, 'Marx-influenced', sociology the tendency has
been to concede that social mobility is in principle important
19 The 'closure' thesis states that the higher reaches of the
occupational hierarchy will be virtually inaccessible to the
'socially mobile', while the closely-related 'buffer zone' thesis
states that large-scale social mobility will be restricted to the
interface between 'higher manual' and 'lower non-manual'
categories of employees. Arguments to this effect may be found
in Bottomore (1965), Miliband (1969), Giddens (1973), Parkin
(1972) and Westergaard and Resler (1975). Using a schema of
occupational classes roughly similar to those of Townsend and
Butler and Stokes, Goldthorpe found that in 1972, about quarter
of the (male) members of his 'highest' class were sons of fathers
from the same class, while over a quarter were sons of mhnual
wage-workers.
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(large-scale mobility would make a difference to one's analysis), but
to deny that really significant social mobility has taken place.
According to Goldthorpe's study, this denial is just empirically
wrong. Poulantzas, on the other hand, characteristically refuses to
debate on the empirical ground of 'bourgeois sociology' and denies
that any degree of social mobility could have a material bearing on
the Marxist analysis of the class structure. Contrary to the
"bourgeois problematic of social mobility", he avers,
"... it is clear that, even on the absurd assumption that
from one day to the next, or even from one generation to the
next, the bourgeoisie would all take the places of workers
and vice versa, nothing fundamental about capitalism would
be changed, since the places of bourgeoisie and proletariat
would still be there, and this is the principal aspect of
the reproduction of capitalist relations" (Poulantzas, 1975,
p.33) .
If one takes this as a statement obliquely concerning the Marxist
political project, it has a certain validity, in that it brings out
the difference between Marxism and 'meritocratic', or
social-democratic notions of 'equality of opportunity': the Marxist
project is not merely to allow access to the privileged classes for
the most 'able' individuals from all sections of society, but to
transform the class structure (to eliminate private possession of the
major means of production and hierarchical management, and to
institute a democratically socialised appropriation). But otherwise,
Poulantzas' assertion is bizarre. The social and political
consequences of his hypothetical periodic interchange of classes (e.g.
in terms of the constitution of political parties and their
constituencies) would be incalculable, and certainly 'fundamental'.
Surely we can maintain that the existence of social mobility does not
undermine the Marxist critique of capitalism, without feeling obliged
to insist that it is really of no consequence. Marx, although he did
not have a great deal to say about the movement of individuals between
classes, did on several occasions note the possible effects of such
movement. For instance, his remarks in the 'Eighteenth Brumaire' and
in correspondence with Weydemeyer, relating the 'immaturity' of the
American working-class movement in the mid 19th century to the 'flux
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and interchange' whereby American proletarians were able to convert
20
themselves into independent self-sustaining peasants. Or, in his
discussion of the banking and credit system, this interesting passage
concerning the ability of individuals without their own capital to
borrow funds and set up businesses:
"Although this circumstance continually brings an unwelcome
number of new soldiers of fortune into the field and into
competition with the already existing individual
capitalists, it also reinforces the supremacy of capital
itself, expands its base and enables it to recruit ever new
forces for itself out of the substratum of society. In a
similar way, the circumstance that the Catholic Church in
the Middle Ages formed its hierarchy out of the best brains
in the land, regardless of their estate, birth or fortune,
was one of the principal means of consolidating
ecclesiastical rule and suppressing the laity. The more a
ruling class is able to assimilate the foremost minds of a
ruled class, the more stable and dangerous becomes its rule"
(Marx, 1972, p. 600-601).
But even without Marx's imprimatur, it would still be clear enough
that large-scale movement of individuals between positions in the
social division of labour, inter - or intra-generationally, can have
important consequences for the formation of social collectivities and
the development of politics. In this regard, it is relevant that the
'places' created by the expansion of non-manual/salaried employment
were in many cases filled by the sons of manual wage workers,
providing them with an avenue for social advancement, rather than,
say, by more rapid breeding on the part of previously privileged
strata.
Goldthorpe argues that in the British case the effects have been
strikingly asymmetrical: the expanding upper occupational strata show
a low 'demographic homogeneity' (i.e. a low proportion of members
whose fathers were members of the same stratum or class), while the
manual wage-earning classes, dwindling in size, show a very high level
of demographic homogeneity: there has been little pressure for
recruitment of manual workers from beyond the ranks of existing manual
workers' families.
20 Marx (1970, p. 103) and Feuer (1969, pp. 494-5).
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For the so-called 'middle classes', then, heterogeneity of social
origin must be added to heterogeneity of socio-economic position as
another factor tending to render problematic any clear 'class'
21
designation (or in other words tending to reduce the degree to which
the term 'middle class' identifies a pertinent social collectivity).
Within the ranks of the (broadly defined) 'middle classes', one can
however make a useful demarcation, with regard to mobility.
22
Goldthorpe writes of a 'service class' on the one hand and
'intermediate postions' on the other hand, where the former includes
professionals, administrators and officials, managers, higher grade
technicians and non-manual supervisors, and the latter include routine
non-manual employees, the traditional petty bourgeoisie of small scale
production and commerce, lower grade technicians and supervisors of
manual workers. His studies show that while the 'service class' has
had quite a broad basis of recruitment, it is 'stable' in the sense
that declassement is unlikely: once individuals have arrived there,
they and their offspring will probably remain there. With the
'intermediate positions', however, mobility is much more disorderly in
its effects. There is considerable inter-generational mobility both
into and out of these positions, as well as a high degree of
'work-life mobility' both among them and out, whether to higher-level
positions or to manual work. If we talk of the partial dissolution of
the 'middle class' as a definite social collectivity, it therefore
seems likely that the most pronounced dissolution effects are to be
found within Goldthorpe's 'intermediate positions'.
21 It may be noted that the substantial proportion of recruits from
'lower' occupational backgrounds also renders problematic the
conception of 'proletarianisation' through the 'degradation of
work'. If it is true that many salaried non-manual jobs have
been becoming more routine, and more closely monitored than
previously, it does not follow that the individuals working in
those jobs experience this as 'degradation', since many of them
come from families which have known considerably worse
degradation in manual wage-labour.
22 The term is taken from Dahrendorf (1959).
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For the manual working class the pattern of mobility has had a double
edged effect, on the one hand increasing the possibility of 'social
advancement' (although this remains slim for men who have passed their
mid-20s), while on the other reducing the influx of people from other
backgrounds. One should beware the temptation of 'reading off' from
the high demographic homogeneity of this category any necessary
political homogenisation (a temptation to which Goldthorpe appears to
give way). The manual working class may not be divided by social
origin, but it remains divided by industry, region, housing tenure and
other factors, which are not politically irrelevant. Equally,
however, the substantial de facto mobility out of the manual working
class has not dissolved its traditional collectivist propensities, at
least so far as trade unionism is concerned. This mobility probably
has helped to 'legitimise' and stabilise the hierarchical structure of
social relations, and to promote the ideology of individual career
advancement, but it has by no means terminated the struggle for
collective advancement.
Party politics once more
The starting point for this discussion - of the changing division of
labour by sectors and by strata, and of the social pattern of
recruitment of individuals to the positions within these divisions -
was the condition of party politics as the 1960s ended, and in
particular the position of the Labour Party, which had forfeited the
active support of important sections of its 'traditional' partisans
yet had not apparently suffered a collapse of electoral support (as
indicated by opinion polls before the 1970 election). I suggested
that the latter point could be explained in part by reference to the
change in the social composition of the electorate which had been in
progress over the '60s. This suggestion can now be justified. If
serious strains were emerging within Labour's main traditional active
support bloc, the expansion of the salariat and accompanying
transformations within the 'middle class' were also tending to
undermine the 'middle class'/Tory axis. The proportion of the
electorate having a strong partisan identification was on the
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decrease, and the electorate becoming more 'volatile'. Electoral
studies of the period show that an increasing number of people were
making their support for one or other of the main parties conditional
upon the calculation of 'rational self-interest' or 'governmental
competence', rather than basing their voting upon a 'class reflex'.
The net effect was that while Labour's electoral support did not
collapse, it became less deeply rooted, and more liable to be swayed
by conjunctural influences. In 1970, Labour identification was not
necessarily tied to support for the party's 'traditional' concerns, or
at least the concerns of the left-wing; only 39 per cent of Labour
identifiers were in favour of nationalising more industries; only 40
per cent did not believe that trade unions had too much power; and
although 60 per cent were in favour of spending more on social
services this represented a marked decline from the 89 per cent
recorded in 1964 (Crewe, 1981).
In this respect, the opinions of the parliamentary leadership were not
dissimilar to those of the majority of Labour supporters, but this
congruence does not invalidate the claim that Labour's substantive and
definite electoral support bloc was on the decline, and was being
replaced, at least at the margin, by a more conditional and
circumspect form of popular support. In 1970, Wilson appealed to be
judged on the government's record, on its competence in dealing with
'the country's problems' and in particular the balance of payments.
If it is true that the publication of figures showing a deficit
shortly before the election was a significant factor in Labour's 'last
minute' loss of support, it is surely fitting - a case of Wilson being
hoist by his own technocratic petard. The irony is only compounded by
the fact that in retrospect those trade figures turned out to be
misleading and only a statistical 'blip'.
One can get a further perspective on the development of the
class/politics relationship in the period of the Wilson goverment by
asking the question of whether matters could have turned out very
differently, and in particular whether a 'socialist alternative' was
there for the taking. Consider Glyn and Sutcliffe's epitaph on the
period:
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"Between 1964 and 1970 the Labour government tried to serve
two masters. It would not challenge capitalism, so it tried
to support it; but it could not make its policy acceptable
to the trade unions on whom it depended. Such
contradictions are bound to beset a working class party in
power, if it does not oppose capitalism, but tries instead
to make it run more efficiently and more humanely" (Glyn and
Sutcliffe, 1972, p.213).
The problem with this conception is that neither 'capitalism' nor the
'working class' are preconstituted masters which it is possible merely
to 'serve'. The Labour government 1964-1970 did not abolish
capitalist relations of production in Britain, for sure, but it did
not merely serve a pre-defined capitalist class interest either.
Social and economic relations were modified in a whole range of ways
over this period, some of them to the advantage of the working class.
Of course the government did not 'challenge capitalism' outright in
the sense, for instance, of attempting massive nationalisation under
workers' control, or even attempting to deny the perogative of the
holders of the famous 'sterling balances' to veto fiscal policy of
which they disapproved. But what precisely would it have meant to
'serve the working class' over this period? Did the industrial
militants in the car industry and the docks, the union leaders
disaffected by incomes policy and the council tenants by the local
state apparatus, the left intellectuals in the universities, add up to
a social bloc capable of achieving sweeping changes in Britain's
insertion within international economic relations and the relations of
production in the domestic economy, even if the Labour leadership had
wished to lead such a movement? I doubt it. Beynon points out that
the militancy in the car industry had no clear political issue:
"the slogan 'the mines for the miners' meant something.
That no similar slogan has come from the car workers is
important, and is tied up with the fact that 'the car plants
for the car workers' makes no sense to the lads who work on
the line. They hate the car plant in a way that the miners
never hated the pit. They can see no obvious salvation in
the nationalisation of the car industry, be it under
workers' control or not" (Beynon, 1975, pp. 318-9).
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Hughes (1960) noted what he called 'a failure of initiative and
imagination on the part of trade unions' concerning workers' control
in the nationalised industries generally, a 'failure' which was not
really made good over the '60s. In the universities, anti-imperialist
students were discovering Marx but generally had little of substance
to propose as regards the development of the domestic economy, or at
least little which found a resonance among the masses.
If the Labour Party had announced, in 1964 or 66, its intention to
'oppose capitalism' fundamentally and had explained what this was
likely to involve in terms of dislocation of international trade and
payments (even Callaghan's mildly redistributive budget of 1964 was
enough to cause a run on the pound), and the onus which would have to
be placed on the trade unions in running industry, given the likely
non-cooperation of many among the managerial strata, it is quite
implausible to say they would have been elected to office. They would
undoubtedly have alienated much of their 'middle class' support, and
would not have won over any working class Tories. That would have
lost them the election, even supposing that such an announcement would
not also have alienated any working class Labour supporters. This is
not to whitewash the actual political practice of the Wilson
government, or to deny any element of political contingency. The
feasible political choices confronting Labour could have been handled
in a way which would have produced greater benefit for working people,
and lost Labour less active support (in the field of social policy,
for instance). Only this: it is misleading to suggest that a
socialist alternative qualitatively different from the actual record
of 1964-70 existed in potentia and merely went by default, on account
of a failure of political will.
Heath and after
I have argued above in terms of a discrepancy between Labour's
electoral success in 1964 and more particularly 1966, and the failure
of the party to hold together a decisive social bloc capable of
accomplishing radical change in a socialist, or even a Croslandite,
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direction (a failure which was not, however, merely a matter of will).
But if the Wilsonian rhetoric went well beyond what Labour was able to
acheive, Heath's 'mandate' for change was even flimsier than that of
Labour in the '60s. In the 1970 election the Tories received the
votes of 33.2 per cent of the electorate (as against 36.4 per cent for
Labour in 1966), and although this was enough to give them a safe
parliamentary majority, it did not reflect massive and determined
popular support for the 'Selsdon' programme of trade union reform plus
'rolling back of the frontiers of government' (the promised direct tax
cuts may have been popular, but that does not prove much). Butler and
Stokes' surveys even suggest that part of the electoral swing to the
Tories was for no more substantial a reason than the belief among some
electors in the 'circulation of the parties', i.e. the sentiment that
'it's time the other party had a go'.
The discrepancy between the Heath government's pretensions, and
presumed mandate, and its actual powers can be shown up by
considering, first, the famous 'U turn' and second, the circumstances
of its electoral defeat in 1974.
The U turn
The intentions of this government in the 'Selsdon' phase are well
known: to regenerate a profitable, fast-growing,
internationally-competitive British capitalism by creating
'incentives' (direct tax cuts), outlawing the 'disruptive' activities
of industrial militants, and reducing state 'interference' in the
workings of the market: no more support for 'lame ducks'; no more
detailed quantitative restriction on credit; no more incomes policy.
These policies were fairly soon in disarray, for a number of reasons.
Relations with the trade unions deteriorated rapidly, as could only be
expected. Heath was attempting to break with the politics of
accommodation, the 'triangular system' of government/union/employer
consultation which had been growing up at least since the war. Wilson
had tried this first, with 'In Place of Strife', but fortunately for
Labour these proposals had never reached the statute book since union
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opposition was internalised within the party. The Tories had no such
mechanism for demonstrating in advance the unworkability of their
Industrial Relations Act. As Middlemass (1979, p.443) remarks of the
Act, the TUC "could hardly have accepted such a reversal of the terms
of politics as they had been understood for a generation." Having
chosen confrontation with the unions the Heath government went down to
important defeats: the resolution of the miners strike by the
Wilberforce Report in 1972; the official solicitor's intervention to
free the 'Pentonville Five' in the context of demands for a general
strike, after which the Industrial Relations Act was virtually a dead
letter. If the 'labour movement' was not in a position to enforce a
socialist alternative on the Labour government between 1964 and 1970,
it was well able to resist Heath. Two factors bolstered this
resistance. In the first place Heath's break with the previous
'Keynesian' consensus on macroeconomic policy (in the minimal sense of
nominal adherence to 'full employment' as a policy-goal) was less than
complete. So when unemployment approached one million in early '72,
following fiscal deflation in earlier budgets, the government went for
reflation by means of substantial tax cuts - a course of action which
had the full support of most economic commentators including the
'Times' . One of the effects of this reflation was a huge surge in
imports and a record trade deficit, but it did also restrict the
growth of unemployment. My point here is that a further rapid increase
in unemployment might have weakened the unions' power of resistance
(one can draw a comparison with the Thatcher government), but playing
according to rules which prohibited blatant mass unemployment tied the
government's hands. A second factor weakening the Heath government's
attempt to dictate to the unions on the basis of its 'mandate from the
nation' was the rather agnostic attitide taken up be large employers.
The CBI, and large companies in particular, refused to use the new
powers of the Industrial Relations Act for fear of stirring up even
more trouble, leaving them for smaller maverick employers to exploit,
and discredit, in highly contentious situations. The strident
anti-union bloc of small businessmen, outraged sections of the middle
classes, and probably also elements of the non-union working class,
was not a sufficient counterweight to organised labour, given the
tendency for the management of large enterprises to stand above the
Aside from the policy of confronting union power, other aspects of the
Selsdon programme were under severe strain by 1972. The
non-intervention policy with regard to 'lame ducks' was effectively
abandoned with the politically inescapable rescue of Rolls Royce and
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, and the 1972 Industry Bill marked a return
to the kind of industrial policy which had been evolving over the '60s
with the formation of NEDC and IRC. Two other areas of the market
were also to succumb to 'intervention'. In the case of wage
bargaining, the Tories had earlier ruled out incomes policy but as
inflation accelerated, following the boom-induced rise in world
commodity prices and the downward 'float' of the pound on the foreign
exchanges from 1972, Heath imposed a statutory pay and prices
standstill. In the case of the financial system, the Heath government
had been sympathetic to the Bank of England's 'Competition and Credit
Control' proposals of 1971 which, while incoherent, promised more
freedom of market competition. It was not long before the effects of
this 'freedom', in the form of rampant property speculation and
massive growth of the money supply, forced the government into
re-imposing restrictions on the volume and direction of credit. Heath
was even led to castigate the 'unacceptable face of capitalism', and
to berate industrialists for failing to take up industrial investment
opportunities. As a result of these multiple features in the attempt
to implement the Selsdon programme the government was forced away from
its original 'free market' radicalism into what Middlemass (1979) has
called the 'politics of crisis avoidance'. But despite the various
aspects of his 'U turn', Heath had by this stage burned his boats, so
far as the recreation of a 'corporatist accommodation' was concerned.
Despite the imposition of price controls, his government could not win
acceptance for its pay restraint policy on the part of the TUC. When
confronted by the miners' pay claim in 197 3, well in excess of the
government's stipulated maximum, Heath therefore reverted to the
doctrine of the national mandate. The miners' strike was presented as
a direct challenge to the authority of the government, and was made
into a sticking-point beyond which the government would not be pushed.
Here was a sectional interest dictating to the democratically-elected
representatives of the people, and since it had proved impossible
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belatedly to accommodate that sectional interest through the mechanism
of ' tripartism', it had to be challenged. Hence the election of
February 1974, to answer the question of 'Who governs Britain?', in
the context of a state of emergency.
The Elections of 1974
The results of the February election provide an interesting commentary
23
on the state of the nation after four years of Heath's rule. Heath
was calling for a decisive mandate to put the unions in their place,
but the most striking feature of the results is that they offered no
party any decisive mandate whatever. For the first time since the
war, the two major parties each received the votes of less than 30 per
cent of the electorate. Compared with 1970, the Liberal's vote nearly
trebled: at over six million, this vote represented more than half of
the votes going to each of the main parties against little over a
sixth in 1970. In Scotland, the nationalist vote doubled relative to
1970. In terms of parliamentary representation, Labour - although
receiving less votes than the Tories - became the largest single
party; the Tories had five seats less than Labour; the Liberals,
with their geographically diffuse support, were grossly
'under-represented' relative to their share of vote, having only
fourteen seats; while the Scottish Nationalists, benefitting from the
concentration of their vote, increased their parliamentary contingent
23 'Heath's rule' must not be interpreted too literally. Basically
it refers to the period during which the Tory party was in
government and Edward Heath was Prime Minister: one is not
subscribing to the 'Great Men' school of history. Nonetheless
the emphasis on Heath is not without justification, given the
notoriously autocratic manner in which he led his party through
the twists and turns of 1970-74.
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from one to seven. Labour, as the largest party in this first 'hung
Parliament' of the post war years, formed a government, but parliament
remained dominated by the prospect of another election.
What can we read in this voting pattern, in relation to the political
developments in the preceding period? First, there is the point that
Heath signally failed to get his popular backing against 'union
blackmail'. The 29.5 per cent of the electorate who did vote Tory
under the circumstances of February 1974 must have known what they
were doing - contesting the 'unconstitutional claims of the disruptive
sectional union interests' - but they did not form a sufficiently
large social bloc. Too many potential Tory voters were scared off by
Heath's dangerous practice of confrontation, and perhaps also
bewildered by the effective abandonment of the brave 'Selsdon' ideals
in other respects. As Middlemass ( 1979, p. 455) puts it: "As in
1944-5, employers and managers in a sense detached themselves from the
dangerous appeal to the nation, over the heads of the nine million
votors who were also affiliated to the TUC". The CBI, which had been
vocal enough in calling for 'curbs on unofficial strikes' in the late
'60s, was alarmed by the massive popular resistance to the Heath
government's stand, and its leader Campbell Adamson suggested that a
Tory victory in February 'would not solve Britain's problems'. If the
Tories' supporters in 1970 had liked the sound of anti-union
radicalism, a significant number had decided by 1974 that it
threatened to bring the house down around their ears.
Second, there is the question of Labour support. The resistance to
Heath on the part of the union movement clearly had mass support, but
equally clearly this resistance movement was not able to constitute
itself, as it were, into a hegemonic political force capable of
securing a workable parliamentary majority through the Labour Party
and imposing a radical alternative course of social development (it
was much less able, of course, to constitute itself as the nucleus of
an alternative state power in an extra-parliamentary manner). The
24 Data from McLean (1978), citing Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt.
jjErr^tum ; -this note pertains io page 3>Zzj
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Labour vote suffered a double slippage. On the one hand the party
lost 'middle class' support, so that a higher proportion of it's votes
came from the working class (i.e. manual workers) than ever before.
But at the same time the party received the votes of a smaller
proportion of working class electors than ever before since the war.
Only 44 per cent of manual workers voted Labour, as against 25 per
cent for the Tories, 14 per cent Liberal, 3 per cent Nationalist and
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14 per cent abstaining (the absention rate among the electorate as a
whole was considerably higher). The gains for the labour movement in
the shipyards, at the power stations and on the streets were not
therefore translated into electoral support for the Labour Party, on a
broad enough basis. Too many electors evidently wished to reject the
terms of Heath's question, wished for neither Heath-style
confrontation nor a politics dominated by trade union power.
Neither did the remaining reduced core of electors identifying with
the Labour Party subscribe with any unanimity to the proposals of the
party's left wing, which were designed to capitalise on anti-Heath
radicalism and extend it in an anti-capitalist direction. According
to studies cited by Crewe (1981), 53 per cent of Labour identifiers
supported more nationalisation of industry, 43 per cent were in favour
of spending more on social services, and 42 per cent did not believe
that trade unions had too much power. Opinion poll findings of this
kind raise a problem. Marxists too often tend to take a cavalier
attitude towards the findings of such polls - anything which people
ought not to think, according to socialist ideology, is regarded as
the product of 'media manipulation' and cannot really be people's own
considered view. But this is just the mirror image of the bourgeois
view that whenever workers take a militant stance this must be due to
manipulation by agitators, and again does riot reflect people's
considered judgement. Each view is essentially contemptuous of popular
judgement, relying on the idea that people are dupes, unable to form
their own ideas and easily swayed by press magnates/communist
agitators. But if one rejects this view and credits people with a
capacity to judge matters for themselves this does not mean that one
should take an uncritical attitude towards poll findings. These
findings are products with definite conditions of production.
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See previous
Pollsters generally face people with questions in the abstract and in
this situation may elicit responses different from those which people
might give when faced with an issue of direct practical concern to
themselves. For instance people may express themselves against the
trade unions in general terms, yet support the claims submitted by
their own union on their behalf. And insofar as the media do 'mould'
opinion their influence is probably greater the less the issue is one
of direct practical concern. People are not merely dupes, but are
more likely to accept uncritically a line which is constantly
propagated by the media if it doesn't touch them personally;
otherwise they are more likely to insist on making up their own minds.
Either way, the low level of support for left Labour policies and the
trade union movement (in general terms) which is indicated in the
findings cited above, is of real importance. That is, to the extent
that the responses were the result of critical reflection they clearly
show that left policies were lacking in credibility and
attractiveness, yet insofar as the responses represented an uncritical
carrying over of the 'media' line this would seem to suggest that the
concerns of the left failed to strike the masses as of immediate
practical importance; the left politics cannot have appeared to meet
the practical needs of the working class, or else the Labour
identifiers polled would not have been content to reiterate the media
line with regard to those policies. I believe, therefore, that it is
not implausible to infer from these findings that a substantial
fraction of Labour voters reckoned merely that the party would be able
to form a more competent and moderate government, and would be better
able to defuse the crisis, although one should not discount the
continued existence of a 'class reflex' vote owing little to any
elaborate political calculation.
Then there is the question of 'third party' support. The main
development here was the spectacular rise in electoral support for the
Liberals, and for the Scottish National Party. To take the Liberals
first, it had been a commonplace of political analysis over previous
years to regard the Liberal vote as largely a product of temporary
disillusion with the Tories following on periods of Tory government,
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as a protest vote. Certainly there was good reason for erstwhile
Tories to protest in 1974, but the scale of the Liberals' revival
suggests that something more fundamental was involved. I argued
earlier that profound changes in the division of labour by sectors and
by strata had been tending to unsettle the 'working class'/'middle
class' partition of the population in certain respects, over the
1960s. These trends continued in a broadly similar pattern over the
Heath years (continuing decline of manual employment in manufacturing
and expansion of the salariat accompanied by continuing social
mobility) so perhaps one can understand the revival of the Liberal
party (with its relative lack of symbolic 'class' connections, and
lack of political 'dogmatism') as reflecting this trend 'de-alignment'
as well as the conjuncture of 1974. That is, the evident polarisation
on the plane of government/organised labour relations was dislocated
from a reduction of 'class' polarisation as regards the political
perspectives of an important section of the electorate.
As for the other main intruder into the parliamentary arena, the
support for the SNP at this time was a more complex phenomenon. I
cannot analyse it fully here, but shall attempt a few remarks. First,
'nationality', ever since the union with England, had continued to
exist as a basis of collectivity in Scotland: in Scotland's
distinctive cultural patterns and traditions, distinct legal and
educational systems, and distinct administrative apparatus. Only the
political pertinence of that collectivity was variable, and for much
of the time its pertinence was low. That the SNP managed to exploit
nationality - to make it politically pertinent - in 1974 must be seen
against the background of Scotland, and West Central Scotland in
particular, as one of the relatively 'depressed regions' of the United
Kingdom. Pressure from the STUC and the Scottish Labour Party over
the 1960s had helped to channel considerable regional aid to Scotland,
which partly reversed the country's relative economic decline (Begg
and Lythe, 1977) but did not eliminate high unemployment, and at the
same time brought recognition of a 'Scottish dimension' to economic
policy. Then in the '70s the development of North Sea oil off
Scottish shores provided the nationalists with a populist gambit of
324
major proportions: the prospect of an oil-rich independence helped to
bring together elements of the nationalistically-minded middle classes
(who furnished most of the leadership) with certain sections of the
Scottish working class (who voted SNP in considerable numbers) . But
if the support for the SNP was, like the Liberal vote, a substantially
'cross-class' phenomenon it cannot so easily be categorised as a
flight from 'class' as pertinent social collectivity, since it must be
recognised that the 'national distinctiveness' of Scotland is
overdetermined by the differential balance of classes in Scotland as
25
opposed to England. Even though the official ideology of the SNP
posited a technocratic non-class Scottish national politics (Hyslop,
1979), many of the party's supporters were reckoning in terms of
cutting adrift from Tory England; settling accounts with the 'Tartan
Tories' could come later.
To return to the fortunes of the government: between February and
October, the minority Labour government settled the miners' strike and
abolished the Pay Board. In July compulsory wage restraint was ended,
but the Price Commission was retained. The immediate industrial
crisis had been resolved, but inflation, which had been substantially
boosted by the rise in world oil prices, continued to accelerate, and
the discrepancy between price rises of 8 per cent and wage rises of 16
per cent over the six months stored up an acute problem of squeezed
profitability. The 'social contract' arrangements, whereby the Labour
26
leadership hoped to secure voluntary wage restraint in exchange for
the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, food subsidies, a rent
freeze and other measures, were developing in somewhat shaky manner.
In October the decision was taken to go to the polls in an attempt to
get more decisive support for a Labour government: more popular
authority and a workable parliamentary position. The net effect of
the October election was to give Labour
25 The preponderance of council housing in Scotland is relevant
here, both as cause and effect.
26 The expectations of the 'social contract' on the part of both
Wilson and the left are discussed more fully below.
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the narrowest of parliamentary majorities (four seats) but in terms of
the popular vote the question of mandate was hardly resolved. Between
February and October the Labour and Tory votes both fell, and Labour's
parliamentary success was merely the result of a greater slump in the
Tory vote. In fact, the SNP was the only party to pull out a higher
27
vote in October. Labour was in government and had to make the best
of it, but the party was with a less numerous support bloc than even
the Selsdon Heath of 1970.
Labour 1974-1979
The Labour government sought from the start to construct and hold
together a support bloc around the theme of a 'social contract', and I
propose to organise my account of the development of political forces
in this period around that same theme. To start with the lowest
common denominator, all sections of the Labour Party could agree that
the object was to cement a good working relationship between the
government and the trade unions, and thereby also to secure widespread
political support, to develop a hegemony which would contrast sharply
with both the Heath phase and the bitterness and disillusionment which
followed compulsory wage restraint and 'In Place of Strife' in the
late '60s. Beyond this, however, the 'social contracts' according to
the left and according to the parliamentary leadership diverged
markedly. Let us first consider the social contract according to the
left.
For the left, the social contract was to be intimately connected with
the industrial policy which had been taking shape under the auspices
of the National Executive Committee over the early '70s. This
originally developed from critical reflection on the failure of
27 This can perhaps be partly explained by a kind of 'demonstration
effect'. A minor party vote in the British electoral system is
often considered a wasted vote since it stands little chance of
affecting the pattern of parliamentary representation. But the
sevenfold increase in the number of SNP MP's in February showed
that an SNP vote did count for something, making it easier to
mobilise latent electoral support.
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'planning' over 1964-70, and on the Italian model of state enterprise,
Stuart Holland's 'The State as Entrepreneur' (Holland, 1972) being an
influential contribution. In the context of the mobilisation and
assertiveness of organised Labour under Heath's government, the
industrial policy proposals became charged with a stronger element of
worker's control which was seen as an essential component of the
'planning agreements' to be made with large enterprises, and vital to
their enforcement. These proposals were embodied in the NEC 'Action
Programme' of 1973, and then also in the party manifesto of February.
As Prior (1980, p. 3) summarises:
"The policy in these documents centred around industrial
policy with a call for the creation of a National Enterprise
Board, which would by selective nationalisation and
investment establish a state presence in all major
manufacturing sectors, and for the use of planning
agreements to achieve a new degree of worker involvement in
company planning".
Prior further claims that union support for such an industrial policy
was a central plank of the social contract, which therefore
"represented the first British attempt within a framework of
parliamentary democracy to build in a process of extra-parliamentary
mobilisation around the policies of a Labour governemnt" (ibid., p.4).
As is clear in retrospect, however, the radical industrial policy of
the Labour left failed, at this time, to provide the focus for a
hegemonic movement, either in the Party, the unions or beyond. That
this was due not merely to right-wing and civil service sabotage is
clearly recognised by the left MPs who were most involved at the time.
Michael Meacher and Frank Field have stressed that only a limited
circle of people were actively involved in formulating the industrial
policy proposals, and that beyond this circle, understanding of the
proposals was rather minimal. Meacher has said of the unions:
"If they had been involved in the kind of ideas that led to
this distinctive industrial policy of '7 3—'74 they would
have demanded as a quid pro quo for the successive incomes
policies of 1975-6-7 the other side of the social contact,
that these various aspects of industrial policy and worker
participation in its various forms should be implemented"
(Meacher, 1980, p.7).
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In a similar vein, Stuart Holland noted that "it takes time to win the
intellectual appreciation by some trade unionists that these policies
would be useful and to achieve that gut reaction by trade unionists
that they are absolutely essential. And that process certainly didn't
happen" (Holland, 1980a, p.20). Holland also accepts in retrospect
that the left damaged its prospects in this regard by hitching its
industrial policy to opposition to the EEC, so that the pro-EEC
verdict of the 1975 referendum reduced the credibility of the left
generally. Holland argues that withdrawal from the EEC was not an
essential component of the strategy for the domestic economy, since
the EEC member-countries are, de facto, able to pursue a wide range of
industrial policies.
For the parliamentary leadership of the Labour Party, the notion of a
'social contract' was never tied to an industrial policy of the kind
which the left envisaged. If there was not much coherent intellectual
opposition to the left's proposals, this by no means signified tacit
support but rather a belief that the pressure of 'realities' in
government would soon dispel the fancies of opposition. This much is
plain from Harold Wilson's comments:
"Sub-Committees and Sub-Sub-Committees (of the NEC) had
produced grandiose proposals for nationalising anything and
pretty nearly everything. In the more difficult political
conditions in which a Labour leader has to operate when in
opposition, appeals for restraint were less likely to be
effective..." (Wilson, 1979, p. 29).
Or again, the left's Department of Industry White Paper produced in
1974 is described as a "sloppy and haif-baked document, polemical,
indeed menacing, in tone" (ibid. p. 33). Wilson was particularly
pleased when, in the re-drafting of this document at his behest, the
section on planning agreements was 'cut down to size' and it was made
plain that the NEB would have no 'marauding role'.
On the Wilsonian view, the social contract was primarily an
arrangement "between government, industry and the trade unions, on the
basis of mutual sacrifices to reach agreement on a strategy to curb
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rising prices" (ibid., p.44). Part of the 'price' was to be
redistributive fiscal policy, and policy aimed at producing increased
industrial investment, but as regards the latter aim the NEB was
conceived as a state merchant bank, a broker in the tradition of the
Industrial Reorganisation Corporation rather than a 'rogue elephant'
wreaking industrial havoc on the basis of leftist dogma. Far from
being an instrument of stuggle against the prerogatives of private
capital, and the 'multi-nationals' in particular, the contract was to
provide a means of national reconciliation. The power of the trade
unions was to be recognised, and channelled into a realistic programme
of social-democratic reforms, thereby defusing, rather than
exploiting, the aggressive industrial mood. When articulated in this
way the Wilsonian social contract appears very close to what Sir Ian
Gilmour ( 1978) has claimed is the essence of true and wise Toryism:
the avoidance of 'dogma'; the balancing of opposed social forces;
the concession of reform where reform is due in order to hold together
a 'national' constituency (despite the fact that Gilmour viewed the
1974/75 legislative programme as a dangerous concession to sectional
union interests and a threat to the constitution - true Toryism is
only recognised as such well after the event!). In his memoirs,
Wilson makes no bones of placing himself in the line of succession of
Baldwin, Churchill and Macmillan.
It was, of course, the latter version of the social contract which
predominated, despite continuing dissent on the part of the left of
the party and certain of the unions. Initially, at any rate, it was
not without genuine benefits to the unions and the working class: the
changes in labour law and the reform of pensions in particular. It
could not otherwise have achieved its conciliatory aim. But over the
years from 1974 the project of incorporation of union power within a
consensus of 'national' dimensions was very severely tested.
Two points are of particular importance here. First, the external
conditions were extremely unfavourable, given the record trade deficit
generated by the 'Barber boom' and added to by the massive rise in oil
prices. The trade deficit had to be either financed or reduced: the
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former course meant courting the international financial institutions
with their implicit or explicit power of veto over domestic policy,
while the latter meant either fiscal deflation in excess of the
deflation of demand already induced by the OPEC financial surplus (in
paradoxical combination with cost-inflation) or setting up stringent
import controls. Since import controls on the necessary scale were
28
regarded as out of the question , a precarious combination of
international borrowing and expenditure-restriction was embarked upon.
Second, also connected with the dual impetus of the Tory boom and the
oil-price rise, inflation was accelerating rapidly over 1974-75. The
'threshold payments' scheme introduced under Heath before the
oil-price rise - a scheme supported by the then Labour opposition -
was tending to generate a runaway wage-price spiral, but since prices
were to some extent constrained by continuing state controls there was
also a severe squeeze on company liquidity, with its threat to
employment. Under these circumstances some kind of pay restraint was
a clear political necessity, not merely to placate 'capital' domestic
or international but because millions of workers and their families
were fearful of the consequences for their livelihood. (The apparent
failure of the left to recognise this was probably one reason why the
29left's economic programme lacked a mass following)
These related constraints at the international and national levels
left the government with very little room to manoeuvre, and selling
corporate peace under the given conditions stretched the Labour
leaders' powers of statesmanship to the utmost. Grudgingly and
haltingly, the trade unions were brought into line on incomes policy
without any actual government diktat, and with increasingly little
28 In this conjuncture, when trade deficits were being enforced
quite generally as an effect of the OPEC surplus, circumstances
were very inauspicious for making these acceptable to Britain's
trading partners.
29 Warren (1977) argued this strongly.
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being offered in return, by means of emotive appeals to the national
interest. Meanwhile international loan finance was secured, but the
inflow of funds to London had the effect of holding the exchange rate
at a level which, given the British inflation rate, made British
enterprises increasingly uncompetitive and hence worsened the
corporate liquidity position. Then in 1976 when the sterling bubble
30
burst the constraint took another twist, with a falling exchange
rate helping to boost the inflation rate and depress real wages. If
one interpretation of the social contract was that it promised the
development of the 'social wage' of state benefits and services in
exchange for sacrifice on the side of wages and salaries, this became
increasingly problematic after the government turned to the
International Monetary Fund to help finance the balance of payments
and bolster the pounds. The IMF could offer secure finance, in
contrast to the holders of short-term sterling balances, but it could
also exact a price. It is well known that part of the price of IMF
finance was curtailment of the government's public expenditure plans,
which was to increase the tension between the party leadership on the
one hand and the left and the unions (particularly in the public
sector) on the other, over subsequent years. What is less clear,
however, is the extent to which the IMF was shoulder-charging an open
door in this respect, that is, whether Labour leaders had already lost
3 1
their faith in public expenditure
The theme of public expenditure is obviously of great importance to
the development of politics under the subsequent Tory government, and
will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, but some
comments at this stage are in order. The main point here is that not
30 According to Keegan and Pennent-Rea ( 1979) the proximate case of
this was a deliberate attempt by the Bank of England to push the
exchange rate downward in order to ease the pressure on the
corporate sector. Since sterling's strength had been founded on
the unstable base of renewed foreign holdings of short-term
sterling balances this move was enough to undermine speculative
confidence, and the pound could not be stabilised anywhere near
the $1.95 level which the Bank had been aiming for.
31 For an argument to this effect, see Bosanquet (1980).
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only did the Labour leaders reject the left's version of the social
contract with its new emphasis on a radical industrial policy, but
also they increasingly came to question even the
Crosland/Fabian/'Keynesian' version of socialism, so that their
politics in the latter half of the '70s became more and more of a mere
holding operation: mere 'government' lacking any social purpose with
a broad popular appeal. The questioning of public expenditure was an
integral part of this process. In the mid '70s public expenditure was
under attack for a variety of reasons. The Institute of Economic
Affairs had for a long time been polemicising against the extension of
state activity on the grounds that it restricted choice, led to
dependency and reduced the motivation to work, and fostered economic
inefficiency in comparison with 'private enterprise'. These arguments
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had not at first cut much ice with social democrats, but two further
ideological strands came to prominence in this period which helped to
put the advocate of social progress through public spending and
'welfarism' onto the defensive, or even convince them of the folly of
their ways: the monetary theory of inflation, and the 'too few
producers' thesis of Bacon and Eltis (1976). The first of these
strands, taken up vigorously by many economic commentators in the
press and the City, undermined confidence in the 'Keynesian' approach
to demand management and employment policy by suggesting that in the
'long run' government deficit-financing merely led to higher inflation
and was impotent to control employment. Its intrusion into the
thinking of the Labour leadership was registered in Peter Jay's speech
for Callaghan at the 1976 Party conference. The second strand, the
Bacon and Eltis thesis, took up a theme which had long been forgotten
32 Roy Jenkins' pronouncement, that once public expenditure had
reached 60 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product democracy was
under threat, is, however, noteworthy in this context. The 60
per cent figure is highly debatable, resting on the widest
possible measure of public spending and the narrowest possible
measure of GDP, but its political use indicates the mood among
some of the right wing of the Labour Party. The notion that such
and such a level of public expenditure is incompatible with
democracy rests implicitly on the conception, propagated by the
IEA, of economic democracy operating through market forces.
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by all but Marxist economists, the distinction between 'productive'
and 'unproductive' labour. It was argued that the non-commodity
producing sector of the economy ('non-marketable' in Bacon and Eltis'
terms) and the public services sector in particular, was pre-empting
resources from private commodity production, and the manufacturing
sector in particular. This was the basic reason for Britain's poor
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investment record and profitability , and what was needed was the
release of resources from the unproductive areas in order to rebuild
the productive base. This influential view suggested that social
democracy in the mixed economy had to 'reculer pour mieux sauter': it
was necessary to call a halt to the expansion of public sector service
expenditure to allow an industrial regeneration, which would then, at
some later stage, permit social objectives to be given priority again.
Once these views were accepted by the Labour leaders, the social
democratic cupboard was bare. Callaghan, Healey and company could
only 'govern': holding the line against inflation through incomes
policy; bemoaning the 'intolerable' level of unemployment; waiting
for an expansion of world trade to lead a recovery and for North Sea
oil to give room for manoeuvre on the balance of payments. The Labour
left, meanwhile, did not manage to mount a convincing enough case for
33 Bacon and Eltis' categories, which have shifted over time, are
not equivalent to the Marxist concepts of productive and
unproductive labour. Nonetheless, an analysis based upon the
latter would yield similar economic conclusions: any expansion
of unproductive labour must be supported out of surplus value,
hence reducing the fraction of surplus value appearing as profit.
A disproportionate growth of unproductive labour could therefore
cause a profitability crisis and lead to reduced investment.
Cockshott (1978) has argued along these lines. It is, of course,
open to Marxists to argue that there is a 'deeper cause' at work
here, if the expansion of unproductive labour is seen as a
contradictory effect of the attempt to mobilise
'counter-tendencies' to the 'tendency of the rate of profit to
fall' due to rising organic composition of capital (Gillman,
1957). See, however, my critical comments on the view that state
expenditure squeezes profits in Chapter 4 above.
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for its 'alternative strategy' (the far left had no half-way
credible strategy to propose), while the trade union movement was not
united in pushing for any positive quid pro quo in exchange for wage
restraint, having rejected the Bullock proposals for Industrial
Democracy, but was increasingly tugging for a return to 'free
collective bargaining'.
If this makes it seem inevitable that Labour's electoral support
should slump, it has to be pointed out that, according to the opinion
polls, Labour might well have won had an election been called in 1978.
From a socialist point of view the government was barren, yet incomes
policy and fiscal restraint were beginning to produce their intended
effects and the expansion of world trade was benefitting the economy.
In the third and fourth quarters of 1978 the annualised rate of
increase of the Retail Prices Index was only 6.8 per cent and real
incomes were rising again following the sharp falls of 1976 and 77;
unemployment, while still very high by post war standards, was
beginning to fall from its peak in 1977 and job vacancies were on the
increase; the balance of payments current account showed a
substantial surplus.
Further, the political alternatives on offer were far from inspiring.
The 'Economist', in March '78, doubted whether Thatcher could 'forge a
new majority of the right' and reckoned that her 'crusade to balance
the books and roll back the government' was not finding much popular
resonance. In fact it took a series of political blunders on
Callaghan's part to spoil Labour's chances of being re-elected, faute
do mieux, as the responsible and sober 'party of government' : the
seemingly endless postponement of the election while the party's
parliamentary position crumbled, requiring the prop of transparent
chicanery; the unenforceable wishful thinking of the 5 per cent pay
34 The failure to convince the parliamentary party is demonstrated
by the election of Callaghan to replace Wilson as leader.
Callaghan had the political credentials of a man who could get
along with the unions, having been the principal opponent of 'In
Place of Strife' in Cabinet, but no MP voting for him can have
imagined that he would lead the party leftwards.
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limit, the last straw for the unions. Even if the media did inflate
the 'winter of discontent', even if Callaghan was 'unlucky' when the
Scottish National Party chose to commit political suicide in revenge
for the failure of Labour's devolution proposals, by supporting the
Tories' 'no confidence' motion in the Commons, Callaghan's
procrastination and the effects of his autocratic dealings with the
unions were surely the main factors weakening the credibility of
Labour between 1978 and 79.
The scene was set for Labour to lose (more than for Thatcher to win)
the election of May 1979.
Reprise
My object in this chapter has been to assemble certain materials which
will be of use in the class analysis of the current conjuncture.
First, certain concepts with which to analyse the formation of
political forces and their popular support blocs, and second an
account - selective and partial as it is - of the development of
politics in Britain over the post war years. In the latter account I
have described a situation in which the major parties each have a
reservoir of virtually guaranteed electoral support, based on the
'traditional' connection between the parties and the two 'classes' of
British society (which I have termed 'social collectivities' to
distinguish them from classes defined at the level of property
relations), the 'middle class' and the 'working class'. On the other
hand, these 'core' support blocs have never been sufficient to ensure
either party a parliamentary majority, and although they are still
important they have been increasingly eroded at the margin, in part
because of the changes in the division of labour which have loosened
the hold of the 'two-class system' within popular ideology. It
appears that an increasing number of people are calculating their
political support on the basis of the plausibility of the parties as
governing parties, asking whether they seem to have the answer to the
'country's problems' (whether these be inflation, unemployment,
taxation, law and order, trading position or whatever) rather than
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voting, and engaging in political activism, on the basis of a
deeply-felt class identification. The consistent appeal of the major
parties to the 'nation* and their attempt to project an image of
governmental competence (and also to brand their rivals as
incompetent) has both reflected and reinforced this trend among the
electorate. At the same time, however, the parties have found it
increasingly difficult to build and sustain popular confidence in
their capacity to 'solve the country's problems', as these problems
have become more acute and intractable.
Consider in this light the succession of governments in the post war
period up to 1979. Labour from 1945 to 1950 pushed through a
programme of social and economic reform which was widely popular,
although bitterly resisted by sections of the professional middle
class and industrial bourgeoisie. By 1950 the party was able to win a
second general election with an increased vote. Then when an accident
of political geography gave the Tories a parliamentary majority in
1951 they too were able to sustain popular support in more than one
election. Popular participation in electoral politics began to flag
after 1951 but arguably this was because most people felt little
urgency as regards political change; there was no strong and
deep-going popular reaction against the government. The economic
class relations of British capitalism were sustaining rapid
accumulation, and in this respect the rise of the large scale
impersonal enterprises discussed in chapter 3 was particularly
important. The emergence and expansion of new industries provided
relatively full employment and made available a whole range of new
consumer goods, while real disposable incomes rose fairly steadily.
Meanwhile, tax revenue was sufficiently buoyant to sustain an
expansion of social service provision. Despite all the shortcomings
of British society in this period from a socialist point of view, and
the alarming prospects raised by nuclear armament, it has to be said
that capitalism was 'too successful', in developing the productive
forces and meeting popular aspirations, for political forces
supporting a radical transformation of social relations to make much
headway. And of course British capitalism was by this stage a very
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different capitalism from that of the inter-war years: a social
formation in which the organised working class, as organised in the
trade unions, was consulted and listened to by governments as a matter
of course, and in which the major political forces took for granted
the obligation to minimise unemployment and to preserve and expand the
welfare state.
By the 1960s, however, the 'success' of the existing social formation
was beginning to be called into question in various ways. We have
seen how Labour made its re-emergence as a governing force in 1964 on
the basis of a need for sweeping 'modernisation' and planning, pulling
together a support bloc spanning the left and managerial technocrats,
and how the expectations raised in the early Wilson period were
substantially frustrated. The popular endorsement of Labour in 1966
was the last time to date that the party in government has been
re-elected. Thereafter, in 1970, '74 and '79, the governing party has
been rejected without however any great surge of popular support for
the alternative party, at least by the standards of earlier years. It
is appropriate here to step back from the detail of party politics and
to attempt to draw out in general terms the conditions producing this
weakening hold of governments over popular support. First, ever since
the war governments had willingly taken responsibility for the
management of the national economy and by the late 1960s it was clear
that this 'management' was becoming much less successful: inflation
and unemployment were emerging as serious problems and the balance of
payments position on which Wilson laid such stress, was increasingly
precarious. But can we go 'deeper' than this and pinpoint the
conditions of existence of these problems? The trading position of
the British economy is one crucial factor here, not only as expressed
in the ex post trade balance but also in the constraint posed on
expansionary demand management. The conditions producing weakness in
this respect are highly complex but at a risk of oversimplification
one might say that the balance of payments constraint reflects a
relative 'industrial ossification' of the British economy - a failure
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to restructure and reinvest on a sufficient scale to maintain the
position of the national economy on the world market. Behind this
there are two interlocking sets of causes: the relative conservatism
of British capital and the strongly entrenched defensive position of
the British working class. As regards the first set of causes one can
point to the conservative/speculative behaviour of British financial
institutions (discussed in chapter 3); the failure to develop fully
the advanced multi-divisional forms of capitalist enterprise; the
continuing low social valuation of 'industry' relative to the 'liberal
professions'; and the relative paucity of commercially-relevant
research and development. The effects of these factors included a low
level of investment, or at least a low efficiency of investment, and a
lack of 'dynamism' in industrial management. That, however, is only
one side of the picture. On the other side is the organised working
class: by the end of the 1960s, after a long period of relatively
full employment, the trade unions were in a strong position both in
terms of wage bargaining and in terms of the defensive 'veto power'
which they were able to exercise over changes at the point of
production seen as threatening workers' interests. The competitive
weakness of the British economy was truly overdetermined: even if the
financial institutions had been more disposed towards promoting
industrial investment, even if managements had been more competent and
imaginative, the restructuring of industry would still have run up
against the formidable defensive conservatism of the organised working
class. Governments over the '60s and '70s, as I suggested earlier,
have not had the capacity, even when they have had the will, to launch
a frontal assault on the organised working class and force through a
radical restructuring in spite of its resistance. But at the same
time the leadership of the organised working class has had neither the
imagination nor the capacity to attempt to force a radical
restructuring of the national economy on working class terms. To
schematise, the British working class has not been ready to run the
risks of attempting to constitute itself as the ruling class, of
putting forward concrete proposals for working class control over
industry and finance and fighting seriously to achieve them. Whether
any alternative leadership could have gone further in this direction
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in the '60s and '70s is an open question, but I have argued that it is
not useful to conceive of the record to far as merely one of
'betrayal'. The problems of the British social formation were
sufficiently pressing to demand at least rhetorical 'radical
solutions' from the parties (Wilson's 'planning', Heath's 'free
market'), and governments' failures to match their promises were of
sufficient concern to the people to breed a serious disillusionment
with party politics, yet I submit that for most people of all classes
the problems were not considered so urgent as to demand a really
radical questioning of existing social relations, with all the risks
that would entail. The parties in government have not found the
social forces with the potential of making revolution (or
counter-revolution) pressing to be shaped and led. Labour governments
have been able virtually to ignore the demands of the left without
provoking massive popular protest (albeit at a cost of running down
the party's membership and activist support) while the Heath
government found that its tough anti-union stance, however much in
accord with 'public opionion', was unworkable, with the electorate
recoiling from its practical consequences. In a word, governments
have made themselves unpopular with their manifold 'failures', those
failures are traceable to their basic failure to restructure the
social relations of British capitalism, and yet there has been no
social force with the 'will' and capacity to enforce any radical
restructuring against the opposition which any such move must
encounter. There has been a kind of stalemate in the class struggle
which has placed governments in the position of tackling deep-rooted
problems with technocratic instruments of strictly limited
effectiveness: they have held the line on the balance of payments by
means of periodic deflation, which has not really solved anything;
they have periodically checked inflation and attempted to rebuild
industrial profitability by means of ad hoc incomes policy but have
been unable either to maintain popular support for such policies or to
push forward to a comprehensive planning of prices and incomes,
investment and consumption.
Against this background, the magnitude of the political problem facing
the socialist project becomes apparent. In chapter 4 I outlined some
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of the major objectives which seemed feasible given the constraints
and opportunities posed by the development of capitalist property
relations, under the two headings of investment planning and
enterprise democracy, recognising the importance of a 'left
government' in relation to these while admitting that the conditions
of formation of such a government were another matter. In the light
of the discussion above, it is possible to present the objectives of
investment planning and enterprise democracy not merely as desirable
from a socialist point of view, but as potential means of tackling the
basic problems reflected in the sorry history of party politics since
the '60s: investment planning as a means of breaking through the
conservative/speculative mode of calculation of the financial
institutions and restructuring industry; enterprise democracy as a
means of transforming the 'veto power' of the working class into a
positive influence over the direction and management of enterprises.
Not a complete programme by any means, but necessary and crucial
components of a restructuring on working class terms which would break
the stalemate. Nonetheless, the politics of support for such a
transformation of economic class relations are complex and
problematic. Some of those on the left have assumed that there is an
inherent socialist majority in Britain which has failed to surface
only because successive Labour governments, in pursuing a policy of
managing rather than opposing capitalism, have never given that
35
majority its political cue. But on the basis of what I have said in
this chapter concerning the formation and power of governments, this
comforting view is not plausible. Governments can mount a radical and
effective challenge to the existing social formation only if they have
definite, credible proposals commanding the active support of a
substantial social bloc, a hegemonic force spanning a whole range of
social positions (as Labour did in 1945, for all the weaknesses we can
see in retrospect) . And the problem is that the left, inside and
outside the Labour Party, and the trade union movement, have not yet
measured up to that historic requirement. To imagine that the Labour
35 For one argument along these lines see Coates (1975).
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leaders could have thwarted and de-mobilised such a force for all
these years is to attribute to them superhuman powers.
Without doubt, the construction of such a hegemonic bloc for socialist
objectives must involve winning the support of many people who regard
themselves as 'middle class' or of no class, many who have never
considered themselves socialists, many who are not members of trade
unions, by colonising and re-defining the notion of the popular or
national interest (while avoiding chauvinism and the opportunistic
erasure of real social differences) . If this is the general
challenge, it is always faced under specific historical conditions.
The following chapter presents a contribution, in the spirit of Marx's
'Eighteenth Brumaire', to the analysis of the 'specific historical
conditions' - the particular relationships between economic class
structure, social collectivities and political forces - under the
Thatcher government. For it is of course Thatcher from the right, and
not the left, who has seized the initiative in attempting to break the
stalemate of class forces and carry through a radical restructuring of
the British social formation.
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CHAPTER 6
THATCHERISM, CLASSES AND POLITICS
In this chapter I shall address three main questions: first the
question of 'where Thatcherism came from'; second, the question of the
feasibility of the central economic programme of Thatcherism; and
third the question of the political effects of Thatcherism in
practice. Let me begin by expanding briefly on the substance of these
three questions. First, I use the term 'Thatcherism' to refer to the
ideology and political practice of the dominant faction within the
current Conservative government. So by the question of 'where
Thatcherism came from' I mean to enquire into the conditions of
formation of 'Thatcherist' ideology, the conditions under which this
tendency could come to dominate the Tory party, and the conditions
under which such a party could win a large parliamentary majority in
1979, and retain considerable, if diminished, support thereafter. In
these enquiries I shall draw on the materials of the previous chapter.
Second, in considering the economic feasibility of the Thatcher
programme I intend to make use of the results derived in chapters 3
and 4 concerning the development of capitalist property relations. I
shall argue that Thatcher's economic programme is contradictory and
unrealisable in face of the dominant form of capitalist property. On
the third question, it must be recognised that although Thatcher's
basic economic programme is not realisable, nonetheless Thatcherism is
having real economic and political effects, and even if Thatcherism is
widely seen to have 'failed' by the time of the next election the
political terrain will have changed irreversibly. There will be no
wiping the slate clean and acting as if nothing had happened since
1979. I shall hazard a contribution to the debate over lasting
political effects of developments in the Thatcher period, and the
effects on the prospects for socialism. Since sections of this
chapter will be dealing directly with contemporary history I should
make clear the cutoff point of my discussion; I shall not take into
account developments after June 1981.
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6.1 Where Thatcherism came from
As mentioned above, this question breaks down into a number of
narrower questions - those of the conditions of formation of
Thatcherist ideology, and of the conditions of dominance of that
ideology within the Tory party and subsequently in the realm of
electoral politics. The answers to these questions are necessarily
interwoven and I shall not attempt to answer them in strictly serial
fashion, but it should be borne in mind that we are dealing with a
complex issue - one which involves processes at the levels of
parliamentary politics, international economic relations and popular
ideology - and, to echo the conclusions of earlier chapters, not an
issue which is reducible to the 'expression' of a pre-given class
interest.
First consider the main strands of Thatcherist ideology. Thatcher and
her close associates subscribe to a very definite and clear-cut vision
of the problems of British society and the economy, and an equally
definite vision of the solutions to those problems. The central
problem is state interference, bureaucracy and waste, a cancer which
has been developing almost continuously at least since the war,
enfeebling the economy and popular morality alike. In order to
finance its wasteful bureaucracy and misguided charitable programmes
the state has levied taxes on a scale which has crushed out incentives
for personal effort. Running up against the limits of taxation, the
state has also borrowed and 'printed' money on an excessive scale, the
former squeezing out more worthy private sector investment and the
latter generating uncontrollable inflation. This cancerous growth of
the state is given the name 'creeping socialism', but it is a
'socialism' which even Conservatives have connived in. In seeking to
break with it, Thatcher also seeks to break with much of the tradition
of Conservatism in Britain. Other major problems which have grown up
in the shade of the meddling socialist state include the excessive
power of the trade unions and the breakdown of respect for law and
order. Within Thatcherist ideology, the solution is to restrict the
role of the state, concentrating its powers on matters which are
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rightfully the business of the state such as defence, policing,
formulation of general laws (including laws to put the unions in their
proper place), and control over the supply of money. The
counter-productive pretensions of the state to preserve employment,
restructure industry and adjust aggregate demand, incomes or prices
(directly) must be rejected. The market must be allowed to function
freely within a framework of sound law and sound money and the
individual must be presented with sufficient incentives to make it
worth his while to succeed in the market. Further, individuals must
be encouraged to accumulate private property, in the housing stock and
preferably also in the means of production so as to realise the dream
of a true 'property owning democracy'. As many people as possible
should have more to lose than their chains. Respect must also l)e re¬
established for the institutions of family and state. This will
provide the social and political stability which is the necessary
complement to the competitive working of the free market system.
This, roughly speaking, is the message which was developing within the
Tory party from 1974 onward, which was presented to the electorate in
1979 and which has been constantly reiterated from the heights of
government ever since, in various different formulations, although it
cannot be said to have guided every action of the Tory party in
office. This message has, as Hall (1980) has said, a 'hegemonic
thrust' or 'global character'. It is not just a matter of new
policies but of a new 'ethic' and a new ' commonsense' . In a sense,
the Thatcherist message is greater than the sum of its parts. But to
investigate the conditions of formation and 'success' of Thatcherism,
we have to return to those parts and see how each could develop, and
how they could be fused into an effective ideological and political
force in the late 1970s. We can distinguish within Thatcherism a
programmatic economic element and a social-philosophical element,
although the two are interwoven. The programmatic economic element
owes a great deal to two connected developments in the field of
theoretical ideology - the rise of monetarism and the rise of the
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'social market economy' doctrine - while the social-philosophical
side rests upon the popular attitude that has been called
'anti-statism' (by Hall (1980), Leonard (1979) and others) as well as
upon classic petty bourgeois ideology and moralism. In all these
aspects, the development of Thatcherism must be considered negatively
as well as positively, in terms of what it attacks and rejects as well
as what it supports and affirms. Thus, for instance, the rise of
monetarism must be connected with the 'failure of Keynesianism', the
rise of the social market doctrine with the 'failure' of state
industrial intervention and corporatist accommodation between
government and unions, the development of anti-statism with the
unpopularity of bureaucracy and the 'tax burden'. I have already put
forward (in the previous chapter) some arguments which are relevant in
this context, but in the following section I propose to examine each
of these couples in more detail, and the conditions under which the
pre-Thatcher orthodoxy could be represented as a failure and the
Thatcherist doctrine as a plausible alternative.
The 'failure of Keynesianism' and the rise of Monetarism
One has to be careful here. There is a convergence, tempting for
Marxists, between the tide of 'monetarist' opinion which claims that
Keynesianism was only ever a temporary palliative, and the view that
Keynesianism merely displaced the contradictions of capitalism onto a
2
different plane . There is also a temptation on the left to avoid any
substantive treatment of Keynesian economic theory as such by
extending the term 'Keynesianism' to refer generally to the 'social
democratic consensus' the crisis of which, it is claimed, brought
Thatcher to power (the notion of the 'Keynesian mode of domination'
put forward by the London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group (1979)).
Keynes' ideas and the practice of Keynesianism merit more careful
attention than this.
1 This is the term which Gamble (1979) had used to label the
resurgent belief in the beneficent effects of the free market.
2 This view has been advanced by Mandel (1975) among others.
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We saw earlier (chapter 5) that Keynes himself recommended, on the
basis of his theory, a "more or less comprehensive socialisation of
investment" - a policy much more radical than those put into practice
3
by postwar social democratic governments . But at the same time there
is undoubtedly a serious weakness in the Keynesian view of the
capitalist economy. Keynes challenged what he called the 'classical
theory' on the question of the determination of aggregate demand, but
he did not doubt the ability of competitive markets to produce an
optimal allocation of resources (or as near optimal as possible)
within the context of state regulation of aggregate demand:
"But if our central controls succeed in establishing an
aggregate volume of output corresponding to full employment
as nearly as possible, the classical theory comes into its
own again from this point onwards. If we suppose the volume
of output to be given, i.e. to be determined by forces
outside the classical scheme of thought, then there is no
objection to be raised against the classical analysis of the
manner in which private self-interest will determine what in
particular is produced, in what proportion the factors of
production will be combined to produce it, and how the value
of the final product will be distributed between them"
(Keynes, 1936, pp.378-9).
This formulation points to a theoretical and practical dislocation
between 'macro' and 'micro' economics : classical theory can claim its
own in the matter of freely-functioning markets, provided that a
governmental practice based on Keynes' theory ensures the correct
volume of demand overall. It was this view, with its 'moderately
conservative implications' (Keynes), and its provision of a limited
yet important role for enlightened government career economists, which
found favour in the Treasury and the Universities in the post war
years. It was, however, a view which was increasingly seen as
deficient, if not 'in crisis', from around 1960 for reasons associated
with stop-go and the balance of payments. The expansion of domestic
3 Kellner ( 1980) is therefore quite right to attack the
Philistinism of Callaghan's famous 1976 speech, which implicitly
represented Keynesianism as coterminous with a shallow post war
Treasury orthodoxy.
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demand consistently produced unsustainable deficits on the balance of
payments, forcing fiscal policy into reverse and therefore reproducing
unemployment. What was needed, apparently, was a mechanism for
alleviating the balance of payments constraint, for making it possible
to expand domestic demand without creating an unbalanced surge of
imports. On the most minimal interpretation, this meant merely
improving the technical competence of demand management: getting the
timing of fiscal changes right and avoiding electioneering budgets.
But the emphasis on industrial policy, 'planning' and productivity
over the 1960s showed that both governments and industrialists felt
there was something more fundamental at stake, so that even the most
competent and politically disinterested management of demand would not
be sufficient to produce full employment and rapid growth in
conjunction with balanced trade. The tendency to move into deficit on
the balance of payments current account with rising GDP reflected a
structural weakness of the UK economy, and this structural weakness
could not itself be abolished by the practice of demand management.
Whatever the precise diagnosis of this 'structural weakness' (lack of
industrial investment, poor design or marketing of British products,
weak management, antagonistic relations on the shop floor, excessive
overseas military commitments, etc.) this view carried the implication
that Keynesianism was not enough. Further policies were required, to
increase productivity and international competitiveness.
As well as the balance of payments, inflation came to be seen as a
distinct 'problem' by the end of the '60s. Keynes had argued that
excess demand (i.e. above the level sufficient to produce full
employment) would cause inflation, and many policymakers had come to
assume that only excess demand could cause inflation : there was a
4
straightforward trade-off between inflation and unemployment . When
in the late '60s inflation and unemployment rose simultaneously this
undermined the notion of a simple trade-off, but it did not undermine
Keynesianism as a whole. Keynes' macroeconomic theory did not rule
4 This was a widespread interpretation of the famous 'Phillips
Curve' correlation between wage rises and employment levels.
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out the possibility of 'cost push' inflation deriving from a rise in
import prices (such as that produced by the 1967 devaluation) or from
wage rises in excess of increases in labour productivity, and many
Keynesian economists accepted the existence of such a mechanism.
Product and labour markets had become progressively more concentrated,
large scale enterprises were pursuing 'cost plus' pricing and strong
trade unions were bargaining on the basis of an expected continuous
rise in real wages. The workings of the 'microeconomy' no longer
corresponded (if they ever had done) to the conceptions of 'classical
theory'.
Under Wilson, the lesson drawn from all this was that the
'microeconomy' could not simply be allowed to get on with allocating
resources and determining prices within an overall framework of
managed demand. The government had to intervene further with
regional, industrial and incomes policies. But although regional and
industrial policies were not without real effects they did not achieve
the government's aim of abolishing the balance of payments constraint
on growth, while ad hoc wage restraint only suppressed inflation
temporarily. It would be fair to say that at this point Keynesianism
was not widely seen as having failed - rather it was the
interventionist attempts to alleviate the balance of payments
constraint and inflation, in order to permit the full application of
Keynesian expansionary policy, which had been less than successful.
Heath, as we saw earlier, began by denouncing such intervention : the
unfettered microeconomy could look after itself, given appropriate
incentives. Keynesian macroeconomic ideas had not been abandoned by
Heath, however, and after the 'U turn' the Chancellor Barber took the
view that a big dose of fiscal expansionism and easy credit would
solve all problems, provided it was combined with the floating of the
exchange rate. A 'dash for growth' would alleviate inflation (since
there would be more real income to go round and therefore less
conflict over its distribution and less wage inflation) and solve the
balance of payments problem (by inducing the investment needed for
modernisation and increased competitiveness) . Any temporary balance of
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payments problem could be coped with by allowing the exchange rate to
depreciate. This wilfully optimistic doctrine, which had no basis in
Keynesian theory or the experience of the 1960s, is of strategic
importance, for this is the example which Thatcher now commonly cites
as evidence for the poverty of Keynesianism (the Barber boom took
place, it should be remembered, during her first period in
government) . The Barber boom certainly raised demand and the GDP
(over 5 per cent in a year) but it also took inflation to new heights
and the balance of payments current account to new depths, as any
Keynesian economist not infected by wishful thinking ought to have
been able to predict. Hindsight is perhaps too easy. If Barber's
expansionism was reckless, it was exaggerated by the inaccuracy of the
data on the GDP available at the time, which under-recorded the pace
of the boom until it was too late. And its results might not have
been so disastrous were it not for the simultaneous boom in other
capitalist economies which drove up world commodity prices and helped
to trigger the subsequent oil-price rise. Nonetheless the experience
of Maudling's 'dash for growth' should have stood as a warning.
In isolation, the Barber boom might have been written off as another
irresponsible Tory 'go' phase, without seriously damaging the
credentials of Keynesianism as such. But in the mid-'70s the notion of
the 'failure of Keynesianism' began to make more headway among
politicians and economists, for a reason which is not hard to see :
the simultaneous development of deep recession and accelerating
inflation. Even if the Phillips trade-off had broken down before, the
scale on which inflation and recession were combined at this time
reduced Keynesian pundits to bewilderment and confusion. Harold Wilson
(1979) paints a picture of Denis Healey, newly appointed Chancellor in
1974 and trying to formulate a budget, reeling around without any
compass and receiving flatly contradictory advice from different
academic economists. A fiscal boost would increase inflation and the
balance of payments deficit, but deflation would worsen the recession,
yet all of these were already off the scale of 1960s experience.
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But if Keynesianism was at this time useless as a guide to Chancellors
attempting to plan their budgets to achieve stable prices and full
employment, that by no means proves that basic Keynesian theory had
been invalidated (no more, one might say, than Stalin refutes
Marxism). For the inflationary recession of the mid-'70s (and the
impossible position of chancellors) is clearly explicable in terms of
Keynes' - and Kalecki's - theory. I cannot offer a detailed
justification of this claim here, but I shall draw attention to the
effects of the oil price rise. It would hardly be exaggeration to say
that over the post war years the metropolitan capitalist countries had
built their economies around cheap oil; certainly the growth sectors
of the automobile industry, petrochemicals and electricity generation
were very dependent upon oil. So when a changed balance of
international forces permitted the formation of the OPEC cartel and
the abrupt raising of oil prices the industrial economies were in no
position to cut their consumption drastically. The inelastic nature
of the demand for oil even in the face of a quadrupling of the price
meant a massive increase in OPEC revenues which could not possibly be
matched by a commensurate increase in OPEC expenditures on the exports
of the main oil-consuming countries, and hence also a massive OPEC
financial surplus. This financial surplus produced a severe deflation
of demand (by way of a reduction of net exports) for the oil-consuming
countries, in accordance with the classic Keynes/Kalecki reasoning. At
the same time the substantial increase in costs faced by the consumers
of oil (direct and indirect) were transmitted in the form of higher
prices; not surprisingly workers demanded pay rises to keep up with
price inflation, and so on it went. Because not all prices are
adjusted simultaneously to a 'shock' of this nature, and the process
of adjustment and counteradjustment is potentially endless, inflation
continued at a rapid pace over the following years. And rapid
inflation, which erodes the 'real' value of financial assets, had the
further perverse effect of stimulating extra personal savings,
deepening the recession. This is only a sketch of the mechanisms of
inflationary recession in the mid-'70s, but it shows in outline, on
the basis of Keynesian theory, why government economic policy at a
national level was powerless to prevent 'stagflation'. A Keynesian
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policy-solution for the recession could only have operated on a world
scale (increase in OPEC's marginal propensity to consume, socially
planned investment of the OPEC surplus in the deficit countries) and
that was a clear political impossibility. This mode of argument also
helps to explain why there should have been a particularly acute
crisis of state finances in the mid-'70s. Recession, as was pointed
out in chapter 4, tends automatically to raise the state's budget
deficit even if the government does not pursue an active
counter-cyclical expansionary policy, since it leads to a simultaneous
deterioration in the tax base and increase in mandatory
income-maintenance expenditures. The reduction in net export demand
and rise in the personal savings ratio in this period could therefore
be expected to increase the state's borrowing requirement as a
fraction of GDP. If at the same time the 'cost-push' impulse from
import prices, and wage claims intended to maintain living standards,
were causing inflation of the nominal GDP then the actual amount of
money which the state had to borrow would be pushed up sharply. This
in fact happened,^ giving greatly increased leverage over government
policy to the financial institutions (domestic and international)
operating in the market for government debt and enabling them to
impose on the government their principles of financial rectitude.
For the British economy then, the longstanding balance of payments
constraint was exacerbated by the new constraint posed for all the non
oil-producing economies and the option of fiscal expansionism at a
national level was foreclosed. It was under these circumstances that
politicians for whom 'Keynesianism' was merely an easy technique for
achieving growth and popularity began to lose faith, to listen to the
ideologues who were announcing its death, and to subscribe to the
5 Between 1973 and 1975 the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
rose from 6.5 per cent of GDP (at factor cost) to 11.2 per cent,
and in money terms from £4.2 billion to £10.5 billion. I am not
arguing that the recessionary impulse deriving from the reduction
of net export demand and increased personal saving is a complete
explanation for this drastic deterioration of the state's
finances, but it was certainly a major factor. For a further
discussion of the determinants of Public Sector borrowing over
this period see Tomlinson (1980b).
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instant mythology that fiscal expansion had 'only ever worked by
injecting inflation into the economy' despite the record of a long
period in which relatively full employment had been combined with only
moderate inflation.
To summarise: by the end of the 1960s it was realised by governments
that Keynesianism was 'not enough'. The problems of the balance of
payments constraint and inflation were in some sense 'structural' and
their alleviation demanded additional interventionist measures, but it
was not clear precisely how these measures could be made more
effective. Under the Tories in the early '70s the view gained ground
that the only 'additional measure' required was the floating of the
exchange rate, then fiscal expansion would work wonders. The effects
of the application of this doctrine helped to discredit Keynesian
doctrine by association. Then in the mid-'70s worldwide inflation and
recession, associated with the rise in oil prices, severely reduced
the scope for fiscal expansionism - most severely for highly open
economies with a weak competitive position already, such as Britain's.
Even mild expansionism would (a) produce a substantial trade deficit
and put the national economy more deeply in debt to the international
financial institutions and/or (b) force down the exchange rate and
exacerbate inflation. But even then Keynesianism might not have been
rejected with such alacrity by the likes of Callaghan, or even the
Tories, were it not for the presence of a seemingly coherent and
plausible 'alternative' which had growing (if minority) support among
academics and which was strongly espoused by both respectable economic
commentators and certain important financial institutions.
This leads me to consider the conditions for the rise of 'monetarism'
as an alternative to Keynesianism. In the first place it should be
noted that the Quantity Theory of money, the core of 'monetarism' in
the narrow sense and a longstanding principle of classical political
economy, had never really disappeared. In Britain it had been
virtually relegated to the status of an eccentricity by the dominance
of the Radcliffe view that changes in the money supply had little
effect on aggregate demand, but in the USA economists such as Friedman
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and Patinkin had revived and modified the Quantity Theory, and
Friedman in particular had sought to verify it empirically by drawing
up correlations between changes in the money supply and subsequent
movements in the general price level.^ So monetarism as an
intellectual construction remained a latent force even through the
years of Keynesian orthodoxy, awaiting its cue to achieve a wider
impact. The inflationary surge of the late '60s and early '70s
provided the first cue: for so long as inflation had not been seen as
a serious problem there had not been much call on a theory which took
movements in the general price level as its central object of
interest, but once inflation did emerge as a 'problem' demanding the
attention of government and economists, the Quantity Theory was at
least in the running again.^ At first, in Britain at any rate, it did
not break the hold of Keynesianism either in academic or governmental
circles. The dominant view of inflation among academic economists was
the 'cost push' theory: it was widely admitted that expansion of the
money supply was a necessary 'permissive' condition for continuing
inflation, but the impulse for inflation was seen as deriving from
cost pressures (or from excess demand, but the movements of
unemployment and job vacancies were taken to show that demand pressure
was not excessive, except possibly at the height of the Barber boom
(Kennedy, 1978)). And the costs of attempting to prevent cost
pressures from generating inflation, by means of restriction of the
money supply, were seen as too high. This view was also accepted by
the Bank of England and the Treasury in the early 1970s. As O'Brien,
the governor of the Bank of England, put it in 1971:
"It cannot be emphasized too strongly or too often that
attacking a severe inflation simply by holding down the
growth of the money supply means reducing real activity"
(quoted in Bonnet, 1981, p. 16)
6 Both the 'money supply' and the 'general price level' are awkward
concepts to define operationally, and such correlations as the
Quantity Theorists were able to draw up remain open to a variety
of interpretations. This empirical work did not, therefore, lead
to a mass conversion of academic economists.
7 In Britain the monetarist researches of Laidler and Parkin at
Manchester University began to attract some attention.
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This view was certainly correct. The inference made was that in order
to avoid massive unemployment and stagnation in the 'real economy',
inflation had to be tackled by means of prices and incomes policy.
The problem with this view, however, was that successful prices and
incomes policy depended on a political accommodation between
governments and unions, and control by union leaders over their
memberships in the matter of wage-bargaining, and this accommodation
and control were hard to come by. Keynesian economists could argue
the merits of a long term, rational and equitable incomes policy but
governments operating in the real world of conflicting interests were
forced into ad hoc and impermanent dealings. The unions could be
corralled for brief periods in the name of the 'national interest',
but periods of severe (and uneven) wage restraint eventually
undermined their acquiescence and provoked bursts of rapid wage
inflation to 'catch up'. The political failure of incomes policy
under Heath, as under Wilson before him, prepared the ground for the
political advance of monetarism. This advance was not uniform
however. Much of the Cambridge/Whitehall economic 'establishment'
remained firmly wedded to the notion of a rational incomes policy and
deeply sceptical of monetary restraint as a mechanism for controlling
inflation, but attitudes were changing elsewhere. There are three
aspects to this which merit attention: the rise of monetarism in the
Tory Party itself; the development of monetarist views in the City
and the intrusion of IMF monetarism; and the half-reluctant
conversion of the Labour leadership.
For the Tory party, smarting after the politically ruinous
consequences of Heath's interventionism and Barber's expansionism,
monetarism offered a convenient and comforting doctrine. Convenient,
because the Quantity Theory suggested that inflation could be
conquered without entering into damaging dealing with the unions.
According to Friedman, the unions were not the instigators of
inflation - their wage demands merely reflected the inflationary
impulse generated by irresponsible expansion of the money supply.
This doctrine meshed perfectly with the emerging right-wing Tory view
that Heath's U turn was a disastrous mistake and that the 'over-mighty
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state', the vehicle of 'creeping socialism', was to blame for the
relative decline of the British economy. For a party not greatly
given to theoretical reflection, it might be added, the Quantity
Theory had an appealing intellectual simplicity: inflation is 'too
much money chasing too few goods' and where can 'too much money come
from', if the state does not 'print' it? The sophisticated Keith
Joseph could easily get this message across to the economically
unsophisticated Margaret Thatcher.
The Tory party was in opposition. But meanwhile the acceptance of
monetarist views among leading commentators and analysts connected
g
with the City stockbroking forms and the financial press was to
invest these views with a respectability and a material force which
would greatly increase the plausibility of a 'monetarist' political
party contending for office. This acceptance (again it was not
uniform) had a number of bases. First, it might be pointed out that
monetarist policy to counter inflation brings immediate short term
benefits to certain of the financial institutions, since it involves
the raising of interest rates in the attempt to restrict the growth of
the money stock. But this point should not be overstressed. The
Supplementary Special Deposits scheme, also part of the apparatus
designed to restrict the money supply, acted to curtail profitable
banking activity to some extent, and further, the interests of the
financial institutions cannot be divorced from the health of their
corporate customers, which is adversely affected by high interest
rates. Besides, it is not very convincing to suggest that financiers
and their spokesmen adopted monetarist views purely because they
thought that the promulgation of those views would line their own
pockets.
Two other reasons for acceptance of monetarist views in City circles
can be adduced. There is the matter of political judgement which I
8 The journalistic support for monetarism is charted by McDonell
( 1977) and Bonnett (1981).
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mentioned above in relation to the Tories : the idea that incomes
policy was a dangerous failure and that monetary restraint was the
only way to cure inflation in the long run. And the control of
inflation has a special importance for financiers since inflation
erodes the 'real' value of financial assets and can turn even very
high interest rates into negative 'real' rates. On the Keynesian view
the costs of monetary restraint would be too high, but what monetarism
offered here was a rationalisation of deflation, a theoretical
guarantee that any effects of monetary restraint on output and
employment would be merely temporary since variations in the money
supply ultimately affect only monetary variables. Now a
rationalisation does not necessarily become convincing merely because
it is convenient, and here I come to my second point: the monetary
theory of inflation appears to be daily confirmed in the markets for
financial assets. Unlike 'real' commodities, financial assets have no
cost of production and therefore the 'cost push' theory of inflation
cannot apply. Financial markets are very peculiar markets, quite
unlike the markets for industrially-produced commodities or for labour
power: buying and selling take place continuously; operators have
very full information concerning prices; and the stock of existing
financial assets changing hands is always much greater than any new
issues of assets. These features give financial markets the peculiar
property that an inflow of new funds to the market will immediately
drive up the prices of the assets being traded (and an outflow
immediately reduce prices) . A sudden increase in the monetary demand
for, say, cars will first lead to the running down of stocks, then
perhaps to increased output to match the demand. The price may or may
not be raised, depending on the policy of the enterprises in question.
But an increase in the monetary demand for, say, government bonds, US
dollars, or company shares is bound to inflate the prices of those
assets, unless the authorities take specific offsetting action. My
suggestion is that agents in day-to-day contact with the latter kind
of market will tend to find the purely monetary theory of inflation
confirmed by their experience in a way in which industrialists and
union leaders, for instance, will not. It must be said, however, that
the turn to 'monetarism' within both the Tory party and financial
capitalist circles was not wholly dependent on the credibility of the
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theory which promised that monetary restruction would have no more
than a passing effect on real output and employment. That is, it may
be possible to interpret the 'monetarist' move as at least in part
linked to the calculation that even if monetary restriction were to
have a real recessionary 'cost' there was no alternative if inflation
was to be reduced substantially and permanently. If this mean
confronting the unions rather than conducting deals over incomes
policy, then so be it.
Once the analysts and operators on the main financial markets had
adopted a monetarist outlook, this put an important constraint on
government policy. Any policies which appeared irresponsible from a
monetarist viewpoint would lead to speculation against government
stock and/or the pound, not necessarily out of political motivation,
but on the basis of perceived economic self-interest: if one reckons
that a given policy will lead to higher interest rates, then one gets
out of gilts; if one reckons that the pound is going to slide as a
result of expansionary policy, then one sells sterling. And in this
way the monetarist expectations are self-fulfilling.
The IMF intervention of 1976, as noted in the previous chapter, with
its condition of adherence to specified restrictions on public sector
borrowing and the growth of the money supply, obviously strengthened
the hand of indigeneous monetarism. In effect, the ideology and
practices prevalent within British financial institutions, the
intervention of the IMF and the doubts already present among the
Labour leaders concerning the validity of Keynesianism were mutually
reinforcing. If monetarism was still a minority position within
British universities and even the Treasury, it made great gains as a
theoretical ideology imposed upon/employed by government (Healey's
monetary targetry from 1976) . The field of economic ideology was
prepared for the advance of the fully-committed monetarism of
Thatcher, Joseph et al.
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Monetarism and the 'social market' doctrine
'Monetarism' in the strict sense of the Quantity Theory of money is
not logically tied to the social market doctrine or to anti-statism
generally. It would be possible, for instance, to accept the
propositions (a) that inflation is caused by excessive growth of the
money supply and (b) that such monetary growth is the result of large
scale public sector borrowing, but also to hold that inflation is not
a serious problem. Or, if one accepted propositions (a) and (b) and
also believed that the control of inflation was of prime importance,
it would be possible to argue that public sector borrowing should be
reduced by means of increased taxation, that public services and
industrial support policies should be expanded even, but should be
financed by means of, say, more progressive income tax, taxation of
wealth and withdrawal of tax relief on the various forms of personal
savings. This hypothetical position would in fact have the advantage
over Thatcherist doctrine of economic feasibility, since increased
taxation in these forms would be much more effective in reducing
9
public sector borrowing than expenditure cuts. In practice, however,
the re-emergence of the Quantity Theory of money has been closely
linked with a thorough-going critique of the usurpations of the state
within the social democratic 'mixed economy' and the re-affirmation of
the virtues of the market as an allocative mechanism. For Friedman
and Hayek, for the ideologues of the Institute of Economic Affairs and
9 Arguably, however, such a course would not be politically
feasible, given the clamour against 'excessive taxation' which
was developing strongly by the mid 1970s. This clamour had two
apparent bases: the high marginal rates of taxation on high
income groups, and the progressive lowering of income tax
thresholds in real terms as a result of inflation, drawing more
of the working class into the income tax net. The combined
effect of these two factors was to create the basis for a broad
anti-tax bloc spanning managers, professionals and manual
workers. Whether the tax system could have been restructured so
as to split this bloc and overcome the apparent 'limit to
taxation' is an open question. Certainly there could be no easy
and painless recourse to corporation tax, given the low level of
profitability, or to indirect expenditure taxes, for indexing
these taxes fully would have contributed to inflation.
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the centre for Policy Studies, inflationary growth of the money supply
is no accident. It is the classic symptom of an over-mighty state,
restoring to the 'printing press' when it can no longer screw any more
tax revenue out of the populace. If the post war expansion of public
expenditure has not been undertaken merely for the self-aggrandisement
or military adventures of the rulers, but partly out of a misguided
philanthropic intent, that neither excuses the agents of public-sector
profligacy nor mitigates the consequent debauch of the currency. And
it is this conception which has inspired Thatcher and her associates
more than any technical arguments concerning the 'real balance effect'
or debates over the relative generality of Keynesian and neoclassical
theory. Let us look more closely at the free market ideology which is
tied up with Thatcher's monetarism.
As with the Quantity Theory, the theory which affirms the efficiency
of the market is by no means new. It is a revival in new
circumstances of the neoclassical economics which developed in Austria
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an explicit
ideological riposte to Social Democracy, a thorough theoretical
defence of Capitalism (one can trace it back to Adam Smith, but from
the neoclassical point of view Smith was not rigorous enough - a
pioneer, but unfortunately encumbered with misleading notions such as
a labour theory of value). Neoclassical theory 'proves', on the basis
of highly restrictive assumptions, that the competitive market
mechanism will lead to an equilibrium in which firms produce the goods
which consumers value most highly, using the lowest-cost methods of
production. It is admitted that there are certain 'public goods' such
as defence, policing and lighthouses which unfortunately cannot be
supplied by the market mechanism, but these goods form a strictly
circumscribed category: any goods or services which can be supplied
by the market will be supplied with the greatest possible efficiency.
Now this position, as we have seen, was not attacked by Keynes (Keynes
argued merely that market equilibrium was not necessarily achieved at
the full-employment level of aggregate demand) but it did come under
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de facto attack by social democrats of left and right over the post
war years. The idea that the state could organise the health service
better than the market, that the state should play a greater role in
education, that certain industries could be better run as nationalised
enterprises not necessarily aiming at maximum profitability, that the
state could usefully 'distort' the market by means of regional policy,
industrial policy, incomes policy etc. - these ideas which were the
common currency of Labour and Tory governments after 1945 (and were of
course, not unique to Britain) all involve the assumption that the
market is seriously defective as a mechanism for achieving social
ends, even for achieving a healthy and profitable growth of private
industry. However, the kind of pragmatism which led to the extension
of state intervention, partly to satisfy popular demands and partly to
meet the demands of large scale capitalist industry^, was by its
nature not susceptible to formulation as a rigorous theoretical system
at par with neoclassical economics. So when it 'failed' in the
British case it was vulnerable to ideological attack from the
neoclassical camp.
What does the 'failure' of state intervention, which opened a space
for the resurgence of social market ideology, actually amount to? We
already have the elements of an answer in the account of political
developments in the previous chapter and in the discussion of the
'failure of Keynesianism' given above. The main points here are (a)
the failure of state intervention to carry through a restructuring of
industry and trade relations sufficient to alleviate the balance of
payments constraint on growth (closely connected with the unpopular
rise in personal taxation which has been required to finance
recession); (b) the political failure of prices and income policy as
a means of controlling inflation; and (c) the growing popular
dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic form of provision of public
services. I shall examine each of these points in turn.
10 These 'demands' were not always made by industrialists
themselves. It is partly a matter of what governments took to be
the requirements for a strong national economy.
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(a) The balance of payments constraint. I have already outlined
the problem here: the export performance and propensity to import of
the UK economy are such that fiscal expansionism designed to promote
growth and employment consistently runs into the barrier of an
escalating balance of payments deficit. And experience over the 1970s
shows that an 'over-valued exchange rate' is definitely not the only
obstacle here. In principle there are two ways in which this
constraint might be overcome: by becoming more competitive on the
world market (raising export volumes and reducing the propensity to
import), or by withdrawing from competition (i.e. setting up import
controls which would forcibly reduce the propensity to import) . These
strategies may be seen in combination - it can be argued that the
imposition of import controls would provide a 'breathing space' to
restructure industry for greater competitiveness in future - or they
may be presented as alternatives. But although successive governments
have willingly taken responsibility for breaking the balance of
payments constraint they have proved incapable of carrying either
strategy to the point of success. As regards the stategy of
increasing competitiveness we have seen that neither 'planning' on the
Wilsonian model, nor the less grandiose industrial policy of later
years, nor devaluation of the currency, have proved equal to the task.
The state has simply lacked the material means to carry out the
radical restucturing of industry (in terms of sectoral distribution,
investment patterns and social relations within enterprises) which
would have been necessary to boost productivity, cut unit costs and
overcome the fossilisation of Britain's industrial structure.
Government's have neither desired (with the possible exception of
Heath) nor been politically able to impose an outright 'capitalist'
solution in the sense of breaking working class resistance to
state-backed managerial dictation, and anyway there is no evidence
that British management, given a clear run, could have greatly
increased industrial competitiveness. On the other side, the
organised working class has never been unified around a programme of
radical restructuring on its own terms, so that even if Labour
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governments had wished to impose a 'working class' solution to the
declining competitive position of British industry that too would have
lacked an adequate material basis. As regards the forcible limitation
of imports, while there have been pressures in this direction from
sections of industry and the trade unions, and while certain temporary
and limited measures have been taken, this option has not to date been
adopted as a consistent strategy. Governments, even if inclined in
this direction, have had to consider the political difficulties both
in terms of the possible reaction of Britain's major trading partners
(particularly since joining the EEC) and in terms of the sacrifice of
popular consumption standards which would be involved, at least in the
short to medium term.
With the balance of payments constraint unbroken, the preservation of
the external balance has necessarily involved periodic deflation and
foreign loans (generally with delationary conditions attached) .
Unemployment has inevitably risen and growth slowed, frustrating the
popular expectations of the earlier post war years and aggravating the
struggle over the distribution of national income, with its
inflationary consequences. In addition to the profits/rages struggle
analysed by Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972), taxation has played an
important role here. Quite apart from expenditure on social service
programmes, governments have been obliged to spend increasing sums
merely to cope with the consequences of slow growth and delationary
policy, in the form of support for both ailing industries and the
unemployed. This has pushed up the tax burden on the employed
workforce, bringing ever broader strata of the working population into
the 'tax net', and further intensified the distributional struggle.^
11 For a detailed argument to this effect see the Cambridge Economic
Policy Group (1981).
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b) The political failure of incomes policy. The failure of
incomes policy has two sides. On the one hand governments have been
unable to use incomes policy as a unilateral discipline over
wage-bargaining in the face of trade union resistance. They have been
obliged to find an accommodation with the trade unions over the
question, and the problem has been that the acceptability of incomes
policy among union members has proved temporary and unstable. On the
other hand, the organised working class has proved unable to exploit
incomes policy as a means of restructuring the distribution of
National Income and extending the scope of collective bargaining. Let
me try to justify the second, more controversial, part of this claim.
I examined in the previous chapter the conjunctural factors which
first sustained the acceptability of incomes policy in the period
1975-78 then led to its breakdown. Now this breakdown arguably lost
Labour support in two ways. First, many union members who had seen
their real wages falling over previous years resented Callaghan's
autocractic insistence on further stringent wage restraint and second,
when the union revolt came, people who did not support the strikers
against the pay limit lost their faith in Labour as the party which
could deal with the unions, the 'natural party of government'. The
Tories were able, opportunistically, to make political capital on both
counts, to say to the disaffected workers that they would not impose
an incomes policy and to the anti-striker public (which includes many
workers) that they would legislate to control the 'abuse' of union
power. This irony has important implications. It suggests strongly
that 'free collective bargaining' over wages is not a means of forging
unity among the working class. In fact the effects of such wages
struggles set up definite tensions between union and non-union
workers, between wage-earners and those on fixed incomes, such as
pensioners. It is relatively rare for a group of workers striking
against an incomes policy to win widespread public approval. This in
turn suggests that the trade union movement could have been on much
stronger ground had it used incomes policy instead of just resisting
it, if instead of pushing for a return to free collective bargaining
it had pushed for a definite quid pro quo in terms of industrial
policy and workers' control. This view is, of course, contested on
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the left. Arthur Scargill expressed a common view among left-wing
union militants when he said, in criticism of any incomes policy, "You
cannot plan one element of a totally unplanned economy. You can't
have a system of free enterprise and then seek to regulate one factor
within it" (Scargill, 1981). But this principled position avoids the
question of whether incomes policy might be used as a means of forcing
the introduction of further elements of planning; the planned
economy, it seems, must come all at once. Equally, it avoids the
point that free wage bargaining can be seriously divisive. Perhaps
the main fear of incomes policy on the left is that although 'in
principle' it might have certain attractions, in practice it would
mean the demobilisation of the shop steward's movement and the
concentration of power in the hands of the centralised union
bureaucracies acting in collusion with the state. But here Hirst's
comment is apposite:
"there is no reason why the powers of shop stewards need be
weakened by a successful incomes policy. What is needed is
the development of new objectives and new forms of struggle
at enterprise level. The scope of bargaining must be
extended from questions of immediate personal benefits to
questions of enterprise policy and operation" (Hirst, 1981,
p.56) .
This is a challenge for the future: we know that these 'new
objectives' and 'new forms of struggle' were not sufficiently
developed over the 1970s and that most union leaders continued to
think of incomes policy as a temporary crisis measure which should
give way as soon as possible to business as usual.
To conclude on the question of the 'failure of incomes policy', I
believe that this failure should be seen at two levels. First there
is the specific conjunctural collapse of Callaghan's 5 per cent limit
over the winter of 1978-79 which greatly undermined the credibility of
the Labour government and helped to hand the 1979 election to the
Tories. But then at a deeper level, there is the impasse of the trade
union movement - strong enough, in certain sections, to resist
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successfully government pay restraint measures yet at once unable to
achieve a hegemonic appeal on a platform of unrestrained wages
struggle and unready to trade off free bargaining in the labour market
against the achievement of broader social and economic objectives.
c) Bureaucracy and the welfare state. Popular dissatisfaction
with the workings of the 'welfare state' has emerged as a central
theme in recent Marxist writing on Thatcherism. It is argued that
Thatcher was able to capitalise on a widespread feeling among the
working class that state provision means unresponsive bureaucracy,
arbitrary authority and in many cases humiliation for the
'beneficiaries' of the state. It is also argued that this problem
goes to the heart of social democracy, that the Labour party with its
faith in state ownership and state provision has set itself up for the
Thatcherist attack, by failing to question the social form in which
state services are provided and administered. Corrigan made the point
some years ago:
"The British working class has struggled hard for the
provision of welfare but has done so without any concrete
appreciation of the need for specific class policies and
administrative forms" (Corrigan, 1977, p. 93).
More recently the London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group (1979) said,
of the Tory opposition to centralised bureaucracy and state control,
"these policies are attractive to working class people because they
speak to their experience of the state" (p.64). Leonard ( 1979) has
put forward a similar view, noting in particular the basis for the
Tory policy of council house sales: "The ghettoisation and poor
quality of council housing together with authoritarian housing
management... contributes to the legitimation of the policy of selling
council houses" (p. 10). Hall (1980) has elaborated the notion of
social democratic 'statism', as an ideology in which the state appears
as a 'neutral beneficiary' and a class practice in which the
'dominated classes' are represented as "passive recipients, as clients
of a state run by experts and professionals over which people
exercised no real or substantive control" (p. 27) .
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There is undoubtedly an important point here. The dominant Fabian
tradition within British socialism is strongly paternalistic, and
'statist' in the sense which Hall has elaborated. 'Social progress'
has been seen as something to be achieved by wise governments rather
than by popular struggle. Socialists in the Fabian tradition have in
the past praised Stalin's Russia, but have not incorporated in their
conception of socialism the kind of comments which Marx made on the
Paris Commune, or which Lenin made in 'State and Revolution', on the
paramount need to break down the 'state' as a distinct bureaucratic
apparatus (or set of apparatuses) and to foster popular participation
and accountability in administration. Therefore although one cannot
write off state welfare services as merely 'requirements of capital',
12
in the functionalist mode , it is true that these services have
generally been administered in a bureaucratic and unaccountable
manner. And this has had differential effects on the 'manual' working
classes and the 'educated' middle classes. The educated middle
classes have been in a much better position to discover and demand
their rights, to avoid intimidation by state-employed professionals,
and have done relatively well out of the welfare services. The manual
working classes, the council tenants and the unemployed, generally
dependent on state benefits and services to a greater extent than
other groups, have tended to experience the state as more alien and
oppressive - talking a bureaucratic language which is hard to
understand, carefully policing their eligibility for benefits, fobbing
them off with the mystique of professional expertise. This is perhaps
a caricature, but it does help to explain the apparent 'paradox' of
the working class turning against the 'socialist' welfare state. It
connects with the comments in the previous chapter concerning Hindess'
account of the decline of working class influence in the Labour Party,
and the resulting tendency for the
12 This kind of Marxist-functionalism can be found in Muller and
Neusus ( 1978).
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Party to pursue a form of politics which is oblivious to the
day-to-day interaction between working class people and the state
apparatuses. It also clearly is of considerable importance as regards
revitalising the 'popular image' of socialism : to return to the
quotation from Corrigan, there is indeed a need to develop 'specific
class policies', in the sense of maximising benefits where they are
needed most rather than merely where people are sufficiently au fait
with the bureaucratic and professional procedures to take advantage of
them, and new administrative forms which will be as transparent and
open to popular participation as possible.
The Thatcherist fusion and the Tory party
As Stephenson (1980, p. 17) has pointed out, Thatcher became leader of
the Tory party "not by emerging as a candidate of the party
establishment, but by a bold commando raid whilst that establishment
was in disarray after the second 1974 election defeat". Heath and his
supporters had suffered a double demoralisation, first when the
Selsdon programme was abandoned in the face of 'political realities'
and then again when the nation failed to endorse Heath's stand against
the usurpations of the trade unions in February '74. The way was open
for the radical right tendency which was pushing for a clear
re-definition of Conservatism as an anti-state, free market political
force, and for a break with patrician 'crisis avoidance'. For a time
Keith Joseph looked a credible candidate for the leadership of this
tendency, and the party. Joseph staked out his view, that post war
economic policy and the Heath government's economic policy in
particular had been entirely wrong, in a major speech in Preston in
September '74. But this challenge was then followed by a further
speech in which he alienated much of his support by suggesting that
the nation's stock was degenerating as a result of a high birth rate
among the poor. Tories may think these thoughts but it is bad form to
voice them from a political platform. With Joseph's political
judgement in doubt, it was Thatcher who emerged as the candidate able
to win the leadership for the new right.
367
Over the years from 1975 to 1979 the Thatcher faction managed to make
the political running in the Tory party. It did not capture all the
key posts in the Opposition, and did not allay the scepticism of many
'traditional' patrician Tories, but nonetheless became the dominant
tendency, able to define party policy and philosophy. The
Thatcherites were able to exploit, amplify and fuse the ideological
currents which I have examined above: the perceived failure of
Keynesianism and state intervention in economic policy, the rise of
monetarism in the City, the resurgent neoclassicism of the IEA,
popular dissatisfaction with the welfare state and 'high taxation',
resentment at the disruptive activities of the trade unions. Joseph
taught Thatcher his monetarism, and Thatcher lent to theoretical
'anti-statism' a petty bourgeois passion and populist mode of
expression which Joseph could not muster. As the ideology cohered, it
provided a pole of attraction for certain Tory 'progressives' of
earlier years who now recognised the error of their ways (Howe, for
instance), and for old stagers like Thorneycroft who had never quite
approved of Tory progressivism since the days of Macmillan. And it
was undoubtedly more in tune with the 'grassroots' Toryism of the
constituencies than Heath's post-Selsdon modernism had ever been. For
instance, if monetarism taught that inflation was the result of an
excessive state budget deficit, Thatcher could link this to the
'commonsense' of 'every housewife' and every petty bourgeois - the
need for careful budgetting and the dangers of debt.
There were some discreet challenges to the direction the party was
taking. Sir Ian Gilmour, the most literate of the traditional Tory
rearguard, published in 1977 his 'Inside Right' in which he took a
long historical perspective on the Tory party and claimed it as the
party of moderation and balance. The essence of true Toryism was the
avoidance of grand theoretical systems (such as that of the
monetarists) and the painstaking maintenance of a broad 'national'
constituency, as seen in the practice of Halifax, Disraeli, Baldwin
and Macmillan. To stir up populist antagonism against the Civil
Service and even the trade unions was, by implication, to betray Tory
principles. But it was precisely the system-less 'moderation' and
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trimming of the Callaghan government which Thatcher was attacking, to
considerable effect. Gilmour was not alone in his doubts, but in the
aftermath of Heath's defeat the doubters could not deflect the
leadership from its chosen course.
Outside of the Tory party itself, among the electorate, indications
were not so clear. On the one hand opinion polls consistently showed
Thatcher to be markedly less popular than her party, and there is no
evidence that Joseph was ever a popular man. In the latter half of
1978 when Labour's moderation and 'governance' seemed to be paying
dividends, Thatcherism did not appear to be the inevitable inheritor
of the 'failure of social democracy'. On the other hand, the
Institute of Economic Affairs (and other) opinion polls showed a
consistent decline in support for high-taxation, high public
expenditure policies, particularly among the working class and even
among Labour supporters. As I argued in the previous chapter, it was
the particular conjuncture of 1978-79 which tipped the electoral
balance, with its combination of well-publicised industrial
disruption, and blatant parliamentary opportunism on the part of
Callaghan government. Thatcher's radicalism gained an electorally
crucial margin of credibility over Callaghan 'safe' no-change
governance. One can trace the extent of this shift in the results of
13
the 1979 election, and of the surveys which accompanied it.
The 1979 election saw a slight recovery in turnout, and in the
proportion of the vote cast for the two major parties relative to
1974; to this extent the 'verdict of the polls' was more decisive.
But the Tory lead over Labour (some two million votes) owed more to a
slump in Labour support than to a surge of Tory support: the
proportion of the electorate voting Tory in 1979 (33 per cent) was
t
lower than in 1970. One can disaggregate the vote, and hence gain a
13 The survey data below are taken from the Economist ( 1980) and
Crewe ( 1981) .
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clearer view of the pattern of party allegiance, in three ways: (a)
by previous party support; (b) by 'social class' (the data available
are based on the market research A to E scale); and (c) by region.
a) In terms of previous party support, the 1979 result was much
affected by a two way traffic in Liberal votes. Almost half of the
1974 Liberal voters defected, splitting in a ratio of around 3 to 1 in
favour of the Tories over Labour. It would appear that many marginal
Tories disaffected by Heath were willing to throw in their lot with
Thatcher five years later. Opinion surveys showed that the issue of
taxation was a particularly important influence on these Liberal
defectors. On the other hand the Liberals picked up some voters who
had supported one or other major party in 1974. Labour lost 10 per
cent of its 1974 supporters in this way, as against only 4 per cent
for the Tories. Evidently there were many erstwhile Labour supporters
disaffected by the experience of the Callaghan government, yet not
thinking in terms of the 'failure of social democracy' and unwilling
to give their votes to Thatcher.
b) Looking at the vote in terms of 'social class' (see table 6.1),
it appears that the swing to the Tories (and collapse of Liberal
support) since 1974 was greatest among skilled manual workers. In
this group the Tories increased their share of the vote by 18 per
cent, nearly drawing level with the Labour vote. There was also
substantial swing to the Tories among semi- and unskilled manual
workers, although here there was a smaller reservoir of Liberal
support to drain back to Toryism and Labour's diminished share of the
vote was still well ahead of the Tories' . The pattern at the other
end of the social scale is interesting: although the A and B groups
together gave far more of their votes to the Tories than to Labour the
increase in the Tory share of the vote was only marginal, and less
than the increase in Labour's share. It is safe to assume that much
of the increase in Labour support here came from the public sector
salariat who saw their position clearly threatened by Thatcherism.
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Table 6.1 Electoral Support In 1979
by social class
% of total vote in 1979 and change in that share since October 1974.
May 1979 Change since '74
Con Lab Lib Con Lab Lib
Professional and
Managerial (AB) 65 17 15 + 2 + 5 -7
Office & Clerical (CI) 57 21 20 +6 -3 -1
Skilled manual (C2) 44 45 10 + 18 -4 -10
Semi and unskilled
manual (D) 31 53 12 +9 -4 -4
Source : adapted from 'the Economist' (1980)
c) The geography of party support which emerged from the 1979
election showed a strengthening of the demarcation lines (already
apparent in previous elections) between Labour and Tory territory.
Labour's main electoral strength lay north of the Trent and in the
inner cities. In Scotland and the north of England the swing to the
Tories was very much below the national average and Labour received
substantially more votes than the Tories (the most cheering result for
Labour was the unseating of that caricature Thatcherist, Teddy Taylor,
in Glasgow). Voters in the north tended to regard inflation and
unemployment as the main issues, and to be sceptical about Tory policy
with regard to these issues. The Tories, on the other hand, were
strongest in suburban and rural areas and in the south of England.
Here the issues of strikes, taxes and lav; and order were given a
higher priority than in the North. But perhaps the most crucial
marginal shift of allegiance came in the Midlands, the site of the
biggest pro-Tory swing among skilled manual workers.
The aggregate result of the vote, which gave the Tories a comfortable
parliamentary majority of 44 seats, must therefore be seen as the
product of a complex pattern of cross currents : skilled workers who
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had seen their pay differentials eroded under incomes policy deserting
Labour and the Liberals for the Tories, particularly in the South and
the Midlands; working people who had lost faith in the 'welfare
state' being attracted by the promise of tax cuts and an attack on
bureaucracy; salaried public sector employees shifting to Labour,
maybe out of plain self-interest given the menacing Tory talk-about
'bureaucracy' and 'unproductive jobs', and maybe out of conviction in
the 'caring' intent of social democracy. These, and other, cross
currents marked a further stage in the breakdown of the 1960s pattern
of 'working class'/Labour and 'middle class'/Tory partisanship, a
development which becomes clearer in the light of opinion survey
results of the time. There are two main points here. First, the
surveys show a further weakening of subjective 'class identification'
among the electorate, linked with a further dissociation of the
elements which had previously combined to form distinct popular images
of 'working class' and 'middle class*. As Crewe (1981) puts it,
"The British election study found that at the last election
less than half of the electorate even thought of themselves
as belonging to a social class. The number of electors with
uniformly middle class or working class characteristics - in
terms of occupation, family origins, house ownership etc. -
was only one in five".
Second, although the two-party vote had picked up to some extent since
1974 the substantive commitment of voters to the party of their choice
had not. Only 20 per cent of voters were found to have a 'very
strong' Conservative or Labour identification (as against 40 per cent
in 1964). This weakening was most marked on the Labour side:
although Labour still picked up a majority of votes among the manual
working classes, from communities in which Tory voting would be
virtually unthinkable, the proportion of Labour identifiers supporting
the time-hallowed party policies was at its lowest ebb. Only 32 per
cent of Labour identifiers supported more nationalisation, 30 per cent
favoured increasing expenditure on social services and 36 per cent did
not believe that trade unions have too much power. In fact, many
Labour supporters actively approved of policies put forward by the
Tories, such as council house sales and more spending on law and
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order. Such approval as there was for Labour's social democratic
'statist' policies tended to be concentrated among the 'professional
and managerial' strata.
In interpreting these points, it is important to stress that the
weakening of the ' class'/party link was a double process: on the one
hand it is true that neither party presented itself in 'class' terms -
both appealed to the 'nation'. Neither party, in other words,
attempted to make 'class' into the politically pertinent basis of
collectivity. But equally there is no evidence that a party offering
an explicit 'class' cue could have made much headway at the time. To
be more specific, there was no ready-made 'class politics' which could
have united industrial workers, and sufficient of the salariat to form
a winning bloc for Labour.
Where Thatcherism came from - reprise
In this section I have stressed the complexity of the conditions which
combined to permit a Thatcherism-dominated Tory party to form a
government in 1979. Thatcherist ideology does not 'represent' a
pre-constituted class interest, but as we have seen it draws upon the
concerns of a wide range of social collectivities: the monetarism of
financial circles; the neo-classicism of right-wing intellectuals
among the 'ideological classes'; the classic anti-tax, anti-debt
ideologies of the petty bourgeoisie; the widespread concern over
disruptive union power (even among union members); working class
objection to wage restraint, rising taxation and state bureaucracy. I
have outlined the particular political conditions under which this
ideological amalgam could achieve a position of dominance, first
within the Tory party and then at the level of national electoral
politics, and in this context I have stressed the weakness of the
incumbent orthodoxy which Thatcherism opposed: first the
demoralisation of the Tory 'left' or statist wing, incapable of
offering the party any direction after 1974, then in 1979 the
political bankruptcy of Labour. These conditions at the level of
party politics must in turn be set against the background of certain
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broader developments: the world wide inflationary recession of the
mid-'70s which sapped the confidence in 'Keynesianism' of governments
everywhere, and the long term failure of state interventionist
measures to halt the relative decline of the British economy. The
question arises as to whether it is possible to condense all these
elements under a generalised claim of the order that the rise of
Thatcherism represents an historic response to the crisis of the
foregoing 'social democratic consensus', an authentic attempt to break
the 'stalemate' in the class struggle referred to in the previous
chapter. It is true that Thatcherism does mark a break with the
bi-partisan base-line from which both Tory and Labour governments have
governed since the war. To give two indices: the proposition that
the government cannot usefully assume any responsibility for
maintaining the level of employment breaks with the thinking which
goes back to the National Government's White Paper on employment
policy of 1944; the determination to pursue certain economic policies
regardless of trade union opposition breaks with the implicit
commitment to tripartite discussion and accommodation which can also
be traced back to the war. Although there are post war antecedents to
Thatcher's 'free market' ideology (the Selsdon Heath), monetarism
(under Healey as Chancellor) and restrictive policy vis-a-vis the
unions (In Place of Strife, the Industrial Relations Act), and
although the Labour government of 1974-79 presided over levels of
unemployment which would have been thought outrageous even in the
1960s, it is clear enough that the rejection of expansionary demand
management and tripartite accommodation on the part of Thatcherism is
far more thorough-going than ever before. Thatcherism has quite
self-consciously undertaken to carry out a counter-revolution against
what it sees as the 'creeping socialism' inherent in the post war
consensus. And this counter-revolution certainly cannot be conceived
as an arbitrary political choice on the part of the Thatcherist cohort
of Tory politicians. I have tried to show that the existence of
Thatcherism as a serious political force is grounded in an impasse
confronting the foregoing mode of socio-economic development. At this
stage in the argument it will be useful to reinforce the case which I
have already made by means of a broad characterisation of that impasse
in specifically Marxist terms.
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I do not claim it as the 'essence', of which all the more specific
problems are merely 'manifestations', but a fundamental aspect of the
impasse of the social democratic settlement in post war Britain is the
problem of the mode of extraction of surplus labour. Within a system
of wage labour one can identify four possible means of ensuring the
performance of surplus labour against the background of the given
state of technology at any point in time: (i) the general
disciplining of labour through the effects of a 'reserve army' of
unemployed; (ii) coercive labour discipline within the unit of
production; (iii) reliance on material incentives to effort and
productivity such as bonus schemes, productivity deals and so on; and
(iv) reliance on the enthusiasm and self-motivation of the workforce.
Each of these modes has definite conditions of existence which may or
may not be satisfied in particular capitalist economies, branches of
industry and enterprises. The problem is that the course of social
development embarked upon in post war Britain tended to undermine the
modes of extraction of surplus labour characteristic of 'traditional'
capitalism without however developing a stable alternative. Prolonged
relatively full employment and the development of a comprehensive
system of social security virtually removed the reserve army of labour
and turned the labour market into a 'sellers' market' in which
capitalist enterprises were unable to resist the demands for a steady
rise in wage and salaries. At the same time this removal of the
reserve army undercut the authority of management within the unit of
production, in terms of the possibility of coercive labour discipline.
Workers, in many cases, could find jobs elsewhere if need be. In this
context the use of material incentives and productivity deals assumed
a greatly increased importance. But the willingness of British
workers to work harder and faster, or to give up time-honoured
practices which they reckon make working life more tolerable, in
pursuit of a marginal increment in the means of personal consumption,
appears to be relatively weak; certainly it is not so strong as in
the USA (foreigners generally seem to be surprised by the findings of
opinion polls which show a high level of satisfaction with material
living standards in Britain). So material incentives could not really
take the place of the prior forms of labour discipline in ensuring the
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extraction of surplus labour. Of the four modes mentioned above, this
leaves only reliance on enthusiasm and self-motivation. This has
always been important in certain occupations involving the exercise of
skill and expertise, but it could not operate as a general mode of
ensuring the performance of surplus labour. There is the example of
Japan, as a capitalist economy in which a 'will to work' is of great
importance, and furthermore the success of the Japanese economy over
the post war period suggests that this mode of extraction of surplus
labour is much the most progressive in terms of development of the
productive forces. But the social relations within Japanese industry
are highly specific, and the continuing sharp social demarcation
between management and 'workforce' in most of British industry rules
out the kind of solidarity within the enterprise which sustains the
Japanese motivation to work.
The general conclusion which emerges here is that conditions of full
employment and social security, by undermining the old modes of labour
discipline under capitalism in effect demand further moves in a
socialist direction; they make it necessary to reconstruct the
division of labour and the mechanisms of control over production in
such a way as to enlist the active involvement of the working class in
raising productivity. In the absence of such further moves, 'full
employment' capitalism is bound to prove unstable. The issue raised
by the retreat from full employment as a governmental commitment,
which has been in progress for a decade but which has now been
consummated under Thatcher, is whether we are now seeing a retreat to
the old modes of extraction of surplus labour in the face of the
inability of British society to resolve the problems of the new. The
gradual retreat from full employment in Britain since the 1960s has
not come about because of a conscious calculation concerning the mode
of labour discipline and extraction of surplus labour. Although there
were economists arguing the need for unemployment to ensure the
'correct functioning of the labour market', even in the heyday of
Keynesianism, their arguments did not attract much open support.
Rather, successive governments have been forced to abandon
expansionary demand management in the face of the balance of payments
constraint and the unwillingness of the financial markets to finance
the PSBR beyond certain levels. But behind these particular
constraints lies the fundamental problem of the competitive weakness
of the British economy which is closely linked to, if not entirely
explicable by, the difficulties experienced in the extraction of
surplus labour, which I have discussed above. ^ And now, in the
Thatcher government, we have a political force which is willing to
talk explicitly in terms of labour discipline, and make into a
conscious objective the re-establishment of conditions under which the
'market' can enforce this discipline.
What remains to be seen, however, is just how much of an 'historic'
turning point the rise of Thatcherism will prove to be. The stakes
here are obviously very high: if Thatcherism can 'succeed', if the
Thatcher government really has a programme capable of regenerating
British capitalism, and of carrying a substantial social bloc along
with that course, by anti-socialist means, then clearly the kind of
socialist transformations of economic class relations discussed
earlier, and put forward as potential means of breaking out of the
circle of relative economic decline, will be off the agenda for a long
time to come. If, on the other hand, Thatcherism proves an historic
dead end, incapable of regenerating the national economy or sustaining
14 This point was probably more influential in the USA than in
Britain. An interesting discussion of the doubts expressed over
'full employment' in the USA is given by Baran ( 1957). In
Britain the 1944 White Paper on employment policy noted the
likely effects of full employment on the bargaining power of the
unions, but the idea of a minimum acceptable level of
unemployment did not make much headway.
15 The retreat from full employment is not, of course, an
exclusively British phenomenon and therefore cannot be explained
wholly in terms of the relative competitive weakness of the
British economy. The argument concerning the problems of
extracting surplus labour in 'full employment' capitalism, on the
other hand, applies (albeit differentially) to all the advanced
capitalist economies and therefore provides a more general
principle of explanation.
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popular support then there may be a more auspicious opportunity than
ever before for putting forward a socialist alternative, although we
can be sure that in this case there will also be powerful forces
working for 'neither Thatcherism nor Socialism', i.e. for a return to
a (revamped) social democratic centre politics.
The next two sections of this chapter are addressed to aspects of this
complex of problems. In section 6.2 below I shall concentrate on the
'economic core' of the Thatcherist programme. In opposition, this
programme gave an appearance of clarity and coherence but I shall
argue that it is fundamentally unrealistic, being based on a radical
misapprehension regarding the conditions required for the successful
accummulation of capital. In other words, I wish to claim that
Thatcherism cannot fulfil the 'historic' role which it has set for
itself. In the light of this claim I shall examine some of the
economic effects of Thatcherism in practice. In section 6.3 I shall
return to the politics of opposition to Thatcherism.
6.2 The economic contradictions of Thatcherism
In general terms, the principal economic commitment of Thatcherism is
to 'roll back the state' and create incentives for the famous
'entrepreneurs' of free enterprise. So much was also true of Heath in
the Selsdon phase, but the monetarist component of Thatcherism gives a
more precise programmatic commitment. The new monetarism places a
special emphasis on the achievement of a steady reduction in the level
of public sector borrowing (the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement or
PSBR), since it is believed that excessive borrowing is the cause of
the growth of the money stock which in turn is the root cause of
inflation. The full argument is actually more complex, and contains a
conditional element: public sector borrowing can be financed in two
broad ways, either by sales of financial assets (Treasury stock) to
non-bank financial institutions or private individuals - which does
not expand the money stock - or by borrowing from the banking system,
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which creates new money. But to sell extra stock the government has
to offer attractive yields, and the greater the bond sales needed the
greater the upward pressure on interest rates. So a high level of
government borrowing, on this view, has two possible and equally
undesirable effects: either it pushes up interest rates or
contributes to inflationary growth of the money stock. Either way, it
undermines the project of regenerating private enterprise, since high
interest rates crowd out private sector investment and inflation
weakens the market order generally (in particular, inflation in excess
of that in the country's main trading partners weakens national
competitiveness). The dual project of ensuring a steady reduction of
the PSBR and of the rate of growth of the money stock is therefore
given pride of place among the government's economic aims, and has
been formalised in the Chancellor's 'medium term financial strategy'.
Now, as I remarked earlier, the PSBR, which is the gap between public
sector revenue and expenditure, could in principle be reduced by means
of higher taxation, but this course obviously flies in the face of the
avowed aims of Thatcherism. In order to create incentives, as well as
maintain the political support of the many Tory voters who were
attacted by the promise of tax cuts without necessarily having any
appreciation of the finer points of monetarism, the Tories are clearly
obliged to cut rather than raise taxes - or at least to appear to be
so doing. This then puts public expenditure under a double squeeze :
cuts are required both to satisfy the general aim of reducing the role
of the over-mighty state, and also to balance the conflicting aims of
cutting taxation and cutting the PSBR. This can be seen most starkly
in the following presentation, where G stands for public sector
expenditure and T for public sector revenue:
PSBR = G - T
If the intention is to cut both the PSBR and T then a sharp drop in G
is clearly a prime necessity.
16 This point is considered further in section 6.3 below.
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Cutting the PSBR by means of expenditure-reduction, sufficient to make
room for tax cuts : it is this project which is impossible, despite
Thatcher's personal conviction that it can be done if the government
only emulates the thrifty housewife or small businessman and 'lives
within its means' . The basis for my argument here has already been
laid out in Chapter 4, on classes and the financial circulation.
There it was shown that the financial surpluses and financial deficits
of the various sectors of the economy (public sector, corporate
sector, personal sector, and overseas sector) must sum to zero. In
other words one sector can reduce its deficit only to the extent that
the other sectors' combined surplus is reduced. So, more specifically,
the public sector financial deficit can be reduced only to the extent
that the personal sector surplus falls and/or the corporate sector
deficit rises and/or the overseas sector deficit rises. The financial
circulation process is a system of interdependencies, and the massive
public sector is simply not able to cut its borrowing unilaterally in
the way a housewife or small businessman may.
Let us consider the mechanisms of financial interdependency more
closely. Public sector expenditure has both discretionary and
mandatory components. The level of expenditure on supply services,
capital investment programmes, industrial aid and so on is
discretionary in the sense that, formally at any rate, it is a matter
for government decision. On the other hand the level of expenditure
on supplementary benefit, enemployment benefit, pensions and so on is
not under government control - once the government has set the rate
for these transfer payments the volume of expenditure is determined by
the number of eligible applicants claiming their rights. Public
sector revenue has a formal similarity with mandatory expenditure in
this sense, since once the government has set the rates of income tax,
VAT, charges for services, and nationalised industry prices, the
actual volume of revenue is determined by the level of taxable income
and transactions. So the overall impact on public sector finances of
a cut in discretionary spending crucially depends upon its
repercussions for mandatory expenditures and public sector revenues,
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and that in turn depends on the reactions of the other economic
sectors. In general terms, a reduction in discretionary public
expenditure is bound to reduce the incomes of the other sectors of the
economy - either the corporate sector (reduced orders for enterprises
which supply the public sector) or the personal sector (public sector
redundancies) . Either way, this reduction will then have the
Keynesian 'multiplier' effect on other incomes (as the enterprises
supplying the public sector cut their, purchases of materials and lay
off labour, and/or the redundant public sector employees cut their
expenditure) . The overall result will be a fall in the level of
demand. Now in the short term this may shift some of the public
sector's financial deficit onto the corporate sector, as firms find
their revenues reduced and are forced into increased borrowing to
cover current costs. But over time firms will react by cutting their
expenditure - shelving investment plans and laying off workers - and
when this happens unemployment will rise further. This in turn will
raise the level of mandatory public sector expenditure on income
maintenance and cause public sector revenues to fall (less income tax,
VAT, and nationalised industry sales revenue). The PSBR will be
driven up. It is a task of considerable complexity to quantify this
effect, but the Treasury (1981) has given a conservative estimate of
£340 million added directly to the PSBR per 100,000 extra registered
unemployed. To summarise, the attempt to cut public sector
expenditure will cause a recession, the financial consequences of
which will largely frustrate the objective of reducing the PSBR.
Whether the PSBR is reduced at all will depend on the behaviour of the
corporate sector (whether firms cut their expenditure fast enough to
shift the financial deficit back onto the state) and the personal
sector (whether recession reduces this sector's financial surplus).
As regards the personal sector, the indications are that rising
unemployment has tended to encourage precautionary saving : the
personal sector surplus has actually increased.
For two years now Thatcher's government has wrestled with this
apparent paradox. Apart from the severe political difficulties of
cutting expenditure at all in the first place, given the trimming of
plans which had already been going on since 1976, expenditure cuts
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have deepened the recession and pushed the PSBR hopelessly off the
course of the medium term financial strategy. The hapless chancellor
has solemnly explained that the 'unexpected' recession has made it
impossible to meet his financial targets. The recessionary effects of
the attempt to cut the PSBR have also been compounded by the
government's reaction to the continuing high level of borrowing by
both itself and the corporate sector. If expenditure cuts were not
working then the government tried to get a grip over borrowing (and
hence the rapidly expanding money supply) by raising interest rates.
Hence the record Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) of 17 per cent from
November 1979 till the summer of 1980. Interest rates at such a level
were sure to deter voluntary borrowing for new investment purposes,
but could not deflect the rise in involuntary borrowing as firms
struggled to meet current costs, including the increased interest
charges on debt already incurred. The effect of high interest rates
on the foreign exchanges added another twist, by causing the pound to
appreciate against other currencies, hence cutting exporting firms'
margins and markets and exposing domestic firms to 'artificially'
cheap foreign competition. Deeper recession, more involuntary
borrowing, more unemployment, and a further deterioration in public
sector finances.
During 1980, when these recessionary effects became increasingly
obvious, with registered unemployment rising beyond two millions and
manufacturing output and investment slumping, the government's first
ploy was to blame the 'world recession'. Jim Prior, secretary of
state for employment, expressed his 'concern' over the level of
unemployment but said that it showed the impact of the world economic
downturn on the British economy. Nothing, in other words, to do with
the government's economic policies. This is clearly false, and was
shown to be false by information published by the Bank of England
around the same time. There was a world recession beginning to make
itself felt after the rise in world oil prices in 1979, but that could
not explain the particular severity of the British recession. As
Blake (1980) points out, "the volume of trade in manufactures in the
first half of this year in our markets was up 7 per cent on the
previous year; the volume of our exports was virtually the same. So
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our share of world trade has been declining rapidly, no doubt in
response to a drop in competitiveness". That the British recession
was largely 'home made' is shown very clearly by the trade figures
throughout 1980. Although, as Blake remarks, British export volumes
were virtually stagnant between 1979 and 1980, the balance of payments
current account began to show large surpluses from early 1980. Partly
this can be explained by the rising exchange rate of the pound, which
raised the revenues from a given volume of exports, but the other
major explanatory factor is the slump in imports of intermediate goods
as British industry ran down its production. This effect was so
strong that it overwhelmed the 'natural' tendency towards a deficit on
the current account with a rising exchange rate, as predicted by the
Treasury for 1980.
It is tempting to ascribe the government's failure to unravel the
'paradoxical' effects of its policies to mere stupidity. After all,
anyone with a reasonable grasp of Keynesian economics could (and did)
predict the severe recessionary effects of public expenditure cuts and
high interest rates. But it is important to grasp the image which
blinds the Thatcherites to such reasoning. If Britain were Thatcher's
ideal world, a world of self-sustaining petty bourgeois convinced of
the virtues of the free market, then none of this should have
happened. The income returned in the tax cuts of 1979 would have been
invested in small enterprises or otherwise stimulated productive
effort, economic activity would have increased and the tax base would
have widened. By reducing the rate of taxation the government would
have at once stimulated free enterprise and actually increased total
tax revenue (this proposition, advanced by the American economist
Arthur Laffer, was explicitly endorsed by Thatcher in 1979).
Government spending cuts would simply have 'made room' for the
expanding claims on resources on the part of the private sector, and
the public sector's books would have progressively come into balance.
Let us admit some wage-workers into the scene : if they were rational
beings, appraised of the Quantity Theory and basing their expectations
of future price movements on the government's announced target for
growth of the money stock, then they would realise that 'excessive'
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wage rises could only cause unemployment, and would have adjusted
their wage demands accordingly. The inflation rate would have fallen
sharply, the international competitive position of the economy would
have improved, and net export demand would have risen. National
recovery.
Alas, Britain is not this ideal world. Britain's is a capitalist
economy (with a large state sector) in which, as I stressed in
chapters 3 and 4, the separation of individuals from the means of
production has reached an advanced stage. Well-off individuals who
receive tax rebates cannot generally put the money 'into the
business'. Instead it goes into the bank (or other financial
institution), reducing effective demand, so that eventually the
government is compelled to borrow it back to pay the costs of
recession. The particular form of 'tax cuts' in the 1979 budget is
important here. Despite Thatcher's brief flirtation with Laffer the
Treasury ministers well realised that a big tax giveaway must conflict
with the aim of reducing the PSBR, so the budget was really an
exercise in rearranging rather than cutting overall taxation. The
form this took was a reduction in income tax (skewed towards the upper
income groups) coupled with a sharp rise in indirect taxation
(principally VAT). The net effect was to leave the tax burden on
lower-paid workers virtually unchanged but to give a large hand-out to
the upper income groups for whom expenditure on consumer goods forms a
smaller proportion of income (so that they pay proportionately less
VAT). In other words, the big rebates went precisely to those social
strata which would be most inclined to add the monies to their stock
of savings, increasing the personal sector financial surplus. The
other effect of the 1979 tax changes was, of course, to raise retail
prices, reinforcing the trend consequent upon the oil-price rise, and
since the British trade unions do not base their wage demands on the
Quantity Theory of money but customarily on the prior changes in the
cost of living this contributed to a continuing wage-price spiral.
Rising labour costs coincided with a rising exchange rate to put
industrial enterprises under a double squeeze. Government policy
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succeeded not only in generating recession, but an inflationary
recession at that.
In this juxtaposition of the Thatcherist world view and the actuality
of the British economy, two points stand out. First, the fact that
income released by cuts in personal taxation cannot flow directly into
productive investment because of the separation of individuals from
the means of production, and because enterprises base their investment
plans on the expected level of demand in relation to their current
level of capacity-utilisation; and second, the fact that the trade
unions do not behave as they are supposed to according to the
monetarist notion of 'rational expectations'. These two discrepancies
do not have the same status. The second point has been noted by many
commentators (see for instance Gamble, 1979) and also by the leading
monetarists themselves. Hayek, for instance, in a letter to the
'Times' (13 June 1980) put it this way:
"If, as I believe to be true, with the present power of the
trade unions no government that has the power over the
supply of money can politically resist the pressure for more
money, the urgently needed termination of inflation cannot
succeed before the power of the trade unions is curbed".
The world must be altered, through anti-union legislation, so as to
ensure that wage-bargainers behave as they should according to the
'rational expectations' doctrine, and limit wage rises within the
target expansion of the stock of money. But the employment secretary
remembers only too well the effects of radical industrial relations
legislation under the Heath government, and has considerable support
within the Tory cabinet for his low-key approach in these matters.
Prior knows something that Thatcher would rather ignore : that however
many people approve of curbing union power in the abstract, workers
will tend to support the claims of their own union when they see their
wages or salaries falling behind price inflation. If it is
politically impossible to force the unions into outright submission to
the dictates of monetary restriction by means of the law, then the
only way to drive down wage-settlements is by allowing unemployment
(actual rather than prospective) to reduce union bargaining power.
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This is in effect what has happened over 1980 and early 1981 (the
so-called 'winter of commonsense'). But at this point 'monetarism'
become indistinguishable from old-fashioned deflation, which is
entirely explicable in 'Keynesian' terms and which holds no guarantee
of continuing 'moderation' and 'commonsense' if and when demand and
employment pick up again. Tory policies become not a 'new beginning'
but merely a prolonged 'stop' episode in the stop-go cycle, the mirror
image of excessive fiscal expansionism on the part of Maudling and
Barber.
If failure to get the unions to act according to monetarist
rationality is economically and politically damaging, the first
discrepancy noted above is in a sense even more problematic for
Thatcherism. The unions can maybe be beaten into at least temporary
submission by enforced recession, but if public expenditure cuts and
tax hand-outs for the wealthy cannot stimulate corporate sector
investment, indeed if they can accomplish only the reverse, then the
long term prospects for the Thatcherist economic programme are very
dim. Changing the world in such a way that it conforms to the ideal
of 'people's capitalism', where personal savings can flow directly
into productive investment is no easy task. This is, however, quite
explicitly the task set for the Tories by Thatcher's staunch supporter
at the department of energy, David Howell. Howell (1978) argues in
terms of moving people out of the irresponsible dependency upon
wage-labour in large impersonal enterprises and getting them to set up
small businesses, giving them a personal stake in capitalism. This is
surely chimerical. It is easy enough to move people out of industrial
wage-labour, and the government has accomplished this on a large scale
over 1980^, but it is quite another matter to get them to set up
their own businesses with their redundancy money. Small businesses
thrive no better than large ones during a recession, indeed many of
them are dependent on large enterprises. Council house sales can
spread the ownership of property as such, but spreading the personal
17 From mid-1979 to the end of 1980 employment in manufacturing
industry alone fell by around one million, or over 10 per cent of
the 1979 workforce.
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ownership of property in the means of production on a significant
scale would require a revolution against the trends of industrial
concentration and the depersonalisation of capitalist property, and
there is no indiciation that the Tories have the means to accomplish
this. In this respect, the much vaunted special fiscal measures to
encourage small businesses have been widely acknowledged to be so
hedged as to be virtually useless (Stanley, 1981).
A U turn?
During 1980, the ghost of Heath haunted the Tory party. As
unemployment mounted and recession deepened, and the government's
financial plans went by the board, political commentators speculated
on the possibility of a 'U turn' back to 'consensus' politics. But
such a move was politically and ideologically impossible for Thatcher
and her supporters. The Thatcherites had a firmer certitude in their
policies than the Selsdon Heath ever had. They maintained, and no
doubt believed, that there was 'no alternative' - that fiscal
expansionism would drive the PSBR even higher, push up interest rates,
expand the money supply faster, and lead to even worse ruination. All
the same, although it could not be acknowledged as a radical break,
the government was forced into a series of accommodations. The
recession was bearing particularly heavily on the nationalised
industries, as suppliers of basic commodities to the rest of the
economy, and many NEB subsidiaries were in financial trouble as well.
The government was forced to recognise that the degree of internal
financing envisaged for these enterprises in the 'medium term
financial strategy' was (as almost all independent observers had said
at the time) out of the question. So along with social security
payments, the government was obliged to increase its expenditure in
the support of these enterprises. Small profitable sections could be
sold off to private financiers but the private sector was hardly
interested in taking on British Steel, British Rail, or B.L. For
Tories who had been expecting the aid to 'lame ducks' to be cut off
this was in itself a kind of U turn, all the more galling in that
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Keith Joseph, at the department of industry, was responsible for
18
providing much of the finance . Joseph, unable to impress his civil
servants with academic oppositionist pronouncements, had to recognise
that his neoclassical ideology was not applicable .
These accommodations had a price, however. If public expenditure
could not be cut and the PSBR was out of control then the only course
at all compatible with monetarist financial rectitude was to raise
taxation. A rise in the actual rate of income tax was considered too
much of a blatant contradiction of the Tories' electoral promises, so
in the 1980 budget, the mini-budget of late 1980 (the chancellor's
'economic statement') and the budget of 1981 taxation was raised in a
number of other less visible ways : increased national insurance
contributions; failure to adjust tax thresholds fully in line with
inflation; increased duties on alcohol, petrol, tobacco; profits tax
on the banks; adjustment of taxation of North Sea oil revenues. All
this was in addition to other measures designed to raise public sector
revenues such as increased council rents and the raising of
nationalised industry prices (those not in direct competition with
overseas suppliers) well in excess of the general rate of retail price
inflation. One effect of this form of tax increase, bearing as it did
upon both industrial costs and retail prices, was to contribute to the
maintenance of a double-figure inflation rate into 1981. The pattern
of taxation also was arranged to fall most heavily on lower income
groups. Westlake (1981) has shown that even if one accounts only
income tax and national insurance contributions, the level of taxation
on the 'average family' (with two children) has risen steadily after
the initial hand-out of 1979 . For the financial year 1981-82 it is
estimated that the proportion of gross earnings taken in tax will be
22.8 per cent for a family on two thirds of average earnings, as
against 18.7 per cent in the last year of the Labour government;
18 A vitriolic attack on Joseph was launched by the Tory Bow Group
in May 1981. But Thatcher had enough realism to stand by her
'renegade' mentor.
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27.5 per cent for a family on average earnings (25.2 per cent under
Labour); and 31.3 per cent for a family on twice average earnings
(29.9 per cent) To look at it another way, the threshold of income
taxation has dropped under Howe's chancellorship from 45 per cent of
average earnings to 38 per cent. For a family on five times average
earnings, however, the proportion taken in tax is estimated at 44.7
19
per cent for 1981-82, as against 49.8 per cent under Labour. As I
remarked earlier, this pattern of taxation, while it may give
satisfaction to certain groups which would be natural Tory supporters
anyway, is precisely the opposite of what would be required to reduce
the PSBR. To cut the PSBR the government would have to devise a
taxation policy which would appropriate the savings of the upper
income strata, rather than drive down the consumption levels of lower
income groups.
So no U turn has been acknowledged, indeed the idea has been firmly
quashed on several occasions, but all the same there has been a marked
discrepancy between the effects of Tory policy over the last two years
and the promises of 1979 . This discrepancy has of necessity been
rationalised by a change of ideological stance. In 1979, Thatcher did
not exactly promise a painless adjustment to the new economic order,
but the future was certainly painted in rosy colours. She genuinely
believed that tax cuts would stimulate enterprise; she claimed that
public expenditure cuts would fall only on bureaucracy and waste and
would provide an occasion for improving services; the professors told
her that any recessionary effects of restrictive monetary policy would
be strictly minor and transient. When the recession came it was an
unpleasant surprise, caused by difficult world economic conditions
19 It is ironic to note the behaviour of the new 'Tax and Prices
Index' (TP1). This index was constructed in 1979 in the attempt
to demonstrate that the overall effect of the 1979 budget, while
it pushed up prices, did not warrant commensurate wage claims
since increases in expenditure taxes were compensated by income
tax reductions. The government wished to deflect wage
negotiator's attention from the Retail Price Index (RP1), the
normal guideline for assessing movements in the cost of living.
Embarassingly for the government, since 1979 the TP1 has recorded
larger increases that the RPl.
389
and irrational trade unionists. But then as the recession deepened,
there came a change in emphasis - a subtle shift towards 'taking
credit for the recession'. The most candid expression of the new view
had been given by relatively junior ministers : Biffen, at the
Treasury, with his talk of 'three years of austerity' as the necessary
precondition for a return to the realm of 'Gladstonian Freedom';
Nicholas Ridley, at the foreign office, who felt able to vouchsafe to
the Conservative ladies of Circencester and Tewkesbury that the
unemployed formed a 'useful reserve'. Mr Ridley was reported in the
'Times' as saying:
"I have good news for you. Our labour is cheaper to employ than that
of our major competitors... We are becoming increasingly competitive
internationally. Britain is now a most attractive place for
industrial investment".
At the top levels of the party there has been less willingness to
admit that the recession is the inevitable result of government
policies, but the view has often been put that industry will emerge
from the recession 'lean and vigorous'. If the new economy cannot be
born of spontaneous entrepreneurial initiative, perhaps its birth can
be forced by the exposure of industry to severe competitive pressures.
Trade unions will learn moderation and managers will learn to manage
and to rationalise their enterprises. Even if the government insists
that it has not caused the recession, it recognises that recession is
perhaps no bad thing.
This new orientation raises an important question concerning the
economic programme of Thatcherism. Is it perhaps the case that all
the talk of precise monetary control, stimulation of small businesses,
reduction of state bureaucracy and so on, is really beside the point?
Does Thatcherism have an ulterior programme, the success of which is
not to be judged against electoral promises or the medium term
financial strategy, nor against the petty bourgeois ideology of
balancing the books? This is what has been suggested by Tony Benn, in
his speeches in parliament and elsewhere: it is quite wrong to judge
Thatcher, Howe et al as incompetent or misguided - they know what they
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are doing only too well, and this is making a calculated and cynical
attempt to break the strength of the organised working class by any
available means, in the belief that this alone will permit a
profitable regeneration of capitalism. Further, they may be correct
in this regard, and the only force that can stop this project from
'succeeding' is the resistance of the organised working class.
Thatcherism, in other words, should be seen as the authentic political
face of capital itself, behind an increasingly ill-fitting populist
mask.
But there are problems with this view. Thatcherism is the politics of
a definite faction within a certain political party, and the
Thatcherites are not in a specially privileged position to divine the
'true needs of capital', nor to frame policies which would satisfy
those putative needs. Thatcherism may have developed a profoundly
callous and even cynical dimension since 1979, but even if one assumes
that restructuring through recession is now its adopted programme (or
always was its 'hidden programme') it does not follow that the
programme is not misguided. It may be cynical, but at the same time
misguided, and destructive of capitalist interests in the sense that
it is worsening the conditions for a long-term improvement in the
competitive position of the British economy. I would argue that the
monetarist/neoclassical/petty bourgeois complex of economic ideology
which characterises Thatcherism is not merely a mask which obscures
its real service to the interests of big capital, but a real
limitation, making it very difficult for Thatcherism to frame policies
which will have their intended effects. I agree with Gamble (1979)
when he writes, of the Friedman/Hayek view, that "it contains no means
of thinking through some of the most important problems confronting
capitalist societies and their governments". Thatcherism relies too
heavily on theoretical ideologies which may have a high 'apologetic'
value but which are not adequate as the practical ideology of a
government. The recessionary effects of Thatcher's economic policies,
whether intended or not, are more likely to accelerate rather than
halt the relative decline of British capitalism, even if Thatcherism
is not smashed by a socialist working class.
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The class struggle is not a 'zero-sum game' in which any loss for one
side is a gain for the other, and while Thatcherism is undoubtedly
inflicting losses on the working class - unemployment, curtailment of
union rights, falling living standards and public service provision -
it is also inflicting losses on capitalist enterprises. Large and
previously successful companies have been forced into profitability
20
crises; large sections of manufacturing capacity have been
scrapped; overseas markets have been lost; unemployment and lack of
training facilities are building up a potential shortage of skilled
labour; resistance to state sector investment plans is weakening the
technological capacity of British industry. Of course the effects are
not uniform. Some enterprises have doubtless taken advantage of the
recession to rationalise and achieve a more competitive adjustment to
world market conditions. But the idea that this will happen quite
generally, that a good 'shake-out' is the necessary first step on the
road to recovery, is belied by the experience of past recessions. The
Cambridge Economic Policy Group ( 1981) have analysed the effects on
industry of the recessions of 1967, 197 1 and 1975. At an aggregate
level, they point out that the '67 and '71 recessions were each
followed by two years of rapid growth of output and productivity.
After 1975, when the recession was deeper and labour productivity
fell, recovery was weaker. In all three cases however, recovery of
output and increased productivity depended upon devaluation of the
currency and rapid expansion of world trade in manufactured products,
leading to a fast growth of exports - a condition which is unlikely to
be met after the 1980/81 recession "because UK cost competitiveness
has deteriorated by nearly 50 per cent compared with the situation in
the recovery of earlier cycles. The level of competitiveness
20 Over 1980, the only major area of high profitability among
industrial and commercial companies' activities in the UK was the
North Sea sector. The real profitability of companies' non-North
Sea activities as measured by the real rate of return on trading
assets (gross trading profits net of stock appreciation and
depreciation as a percentage of capital employed, valued at
replacement cost) fell to a record low of 3 per cent. This
compares with an average figure of 5.5 per cent over 1974-79 and
10 per cent from 1963 to 1973. Financial companies and
institutions, by contrast, did very well out of a regime of high
interest rates (Treasury, 1981a).
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achieved then could not be restored in the early 1980s without a huge
and unprecedented devaluation which would have very serious
consequences for the rate of inflation" (CEPG, 1981, p. 51). Looking
at the trading performance of the different branches of manufacturing
industry in more detail, the CEPG conclude that there is no evidence
that those branches which undertook shake-outs of labour in the early
1970s "made any gain in competitiveness relative to those which had
expanded their employment. The latter group continued to have a
considerably better export performance than those which cut their
manpower" (ibid., p. 52). The redundancies and closures of earlier
recessions, it seems, achieved "no more and no less than a contraction
of the industry in question" (ibid.). And the scale of the
contraction achieved over 1980 makes it probable than in the event of
a recovery of domestic demand British industry will be worse placed to
respond than before, so that the balance of payments constraint will
be tighter than ever.
It might be claimed that this kind of argument misses the point;
maybe, given the development of the international division of labour
and the changing pattern of competitive advantage, there are branches
of industry or particular enterprises which should simply be wound
down, and their resources transferred to more optimal uses. There are
two problems here. First, the extremely adverse trading conditions of
the current recession have not necessarily hit hardest those
industries or enterprises which are 'least efficient'; they have been
more arbitrary in their impact. For instance, the over-valued pound
of 1980 bore especially hard on enterprises producing internationally
traded commodities with a relatively high price elasticity of demand,
such as bulk chemicals, regardless of the efficiency with which those
commodities were produced. Or again, the moratorium on council house
building has hit the building trades hard, regardless of their level
of efficiency. Secondly, even it it is true that conditions of
generalised recession produce a certain 'weeding out' effect on
producers whose market position is most marginal by reason of
inefficiency, this is at best only half of a programme for economic
regeneration. That is, recession can force the withdrawal of
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resources (plant, labour power) from certain lines of production but
there is no guarantee that market mechanisms will lead to the
re-employment of resources in more optimal lines of production.
Thatcherist ideology, of course, absolves the government from any
responsibility for ensuring this re-deployment and maintains that it
will be accomplished by unfettered private initiative. We shall see -
the record of the British economy after the return to the gold
standard in 1925 is hardly encouraging. And it can be argued that the
kinds of transformations of the industrial structure which are called
for in the 1980s - development of more 'knowledge-intensive'
industries and a broad move 'up market' to reduce the vulnerability of
the national economy to competition from the newly-industrialising
countries - are transformations which call for a more active role for
the state than previous industrial mutations, in terms of developing a
skilled, knowledgeable and mobile workforce and funding applicable
research and development. In other words, the production of the
social surplus product is increasingly becoming a social process in
the advanced capitalist economies, so that a policy which achieves the
object of enforcing labour discipline through the reconstitution of a
reserve army of unemployed at the cost of running down the social
preconditions for raising productivity (education cuts for example),
appears increasingly myopic.
To summarise the argument of this section : I have maintained that
the economic programme of Thatcherism is unrealisable, and that the
attempt to put it into effect has produced results which appear highly
paradoxical to its supporters : the rapid dwindling of private sector
productive capacity and investment along with a continuing 'excessive'
PSBR and rapid growth of the money supply as measured by the
government's chosen indicators. Further, if the Thatcherites have now
shifted their ground and are inclined to 'take credit for the
recession', believing that its purgative effects will lay the basis
for a sound economic recovery, it is very doubtful whether even this
'cynical' version of Thatcherism can succeed. Belief in recovery
through recession is an act of faith in the adaptive capacities of the
market, unsustained by evidence. But if Thatcherism fails - fails to
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achieve its objective of a thriving free-market British economy and
fails to win the next election - it will clearly not be without
lasting political effects. In the third and final section of this
chapter I shall consider the politics of support for, and opposition
to, Thatcher ism, and try to identify some of the constraints and
opportunities for socialism connected with the effects of Thatcherism.
6.3 Political effects of Thatcherism .
At its most general and abstract, the question of the political
effects of Thatcherism can be stated quite simply : if Thatcherism
fails, will the result be a return to the social democratic 'centre',
shifted somewhat to the right since 1979 by the effects of
Thatcherism, or is a return to anything like the status quo ante
impossible - will a failure of Thatcherism provide the ground for a
counter-radicalism of the left, and at last put on the agenda the
kinds of socialist transformation of economic class relations
discussed earlier? To make any headway in approaching the question,
however, one must start from an analysis of the particular ways in
which political forces, corporate bodies and social collectivities are
aligning themselves in the context of Thatcherism - how they are
defining their support or opposition. One can then ask which
'alternative' is most likely to be successful in giving direction to
the very widespread discontent which Thatcherism is generating, and at
the same time try to identify the crucial questions around which the
credibility of a post-Thatcher socialism might turn.
I begin with the patterns of alignment visible by early 1981. First,
at the electoral level it is clear now - in fact it was clear by early
1980 - that the specific electoral support bloc which carried
Thatcherism to power has already broken up. The manual working class
voters who turned to the Tories in large numbers in 1979 have
emphatically withdrawn their support, according to the opinion
n 21polls.
21 A summary of poll findings, by social class, for early 1980 is
presented by Kellner and Worcester ( 1980) .
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This is hardly surprising, given that much of this support was
motivated by the wish to see taxation cut and as we have seen taxation
has actually increased under the Tories for all but the most
highly-paid. Also unemployment has risen particularly rapidly in the
very industrial areas of England - such as the West Midlands - which
provided the biggest pro-Tory swing among working class voters in
1979. Further, any worker voting Tory in expectation of better and
less bureaucratic public services will have been sorely disappointed.
Polls have also indicated that the Tories' electoral lead among the
middle classes, which as we have seen was already being eroded by
1979, has declined further: certainly the public sector salariat at
all levels has good reason to withdraw support from a party committed
to cutting their numbers, privileges and influence, and there must
also be many private sector salaried employees who see Thatcherism in
practice as destructive and dangerous for industry. The managerial
strata have not escaped the redundancies of the current recession,
although they have been less hard-hit than manual workers.
If the mass popular support has been eroded rather rapidly this does
not, however, mean that all the aspects of the Thatcher programme and
its effects have been equally discredited. In particular it is
noteworthy that the longstanding trend in popular opinion against the
'abuse of trade union power' has not been reversed. Around the time
of the steel strike in early 1980 - a very reasonable strike, one
might think, given the truly derisory 2 per cent pay offer with which
the British Steel Corporation opened the bidding - a poll commissioned
by the 'Times' (21 January) found 73 per cent of respondents in favour
of legislation to reduce trade union powers : 61 per cent of trade
union members were in favour, as were 45 per cent of active union
members. Also, despite the resistance of the unions to the
government's scheme to provide funding for trade union postal ballots,
over 70 per cent of members (and of active members) favoured election
of leaders and officials by secret ballot, and the support for strike
ballots was even higher. It would be wrong to place too much reliance
on those poll findings. In early 1980 memories of the so-called
'winter of discontent' were still strong, and the steel strike was one
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which gave rise to emotive scenes of picketing, rapidly reproduced on
the nation's TV screens, and fueled the latent public hostility to
unions 'overstepping the mark'. Popular reaction to the subsequent
protracted civil service dispute, over the government's failure to
honour its agreed pay procedure, has been much more muted. It could
be that rising unemployment and the turn towards falling real earnings
on a broad scale for those in employment (the rising pound held real
earnings up in the early Thatcher period) are shifting the balance of
public sympathy in pay disputes, at least to some extent.
Nonetheless, the discrepancy between the rapid loss of overall support
for the Tories and the continuing relative popularity of restraint on
the trade unions cannot be ignored. It seems to me that if one takes
the measure of this discrepancy it suggests that a movement of
resistance to Thatcherism based upon the simple defence of trade union
rights and/or wage militancy is unlikely to provide a pole of popular
attraction capable of drawing together a hegemonic social force. This
is not, however, to argue that defence of union rights and real
earnings is unimportant or should be dropped - far from it - only
these objectives have to be articulated within a broader political
project.
Trends in popular opinion one way or the other do not directly produce
effects at the level of party politics and governmental
decision-making, except infrequently when they are permitted to act
through the mechanisms of elections and referenda. All the same they
may enter into the calculations of political forces concerned to build
or conserve popularity. As regards the effects of popular opinion
acting through electoral mechanisms, it is clear that a general
election will not be called in the near future, and probably not until
1983 or '84 unless there is a large scale revolt within the Tory party
before then. The effects of the local government elections of May
1981, in which Labour gained control of the major city councils, will
create difficulties for the government's project of reducing local
authority expenditure, and will also offer a useful if embattled field
for the development of a popular left oppostion to Thatcherism, but as
regards the maintenance of central government power Thatcher and her
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supporters can afford to ignore public opinion in the short run. The
collapse of the Tory electoral support bloc of 1979 does not therefore
have a direct political effectivity at a national level, but it
clearly has influenced the forces active in British politics, whether
they seek to maintain and rebuild support for the Tory party or
further to undermine that support and to construct an alternative. It
is to these forces that I now turn : the political parties and
tendencies, the ideological groupings and corporate bodies, which are
more or less capable of giving definition to popular discontent, of
influencing the course of the government, or of constructing an
'alternative' which will carry conviction. I proposed to organise
this account into three sections. First, there are those forces and
groupings which claim that the only reason why Thatcherism has run
into difficulties is that the Thatcherist programme has not been taken
far enough, fast enough. Second, there are those forces which define
their opposition to Thatcherism in broadly 'social democratic' terms,
regarding Thatcher's programme as a dangerous and misconceived break
with consensus politics. Third, there are the forces which hope to
exploit the prospective failure of Thatcherism to promite a radical
left alternative, accepting Thatcher's own claim that the social
democratic accommodation has failed .
The Ultra-Right
I adopt the 'ultra-right' as a convenient label for those political
forces and ideological groupings which take the view that Thatcherism
is in danger of failing only because it is not being pursued far or
fast enough. In this category one finds certain sections of the Tory
party (notably the Bow Group) , as well as the major ideologues of
monetarism and 'free market' economics such as Friedman, Hayek, and in
Britain Patrick Minford of Liverpool University. The arguments put
forward by the ultra-right have three main concerns: first the failure
of the Thatcher government to deal rapidly and effectively with the
trade union movement; second, its failure to cut public spending fast
enough or deep enough; and third the supposed technical incompetence
of the government (or certain state apparatuses) in controlling the
growth of the money supply. I shall consider these concerns in turn.
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As regards the trade unions, it is a general grievance on the right
that the government has not acted decisively enough to challenge trade
union power and to place close legal restrictions upon union
activities, in particular picketing, unofficial strikes and the
formation of closed shops. Such decisive action is seen as necessary
to create a competitive British economy, and to reduce unemployment in
the medium term (since unemployment is regarded as the effect of
22
artificial rigidities in the labour market) . The point is often put
that if the labour market is not drastically reformed then attempted
monetary control will continue to produce severe political
difficulties which will jeopardise the chances of reelection of the
government and hence jeopardise the whole Thatcherist project. It is
also claimed that the election of 1979 and the widespread hostility to
the unions after the 'winter of discontent' gave the Thatcher
government a decisive mandate to reform the labour market without
having to negotiate or secure the agreement of the unions themselves :
the more the task is delayed, the more difficult it may become. From
the evidence of her various speeches on the subject it would appear
that Thatcher herself is sympathetic to this line of criticism of the
government's record, but is unable to enforce her own views upon an
unwilling Employment Secretary who still has a support-base within the
Tory cabinet and among the party's industrial constituents.
It would be foolish to pretend that the call for tighter curbs on the
unions does not have significant popular backing, not only among the
rank and file of the Tory party but also among nonworkers, the
self-employed, non-union workers and even union members. But it now
seems unlikely that the government will attempt further drastic legal
restriction. Prior has an important element in the CBI on his side in
his resistance to such a move : many large employers do not have any
objection in principle to the closed shop, which can help to
regularise labour relations, and are suspicious of 'impractical'
schemes which are liable to generate 'political warfare'. Anthony
22 See, for instance, Minford and Peel (1981).
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Frodsham of the Engineering Employers Association summed up the
majority view at the 1980 CBI conference when he praised Prior for his
"conspicuous sincerity, moderation and, above all, practical
understanding of this minefield through which he is moving" (Financial
Times 12/11/80). Providing that the line of Prior and the majority in
the CBI holds up against Thatcher's political instincts and the Tory
petty bourgeoisie, the ultra-right is likely to be disappointed on the
issue of radical labour-market reform.
A second concern of the ultra-right is the question of public
expenditure. Here the claim is that if only the government had cut
deeper from 1979 this would have 'released resources' for the private
sector, permitted tax-cuts and, by reducing the PSBR, would have
permitted lower interest rates over 1980. We have already seen,
however, that public expenditure cuts may 'release resources' onto the
dole queue, but they do not necessarily reduce the PSBR or make room
for tax-cuts because of their recessionary effects. The spokesmen of
industry are in a very awkward position over this issue : on the one
hand many of them accept the basic Thatcher doctrine that expenditure
cuts are necessary to permit growth in the private sector, but equally
there are many businesses which appreciate the importance of public
sector contracts, and complain vocally over the limitation of public
sector building and engineering programmes. What the industrialists
really want to see is the restriction of spending on 'socialism' and
'waste', rather than on projects which provide profitable
opportunities for private business, but the problem is that these
evils are harder to identify and root our than the Tories expected in
1979. The attempt to cut supposedly 'wasteful' discretionary
expenditure has been subject to diminishing returns for political
effort (some of the political opposition will be considered below).
Meanwhile the level of expenditure on social security, industrial
23
support and financing of the nationalised industries is relentlessly
driven up by the recession, and the level of defence expenditure is
23 It is interesting to note that government lending to the
nationalised industries for 1980-81 is estimated at rather more
than £2 billion - more than twice the figure (in constant prices)
for 1978-79.
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driven up in accordance with the militaristic international stance of
the Thatcher government, leaving little room, as the Government see
it, for the financing of large-scale projects which would benefit
private industry. On present indications the ultra-right and business
interests are likely to remain disappointed on this issue as well as
the labour-market issue .
Writers such as Gough (1979) have argued that the 'expenditure cuts'
since 1976 should be seen not merely as a quantitative exercise, but
as an attempt to make public expenditure more 'functional' for
capital. Leaving aside the problem of how one defines what is
functional for capital, it is ironic that the application of
monetarist ideology in economic policy has led to a pattern of
expenditure which is manifestly 'non-functional' on any reckoning,
with its heavy weight of support for the unemployed and for state
enterprises hit by recession.
The third ultra-right concern which I shall consider here is the
limitation of monetary growth. On this issue one has the spectacle of
Milton Friedman turning on the Bank of England and the Treasury and
accusing them of incompetence in monetary control, and Hayek arguing
that the 'gradualist' approach of Howe's 'medium term financial
strategy' is doomed to political failure since it cannot be
accomplished within the span of one parliament. First consider
Friedman's charge of incompetence. To appreciate this point it is
necessary to say a few words on the definition of the 'money supply'
and the conditions of monetary growth. The definition of the money
supply upon which the government has placed most weight is Sterling
M . Basically this refers to cash in circulation plus the sterling
deposit liabilities of the banks, including both 'demand deposits'
(i.e. current accounts) and 'time deposits' (i.e. deposit accounts, up
to two years maturity) . This measure is supposed to provide an
approximation to the total means of payment in the economy. Now the
only kind of transaction which can lead to an expansion of Sterling
is borrowing from the banking system, while repayment of debt to the










(= cash in circulation
+ bank deposits) OUTFLOW
Repayment of debt
to the banks.
1. Money is created by borrowing from the banks. Consider two
forms: the term loan and the overdraft. In the case of a term loan a
bank customer is granted a deposit by the bank, against the promise to
repay the sum plus interest. This is a net addition to the stock of
money since the customer has not been obliged to pay in cash or
cheques to produce the deposit. In the case of an overdraft the
borrower is not granted a deposit, but is granted the right to draw
out cash or write cheques even when his deposit is zero. When this
right is exercised it results in expansion of the money stock. Say I
have a zero bank deposit, yet I am allowed to withdraw cash. Then
cash in circulation rises but the total of bank deposits is not
24
reduced. Say I write a cheque to someone else. Their bank deposit
will be increased when they pay it in, yet my bank deposit cannot be
reduced correspondingly if it is already zero.
2. Money is 'destroyed' when cash or cheques are used to repay a
bank loan, or paid into an overdrawn account. Say I make out a cheque
for £20, payable to someone whose account is £40 overdrawn. When the
cheque is cleared my deposit is reduced by £20 but the payee's deposit
remains at zero before and after. So total deposits are reduced.
24 That is, indebtedness to a bank is not counted as a 'negative
deposit' for purposes of measuring money stock.
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3. Consider what happens if one borrows money not from a bank but
from some other kind of economic agent, say a building society or a
pension fund, an industrial company or an individual. In this case
the lending agent simply transfers cash or bank deposits from its own
possession to that of the borrower, against the promise of repayment
plus interest. The money stock is unchanged, only the custody of part
of that stock is shuffled around. The point is that the banks are the
only agents capable of granting to borrowers new bank deposits, or the
right to continue writing cheques even when the borrower's account is
empty.
So the restriction on monetary growth comes down to the restriction of
bank lending. Now Friedman's point is that the British monetary
authorities have sought to limit monetary growth by means of high
interest rates, where they should have been restricting the expansion
of the banks' deposit liabilities directly by means of 'monetary base'
control.
The latter principle of control depends upon the fact that the
'monetary base', or notes and coins plus the banks' own deposits with
the Bank of England, has a specially privileged role within the
banking system. The commercial banks can create credit for their
customers, and hence, as we have seen, create new bank deposits, but
they cannot themselves create any additions to the 'monetary base'.
The position of 'bankers' balances' (the banks' deposits with the Bank
of England) is particularly important here. These deposits are used
to settle inter-bank indebtedness arising from the making of payments
by the customers of one bank to the customers of others, and also the
banks draw upon these deposits to obtain their supply of notes and
coin to meet the demands of their customers. If the call made upon
'bankers' balances' for these purposes is roughly proportional to the
level of the banks' own deposit liabilities, then the idea is that the
level of the bankers' balances constitutes a constraint upon the
banks' ability to create deposits through the granting of credit : the
banks cannot allow the ratio of bankers' balances to their own
liabilities to fall too far, or else they will run into problems in
maintaining the convertibility of those liabilities into the legal
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tender on demand. So if the authorities can restrict the 'monetary
base' then the banks will be correspondingly limited in their capacity
to create credit.
There are two problems here: restricting the 'monetary base' in the
first place, and coping with the consequences of a successful
restriction, should this be achieved. In order to restrict the
'monetary base' the monetary authorities have to sell securities to
the customers of the banks, who then draw cheques on their bank
accounts payable to the Bank of England, hence reducing the banks'
claims on the Bank of England (i.e. the bankers' balances). But there
is no telling what interest rates would be required to achieve this
sale of securities on a sufficient scale. Assume, however, that this
is achieved, offering whatever yield is required. Now the commercial
banks are obliged to curtail their lending, by means of high lending
rates and/or refusal of credit to marginal customers. But this will
have grave repercussions for the 'pyramid of credit' which sustains
the monetary economy : if the banks grant no additional credit in the
context of recession then the result will be widespread company
liquidations, while if they do grant additional credit and the central
monetary authorities refuse to countenance any expansion of the
monetary base then the banks' own liquidity position will be under
threat; the convertibility of the banks' liabilities into the legal
tender will be jeopardised. It is just these effects which the British
monetary authorities have in mind when they reject Friedmanite
'monetary base' control. In effect the authorities reckon on setting
a ceiling on acceptable interest rates, and living with whatever
monetary growth occurs at that level of interest, rather than allowing
interest rates get as high - and the liquidity position of banks and
precarious - as is required to achieve a given monetary growth target.
In this they cannot be accused of 'incompetence', but only of lacking
political boldness - or of preferring not to see the monetary system
crash into ruins, depending on one's point of view.
Friedman presents his critique, disingenuously, as if it were a purely
technical matter. Hayek on the other hand is more candid. He is
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prepared to admit that a rigid monetary policy, necessary to stop
inflation dead, would at the same time create chos in the 'real
economy*. For him, a few months of chaos would be preferable to the
long drawn-out agony of gradual monetary restriction, and he has
claimed that the 'short sharp shock' treatment would give the Tories a
better chance of winning the next election. This is clearly a wild
gamble which no government could seriously contemplate. Even if
Thatcher were inclined in this direction (this is doubtful : she was
one of the first to complain about high mortgate interest rates in
1979, showing a healthy politician's response to the effects of her
own favoured monetary policy) , it is most unlikely that the Tory
cabinet would hold together around such a course of action.
The ideological champions of monetarism do not, therefore, offer any
politically acceptable advice to the Thatcher government. They too
are likely to remain disappointed. If we take together the comments
made above concerning the three areas of union reform, public
expenditure and monetary control, the conclusion which emerges is that
the ultra-right criticism of the Thatcher government's practice is
doomed to political marginality. It is highly improbable that it can
form the basis for a regenerated and even more strident version of
Thatcherism within the lifetime of this government, and even less
probable that it could sustain support at the next election. This is
not to say that the Tories will not make some further moves on union
reform, or carry out further damaging reductions in public spending,
but only that this will not amount to a political regeneration capable
of winning back broad popular support.
The 'social democratic' opposition
I shall use the term 'social democratic opposition' to refer broadly
to those critics of Thatcherism who claim that the departure from
'consensus' politics was a mistake, and that 'selective reflation' is
needed to improve the economic situation. This opposition spans a
very wide range of political positions, from the so-called Tory 'wets'
to the Liberals and the newly formed Social Democratic Party (SDP), to
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sections of the Labour Party and the trade union movement. It also
includes major articulate sections of the high-level salariat in the
public sector. There are of course important disagreements and
conflicts within this broadly defined political category, but the
distinctive feature which gives the category some validity is that the
social democratic opposition does not accept Thatcher's claim that the
political accommodation of the post war years was a disastrous
failure, nor that the 'mixed economy' is an incoherent and inherently
crisis-ridden system which must be transformed either in the direction
of free market dominance (Thatcher) or towards a more fully socialised
and planned system (the Labour left).
My discussion of the political capacities of the various strands of
social democratic opposition will focus on two questions : what chance
do they have (a) of deflecting the present Tory government, and (b) of
forming a credible and popular opposition by the time of the next
general election?
Take first the question of deflecting the present government.
Potentially this could come about in a number of ways: Dissent within
the Tory cabinet could be pushed to the point of forcing an
acknowledged change of strategy, conceivably involving the replacement
of Thatcher as party leader. Pressure from the unions or from the
salariat within the state apparatuses could force major changes of
policy. Evidence of strong popular support for a 'social democratic'
alternative could, as the next election approaches, push the Tories
into a modification of their strategy in the attempt to ensure
electoral survival. These processes could occur in combination,
reinforcing one another and bringing about a major deflection.
Alternatively the Thatcher faction could successfully resist them to
the last. On balance, continuing effective resistance to major
deflection during the lifetime of this government seems more likely.
It is true that the Thatcher government has already been deflected , in
a sense, from its original programme, as has been mentioned earlier.
Tax cuts have not been forthcoming; neither aggregate public
expenditure nor monetary growth have been controlled; the 'wets' have
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toned down the original Thatcher line on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, on labour
law, and on immigration control; the threat of concerted miners'
action turned the government round over accelerated pit closures. But
none of this has produced any acknowledged change in the basic
Thatcherist objectives; there has been no definite U turn and no
reacceptance of social democratic attitudes. If public expenditure
and monetary controls have failed this has not been for want of
trying, and if other policies have been toned down this represents a
partial accommodation to realpolitik rather than a basic change of
line. Thatcher and her close associates have managed to overrule the
cabinet dissenters on what they take to be the crucial issues of
fiscal and monetary policy, to pursue deflation even as the recession
deepened in 1980, and again in 1981. They have effectively ignored
the slide in the Tories' rating in the opinion polls, trade union
arguments against monetarism and demonstrations against unemployment,
and the continuing flood of critical declarations emanating from the
high-level public sector salariat in the National Enterprise Board and
the National Economic Development Council, in the nationalised
industries and the Manpower Services Commission, from former
top-ranking civil servants, university vice-chancellors, academic
economists, education inspectors and even churchmen. The Thatcherites
are so firmly wedded to the idea that Heath's U turn, his decision to
'cut and run', was a political disaster that they will never willingly
concede that their own programme is fundamentally misguided. I would
argue, therefore, that a decisive break with Thatcherism on the part
of the Tory part could occur only if Thatcher herself is displaced
from the leadership. But for the 'wets' to push their opposition to
the point of contesting the leadership of the part during a term of
government, a truly desperate situation would be required. The ties
of loyalty are strong, there is no obvious candidate for leadership of
the 'social democratic' tendency within the party and it is not united
around any definite alternative programme. If an anti-Thatcher coup
cannot be completely ruled out, it seems more likely that the
Thatcherites will keep the Tory opposition constrained and divided.
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If the foregoing argument is correct, then the prospects are poor for
a social democratic alternative to Thatcherism within the lifetime of
the present government. The question then is whether any of the social
democratic political forces will be able to present a popular
alternative by the time of the next general election, and beyond.
This question turns on the developments within the Labour Party on the
one hand and the SDP/Liberal prospective alliance on the other,
against the background of the broader development of the economic
situation and alignment of opinion among the classes of society. That
is, the formation of a broadly social democratic government would
require either (a) that the Labour Party takes a social democratic
course and wins the next election, or (b) that an SDP/Liberal alliance
wins the election, or (c) a hung parliament, i.e. a situation in which
an SDP/Liberal alliance gains a sufficiently large parliamentary
representation to block a leftward-leaning Labour Party and constrain
the government within a 'consensus' mould. (The fourth possibility,
that the Labour party adopts a radical left programme and wins a
sufficient parliamentary majority to implement this programme, and
that the left gains sufficient leverage to ensure that the
parliamentary party does attempt to implement it, would take us beyond
'social democracy'. This possibility is analysed separately below).
There are therefore three points to be considered here: whether the
Labour Party will present a social democratic face at the next
election; whether the putative SDP/Liberal alliance has any real
political future; and how political affiliations will evolve among the
various social collectivities which make up the electorate.
Consider first the question of the Labour Party. It is clear that the
party has undergone considerable changes since the election deafeat of
1979 but it is much less clear where these changes are leading. As
Hall (1981) puts it, the political character of the party is presently
'highly indeterminate' . Let us first take note of the main changes
which have occurred to date. The Labour Party comprises several
political formations, operating at different levels and facing
different constraints: the parliamentary party; the national party
apparatus headed by the National Executive Committee (NEC); the
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affiliated trade unions; and the constituency members and activists.
What we have seen since 1979 is a complex pattern of conflict both
within and between these different formations, a pattern which is not
reducible to a simple conflict between 'socialism' and 'social
democracy', or between definite 'class' forces. The outcome of this
conflict will nonetheless have an important bearing on the face which
Labour presents at the next election. The 1979 conference showed up
very clearly the bitterness on the left, among MPs, constituency
parties and the unions, concerning the autocratic leadership of
Callaghan and Healey, which, it was argued, was responsible for the
election defeat. But it was not until 1980 that the lines of division
became clarified. During that year it became increasingly evident
that there were two forces within the party with clear - and clearly
incompatible - political objectives. On the one hand there were the
acknowledged social democrats, led by the so-called 'Gang of Three'
(Shirley Williams, William Rogers, David Owen). This group made it
plain that they stood for a 'mixed economy' with a strong private
sector, for continuing EEC and NATO membership, for incomes policy,
and for the autonomy of the parliamentary party to pursue these aims.
They clearly wished to weaken the 'corporatist' ties between the
parliamentary party and the unions, and emphasised MPs' responsibility
to the electorate at large. Their support came mainly from within the
parliamentary party, but also from some right wing unions such as the
electricians. On the other hand there was the radical left, headed by
Tony Benn and his associates and organised by the Labour Co-ordinating
Committee and the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy. In policy
terms this tendency stood for the 'Alternative Economic Strategy'
including large scale nationalisation, for withdrawal from the EEC and
NATO, against incomes policy, and for the close accountability of the
parliamentary party and its leadership to the Party Conference and
constituency parties. This tendency had some support in the
parliamentary party but was based primarily on the left in the unions
and the constituencies. But apart from these two opposed forces with
their definite programmes and uncompromising stands, there were also
large sections of the party unwilling to commit themselves either way
: left MPs dubious about the workability of 'Bennite' policies and
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constitutional arrangements; 'social democratic' MPs appreciative of
the value of the party/union link and unwilling to provoke a split in
the party; trade unions taking the view that there should be a clear
'division of labour' between the parliamentary party and the union
movement, yet not necessarily 'right wing' on other issues (e.g. The
National Union of Railwaymen).
The 'political indeterminacy' of which Hall writes, must be seen
against this background. The radical left has made sufficient gains
(in terms of policy on the EEC and disarmament at the 1980 conference,
and in terms of constitutional change at the special conference of
January 1981) to make the position of the open and consistent social
democratic right untenable. The latter group has felt compelled to
break with Labour and found the new Social Democratic party. But
despite this, the 'centre' of the party has not accepted defeat, over
policy or the constitution, and the left is now divided over the means
which should be employed to consolidate its gains. In this regard the
outcome of the leadership election following Callaghan's resignation,
before the electoral college mechanism was set up, is important. The
MPs gave Michael Foot the leadership, and Foot is in the position of
having a left-wing reputation and left-wing friends, but also of
upholding the right to, and necessity of, 'relative autonomy' of the
parliamentary party. He is also strongly committed to the 'unity' of
the party and for that reason is happy to have Denis Healey as his
deputy, to balance the leadership from the MPs' point of view. Foot
has therefore strongly resisted Benn's campaign to contest Healey's
position under the new electoral rules and more broadly to make MPs
into the 'parliamentary delegates' of the extra-parliamentary party.
This leaves many on the Labour left (primarily but not exclusively in
the parliamentary party) in an awkward position : on the one hand they
do not want to see the party return to the Mandarin style and centrist
line of Wilson and Callaghan, but on the other hand they may either
feel loyalty to, and trust in, Foot, or be personally suspicious of
Benn's ambitions, or reckon that the 'mandating' of MPs by the Party
conference is not the way to achieve a coherent and practicable
socialist programme or to win the next election. One cannot hope to
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predict the precise direction in which the Labour party will develop
from the present position of unstable compromise. Much will depend on
block votes of unions (whether Benn will succeed in dislodging Healey
from the deputy leadership, whether the party constitution is altered
again, whether certain strands of conference policy are reversed in
future) and also on the reaction of the parliamentary party and leader
to the outcome of conference voting. But it seems unlikely that
Labour can now return to the political practice of the Wilson and
Callaghan years. Whoever are the incumbents of the leading party
positions, and whatever are the precise arrangements of accountability
governing the parliamentary party, the Labour Party at the next
election will not get away with a minimal social democratic programme.
Even if it is not de .jure compelled to 'implement conference policy',
the parliamentary leadership must appreciate that to ignore the policy
demands of the left would be to invite an internal revolt on an
unprecedented scale.^
If it is true that the Labour party has been so marked by the failure
of the Callaghan government that it cannot return to a minimal
programme of mild reflation and 'responsible government', and must at
least take on board elements of the left's Alternative Economic
Strategy, then the possibility of a 'return to the centre' at the next
election rests mainly upon the prospects of the putative SDP/Liberal
alliance (I shall return to the prospects of a left-leaning Labour
party under the heading of the 'radical left opposition' below).
There are two problems to be considered here : first, the likelihood
of the SDP and Liberals achieving a workable alliance, and second the
likelihood of such an alliance winning large scale continuing popular
support. On the first point it is clear that the leadership of the two
parties appreciate the importance of alliance if they are to achieve
25 The outside possibility of a 'declaration of independence' on the
part of the parliamentary party would, however, make political
prediction even more difficult.
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an electoral break-through: divided, they would both probably be
condemned to marginality. But there are still problems in
constructing an alliance : is this to be merely a short-term electoral
pact or a long-term coalescence? The current indeterminacy of the SDP
in term of policy, constitution and leadership makes this difficult to
answer. And will the rank-and-file of each party accept alliance?
There are indications that many Liberals are uneasy about throwing in
their lot with a new and untried party which is attempting to unsurp
the Liberals' claim to the 'centre ground'. There are also Liberals
who are more interested in maintaining the purity of their ideological
stance than in attaining governmental power. But let us assume for
the moment that the minimal condition of alliance - an agreement not
to stand competing candidates in the same constituencies - is
attainable. Then the second question arises : how likely is it that
such a political force can win popular support on a scale sufficient,
if not to form the next government then at least to produce a 'third
bloc' within parliament which could hold the balance between the major
parties? This is not just a matter of passive prediction of the
details of British party politics. What I am really asking here is
whether the failure of Thatcherism, which I have suggested is more
than likely, can be turned to advantage by those social forces
pressing for a 'return to the centre', a move which would clearly
undercut the left's attempts to gain acceptance for a
counter-radicalism premissed upon the idea that there can be no such
'return', that the rise of Thatcherism marked the terminal crisis of
social democratic centrist politics in Britain. The importance of the
putative SDP/Liberal alliance and its electoral prospects must be seen
in this context, since I have suggested that with the Labour Party in
its current state and the anti-Thatcher Tories paralysed the fate of
the 'centre' arguably rests with this new and untried political force.
It is therefore important for those who wish to advance socialist
objectives in the 1980s to have some assessment of the potential bases
of support for such a 'centrist' force.
As regards the opinion surveys to date, these have produced
contradictory findings: some polls have shown a high level of support
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for the putative 'centre' alliance (up to 46 per cent of the vote),
but the level of support has been highly variable and the hypothetical
nature of the questions asked of respondents suggests that these
findings should be regarded with some scepticism. The policy of the
SDP/ Liberal alliance remains very sketchy, and polls have discovered
a marked discrepancy between the views of 'supporters' of the SDP and
the party's leadership especially over the issue of EEC membership.
Many people willing to give their hypothetical vote to the centre
party remain ignorant of such policy positions as have been avowed by
the SDP leaders, and they may express their hopes of the Social
Democrats in widely differing terms - from the disaffected Tory
businessmen hoping for a boost to business and the resurrection of
"the old values of decency and liberalism", to disaffected Labour
workers who expect the SDP to be "more for the working class than
labour is" (interviews in the 'Times' 18/2/81). It remains to be seen
how the firming up of the SDP/Liberal platform and its dissemination
through electoral compaigning will attract or repel different groups
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of voters, and whether the cross-class bloc which the alliance seeks
to construct can find any stable basis.
In the present state of indeterminacy, widely differing assessments
have been offered, not all of them, of course, disinterested. On the
one side mainstream Labour politicians have tended to discount the SDP
as largely a creation of the media, destined to fade as it loses its
novelty value, although as the months have passed they have come to
admit that an alliance could pose a threat at the next election,
possibly even permitting the Tories to return for a second term of
office by splitting the opposition vote. The chance of a centre
alliance government, however, is discounted outright. On the other
side the SDP leaders and sympathetic political commentators have
heralded the emergence of a centre alliance as the first step in a
fundamental realignment of British politics, the most important
26 At the time of writing, it seems that the first indication of
this will be given in the forthcoming by-election at Warrington
where Roy Jenkins will contest the seat, which traditionally has
had a large Labour majority, for the SDP.
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development in party politics since the emergence of the Labour Party
around the turn of the century. Political analysts such as Crewe
(1981) have linked the question of a centre alliance to the changing
class structure of British society, arguing that the blurring of the
working class/middle class division provides the social conditions for
the emergence of a 'non-class' political party appealing to moderate
minded citizens of whatever social background. On this view the
emergence of a strong SDP/Liberal force in parliament would bring the
party-political realm into correspondence with the already
identifiable changes in the social realm.
Hall (1981) has offered an interesting discussion of this question
from a Marxist, or more particularly a Gramscian, standpoint. He
rejects the notion of the rise of the SDP/Liberals as the necessary
accompaniment to a supposed 'drift to the centre' at the level of
public opinion, but at the same time does not write off the centre
party as a nine days' wonder. In effect Hall advances two theses,
between which there is a certain tension. On the one hand he brings
into play Gramsci's concept of 'crisis of representation', a situation
in which "social classes become detached from their traditional
parties" and the organisational forms and leaderships "who constitute,
represent and lead them are no longer recognised... as their
expression" (Hall, 1981, p.12). One main reason for such a crisis may
be that "the ruling class has failed in some major political
undertaking for which it has requested or forcibly extracted the
consent of the broad masses" (ibid.). Hall suggests that this may
have happened in the British case : both Labour and the Tories have
'requested the consent of the masses' in their attempts to revitalise
the British economy and it now looks as if both are discredited. As a
result both working class support for Labour and middle class support
for the Tories have become increasingly problematic, possibly creating
a space which the SDP/Liberal parties could exploit. Hall claims that
"neither of the main electoral machines now offer themselves as a
credible occupant of power at another turn of the electoral wheel"
(ibid.), and that the centrist policies of selective reflation plus
incomes policy could look credible. Further a centre party "could
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secure powerful support 'from above', amongst all those forces
currently detaching themselves from the Thatcher path to the brink"
(ibid.). This then is Hall's first thesis : the centre party could
appear as the beneficiary of a 'crisis of representation' affecting
the existing major parties and their traditional support blocs.
Hall's second thesis, however, tends to undermine the first. This is
the argument that we have had the 'centre' in power for years despite
the ideological jousting between Labour and the Tories and it was
precisely the failure of the centre which licensed the rise of
Thatcherism: "the progressive abandonment of 'the centre' has taken
place for the best of all possible reasons : it failed" (ibid., p.13).
As I have noted earlier, this is a common view of Thatcherism on the
left - Thatcherism as the beneficiary of the failure of the social
democratic 'centre' in both Labour and Tory variants - and on this
view it is hard to imagine how an avowedly social democratic grouping
could make any political gains out of the failure of Thatcherism.
From the arguments mentioned above, three main themes emerge
concerning the potential support base for a centre party alliance :
first, Crewe's argument that the social conditions for a radical
realignment of party support are favourable; second, Hall's thesis of
a political 'crisis of representation' affecting the major parties;
and third, Hall's thesis - shared by many on the left - that the
political 'centre' is basically discredited already. The first and
third of these themes give rise to definite, and opposite, views as to
the potential long term success of a centre alliance. I would argue,
however, that they are both problematic, and that the future of a
centre alliance will be determined by the particular mode of
development of the 'crisis of representation' of which Hall writes,
over the next few years - a development in which the intervention of
socialist political forces will be of great importance. Let me
justify this claim. First, consider Crewe's theme. Crewe basically
reads off the potentialsuccess of a political party or alliance of the
'centre' from the social changes which have been in progress at least
over the 1960s and '70s, changes which have blurred the traditional
British 'class structure' and loosened the ties between definite
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social collectivities and the two major parties. I have considered
these changes in the previous chapter, and there is no doubt they are
real enough : supporters of the major parties are, in general, less
committed now than in the 1960s, and Labour's traditional distinctive
proposals of nationalisation and increased social expenditure have
been subject to diminishing support even among Labour identifiers, as
has been the party's traditional link with the trade unions. But all
the same this evidence is not sufficient to support the claim that a
fundamental realignment of party politics is at hand. After all, a
third political force, in the form of the Liberal Party, has been
playing for the centre ground over the whole period without a great
deal of success. In February 1974 the Liberals gained rather more
than half as many votes as Labour and the Tories, but that result was
obtained under rather special circumstances (remember the election was
held during a state of emergency) which arguably produced a
conjunctural 'flight to the centre' among voters who did not wish to
take sides in the battle between a confrontationist Tory government
and the trade unions. Since February '74 the proportion of the
electorate voting Liberal has declined, and in May 1979 the Liberals
received around a third as many votes as the major parties. Now it
may be argued that' the formation of the SDP, with the defection from
Labour of a number of prominent and experienced politicians, will give
the 'centre' a credibility it previously lacked and therefore bring
out a massively increased vote, but this remains to be proved. It may
happen, but my point here is that one cannot read off the likelihood
of such an event by reference to the changing social composition of
the electorate : the Tories were quite effective in rallying electoral
support in 1979 after the debacle of 1974 and it is quite possible -
although by no means certain - that Labour may do the same at the next
election.
Then consider Hall's theme of the 'failure of the centre', which gives
rise to the opposite long term assessment from Crewe's argument. The
problem here is that the view of Labour and Tory politics prior to the
Thatcher period as mere variants of social democratic centrism is not
very widespread outside of Marxist circles. If one compares the
416
practices of previous Labour and Tory governments against a
hypothetical true socialist government then Labour and the Tories can
appear essentially similar, but if one does not have such a
hypothetical comparison in mind then they can look 'extreme' and
'divisive'. Even if both parties have been pushed into a broadly
similar politics of corporatist accommodation and crisis avoidance
over their terms of office they have been sufficiently different in
their political approaches, particularly in the earlier years of
government, to dismantle and undermine each others' policy
achievements: think of the nationalisation, de-nationalisation and
re-nationalisation of steel; the emphasis and de-emphasis of
comprehensive education; the scrapping of the Industrial
Reorganisation Corporation; the repeal of the Industrial Relations
Act; the scrapping of the Price Commission, and so on. Also the
conditions of electoral competition between two major parties with
roughly evenly-balanced support blocs may be argued to have
contributed to the practice of 'electioneering' fiscal policy, and
therefore to have aggravated 'stop-go'. There is therefore a space in
which the centre party alliance can propose its arguments along the
following lines: better government could be attained by an avowedly
centre or social democratic alliance unencumbered by right or left
wing dogma, and not beholden to the sectional interests of business or
the trade unions; and further, such an alliance, once in power, could
reorganise the British electoral system along the lines of
proportional representation, thus destroying the conditions which have
sustained the damaging oscillation between 'extremes'. There is
evidence from opinion polls that these arguments are not without
popular appeal, although whether they are likely to figure as the
major consideration in determining many people's voting pattern is
uncertain. Of course, winning votes and being able to govern
effectively are two different things. If a centre alliance can
convince enough people of all classes of the virtues of 'moderation'
in politics, of 'continuity' in government and of proportional
representation to undercut the position of both Labour and the Tories
at a general election, it does not follow that such an alliance would
be able to deliver in office the revitalisation of economy and society
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promised in opposition, any more than the electoral success of the
Tories in 1979 guarantees the eventual success of the Thatcherist
programme. In attempting to assess the prospects of an hypothetical
centre alliance government what is important is not so much whether
Hall's 'failure of the centre' thesis is broadly accepted within
popular ideology, but whether it is correct. That is, would a centre
alliance government committed to moderate reflation rapidly find
itself running up against the same old problems of inflation and the
balance of payments constraint, without the capacity to transform the
underlying social relations which sustain these problems? Certainly
there is little evidence so far of hard-headed proposals on the part
of the Social Democrats/Liberals for the planning of incomes, the
restructuring of industry and trade or the transformation of social
relations at the point of production. On the other hand, it would be
dangerous to assume that a centre alliance victory at the next
election would be of little consequence on the grounds that centrist
politics would be bound to be rapidly discredited in practice,
re-opening the way for the left. A new party in government, with a
message of conciliation and entrusted with the obviously difficult
task of picking up the pieces after Thatcherism, might not lose
support so quickly, and one point worth considering is that the trade
union movement would find it much more politically difficult to take
up a stance of outright opposition than in the case of Thatcherism.
To return to the positions of Crewe and Hall, my argument is that
neither Crewe's thesis nor Hall's 'failure of the centre' thesis
provide an adequate basis for assessing, either way, the political
capacity of an SDP/Liberal alliance. In my view Hall's first thesis
is the most useful; this capacity will depend crucially on the
playing-out of the 'representation crisis' affecting the major
parties, on whether the Tories and Labour can succeed in winning back
their supporters and 'crowding out' the new centre or whether, as Hall
has it, 'neither of the main electoral machines offer themselves as a
credible incumbent of power'. In relation to this question - which
obviously cannot be answered definitively at present - it might be
argued that neither of the 'main electoral machines' are really trying
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wholeheartedly to achieve maximum electoral popularity at present.
The Tory leaders are concerned to drive through a particular
socio-economic programme with scant regard to the polls, and the
Labour Party is more concerned with internal issues of policy and the
party constitution than with its popularity rating. But as the next
election approaches it seems a safe bet that both parties will concern
themselves more with the electoral question. If the current recession
has by then given way to some sort of economic upswing, however
feeble, we can be sure that the Tories will campaign vigorously for a
mandate to 'build on the achievements' of their first term, and
tax-cuts on the strength of North Sea oil revenues are also a likely
gambit. As for Labour, it is likely that great efforts will be made
to present the party as the only force capable of reducing
unemployment which, if current polls are a reliable guide, will be a
major electoral issue. And it is surely to be expected that the
prospect of continuing Tory government will help to mute the internal
struggles within the Labour Party, whatever the state of play in those
struggles at the time. It could be that neither of these ploys by the
major parties will succeed, that the record of the Thatcher government
on the one hand and the internal struggles and inconsistencies of
Labour on the other will create a space in which an SDP/Liberal
alliance can pull out a third party vote on an unprecedented scale,
but the possibility of a successful 'crowding out' operation on the
part of the major parties should not be discounted. On the best
evidence, one's analysis must at present remain open. And as regards
political objectives, the left will have to make all attempts to
resolve the 'representation crisis' as it affects the Labour Party,
i.e. to draw together a social bloc which recognises in the Labour
Party its adequate representative as against the temptations of the
'centre' .
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The radical left opposition
I have considered above two kinds of opposition to the practice of the
Thatcher government, those of the 'ultra-right' and of 'social
democrats'. I have argued that there is little chance of the
ultra-right getting its way over the next few years, and also little
chance of the 'social democratic' Tories getting theirs, but have
returned an open verdict on the prospects of the social democratic
opposition at the time of the next election and beyond. The social
democratic forces face severe difficulties in establishing their
credibility, but they cannot be written off on the grounds that social
democracy is already a proven failure. I now turn to the radical left
oppostion. Here I propose to concentrate on the left in and around
the Labour Party, on the grounds that no other political force stands
a real chance of substantially influencing the course of political
development in Britain. I shall organise this account around a series
of questions as follows: (1) who is the 'left' in and around the
Labour Party? (2) what does the left propose? (3) how far has it
been successful in getting these proposals accepted by the Labour
Party, and what are its chances of making further gains? (4) assuming
a strong left influence in the Labour Party, what are the party's
chances of winning the next election and of sustaining popular
support? Finally I shall pose the question of how far the
developments on the left of the Labour Party provide favourable
conditions for the advance of what I have earlier referred to as 'the
socialist project' - whether they open up a real prospect of achieving
the strategic economic objectives outlined in Chapter 4.
(1)
First, the question of who the 'left' is. The Labour left is not a
homogeneous force, but one can identify certain centres of left
activity. There is the 'traditional' parliamentary left of the
Tribune Group of MPs, but the left which has emerged to a position of
prominence over the last few years draws its main support from outside
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the parliamentary party : I refer here to the cluster of
organisations at present grouped together under the banner of
'democratisation' of the party and supportive of Tony Benn's campaign
for the deputy leadership of the party - the campaign for Labour Party
Democracy (CLPD), the Labour Co-ordinating Committee (LCC) and the
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Rank and File Mobilising Committee (RFMC) . These organisations, and
their foremost spokesman Tony Benn, have a support bloc which is
concentrated in the constituency parties and certain of the trade
unions, and primarily among the activists in both of these areas. The
social composition of the left activist groups is quite varied. It
has been shown (Denver and Bochel, 1980) that the General Management
Committee (GMCs) of the constituency parties show a strong
'over-representation' of males, and of professional and managerial
employees, relative to their share of the Labour vote (the latter
group provided 33 per cent of GMC delegates as against 5 per cent of
Labour voters). But the constituency parties are not uniform in this
respect and there are doubtless many Benn-supporting manual workers
active in the constituencies. Further, the tally of trade union
conferences which have been swung to support Benn for the deputy
leadership shows that the policies and political practice which he
proposes are not supported by intellectual 'middle class' socialists
28
alone . The 'Bennite' left (I use this term as a convenient label
for the tendency of which Benn is the foremost spokesman, without
implying that 'personality' is a dominant consideration for that
tendency) is clearly aware of where, within the party as a whole, its
strength lies, and has devoted most of its persuasive energy to
compaigning in the constituencies and the unions rather than
attempting to win over MPs.
27 There is also the infamous 'Militant Tendency' and a scatter of
smaller avowedly Marxist groups, but the role of such groups has
almost undoubtedly been overestimated by the media.
28 To date (June 1981) Benn has secured the support of the train
drivers (ASLEF), the bakers union, the furniture workers, and the




What does this left propose? Its proposals may be grouped under the
two heads of policy and party constitution. In terms of policy the
Bennite left stands for the 'Alternative Economic Strategy', which is
not a fully-elaborated programme but at least involves planned large
scale reflation, import controls, further nationalisation, workers'
'self-government' in industry and expansion of the public services.
It also stands for withdrawal from the EEC, for unilateral nuclear
disarmament and withdrawal from NATO, and for the unconditional
defence of trade union rights. It is hostile to talk of incomes
policy under a future Labour government, but inclined to favour price
controls. It wishes to see the House of Lords abolished. Finally,
although Benn has not campaigned on these issues at the union
conferences, it favours withdrawal of British troops from Northern
Ireland and tends to be hostile towards civil nuclear power. The
Bennite left, in order words, has the makings of a quite comprehensive
political programme. In terms of the party constitution, this left
has the objective of ensuring that any gains it can make in the party
outside parliament, at the annual conference and in the National
Executive Committee, will be translated into definite manifesto
commitments and will then be implemented by the parliamentary party,
insofar as the PLP is necessary for their implementation. Hence the
threefold aims of reselection of MPs by constituency activists,
election of the leader and deputy leader by a broad electoral college,
and abolition of the leader's 'right of veto' over the contents of the
party manifesto, or even a two year 'rolling manifesto' the
implementation of which should be supervised by the party conference.
These constitutional issues are accorded a crucial importance, since
the analysis of the previous performance of Labour governments offered
by the Benn tendency is one which stresses the pusillanimity and even
treachery of the PLP in failing to implement perfectly good conference
policies. In an image which Benn has favoured in several interviews,
the party in the country has acted in the past as a mere 'rocket
launcher' sending the PLP into government but without any means of
controlling its subsequent trajectory. Or as Frank Allaun has put it,
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writing in 'Labour Activist', the organ of the LCC:
"We have a fine programme which has not been carried out.
Our job now is to find a way of so democratising the Labour
movement that the parliamentary leaders will implement it"
(Allaun, 1979).
If one has a 'fine programme' already, then the emphasis of one's
activity must be on ensuring its implementation, rather than on
further elaborating the programme.
Aside from questions of policy for a future government and
constitutional matters, it should also be stressed that the Bennite
left has a conception of politics which places considerable emphasis
on extra-parliamentary mobilisation, particularly in the 'labour
movement'. Winning a left government is seen as an essential
component of political progress, but the need for strong popular
pressure both to back up and to push forward such a government is
clearly recognised.
(3)
Then there is the question of how far the left has been successful in
pressing its case within the Labour Party, and of the prospects for
further gains. Here one cannot be so definite. Take the question of
party policy as decided by conference. Certainly motions have been
passed supporting certain elements of the left policy : withdrawal
from the EEC, nuclear disarmament, opposition to incomes policy,
abolition of the Lords. But on closer inspection it appears that
policy as decided by conference is not always consistent, and motions
qualifying or undermining the left positions have also been passed.
The 1980 conference passed one motion from a constituency party
rejecting incomes policy, as a major factor in the past electoral
defeats of the Labour party, but shortly afterwards it also passed a
motion from the Union of Communication Workers which rejected the idea
of "an incomes and prices free-for-all inherent in the nature of free
collective bargaining and free price fixing" (quoted in the 'Times'
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5/6/81). Similarly, while conference called upon a Labour government
to pursue nuclear disarmament and rejected British participation in
any defence policy based on the "use or threatened use of nuclear
weapons" it also rejected a motion calling for withdrawal from NATO.
Considering the broader 'Labour movement', as the left is wont to do,
one finds other inconsistencies of policy. For instance the Labour
Party conference called for outright withdrawal from the EEC, while
the TUC favoured a further referendum on the subject. And certain
other policies favoured by the Bennite left, such as withdrawal of
British troops from Northern Ireland, have been firmly defeated at
conferences to date. The general point here is that it is something
of a bluff on the part of Benn and his supporters to present
themselves as the sole force consistently pressing for the
implementation of conference policy. Each tendency within the party
stresses those elements of conference policy which fit best with its
own conception of politics, and the Bennite left is no exception.
Then there is the constitutional question. On this score, as noted
earlier, the left has been successful so far in altering the mechanism
of election of the party leaders. An electoral college has been
established giving 40 per cent representation to the unions, 30 per
cent to the constituencies and 30 per cent to the parliamentary party.
The left has also won the principle of periodic reselection of MPs by
their constituency parties, but has not managed to change the method
of arriving at a final draft of the manifesto. The constitutional
changes achieved to date will have real political effects. Whether or
not he is successful in his current challenge to Healey, Benn has
already demonstrated that the electoral college mechanism permits,
even necessitates, a new form of campaigning for leadership positions.
Candidates must actively lobby not only their parliamentary colleagues
but also the trade union conferences, putting themselves and their
policies publicly on the line and at the same time politicizing union
conferences to a hitherto unprecedented extent. There can be little
doubt that Benn's campaign has got across the rudiments of the
'Alternative Economic Strategy' to a much larger public, at least
among union activists, than was ever the case in 1973/74. Also the
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reselection system is going to cost a number of right-wing MPs their
seats, and install supporters of the left as candidates if not as MPs.
This latter effect should not, however, be exaggerated. The study by
Denver and Bochel (1980) suggests that most GMC delegates have a
preference for parliamentary candidates towards the 'centre' of
Labour's political spectrum, even if personally they see themselves as
'right' or 'left' of centre.
Projecting forward, can one assess the extent to which the left may be
successful in getting its policy positions further ratified by
conference, and at the same time exploiting the constitutional changes
so as to ensure that the parliamentary party is firmly committed to
implement left policy? In the short term the dominant issue here is
Benn's challenge to Denis Healey, which is widely seen as an attempt
to consolidate the position of the left within the party and press
home the advantage gained out of the Wembley conference. Benn's
supporters hope that he will win the election, dislodge the rightist
Healey and then be within striking distance of the leadership when
Michael Foot retires. Capture of the leadership as well as the 'base'
of union and constituency activists would then place the left in a
good position to make further policy and constitutional gain and to
determine the course of a future government. But of course Benn's
campaign has met with considerable resistance. On the one hand there
is the right wing in the PLP and the trade unions - those who
thoroughly oppose Benn's platform in all its essentials and regard it
as a sure vote-loser. It is only to be expected that the Neville
Sandelsons and Frank Chappies would bitterly oppose Benn (although
some of the right-wing MPs are no longer in a position to oppose him
directly, having already left the Labour party to join the SDP). But
if the only opposition were from the implacable rightists then matters
would be much simpler than they are. As I noted earlier, the Benn
campaign is also regarded with misgivings or worse by many on the
'left' of the party, in a broader sense. Foot still commands the
sympathy of many left wing MPs, as well as Labour supporters in the
unions and the constituencies, and we have seen him attack Benn in no
uncertain terms for questioning the integrity of the party leadership,
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for attempting to make MPs into mandated 'marionettes', for posing
falsely as the champion of conference policy, for dividing the party
and for posing an intolerable challenge to his own leadership. And
aside from personal loyalty to Foot on the part of old friends, Foot's
arguments carry some weight. In particular, he is surely correct to
insist that conference decisions do not provide an adequate means of
deciding the actions to be taken by the PLP in office. Even if Foot
over-emphasises the role of parliament it is true that the party in
government, faced with the definite constraint of maintaining a
parliamentary majority, receiving advice and information from informed
sources which may take time to filter through to the party at large,
acting under definite pressures from, for instance, trade unions and
other governments, must have a certain 'relative autonomy' from the
29
party conference . It is not realistic to imagine that the PLP can
be a simple mechanism for 'implementing' pre-given conference policy -
even if that policy were self-consistent - and irresponsible to
encourage that expectation. For these reasons and for others, such as
the apparent intolerance of Benn and his active supporters, there are
many on the left who do not see Benn's campaign, whatever the result,
as strengthening the ability of the Labour Party to achieve socialist
change in Britain. Even if they see the degree of commitment to
socialism of the PLP as problematic and in need of reinforcement they
do not see the Benn strategy as the best way of achieving this, and
even believe that it may result in an extremely damaging rupture
between the PLP and the Labour Party outside parliament if Benn wins
the deputy leadership of the party against the wishes of a large
majority of MPs.
There is therefore a confrontation of views on the left of the party,
broadly defined, between Benn's unequivocal supporters who see him as
the champion of 'conference policy' and 'accountability' and Healey
merely as the rightist who administered IMF monetarism and stringent
incomes policy, and those others on the left who believe the issues
are more complex and that it is important not to foist upon the PLP a
leader (or deputy leader even) who does not command its confidence.
29 This point is argued fully by Hindess (1980).
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This division makes it particularly hard to assess the chances of 'the
left' advancing its position further, since the personal advancement
of Benn, which many see as virtually synonymous with the advance of
the left, would make difficult the positions of many others on the
left. If Benn wins, then a splitting of the Labour Party is at least
a possibility. But if he loses the election, to either Healey or John
Silkin, he will at least have demonstrated considerable support for
his general policy position in the constituencies and the unions, and
the leadership will have to take note of that. From the standpoint of
the non-Benn left in the party one might therefore argue that his
campaign may bring certain benefits in terms of popularising left
policies but it would be best if he loses the election'.
(4)
The fourth question posed above concerned the degree of popular
support for the positions staked out by the Labour left. If we leave
aside the possibility of a phyrric victory for Benn followed by a
split between most of the PLP and the Labour Party outside parliament,
the consequences of which are incalculable, and assume that in some
way or other the Labour Party holds together while left policy
commitments gain some ground, and the process of reselection changes
the composition of the PLP at the margin then the question arises :
how popular are those left policies? What are the chances of the
party winning widespread credibility at the time of the next election
and beyond?
Take first the issues of party policy as such, rather than the
constitution. A National Opinion Polls survey of August 1980 produced
an interesting picture of the state of play among Labour supporters.
Some of the left's favoured policies had widespread support : 79 per
cent favoured import controls; 74 per cent favoured withdrawal from
the EEC; 51 per cent were opposed to the siting of cruise missiles in
Britain. But on the other hand 66 per cent of Labour supporters
favoured incomes policy and only 36 per cent supported more
nationalisation (opposed by 53 per cent). Interestingly, Healey has
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included the issues of import controls and "restoring the sovereignty
of Britain from control by the Common Market" in his personal
manifesto for the deputy leadership election (the Times 16/6/81).
Where 'left' policies have clear majority support among Labour voters,
it is hard for others to resist them'. But equally, the lack of
support for nationalisation and for the rejection of incomes policy is
important. Nationalisation remains fairly unattractive except to the
'party faithful', and if it is to be a major plank of a left-leaning
Labour party platform then it must be redefined and clearly
distinguished from the disappointing performance of the past in order
to achieve much popular resonance. The popularity of incomes policy
shows that if one moves beyond the circle of union activists then
'free collective bargaining' is regarded with circumspection. This
raises the question of the credibility of Labour as a party that can
contain inflation, a question to which I shall return below in
assessing the potential of the Labour left for advancing the socialist
project.
Moving to the constitutional issues, the reaction to these on the part
of Labour voters was investigated in a poll published in the 'Times'
(9/2/81) shortly after the Wembley conference. Only 57 per cent of
voters were aware that the conference had taken place, despite the
fact that all the papers were full of outraged commentary. Anyway,
among those who were aware of the Wembley decisions and were also
Labour voters there was generally only minority support for the idea
that the constitutional changes meant increased democracy (29 per
cent), or enhanced Labour's electoral chances (20 per cent).
Regarding the issue of an electoral college with a trade union
majority, for selecting the leadership, 78 per cent disapproved and
only 15 per cent approved. This finding tallies with the longstanding
opinion poll result that trade union 'domination' of the party is
highly unpopular among Labour voters. Of course the role of the media
on this issue was far from neutral, but one must credit people with
some ability to come to their own conclusions. Further, the principle
of majority union representation in the electoral college was actually
opposed by the majority at the Wembley conference, and it was only
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because the engineering union was tied to the rejection of any
proposal which did not give the PLP a majority that the final result
was obtained. On the other hand, the principle of reselecting MPs was
found by the 'Times' poll to have substantial majority support among
the supporters of all parties. Reselection is after all a
'commonsense' proposition if parliamentary candidates are in the main
seen as party candidates rather than as individuals campaigning on
their own merits, as is generally true in Britain. Since reselection
was generally presented by the media as equally sinister as the role
of the union vote in selecting the party leader, this finding
reinforces the idea that the people whose opinions were assessed in
these surveys were not merely parrotting the line put across in the
papers and on TV.
Summing up, the whole programme of the Bennite left is presently
backed by only a minority of Labour voters (a fortiori, by a smaller
minority of the electorate as a whole). But the party constitutional
issues, on which popular support for the Benn tendency is weakest -
apart from the issue of reselection - are probably of less importance
than the policy issues when it comes to voting in a general election.
It is likely that voters will concern themselves with the quality of
the party leadership as they see it, and with the credibility of the
overall policy stance of the party more than the method of selecting
the leadership or of generating party policy. And the discussion
above suggests that if Labour in effect give prominence to those
elements of 'left' policy which command the greatest popular support
then the party may be in a position to make gains from the 'failure of
Thatcherism' and widespread rejection of unemployment at the time of
the next election.
Labour might win the next election, but will it be able to sustain
popular support, and will its programme make a substantial
contribution to the advance of socialism in Britain? This is the
final question which I wish to consider here.
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(5)
In the previous sections I have tried to bring out some of the
positive aspects of the Labour left's campaign, in relation to the
socialist project : the emphasis on the need to do more than elect a
'left government'; the carrying of left policy, and the Alternative
Economic Strategy in particular, into the trade union movement. At the
same time, however, I have emphasised certain problems in the strategy
of the Bennite left. These problems may be grouped under three
headings, although the distinction here is analytical and in practice
the three sets of problems are closely related : the construction of a
workable political 'vehicle' for socialist change; the development of
a hegemonic appeal to counter the possible attractions of resurgent
Toryism or of social democracy for certain social collectivities; and
the development of practical policies which stand a good chance of
producing their intended effects, rather than alienating support.
On the question of the political vehicle, I have already indicated the
difficulties in the strategy of the Benn tendency. This strategy,
with its emphasis on the potential treachery of the parliamentary
party and the need for mechanisms to ensure that the PLP follows the
conference line, risks breaking the links between the PLP and the rest
of the party. I also suggested that it underestimates the necessary
autonomy of even the most committed socialist PLP from the extra-
parliamentary movement, if one takes seriously the need for an
effective parliamentary contingent in achieving socialist advance.
The PLP cannot merely 'express the will' of the 'labour movement'
since the notion of a homogeneous 'will' of the movement is a myth and
the PLP has to operate within definite political conditions which may
not be immediately apparent to the rest of the party. The notion of
political forces 'representing' pre-given class interests, which I
have consistently argued is inadequate, may have malign effects on the
workability of the Labour Party as a socialist political force.
On the issue of hegemonic appeal, again I have adumbrated some of the
difficulties faced by the Labour left. There is a need to build
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support beyond the trade union movement, and a fortiori beyond that
subset of trade unionists who are also committed left activists (and
who are often misleadingly identified as the 'labour movement'). This
means taking seriously the point that 'socialism' does not have a
built-in majority in British society, or even among the 'working
class', and painstakingly constructing a support bloc among those
people who do not have any prior faith in nationalisation as such, who
do not necessarily regard public expenditure as an intrinsic good but
who are open to persuasion by concrete arguments, who are worried by
the possible inflationary effects of the left's programme to counter
unemployment, and who are not impressed by the level of 'democracy'
30
within the trade unions. Non-union workers, women both within and
outside of the workforce, members of the salariat who have been
putting forward reasoned and considered arguments against
Thatcherism - if socialism is to be advanced then these groups should
not be allowed to slip away to the SDP and the Liberals in the belief
that a 'dogmatic' or 'union-dominated' Labour Party has nothing to
offer them. This is not a matter of simple opportunism, of selecting
policies on the basis of the opinion polls, but of honestly facing the
problems which a left programme entails and encouraging informed and
open debate over policy, as well as taking advantage of the positions
of strength which Labour has - in the metropolitan local authorities
for instance - to promote popular participation and accountability and
break the connection between 'socialism' and bureaucratic statism.
The development and popularisation of practical socialist policies
clearly has a crucial importance in relation to both of the previous
points i.e. the construction of a workable political vehicle and the
development of a hegemonic appeal. If the left is seen to be
advancing credible policies which provide a workable alternative to
30 It is noteworthy in this context that democracy in the unions can
cut both ways. Milligan (1980) points out the importance of
secret postal ballots for officials in producing a right wing
leadership in the AUEW after 1975, and also cites a poll showing
that in late 1980, 61 per cent of the AUEW membership were
satisfied with their leadership, the highest rating among the
unions studied in the poll.
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both Thatcherism and a 'return to the centre' then this will help both
to sway Labour MPs and maintain the cohesion of the Labour Party, and
to broaden the party's electoral appeal and continuing support bloc.
But here again the strategy of the Benn tendency has serious
weaknesses both as regards the substance of policy proposed, and the
means of generating party policy. Take the Alternative Economic
Strategy (AES): there is no doubt that more critical thought has gone
into the elaboration of this strategy over the last few years than at
any earlier stage (I have made particular mention of the CSE London
Group's contribution in conjunction with the the LCC, in Chapter 4).
But all the same there is a damaging tendency on the Bennite left to
minimise the costs and problems associated with the AES and even to
present it as a panacea. To substantiate this claim I shall briefly
consider two problem areas: inflation and international trade.
The question of inflation has been touched upon previously, but merits
more consideration. The particular problem here is that the principal
'macroeconomic' measures connected with the AES, i.e. large scale
reflation and import controls, would undoubtedly tend to raise the
rate of inflation. Certain policy measures could be proposed which
would tend to reduce prices - such as lower interest rates and a
reduction of indirect taxes, national insurance contributions, and
public sector charges - but the overall impact of import controls,
whether by means of a tariff or quotas, and increased monetary demand
would be to raise prices. Blake (1981) has simulated the effects of a
£6,000 million reflationary impulse plus a 30 per cent tariff on
manufactured imports, as of the present, using the Treasury model of
31
the UK economy . While unemployment ends up half a million lower by
1984 than on unchanged Tory policies, and GDP 3 per cent higher,
inflation rises to around 20 per cent over a year and the retail
prices index stands 17 per cent higher by 1984 than on present policy.
Further, because of the import controls the real take-home pay of
31 Blake's assumptions are quite generous to this strategy. In
particular he assumes that retaliation, in the form of import
controls imposed by other countries on British goods, would be
minor.
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those in work falls 3h per cent over a year, and ends up 3h per cent
lower by 1984 than on present policy. The Treasury model is not, of
course, infallible in its predictions but it does represent a
sophisticated means of economic projection, given the continuing
validity of relationships between economic variables constructed on
the basic of past data. Either the left must accept the validity of
such projections, at least in outline, in which case it is clearly
dangerous to pretend that the central policies of an AES can
simultaneously reduce unemployment, keep prices steady and improve
living standards, or else the projections may be contested. But in
the latter case it is incumbent upon the left to show why the
projections are invalid, and precisely what kind of social and
economic changes are envisaged which would render the equations
derived from past data irrelevant in judging the future success of the
AES. The easiest answer here is to say that price controls would be
enforced, so that accelerating inflation would be impossible, but
although price controls could have some role this answer is not very
convincing. If import prices rose and workers demanded commensurate
wage rises then strict price controls would tend to bankrupt firms and
lead to increased unemployment. Then if one argues that bankrupt
firms would simply be nationalised and run on the basis of state
subsidies, one has to explain where the finance will come from
(taxation, borrowing or creation of new means of payment) and how it
can be ensured that the extra monetary demand will be channelled into
higher output and employment rather than just driving up money wages.
Besides, the strategy of bankrupting firms in order to nationalise
them is unlikely to prove popular. To produce a more plausible answer
to the question of inflation under the AES one would have to raise the
issues of (a) incomes policy in some form and (b) policy to improve
labour productivity. Increased productivity would help to offset the
inflationary impact of higher import prices and permit higher levels
of real income than would otherwise be available, while the planning
of personal incomes would help to ensure that the reflation of
domestic demand was not dissipated in inflation of wages and salaries.
I cannot offer a full discussion of these issues here, but I point
them out as an area in which informed debate is greatly needed on the
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left. Unfortunately there is no sign that the Benn tendency is ready
to encourage such a debate, partly because it would necessarily raise
problems concerning the connection between wage-militancy and
socialist advance.
Similar considerations apply in the case of policy towards
international trade. I made the point (section 6.1 above) that the
easing of the balance of payments constraint on the growth of output
and employment basically depends upon becoming more successful in
international competition and/or withdrawing from that competition.
The strategy of import controls put the emphasis on the latter course,
but while this is a defensible position it must be recognised that the
improvement of the competitive position of UK industry is in fact an
essential complement of import restrictions. The protection afforded
by controls must be exploited to build up a more sustainable long term
trading position, otherwise the maintenance of a reasonable balance of
trade will necessitate escalating import controls, with malign effects
on inflation and popular living standards. Then there is the related
question of EEC membership. We have seen that withdrawal from the EEC
is currently a popular demand, but is it really necessary in order to
pursue radical industrial and trading policies? And what precisely
would the UK pattern of trade look like if we withdraw from the
trading bloc with which almost half of our trade is currently
conducted? Perhaps the answer to the first question is 'yes', and
perhaps it is possible to construct a feasible alternative trading
pattern, but again I believe that these issues have not been the
object of full and informed debate. The Bennite left is too ready to
write off the EEC as a 'capitalist club', to invoke the atavistic
demand for the 'restoration of national sovereignty', and to minimise
the difficulties of developing an alternative pattern of trade.
The general point which emerges from this brief discussion of
inflation and trading policy is the need honestly to face the
unresolved problems associated with left policy. But this would mean
breaking with the influential left view that 'the movement' already
has a 'fine programme' and the only problem is ensuring its
implementation. Hindess (1980) has argued forcefully that this latter
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view gives rise to a peculiarly limited conception of the kind of
'debate* needed in the Labour Party. Debate is required to overcome
residual rightist views in the movement but the fundamental
conclusions of that debate are known in advance - they are given by
the 'fine programme' of conference policy already in existence, which
expresses the fundamental interests and objectives of the labour
movement. Little attention need be devoted to "working out the
details of how policy is to be put into effect and what consequential
changes might be needed in the organisation of government, unions, and
other bodies, to the obstacles that would have to overcome and the
sources of effective resistance, and so on" (Hindess, 1980, p50) .
Sidney Weighell of the Railwaymens' Union has argued further that the
existing arrangements at the Labour Party conference are not conducive
to the kind of detailed debate which is required:
"Policy is all too often decided on the basis of composite
resolutions which are hastily scrambled together, often
self-contradictory and disposed of in ludicrously
abbreviated debates. Ministers or Shadow spokesmen have
little or no opportunity to contribute to conference's
cursory debates We believe that the present arrangements
for policy debate hamper rather than encourage the detailed
and considered evaluation of policy options" (Weighell,
1980).
So long as this situation continues and the left does not mount an
effective challenge to the existing means of generating policy -
indeed considers those means as working in favour of left policy - the
chances of building active support for socialism outside of the ranks
of the faithful will remain limited.
Reprise
In this chapter I have set out to consider three main questions, those
of the 'origins' of Thatcherism, of the economic feasibility of the
Thatcher programme, and of the political effects of Thatcherism in
practice, including the main forms of opposition which are developing
and competing to define the 'alternative' which Thatcher insists is
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non-existent. The underlying interest in these discussions was to
advance the analysis of the conditions under which movement in a
socialist direction might be possible in Britain. I have argued that
the rise of Thatcherism must be seen against the background of a
series of 'failures' afflicting the previous mode of social
development and the previous politics of both Tory and Labour
governments. Some of these failures were narrowly conjunctural, such
as the miscalculation of Callaghan concerning the timing of the last
election and the severity of pay restraint acceptable to union members
in the winter of 1978, but Thatcherism was only able to capitalise on
these conjunctural factors because of the seemingly plausibility of
its response to a deeper-seated impasse confronting the kind of social
democratic politics practised over the post war years, which had by
the late 1970s proved powerless to reverse the relative decline of the
British economy and to develop a stable mode of extraction of surplus
labour to replace the old market discipline of unemployment. With
regard to the feasibility of the Thatcher programme, however, I have
argued that the 'economic core' of that programme flies in the face of
the form of capitalist property which is dominant in Britain, and that
the theoretical ideology of Thatcherism, with its heavy dependence on
petty bourgeois and financier concerns, badly misrecognises the
effects of that form of property at the level of the financial
circulation process. This explains the deeply paradoxical effects of
Thatcherist economic policy in practice, effects which have already
led to the break-up of the opportunistically-constructed electoral
bloc which brought the Tories to power in 1979. I argued further that
the aggravation of recession and increases in taxation which have
resulted from the application of 'monetarism' by the Thatcher
government cannot be conceived as the 'short term costs' of a strategy
which nonetheless holds out a real prospect of regenerating British
capitalism. It is no paradox to say that Thatcherism, while
inflicting defeats on the working class and talking an openly
pro-capitalist language, is at the same time weakening the prospects
for profitable real accumulation in Britain. The key to the apparent
paradox (a paradox from the viewpoint of an over-simple Marxism) is
the recognition that the accomplishment of the changes in industrial
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structure and the distribution of social labour required to break out
of relative economic decline depend on a positive and constructive
intervention by the state, and will not be achieved by the 'unfettered
market'.
On. the question of the political opposition to Thatcherism and the
definition of alternatives I have claimed that a resurgence of social
democracy cannot be ruled out, since it is over-simplistic to regard
the rise of Thatcherism as marking the terminal crisis of social
democracy in Britain, much as certain sections of the left would wish
to believe this. Any post-Thatcher social democratic 'centre'
government would certainly face serious problems. Indeed the old
problems of social democracy would be more acute than in the past,
given the run-down of British industry which has been proceeding under
Thatcherism. But the experience of Thatcherism is proving so much
more intolerable to many sections of the population than social
democracy ever was, that such a government might be able to command
considerable support. There is no guarantee that Britain will not
slide back to the old 'moderation', made more acceptable by a change
of cast : the crusading 'moderation' of David Steel, Shirley Williams
et al in place of the tired conservatism of Callaghan. The prospects
of a radical left alternative emerging within the Labour Party have
also been considered and I have maintained that such an alternative
has no historic guarantee of success, although Labour may be well
placed at the time of the next election if the party develops a
greater degree of cohesion around the theme of reducing unemployment,
which is bound to be at a post war record level as the election
approaches. I have stressed however, that winning an election on a
manifesto containing left policy commitments would be only the
beginning and that Labour left policies remain problematic. There
would be a real danger of losing popular support and creating further
disillusionment, unless the left questions its own assumptions in good
time and takes on board the need for a serious critical evaluation of
its programme, in terms of the practicability of left policies, the
conditions required for their implementation, and the politics of
support among social groups which are not already 'safe' for the left.
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Certain aspects of my discussion in this chapter may date rather
quickly, given the fluidity of current British politics and the
difficulty of predicting developments in the SDP/Liberal alliance and
the Labour Party. I should like to emphasize, therefore, the aspects
which I believe will be of continuing importance. These relate back
to the conclusions derived in Chapter 4, concerning the constraints
and opportunities posed for the socialist project by the current forms
of capitalist property relations in Britain, and also to the
conclusions of Chapter 5 concerning the conditions of formation of
support blocs for political forces. That is, in Chapter 4 I outlined
certain strategic socialist aims regarding the transformation of
capitalist property relations, but left open the question of the
political means of achieving those aims. Then in Chapter 5 I examined
some of the conditions governing the division of the economic category
of wage and salary earning employees into distinct collectivities, and
the alignment of those collectivities with definite political forces.
An examination of the record of post war politics in Britain led me to
emphasise the difficulties in constructing a support bloc for the
radical transformation of property relations, and to reject the notion
of an inherent 'working class' majority for such a transformation
which was thwarted by betrayal on the part of Labour leaders. The
Labour leadership since the 1950s has indeed shown a paucity of
socialist imagination and determination, but more important than this
was the fact that for a long period the majority of the British people
simply did not experience a pressing and urgent need for a radical
shift in the direction of social development. By the end of the
1970s, however, as I have emphasised in the present chapter, more
people of all classes were willing to subscribe to a new radicalism -
unfortunately a radicalism of the right. The left, which was
attempting to offer an alternative radical solution to the impasse of
social democracy, was imprisoned within a Labour Party led from the
centre-right (or else marginal to British politics); it was also,
however, imprisoned within a circle of left policy commitments which
were not credible or convincing to a sufficiently large social bloc,
and had failed to dissociate itself sufficiently clearly from the very
'statist' mode of development which was seen by many people as part of
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the problem. If the left is to capitalise on the failure of
Thatcherism it will not be sufficient to overthrow the centre-right
leadership of the Labour party. It will also have to overthrow the
presumption that the Party conference represents a hotline to the
given interests of the working class, which only have to be presented
with sufficient force to be recognised as such. Only then will the
progressive transformation of economic class relations be on the
historical agenda.
In this sense I would argue that the theoretical positions arrived at
in Chapters 1 and 2 above, through a critical examination of the
problems which arise in the accounts of social class given by both
Marx and modern Marxist writers, are of more than academic importance.
The conception of economic classes being endowed with inherent
political interests which are then merely 'expressed' by political
forces is not only conceptually problematic, but also a political
practice based upon that conception jeopardises the chances of
achieving the advance of the socialist project - in Britain in the
1980s as much as anywhere else - by short-circuiting the need to




The main conclusions which I am able to draw from the foregoing
investigations have already been indicated (see chapter 4, section 2,
and the conclusions to chapters 5 and 6). However, in these
concluding remarks I shall draw together some of the main points made
earlier and put them into perspective. I should like to draw
attention to the three broad 'movements' of this thesis, and bring out
the relationships between these. Briefly, these three movements are:
(1) a critical reading of Marx and modern Marxists on social classes
and the class/politics relationship; (2) an investigation of economic
class relations defined at the level of forms of property; and (3) an
investigation of the realm of social collectivities and political
forces. I shall highlight the main arguments of these movements in
turn.
First movement (chapters 1 and 2): In my reading of Marx and modern
Marxists I was concerned to bring out certain problems which seem to
me to be endemic to Marxist class analysis as it has been commonly
understood. First I considered Marx's definition of the capitalist
class and working class at the level of economic property relations :
the capitalist class was defined as the class of owners of the means
of production and employers of wage-labour, extracting a social
surplus product in a specifically 'monetarised' or commodity-form,
while the working class was the class of agents separated from the
means of production and therefore obliged to sell their labour power
for a wage or salary. At this level, there was no particular
conceptual problem or ambiguity. But I them examined the problems
which arise when Marx attempts to specify the relationship between
these 'basic classes' and the political forces active in particular
capitalist social formations. In the 'Communist Manifesto' Marx put
forward a clear and definite proposition : there would be a tendential
convergence between the two basic economically-defined classes of the
capitalist mode of production on the one hand, and the political
forces active in capitalist societies on the other. In other words,
political forces would become progressively polarised around the
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contradiction between wage-labour and capital, with the proletariat
becoming organised into a social collectivity by the pressures of
capitalist development, and subsequently organising itself into a
political party in order to pursue its historic mission of the
overthrow of capitalism. The problem was that this proposition was
not sustained by the arguments of the 'Manifesto'; the necessity of
this convergence was simply not demonstrated. Then in the 'Eighteenth
Brumaire' we saw that Marx affirmed the principle that political
forces 'represent' or 'express' class interests already given at an
economic level, but this principle was effectively abandoned, or at
least seriously compromised, in Marx's specific analyses. He could
not, perforce, ignore the specific effects of politics : the
dislocations between 'representatives' and 'represented'; the
ambiguity of the 'representation' relation whereby a given political
force might draw its ideology from one social stratum, work it up in
certain ways and use it to organise the support of others; the role of
political forces which were admittedly not tied to any definite
economic class interest. We also saw that Marx admitted the real
effects of interests other than those of bourgeoisie and proletariat.
In other words, it appeared that when Marx was analysing in detail a
particular historical period he was led to undermine the conception of
the class/politics relationship proposed in the 'Manifesto'. And
while Marx himself might have argued that the validity of the
propositions of the 'Manifesto' would be proved in the long run, this
no longer seems tenable. Well over a century has passed since the
Eighteenth Brumaire and historical circumstances are still as
'complex' as ever; nowhere have political forces become reduced to the
'pure' representatives of labour and capital. It might be said that
this would not really have surprised Marx, and certainly would not
have surprised Lenin, yet if that is true I believe it only goes to
show that their political judgement was not in practice constricted by
the general theory which Marx affirmed - that they were able, as we
all are, to live with inconsistencies. It does not, in other words,
contradict the proposition that the general theory announced in the
'Manifesto' has serious problems. My conclusion from this discussion
of Marx was that class analysis, if it is to be adequate as a guide
for socialist politics, must respect the specificity of politics.
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Analysis of economic class relations is important, but it cannot
provide a basis for 'reading off' the political forces active in the
social formation.
The second chapter was concerned with modern Marxist writing on social
classes. I examined the arguments of Poulantzas, Olin Wright,
Carchedi and others, who were all concerned in one way or another to
draw lines of class demarcation within the ranks of wage and salary
earning employees. I argued that none provided a satisfactory
solution to this 'demarcation problem', and suggested that this was
because the object of the 'demarcation' was not specified clearly
enough. The kind of demarcation which one carries out must depend on
the aims of one's analysis, and the demarcation will be valuable only
to the extent that these aims are adequately thought out. For
instance, if one is attempting to give an account of the dominant
system of economic property relations in order to develop a strategy
for its transformation, then one's conceptual 'demarcation' should be
squarely based on the criterion of possession/separation from the
means of production. If, on the other hand, one is attempting to
assess which social collectivities can be won to support a certain
socialist political force, then one's 'demarcation' must take into
account specific social and political factors other than property
relations. Knowledge of an agent's position with respect to property
relations will not enable one to 'derive' that agent's political
affiliations.
In effect, Poulantzas was searching for a conceptual line of division
which would both (a) respect the supposedly 'determinant' role of
economic relations in defining classes and (b) at the same time grasp
the 'political and ideological' aspects of class. In my view this
project was bound to fail, since one concept cannot fulfil both
functions simultaneously. As I argued in relation to Marx's own work,
there must be two movements in 'class analysis' : one which identifies
economic class relations and one which traces the specific connections
between classes, social collectivities and politics. To approach the
problem from a different angle : Poulantzas, Olin Wright and Carchedi
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all draw attention to the point that capitalist enterprises have in
general (and not by chance) developed a division of labour
characterised by hierarchy, bureaucracy and authoritarianism, a
structure in which access to information, 'knowledge' and
decision-making is distributed highly unequally. Clearly it is an
important task of socialism to reconstruct this division. But the
writers I have considered make this hierarchical structure into a
principle of class division, claiming that the employees occupying the
higher, or even intermediate, reaches of this structure cannot really
be 'workers'; they are either 'new petty bourgeois' (Poulantzas) , 'new
middle class' (Carchedi), or in 'contradictory locations' (Olin
Wright). The problem is that the 'class' demarcation operated here is
not at par with the definition of classes in 'classical' Marxism,
since it is not based on property relations (all wage and salary-
earning employees including those in the 'higher' positions are
separated from the means of production), yet neither is it of direct
relevance to the analysis of political forces, since there can be no
presumption that all 'true' proletarians will support socialism (think
of Tory-voting, anti-union manual workers), nor that all those in 'new
petty bourgeois' class places or occupying 'contradictory locations'
will be opposed to socialism (think of Mike Cooley and his colleagues
in the design staff at Lucas Aerospace).
The debate over the class determination of the middle strata conducted
by Poulantzas and his critics - the search for a synthetic totalising
definition of social classes -has a peculiar interminable quality.
There can be no one position within that debate which is finally and
authoritatively 'Marxist', since Marx's various writings on the
subject are highly 'open' and there is always room for argument over
the nature, applicability and relative importance of the various
criteria which have been brought to bear (productive/unproductive
labour, mental/manual labour, function of labour/ function of
capital) . And at the same time the lack of specification of the
precise objectives of the theoretical demarcation of classes means
that no contributor can show definitively that his or her contribution
meets those objectives better than others'.
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My reading of modern Marxists on social classes therefore reinforced
the critical conclusions arrived at earlier, and gave me my programme
for the remaining two 'movements' of the thesis : first to analyse the
structure of economic property relations, then to consider the pattern
of social collectivities and the line-up of political forces
attempting to organise those collectivities in certain ways in support
of their political projects.
Second Movement (chapters 3 and 4) : These chapters were concerned
with the dominant form of economic property relations in contemporary
capitalism, and British capitalism in particular. In chapter 3 I
examined the rise of the 'impersonal capital' and argued that this
form of possession of the means of production has become dominant in
Britain over the post war years, although this dominance is not even
across all branches of production and sectors of the economy. The
evidence I considered suggested that the major form of impersonal
capital was the multi-divisional joint-stock company, employing
salaried managerial staff to direct its operations. Such enterprises
were not, however, 'autonomous' centres of economic decision-making
since they were obliged to enter into relations with financial
enterprises which gave the latter some leverage over them. I examined
two main forms of relationship between financial and other enterprises
: shareholding by financial institutions and the provision of loan
finance. In the British case these relations were relatively
distinct, with the long term savings institutions such as life
assurance companies and pension funds appearing as the major
shareholders but the banks appearing as the main providers of external
finance. Neither of these forms of relationship, however, amounted to
the kind of 'dominance' of financial over industrial capital specified
in Hilferding's conception (taken up by Lenin) of 'finance-capital'.
The contractual savings institutions rarely carry out active
intervention in the affairs of the enterprises whose shares they hold,
and the British banking policy of relatively short term lending has
not encouraged close relations between the banks and industry
(although I suggested that the effects of the current recession might
modify somewhat the latter situation). Nonetheless, to say that
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financial enterprises in Britain do not 'dominate' industrial
enterprises is not to say that the financial system is without
important effects upon industry. The cautious but speculative mode of
calculation of the financial enterprises which deploy the financial
surplus of the personal sector has arguably tended to produce a degree
of industrial concentration higher than in other national economies,
and in excess of the level required to take full advantage of
economies of scale, while at the same time 'retarding' the development
of new 'growth industries', relative to the situation in other
advanced capitalist economies.
The other side of the coin from the development of the impersonal
capital was the expansion of the category of wage and salary-earning
employees, i.e. the 'working class' in the economic sense. These
latter, whatever their position within the division of labour in
capitalist enterprises (or state apparatuses), were unable personally
to carry out real accumulation, in the way that the owner-manager of
early capitalism might, on account of their separation from the means
of production. This point, which is effectively obscured by the
theories of Poulantzian inspiration which exclude managers,
professional workers and others from the working class, I regard as
one of the most important aspects of my own investigations. I pointed
out that the high level of personal saving in Britain was an index of
the payment of 'surplus income' over and above employees' regular
consumption requirements (particularly in the case of the better-paid
salaried employees), which nonetheless could not be channelled
directly into real investment. Instead the funds poured into the
financial institutions and eventually tended either to inflate house
prices (the building society financial circuit) or to pass through the
hands of the contractual savings institutions into the purchase of
shares, property or government debt - a debt increasingly bound up
with the financing of recession and unemployment rather than real
investment.
This analysis of the dominant form of capitalist property and its
effects led me to offer an account of the possible ways in which it
might be transformed in a socialist direction, i.e. towards the goal
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of a democratically-controlled social appropriation. In this account
I envisaged a 'pincer movement' requiring both governmental action
'from above' and popular struggle 'from below'. The former was
necessary to gain state control over investment funds and to ensure
that the 'people's savings' (the surplus income referred to above)
were channelled into productive and employment-creating investment,
and could also play an 'enabling' role in relation to the latter, by
providing appropriate legal forms and incentives to help workers gain
control over the operation of the impersonal enterprises which employ
them. In effect, by challenging the prerogatives of the financial
institutions the state could gain an important measure of leverage
over the composition of the social product and in particular over the
disposition of the social surplus product. And there is a great
opportunity here : an opportunity to make a broad popular appeal by
arguing that the only way to ensure a reasonable standard of living in
the future for today's savers is to channel the savers' financial
surplus into productive investment now, and that the private
capitalist deployment of the surplus militates against such investment
on a sufficient scale. Nonetheless, there was an urgent need to
develop socialist thinking on the criteria for resource allocation
which would be employed in such an exercise, and to drop the damaging
formula of 'nationalisation as panacea' : the 'people' remain to be
convinced that the state could manage their surplus income to better
social effect than private financial capitalist enterprises. I also
pointed out that the two 'pincers' referred to were not at par and
could not be expected to develop with perfect synchronisation, and
that the relationship between them was more problematic than many on
the left would like to admit. There are virtually bound to be
conflicts between the interests of workers generated 'from below' at
enterprise or industry level, and the 'general interest' constructed
at the level of national politics and national planning. Yet these
are conflicts which socialism will have to live with since both
aspects (central planning and 'grassroots' enterprise democracy) are
indispensable if the socialist project is to be advanced. Central
planning alone would not of itself alleviate the hierarchy and
oppression built into the division of labour in most enterprises,
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while enterprise democracy alone would lead to the maintenance of
competitive market relations between 'worker-controlled' enterprises.
The analysis of economic property relations, therefore, made it
possible to identify certain problems and opportunities for socialism,
problems and opportunities which have not been drawn out in the same
way, to my knowledge, in previous Marxist discussions of the class
relations of contemporary capitalism. Such an analysis however, had
to be complemented by an examination of the political forces which
might actually take advantage of those opportunities, and of the
social collectivities which might support or oppose the socialist
project. My intention in the remaining chapters was to make a start
on this examination.
Third Movement (chapters 5 and 6) : In chapter 5 I explored some of
the various divisions which can form the basis for the formation of
social collectivities. In view of the emphasis placed upon the
division of labour in both the Marxist and the sociological
traditions, I began by examining this division, and came to the
conclusion that the term 'division of labour' refers to a complex
interlocking set of divisions (by branch, sector, enterprise and
stratum) which cannot yield any unique determination of social
collectivities. Rather, collectivities with common interests and
political orientations can be formed in a variety of ways within or
against the 'division of labour grid', depending upon further social
and political factors.
There was therefore a need to be more specific in giving an account of
collectivities, and I undertook an outline account of the post war
development of politics in Britain, showing the various ways in which
certain principles of collectivity could be made politically
pertinent, and collectivities drawn into support blocs for definite
political forces. This meant considering the 'middle class'/'working
class' distinction within popular ideology in Britain. This is
another point which has received little comment in previous Marxist
discussions of class : there has been a tendency to discount
'subjective' class identification on the grounds that Marxist theory
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deals not merely with what people think of themselves, but with their
'objective' class place. Now while it is quite reasonable to say that
the self-estimation of people (or for that matter parties,
governments, etc.) should not be taken at face value, and that one
cannot take notions from popular ideology and treat them as if they
were rigorous concepts, it is nonetheless important to analyse the
phenomenon of 'class' division as it exists within popular ideology in
particular social formations. Just because the lines of 'class'
division of the latter kind do not at all coincide with the lines of
economic class division within Marxist theory is no reason to ignore
them, for they have an undoubted political pertinence. So I examined
the 'working class'/Labour and 'middle class'/Tory links within
British politics, and also the weakening of this polarisation as the
'working class'/'middle class' partition itself became more
problematic. This latter process could be in part explained by the
dissociation of the 'elements' which were previously combined in the
popular image of 'class' in Britain - character of occupation, family
background, level of income, form of housing tenure, style of
consumption and so on - with the changing divisions of social labour,
large scale social mobility and the spread of owner-occupation.
Nonetheless, two views of this partial breakdown of the 'working
class'/'middle class' dichotomy have to be resisted: the result is
neither an 'embourgeoisement' in which the traditional working class
is ultimately dissolved into an affluent 'middle class' society, nor a
'proletarianisation' in which the whole working population is
progressively homogenised and turned into an overwhelming support bloc
for socialism. The traditional 'manual' industrial working class has
been shrinking, and losing leverage within the Labour Party, but it
has not disappeared and upward social mobility for some has not
dissolved its (uneven) collectivist propensities. On the other hand
the expansion of the salariat, and in particular the public sector
salariat, and the spread of union organisation within the salarian
ranks, has rendered problematic the old 'middle class' ideological
complex. But although the salariat is a part of the working class,
defined at the level of property relations (i.e. sellers of labour
power separated from the means of production), it is far from becoming
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socially and politically homogeneous with the 'working class' of
British popular ideology (which is itself not homogeneous either) .
Consider for instance the contrast between a salaried public sector
employee who supports Labour as the part more committed to expanding
opportunities within the public sector, and the manual worker in
private industry who supports Labour out of a 'class' reflex but who
is suspicious of 'bureaucracy and waste' and wants to see taxation
cut.
My discussion of post war politics also showed up the problematic
relationship between the corporate bodies in which many workers are
organised, and the political. For Marx in the 'Communist Manifesto'
the corporate organisation of the working class was just a step on the
way to its formation as a socialist political party. We have seen,
however, in 1974 and again in 1978-79, that while the corporate
struggles of certain unions achieved 'success' in the sense of
breaking government pay policies, in neither case could this success
be translated into political gains for socialism - indeed although in
1974 a Labour government was narrowly elected, largely by supporters
uncommitted to left policies, in 1979 popular reaction against the
activities of the unions provided part of the grounds for a swing to
Toryism. On these occasions the trade unions were strong enough to
resist government policies but were not in a position to translate
that defensive strength into a positive programme capable of playing a
hegemonic role. And I argued that this was not just a matter of
isolated incidents, but was an index of a more general and serious
incapacity. Of course Marx, and more particularly Lenin, long ago
made the point that trade union organisation and action were
'inadequate' from a socialist point of view, and that the working
class needed a specifically political arm - a Party - to give its
aspirations a consistent socialist direction. But the point I wish to
make here is in a sense 'stronger' than that : there is a severe
dislocation between the defensive industrial strength of certain
sections of the working class and its political capacities; bluntly,
the trade unions are not popular as a national political force, and
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their activities have on more than one occasion undermined popular
support for the Labour Party. Naturally, it takes two to generate
union/party conflict and the Parliamentary Labour Party has, to say
the least, often shown itself insensitive to demands emanating from
the unions, but the fact remains that, in their conflicts with the
Labour Party, the trade unions have not been capable of carrying the
mass of the working class, of laying claim to a popular 'legitimacy'.
In post war Britain at any rate, trade union politics are not merely
the 'bourgeois politics of the working class' (Lenin), but rather
exist in unstable tension with social democratic politics, without
pointing in any clear way to a radical yet potentially hegemonic
alternative.
In view of the real social and political divisions within the broad
working class, economically defined, and the dislocation between the
industrial strength and political weakness of the 'organised working
class' in industry, I argued that it was quite misleading to suppose
that socialism in Britain has an essential majority which has been
held back by the 'betrayals' of the Labour leadership or the
blandishments of the media. A hegemonic socialist force still remains
to be constructed, and if it is ever to be constructed this will
require building support beyond those social collectivities which are
already 'safe' for the left, which in turn can happen only if those on
the left take seriously the reasons for many people's resistance to
what they see as 'socialism' : suspicion of 'free collective
bargaining'; suspicion of state 'bureaucracy'; fears of arbitrary
allocation of resources in the public sector; fears of inflation and
so on.
Following up my general account of post war politics, in chapter 6 I
attempted what can really only be the beginnings of an analysis of
Thatcherism. My intention here was (1) to discover why it was that a
'Thatcherist' Tory party could win the election in 1979 and dominate
British politics, (2) to examine the chances of 'success' for the
Thatcherist programme (for the success of such a programme would
clearly put socialism off the agenda for a long time) and (3) to
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assess the forms of opposition which are developing, and in particular
the prospects for advancing the socialist project in opposition to
Thatcherism. My conclusions were (1) that Thatcherism was able to
make a broad, and opportunistic, appeal to the concerns of a wide
variety of social collectivities on the basis of the 'failure' of
previous political forces : failure to alleviate the balance of
payments constraint (with all the consequences in terms of slow
growth, unemployment and high taxation); failure to develop a workable
long term incomes policy (with its consequences for inflation and
disruption in industrial relations); failure to develop forms of state
provision open to popular participation and accountability (which gave
popular resonance to the 'anti-bureaucracy' populist streak in
Thatcherism). But (2) I argued that the economic core of Thatcherism
did not provide a feasible project - here I drew upon the arguments of
earlier chapters concerning classes and the financial circulation -
and the attempt to implement the Thatcher programme was producing
effects which appear paradoxical to its remaining supporters while
alienating many of the Tories' less committed followers. Thatcherism
does not have the means to produce an increase in real investment (its
policies have accomplished the reverse), and neither can it provide
the cheap yet efficient government promised in 1979. Then (3) I
argued that it could not, however, be assumed that the probable demise
of Thatcherism will lead Britain to socialism. Socialists will have
to contend with a revamped social democracy, and will have to convince
enough people (not only at the Labour conference) that their policies
offer a credible and superior alternative. And this cannot just be a
matter of propaganda and persuasion, but must involve re-examining,
debating and developing left policies and aims. Contrary to the
apparent belief of many on the Labour left, the 'movement' does not
already have a 'fine programme', an unproblematic set of objectives
which merely await the political will to realise them. A genuine
debate over policy is needed, without the debilitating presumption
that the conclusions of that debate are known in advance, that the
programme of the Labour left has a privileged 'expressive' link with
the given 'interests of the working class'.
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These then were the three movements of the thesis. The second and
third have a double status. First, they are intended to show that the
critical conclusions of the first movement can have a fruitful effect,
that they do not merely lead to the rejection of certain aspects of
Marxism (a negative function) but can open the way to useful kinds of
investigation. Second, they may be regarded as a contribution to the
debate over the future of socialism in Britain. As I pointed out in
the Introduction, the basic object of the theoretical and empirical
investigation of class relations from a Marxist standpoint is to help
to orient socialist politics, to 'change the world'. I hope that the
investigations in the preceding pages may aid in that task, first by
identifying some of the problems and opportunities associated with the
dominant form of modern capitalist property relations in Britain, and
second by identifying some of the problems and opportunities for a
popular political force which might accomplish a measure of socialist
advance in the particular conditions of British politics. Of course,
neither of these investigations are complete; in many contentious
areas I have only been able to suggest an approach to the problems
rather than to offer solutions. And even those questions which have
been discussed more fully are far from resolved. In this context I
should like to draw attention to two areas in which the analyses of
this thesis might usefully be extended:
1. I have laid stress on the importance of the surplus income saved
by wage and salary-earning employees, and on the strategic opportunity
to subordinate the disposition of this surplus to social control. If
this argument is to be advanced it would be useful to have a more
detailed analysis of personal savings, of which strata carry out what
proportion of saving, of the forms which saving takes and of the
particular ways in which these flows of funds might be socially
appropriated. This would help to take the left beyond the simple call
for 'nationalisation of the banks', and to develop an adequate
conception of how the financial institutions might be reorganised and
used to achieve socialist objectives.
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2. I also emphasised the importance of 'enterprise democracy' as an
element of an overall strategy to break down the capitalist separation
of the working class from the means of production. Here it would be
useful to analyse in more detail (a) the decision-making structures of
impersonal capitalist enterprises, so as to know how practicable
alternative forms might be developed, retaining any advantages of
efficiency or flexibility while breaking down hierarchy and
bureaucracy so far as possible, and (b) the kinds of aid which a
government might be able to provide for workers struggling for control
over the enterprises which employ them (eg. changes in company law,
taxation and industrial policy) . This would help the left to get
beyond the paralysing dichotomy between 'workers' control' (mechanisms
unspecified, but an essential part of socialism some time in the
future) and 'Industrial Democracy' (despised as a mere trick to
incorporate the workers in their own exploitation) .
These two points concern strategic objectives. There is also, of
course, the whole question of the currently developing alignment of
social collectivities and political forces and the approaches which
might be made to different groups to win their support for the
socialist project. If I have offered only the beginnings of an
analysis here, it is important to emphasise a point of approach which
has, I hope, been well established: the building of support for
socialism among the classes of society should not be represented and
simply one of 'class alliances', in the sense in which this project
has commonly been understood by Marxists, i.e. where one takes the
basic allegiance of the 'proletariat' to socialism for granted and
then poses the question of the terms on which it can recruit 'allies' .
Since common membership of an economically-defined class does not
carry a necessary implication of political unity, the building of a
'socialist alliance' means constructing forms of political unity
between the workers of different industries and regions, unionised and
non-union, men and women, homeowners and tenants, public sector and
private sector, as much as between the 'proletariat' and the
supposedly 'non-proletarian' strata of employees (however conceived).
Needless to say the elaboration of the objectives referred to above,
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concerning the socialisation of investment and enterprise democracy,
will be only one part, if an important one, of the political
enterprise which might achieve such forms of alliance.
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